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TransHistFarRight

Transnational History of the Far Right
A Collective Research Project led by Marlene Laruelle

At a time when global political dynamics seem to be moving in favor of illiberal regimes around the world, this research project seeks to fill in some of the blank pages in the contemporary history of the far right, with a particular focus on the transnational dimensions of far-right movements in the broader Europe/Eurasia region.

www.historyofthefarright.org/

Executive Summary

This report traces the origins of the Italian conservative think tank *Nazione Futura* and assesses what this organization tells us about the nature of Italian far-right and neofascist politics today. *Nazione Futura* plays a key role in conservative cultural production in Italy, while also serving as a critical nexus within the burgeoning network of Italian right-wing organizations centered around the Brothers of Italy (Fdi, *Fratelli d'Italia*), heir to the neofascist Italian Social Movement (MSI, *Movimento Sociale Italiano*). Beyond the national sphere, it is also an important link between the Italian and European Far Right—for example, *The European Conservative* is published “in collaboration with” *Nazione Futura*¹ and it has links to similar conservative think tanks in Hungary (Center for Fundamental Rights) and Poland (Ordo Iuris). Its relationship with *The European Conservative* further links it to the magazine’s other sponsors, including the Iliade Institute, which developed out of the French *Nouvelle Droite*. Thus, gaining a clearer understanding of this organization promises to illuminate broader trends and linkages throughout the transnational Far Right.

At the core of *Nazione Futura*’s message is the claim that it represents a youthful, citizen-centered, and future-oriented political movement—devoid of the contradictions that saddle the political establishment. Yet upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that the “future” *Nazione Futura* strives for is simply a recreation of the (neo)fascist past. Far from being modern or progressive, the organization’s understanding of “youthfulness” springs forth from the writings of Julius Evola (1898–1974) and is steeped in a 70-year-old network of far-right youth movements within the Italian neofascist milieu. Thus, *Nazione Futura*’s political project is best understood as an effort to “look back to the future,” using the ideas, strategies, and politics of yesterday to chart a path “forward.”

A key actor whose connections illustrate *Nazione Futura*’s neofascist lineage is the organization’s founder and president, Francesco Giubilei (b. 1992). Despite repeated assertions that his family has always been “antifascist,” he was partly raised by a grandfather who participated in the youth movements of the fascist era, hoarded a trove of fascist memorabilia in his attic for decades, and shared these items with Francesco when he was a child—which, in his own words, left him feeling “enchanted.”²

Giubilei also serves as president of the Tatarella Foundation, which is an archive for the MSI and National Alliance (AN, *Alleanza Nazionale*)³ and a far-right cultural center—named after longtime MSI member and leader Giuseppe Tatarella (1935–99). Of his many contributions to the growth of the

¹ The other co-publishers are the Bibliothek des Konservatismus in Berlin and CEDI/EDIC in Vienna. <https://europeanconservative.com/impressum/>.

² Lorenzetto, Stefano. 2010. “Giornalisti e medici in fila per farsi pubblicare dall’editore che ha 18 anni.” *Il Giornale*. June 6. <https://www.stefanolorenzetto.it/pagine/interviste/Giubilei.pdf>.

³ *Alleanza Nazionale* emerged from a split in MSI in 1994–95.

Italian neofascist Right, Tatarella was among the founding members of the MSI's youth organization, *Giovane Italia* (est. 1954), which adopted as its manifesto the "Youth Charter" written by Julius Evola in 1951 (who himself was put on trial for corrupting youth and reconstituting the fascist party). Thus, these linkages illustrate a clear throughline bringing together the (neo)fascist milieu of the interwar and immediate postwar periods, the writings of Julius Evola, the MSI/AN of the late twentieth century, and the contemporary Italian far-right environment.

To better understand the origins of *Nazione Futura* and its linkages to both the historical and contemporary neofascist Right, this report is divided into five chapters.

- Chapter I delves into the history of **far-right youth movements in Italy**, tracing their development from the fascist era, through the postwar MSI, to today.
- Chapter II then turns to **Francesco Giubilei's** personal backstory, recounting how his ancestors were involved in the politics of interwar Italy and how his grandfather inculcated in him far-right sympathies—most notably by sharing with him fascist memorabilia kept in the family's attic.
- Chapter III then examines **Nazione Futura**, including its history, organizational structure, and links to other far-right movements within Italy and around Europe.
- Chapter IV briefly explores the **Tatarella Foundation**—of which Giubilei is the president—by examining the Tatarella family's pivotal role in the history of the MSI and the contemporary activities of this organization, which acts as an archive for the party and cultural hub for the Italian Far Right.
- Chapter V then concludes this report by offering several summary reflections.

Together, these perspectives illustrate how *Nazione Futura* and the Tatarella Foundation, as think tanks of Brothers of Italy, exemplify the overlap between the European Conservatives and Reformists party and group in the European Parliament, *The European Conservative Journal*, and the matrix of far-right organizations affiliated with them. Furthermore, the trajectory and centrality of Francesco Giubilei within this network represents yet another incidence of far-right politics becoming "normalized" with promises not of progress, but rather a return "back to the future."

Chapter I: Youth in the History of the Italian Far Right

“...the Italian youth seek to establish a spiritual and national movement...to train the cadres of a new ruling class constituting an ‘order of believers and fighters’...”

—Julius Evola⁴

While the notion of “youthfulness” features prominently in the messaging of *Nazione Futura*, it is far from an innovation. In fact, the notions of youth and rejuvenation are common themes throughout the intellectual history of Italian fascism—from the earliest days of Mussolini’s regime in the 1920s, to the writings of Julius Evola in the 1950s, to the far-right youth groups and summer camps of the MSI in the 1960s onward. Thus, understanding the role of the “youth” in the Italian (neo)fascist milieu is vital in situating contemporary movements into their historical context. By doing so, it will become evident how *Nazione Futura* represents just the most recent manifestation of a more deeply embedded approach through which fascism recruits, trains, and indoctrinates what Evola referred to as “a new ruling class...of believers and fighters.”⁵

Youth Mobilization During the Ventennio

Youth mobilization was a critical component of how interwar fascist regimes indoctrinated younger generations and galvanized foot soldiers for the fascist project. In Italy, such movements arose soon after the end of World War I; in fact, one of the first such groups, the Fascist Youth Vanguard (AGF, *Avanguardia Giovanile Fascista*), arose in 1920, before Mussolini officially established the National Fascist Party in 1921.⁶ While the AGF principally targeted students or other adolescents and young adults, once Mussolini took power in October 1922, his regime sought to dramatically expand the scope of these operations. In 1926, all prior fascist youth organizations were unified under the authority of the Ministry of National Education, taking on the name “Opera Nazionale Balilla” (ONB).⁷ The ONB consisted of numerous branches, with separate subdivisions based on sex and age. For example, the path of a boy through the ONB consisted of three stages: *Figli della Lupa* (ages 6–8), *Balilla* (ages 8–14), and *Avanguardia* (14–18).⁸

⁴ Evola, Julius. 2017 [1951]. “For a ‘Youth Charter’.” In *A Handbook for Right-Wing Youth*, edited by John B. Morgan, 124–32. London: Arktos, 131–32.

⁵ Evola, 2017 [1951], “For a ‘Youth Charter’,” 131–32.

⁶ Stellavato, Ornella. 2008. “Gioventù fascista: l’Opera nazionale balilla,” Doctoral Thesis, Università degli Studi “Roma Tre.”

⁷ Stellavato, 2008, “Gioventù fascista”; Zapponi, Niccolò. 1982. “Il partito della gioventù: Le organizzazioni giovanile del fascismo 1926-1943.” *Storia contemporanea* 13 (4-5): 569–633.

⁸ Stellavato, 2008, “Gioventù fascista.”



Members of ONB in uniform.
Source: Wikimedia Commons.

The ONB was designed to offer indoctrination and paramilitary training to Italian youth, with the goal of creating the “fascists of tomorrow.”⁹ In the words of ONB proponent and Futurist Filippo Tommaso Marinetti (1876–1944), the organization was envisioned as a “school for physical courage and patriotism”¹⁰ and it permeated most aspects of young children’s lives—including at school. For example, the ONB held weekly “Fascist Saturday” events and organized summer camps at which the young engaged in military training. Apart from their military dress, members were armed with scaled-down Italian army rifles, known as the *Moschetto Balilla* (Balilla musket).¹¹

In 1936, the ONB merged with the paramilitary Youth Combat Fasces (FGC, *Fasci Giovanili di Combattimento*) (ages 18–21) to form the Italian Youth of the Lictor (GIL, *Gioventù Italiana del Littorio*), which served as the National Fascist Party’s official youth organization until its dissolution on July 25, 1943 (the day Mussolini was deposed). The new organization also established a preparatory program for children under the age of 6—creating a system that provided an organization for every stage of a child’s life.¹²

MSI and Postwar Far-Right Youth Groups

Almost immediately following the collapse of Mussolini’s Italian Social Republic (also known as the Salò Republic)¹³ in 1945, the remnants of the Nazi-backed regime and the Republican Fascist Party began to reconstitute themselves. On December 26, 1946, several prominent Italian fascists—including Giorgio Almirante (1914–88), Pino Romualdi (1913–88), Arturo Michelini (1909–69), and Rodolfo Graziani (1882–1955)¹⁴—established the Italian Social Movement (MSI).¹⁵ This neofascist political party served as a vehicle through which elements of the fascist regime could resume their political activity.

⁹ Stellavato, 2008, “Gioventù fascista.”

¹⁰ Marinetti, Filippo Tommaso. 2006. *Critical Writings* [trans. Doug Thompson; ed. Günter Berghaus. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

¹¹ See the discussion in Chapter II, in which Francesco Giubilei’s grandfather reminisces about his time in the ONB, including by showing his grandson his Balilla rifle and helmet, which he kept as a souvenir of the Ventennio. See also: Stellavato, 2008, “Gioventù fascista”; “Moschetto modello ‘Balilla’.” <https://www.il91.it/balilla.html>.

¹² Stellavato, 2008, “Gioventù fascista.”

¹³ Moseley, Ray. 2004. *Mussolini: The Last 600 Days of Il Duce*. Boulder, CO: Taylor Trade Publishing.

¹⁴ Graziani was the Defense Minister of the RSI. He was named Honorary President of the MSI in 1953, during the 1952–54 presidency of Prince Junio Valerio Borghese.

¹⁵ Ferraresi, Franco. 1988. “The Radical Right in Postwar Italy.” *Politics & Society* 16 (1): 71–119; Ignazi, Piero. 2003. “Italy: The Faded Beacon and the Populist Surge.” In *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*, 35–61. New York: Oxford University Press.



Italian and German fascists march through Rome on November 21, 1940. From left to right: Karl Wolff, Reinhard Heydrich, Adelchi Serena, Heinrich Himmler, Emilio de Bono, Rodolfo Graziani, and Hans Georg van Mackensen.

Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Despite their common origins, the members of MSI fiercely contested the appropriate strategy for the party to adopt in the postwar Italian political environment. A primary debate at the time was whether the MSI should accept electoral competition and parliamentarism or hold firm to the anti-democratic and extra-parliamentary orientation of historical fascism. This divergence led to the formal split between MSI and Pino Rauti's (1926–2012) *Ordine Nuovo* (New Order) in 1956, and also influenced the split between MSI Secretary Gianfranco Fini (b. 1952) and Rauti in 1994, leading to the formal dissolution of MSI and the creation of Fini's National Alliance (AN, *Alleanza Nazionale*) and Rauti's Tricolor Flame Social Movement (MSFT, *Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore*). Regardless of these divisions, the MSI quickly gained a solid footing among the Italian electorate. While it failed to retake power for itself, it was not inconsequential—it regularly elected dozens of members to parliament and typically received between 5% and 7% of the national vote.

While the MSI's adoption of an electoral strategy is sometimes viewed as a sign of "moderation," this terminology fails to adequately address the glaring continuities between interwar fascism and its postwar incarnation. While adopting an electoral strategy and formally eschewing paramilitary violence, the MSI from Almirante to Fini held firmly to its fascist origins; a change of political strategy does not signal an overall "moderation" of the party in its ideology, policies, or aspirations. A particularly stark historical analogy that illustrates this point is Hitler's change of strategy between the failed Beer Hall Putsch of November 8–9, 1923, and the Nazi Party's success in the German elections of November 6, 1933. When political violence failed, the Nazis turned to electoral politics to effect their seizure of power—but Hitler was certainly no more "moderate" following electoral success than he was a decade earlier when engaging in paramilitary violence. The same logic applies to far-right figures of the present day—such as Marine Le Pen and Donald Trump—whose varying political tactics (e.g.,

Le Pen’s “dediabolisation”) are less a sign of moderation than a fierce determination to win power even if it means utilization of democratic tools to do so.

Yet, beyond serving as a means for old-time fascists to politically “reinvent” themselves, the MSI served as an onramp into the neofascist milieu for youth with no prior political experience. It did so through the network of youth and student organizations it established, beginning in 1947 with the founding of the Student and Worker Youth Group (RGSL, *Raggruppamento Giovanile Studenti e Lavoratori*).¹⁶ This subsidiary of the MSI brought together several neofascist youth organizations that had emerged in the immediate postwar period, including the University Nuclei (*Nuclei Universitari*, joined October 31, 1947) and the Youth Front (*Fronte Giovanile*, joined November 20, 1947). Besides organizing the political activity of young students and workers, the RGSL also spearheaded the paramilitarization of the neofascist Right. Specifically, in August 1952 the group organized one of the first paramilitary youth camps of the postwar Far Right; the camp was conducted in Trentino under the guidance of two prominent neofascists—Fausto Gianfranceschi (1928–2012) and Clemente Graziani (1925–96).¹⁷

While RGSL served as the MSI’s official youth organization until 1971, it was not the only such organization operating in the neofascist political space. In May 1950, university students left RGSL to form the National Action University Front (FUAN, *Fronte Universitario d’Azione Nazionale*). It was among the organizers of the Congress of the National Youth of Europe, held in Rome on October 22–25, 1950, which was attended by numerous prominent fascists from across Europe—including Britain’s Oswald Mosley (1896–1980) and France’s Maurice Bardèche (1907–98). FUAN operated until 1996 and took an increasingly radical path in the 1960s and 1970s—including participation in numerous paramilitary actions on university campuses.¹⁸

Additionally, on November 13–14, 1954, a separate student association was established under the name *Giovane Italia* (Young Italy). At its founding conference, *Giovane Italia* adopted as its manifesto the “Youth Charter” written by Julius Evola in 1951. In the document, Evola declares, “we conceive youth not as a matter of age or a biological fact, but essentially as a spiritual attitude, as a tone and style of life...youth has a revolutionary character...”¹⁹ This Evolian understanding of youth played a crucial role in the early years of the neofascist youth movement and reverberates even today through the “youth-oriented” network surrounding *Nazione Futura*.

Over the course of the late twentieth century, the constellation of youth groups associated with MSI underwent a variety of splits, mergers, and reforms. In 1971, RGSL and *Giovane Italia* merged to form Youth Front (FdG, *Fronte della Gioventù*), which became Youth Action (AG, *Azione Giovani*) from 1996–2009 following the creation of Fini’s National Alliance, then Young Italy (*Giovane Italia*) from 2009–14 following AN’s merger with Forza Italia under People of Freedom (PdL, *Popolo della Libertà*), and finally National Youth (GN, *Gioventù Nazionale*) since 2014 following the creation of Brothers of Italy. Likewise, following its dissolution in 1996, FUAN was refounded as University Action (*Azione Universitaria*) from 1996–2009, incorporated into the PdL’s Young Italy from 2009–2014, and then reestablished as University Action in 2014.

While not officially “youth groups,” two additional organizations merit a brief mention in this discussion—*Ordine Nuovo* (New Order) and *Avanguardia Nazionale* (National Vanguard). *Ordine*

¹⁶ Ponti, Riccardo. 2013. “Quello ‘strappo’ con Almirante nel lontano ‘48.” *Segnavia* [Blog], August 25. <https://segnavi.blogspot.com/2013/08/quello-strappo-con-almirante-nel.html?spref=fb>.

¹⁷ Caprara, Mario, and Gianluca Semprini. 2008. *Neri!* Rome: Newton Compton.

¹⁸ Perhaps most notable in this regard was the so-called “FUAN-Caravella” section of the organization at the Sapienza University of Rome, which engaged in numerous violent altercations with law enforcement and left-wing student groups.

¹⁹ Evola, 2017 [1951], “For a ‘Youth Charter’.”

Nuovo was founded by Pino Rauti in 1954 to organize the “spiritualist” and Evolian current within the MSI (Rauti himself was a disciple of Evola). It was first established as a study center following the January 1954 MSI party congress in Viareggio, at which Arturo Michelini (1909–69) was elevated to leadership. *Ordine Nuovo* opposed Michelini’s acceptance of electoral competition and his openness to collaboration with mainstream parties on the Right—such as the Italian Monarchist Party and Christian Democracy. Following Michelini’s reinstatement as party leader at the Milan congress of November 1956, Rauti and his followers in *Ordine Nuovo* formally left MSI in January 1957. This began an almost two-decade period of formal estrangement, during which *Ordine Nuovo* developed into an organized and active paramilitary organization. It was a critical actor advancing the “strategy of tension”²⁰ during the violent “Years of Lead” (ca. 1968–82) and was responsible for numerous acts of terrorism, including the Piazza Fontana bombing in Milan on December 12, 1969 (killed 17, wounded 88).²¹ On the European level, *Ordine Nuovo* was among the collaborators within *Jeune Europe* (Young Europe), along with Jean Thiriart’s (1922–92) *Movement d’action civique* (MAC) and Oswald Mosley’s (1896–1980) Union Movement. *Ordine Nuovo* was dissolved by the Italian authorities in 1973, who accused it of attempting to reconstitute the fascist party. Rauti, who reconciled with and rejoined MSI in 1969, focused his efforts on gaining predominance within the party, while other former members of *Ordine Nuovo* reconstituted themselves as *Ordine Nero* (Black Order) and continued their activities.²²

Yet this brief overview of *Ordine Nuovo* glosses over the internal divisions it also experienced during its years of activity. Perhaps the most salient such schism occurred shortly after its foundation—in 1959, Stefano Delle Chiaie²³ (1936–2019) founded *Avanguardia Nazionale*²⁴ as an offshoot of *Ordine Nuovo*. Delle Chiaie had joined the organization upon its founding and, in 1958, established an internal sect—Revolutionary Armed Groups (GAR, *Gruppi Armati Rivoluzionari*)—which served as the basis for the split. *Avanguardia Nazionale* took an active role in the violent conflicts that arose in Italy during the 1960s, particularly against left-wing student organizations. Particularly notable, *Avanguardia Nazionale* is believed to have played a leading role in the attempted coup of December 7–8, 1970 (*Golpe Borghese*),²⁵ orchestrated by Prince Junio Valerio Borghese (1906–74).²⁶ Delle Chiaie himself quickly gained international notoriety for his neofascist, paramilitary activities—by the early 1970s he was active in Spain (notably, with the Portugal-based Aginter Press) and by the mid-1970s his activities had spread to Latin America (including at least Pinochet’s Chile and the generals’ Argentina and Brazil).

Prominent Figures from MSI Youth Milieu

The jostling of these various youth factions served as the training ground for a significant number of far-right leaders who shaped the effort to “mainstream” the MSI beginning in the 1990s. While a full accounting of these various figures is beyond the scope of this report, several merit particular attention due to their relevance to the network of individuals and organizations surrounding Brothers of Italy and *Nazione Futura*.

²⁰ The strategy of tension was an attempt by far-right militants to terrorize the Italian population through numerous massive violent events from the late 1960s to early 1980s. The expectation was that a greater sense of chaos and instability would damage mainstream and left-wing parties to the benefit of the neofascist Right.

²¹ Mackay, Jamie. 2020. “50 Years Since the Piazza Fontana Bombing and Italy Is Still Facing Up to its ‘Years of Lead’.” *Open Democracy*, January 2. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/50-years-since-the-piazza-fontana-bombing-and-italy-is-still-facing-up-to-its-years-of-lead/>.

²² Pisano, Vittoriofranco. 1987. *The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Press.

²³ Christie, Stuart. 1984. *Stefano Delle Chiaie: Portrait of a Black Terrorist*. London: Black Papers No. 1.

²⁴ Christie, 1984, *Stefano Delle Chiaie*.

²⁵ Ferraresi, Franco. 1996. *Threats to Democracy: The Radical Right in Italy after the War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

²⁶ Ferraresi, 1996, *Threats to Democracy*.

Giuseppe Tatarella

Giuseppe Tatarella (1935–99) was a longtime member and leader of the MSI who played a key role in Gianfranco Fini's transformation of the party into National Alliance in the 1990s.²⁷ In his teens, Tatarella was a provincial leader of the MSI's local youth club in Foggia, Puglia, and was among the founding members of the MSI's official youth organization, *Giovane Italia*, in 1954. During his time at university in the mid-1950s he was a leader of FUAN, representing the organization in the Italian National University Representative Union (UNURI), which served as the national representative body for university students in Italy from 1948 to 1968. After leaving university, he entered politics as a member of MSI. From 1962–70 he served on the Bari city council and from 1970–79 he sat on the Puglia regional council. He was elected to parliament in 1979, where he served until his death in 1999. He was among the founding members of National Alliance in 1994 and served as deputy prime minister in Silvio Berlusconi's first cabinet (1994–95); he also chaired National Alliance's parliamentary group from 1995–99. (For more on Tatarella, see Chapter IV.)

Salvatore Tatarella

Salvatore Tatarella (1947–2017), brother of Giuseppe Tatarella, was a prominent MSI leader and politician who established the Giuseppe Tatarella Foundation in 2002 as an official archive for the MSI/AN and as a hub of cultural activity for the Italian Far Right.²⁸ He joined the MSI's youth circles at a young age and served as both a regional coordinator in Puglia and as a member of the party's national executive (*esecutivo nazionale*).²⁹ During his political career, he held several leadership positions within the MSI, as well as elected office at the local, national, and European levels. Within the MSI, he served on the central committee and the national board (*direzione nazionale*); following the creation of National Alliance, he served on the party's national board (*direzione nazionale*) from 1995 onward; and he likewise served in the leadership of People of Freedom from 2009–10. Outside of the party, his elected positions included municipal counselor in Cerignola (1970–93), mayor of Cerignola (1993–99), provincial counselor in Foggia (1980–85), regional counselor in Puglia (1990–1994), member of the European Parliament (1994–99; 2004–14), city counselor in Bari (1999–2003), vice-mayor of Bari (2003–04), and member of the Chamber of Deputies (1999–2001). Like his brother, he supported Fini's "mainstream" strategy—he joined National Alliance following its creation in 1994, supported merging with Forza Italia to create People of Freedom in 2009, and followed Fini out of PdL in 2010 to create

²⁷ For a brief bios, see: Masella, Luigi. 2019. "Giuseppe Tatarella." *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 95. https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giuseppe-tatarella_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/. Redazione. 2019. "Domenico Crocco(*): il giovane Pinuccio? Straripante, un'intelligenza poliedrica e indomabile." *Secolo d'Italia*, February 8. <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2019/02/domenico-crocco-il-giovane-pinuccio-straripante-unintelligenza-poliedrica-e-indomabile/>.

²⁸ Russi, Francesca. 2017. "E' morto Salvatore Tatarella, alfiere della destra dalla Puglia a Strasburgo." *La Repubblica*, January 28. https://bari.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/01/28/news/lutto_nella_politica_e_morto_salvatore_tatarella_alfiere_della_destra_in_puglia-157061308/; Fragalà, Girolamo. 2017. "Il mondo di destra in lutto: è morto Salvatore Tatarella." *Secolo d'Italia*, January 28. <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2017/01/il-mondo-di-destra-in-lutto-e-morto-salvatore-tatarella/>; "Chi siamo." *Fondazione Tatarella*. <https://www.fondazionegiuseppetatarella.it/chi-siamo/>.

²⁹ Schena, Rita. 2017. "Addio a Salvatore Tatarella, fratello di Pinuccio, Leader della destra al Sud." *La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno*, January 28. <https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/home/852398/addio-a-salvatore-tatarella-fratello-di-pinuccio-leader-della-destra-al-sud.html>.

Future and Freedom for Italy (FLI, *Futuro e Libertà per l'Italia*) (he served as president of the party's constituent assembly on February 11–13, 2011).³⁰

Ignazio La Russa

Ignazio La Russa (b. 1947) is President of the Italian Senate, cofounder of Brothers of Italy, and longtime member of MSI and its affiliated youth organizations. The fascist lineage in his family traces back to his father, Antonio La Russa (1913–2004),³¹ who was a member of the National Fascist Party's youth group (Fascist University Group [GUF, *Gruppi Universitari Fascisti*])³² while studying law at the University of Catania (ca. 1931–35). Antonio became secretary of Mussolini's National Fascist Party in the town of Paternò in 1938 and was an early supporter of MSI, being elected to the Chamber of Deputies (1958–72) and Senate (1972–92) for the party. Ignazio La Russa joined the MSI's Youth Front (FdG) in 1971, immediately following the merger of RGSL and *Giovane Italia*, and quickly rose to leadership in the Milan section. He was implicated in the 1973 “Black Thursday” bombing in Milan that left one dead.³³ He entered electoral politics for the MSI in the 1980s, serving on the Lombardy regional council from 1985–92 and on the town council of San Donato Milanese (near Milan) from 1989–94. He was elected to both the Chamber of Deputies and Senate for MSI in 1992, choosing to take his seat in the lower house; he served there until 2018, when he was elected to the Senate. La Russa was a key figure in the transformation of MSI into National Alliance—he was a close ally to Fini, who appointed him vice president of the new party in 1995. He also served as defense minister in Berlusconi's fourth government (2008–11).

Gianfranco Fini

Gianfranco Fini (b. 1952) was the key figure in the transformation of the MSI into National Alliance in the mid-1990s—catalyzing the “mainstreaming” process that eventually would culminate in the FdI victory in the 2022 elections. Fini's roots in Italian fascism were deep—both of his parents were unwavering supporters of Mussolini and they became active in MSI immediately upon its founding.³⁴ Fini's formal entry into far-right politics occurred via the MSI's youth organizations—he joined *Giovane Italia* in 1969 at the age of 17 and continued on as a member of Youth Front (FdG) following its creation in 1971. He quickly rose through the ranks: in 1973 he joined the FdG provincial leadership in Rome and by 1974 he gained a spot in the organization's national leadership (*direzione nazionale*). In January 1977 he became a member of the MSI's central committee and in June of that year he was selected by MSI leader Giorgio Almirante to become secretary of the FdG, a position he held until assuming leadership of the party in 1987. He remained secretary of MSI until 1995—except for the period from January 14, 1990, to July 6, 1991, during which Pino Rauti helmed the party.³⁵

³⁰ Di Caro, Paola. 2011. “Partitino o primo polo, Fli al bivio.” *Corriere della Sera*, February 11. https://www.corriere.it/politica/11_febbraio_11/Partitino-o-primo-polo-Fli-al-bivio_84820316-35af-11e0-9a90-00144f486ba6.shtml.

³¹ Redazione. 2017. “Antonio La Russa.” *Secolo d'Italia*, March 21. <https://www.secoloditalia.it/2017/03/antonino-la-russa/>.

³² Anicito, V. 2003. “Il senator Brinda 90 anni.” *La Sicilia - Edizione di Catania*, August 31.

³³ Mackinson, Thomas. 2022. “Ignazio La Russa nuovo president del Senato.” *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, October 13. <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2022/10/13/ignazio-la-russa-nuovo-presidente-del-senato-primo-postfascista-seconda-carica-dello-stato-un-mese-fa-diceva-siamo-tutti-eredi-del-duce/6837351/>.

³⁴ Negri, Luca. 2010. *Doppifini: l'uomo che ha detto tutto e il contrario di tutto*. Florence: Vallecchi.

³⁵ Rauti was elected to replace Fini at the MSI party conference in Rimini in January 1990. However, in the regional elections in Sicily in June 1991, he led the party to a crushing defeat in which it lost approximately half of its voter base. The following month, the MSI central committee returned Fini to party leadership.

In the early 1990s, Fini spearheaded a movement to “mainstream” the MSI—which culminated in the creation of National Alliance³⁶ in 1994–95 (and Rauti’s establishment of the Tricolor Flame Social Movement,³⁷ attracting the more “radical” MSI members who opposed Fini’s strategy).³⁸ National Alliance was first founded as an electoral list on January 22, 1994—in advance of the March 27–28, 1994 elections. It joined the “Pole of Good Government” pre-election coalition³⁹ organized by Silvio Berlusconi’s newly-formed party, Forza Italia, which led the formation of a new government following the election. National Alliance contributed five ministers to Berlusconi’s first government: Giuseppe Tatarella as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Post and Telecommunications; Adriana Poli Bortone (b. 1943) as Minister of Agricultural, Food, and Forestry Resources; Publio Fiori (b. 1938) as Minister of Transport and Navigation; Domenico Fisichella (b. 1935) as Minister of Cultural and Environmental Heritage; and Altero Matteoli (1940–2017) as Minister of the Environment. Building on this success, National Alliance formally became a political party on January 1995, at the Fiuggi party conference (Rauti’s departure was confirmed shortly thereafter, as he founded the Tricolor Flame Social Movement on March 3, 1995).

Under Fini’s leadership, National Alliance participated in all four of Silvio Berlusconi’s governments. In fact, in a 2019 speech to Forza Italia party members, Berlusconi stated: “It was we who brought the League and the fascists into government...*We* legitimized them, *we* constitutionalized them.”⁴⁰ Berlusconi’s strategic alliance with Mussolini’s heirs was also linked to his membership in the secretive masonic organization Propaganda Due. In 1996, the lodge’s leader, Licio Gelli (1919–2015) (who was a member of the Waffen SS), stated: “He [Berlusconi] is implementing my plan for democratic rebirth to perfection...He should at least give me copyright.”⁴¹

The link between National Alliance and Forza Italia was formalized in 2009, when the two parties joined forces under the banner of People of Freedom (*Popolo della Libertà*, PdL). Yet this alliance was short-lived—Fini and Berlusconi vied for leadership and after a year of public quarrels, in July 2010, the leadership of PdL passed a motion declaring Fini in violation of the party’s founding principles and de facto expelled him. The following day Fini declared a new party—Future and Freedom for Italy (FLI, *Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia*). While he continued to serve as president of the Chamber of Deputies for the remainder of the parliamentary term, his new party failed to cross the threshold in the subsequent elections in February 2013, forcing him to leave parliament. While he has not since returned to elected office, he has publicly confirmed his support for FdI and expressed enthusiasm following Meloni’s victory in the 2022 elections.

³⁶ Ruzza, Carlo, and Stefano Fella. 2009. *Re-Inventing the Italian Right: Territorial Politics, Populism and ‘Post Fascism’*. New York: Routledge; Ignazi, Piero. 1998. *Il polo escluso: profilo storico del Movimento sociale italiano*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

³⁷ Ignazi, 1998, *Il polo escluso*.

³⁸ The debate between those who favored an “electoral” strategy for the MSI and those who preferred a more “radical” extraparliamentary approach stretches back to the very earliest days of the party and led to many schisms over the years. Yet, the split between Fini’s National Alliance and Rauti’s Tricolor Flame Social Movement marked a rather definitive moment—as from then on, National Alliance held firmly to its “mainstreaming” strategy (through its integration into PdL in 2009 and the formation of FdI in 2012).

³⁹ In Italy, parties may form pre-election coalitions to enhance their chance of winning seats. In the March 1994 elections, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia also formed a pre-election coalition with the Northern League (Pole of Freedoms), which only ran candidates in certain northern districts.

⁴⁰ *La Repubblica*. 2019. “Berlusconi: ‘Noio abbiamo fatto Lega e fascisti al governo’” [YouTube Video]. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xnf6eBLexYY>.

⁴¹ NA. 2015. “Italy’s Shadowy Masonic Leader Dies Aged 96.” *The Local*, December 16. <https://www.thelocal.it/20151216/controversial-p2-masonic-leader-dies-in-italy>.

Isabella Rauti

Isabella Rauti (b. 1962) is an FdI senator and daughter of Pino Rauti. She was a member of FdG from a young age and is known to have participated in several “Hobbit Camps” organized by the group, including Hobbit Camp IV in 1981, during which she met her future husband Gianni Alemanno (b. 1958).⁴² She followed her father out of MSI in 1994 and joined his new party, Tricolor Flame Social Movement (MSFT), despite the fact that her husband sided with Fini and joined National Alliance.⁴³ She was an MSFT candidate in numerous elections, including the 1996 parliamentary elections, the 1999 European parliament elections, and the 2001 Rome mayoral election. In 2004, she left the party and joined National Alliance—just as her father left MSFT and formed a new party, the Social Idea Movement (MIS, *Movimento Idea Sociale*).⁴⁴ She followed National Alliance into Berlusconi’s People of Freedom (PdL) in 2009. Following the alliance’s collapse, in 2013 she briefly founded a new party, Italy First (*Prima l’Italia*), alongside husband Alemanno. However, this party merged into Brothers of Italy in late 2013, and she was elected a senator for FdI in 2018 (and reelected in 2022). Isabella Rauti also serves as the president of the Pino Rauti Study Center,⁴⁵ established to honor and preserve the memory of her father.

Giorgia Meloni

Giorgia Meloni (b. 1977) is the Prime Minister of Italy, whose political roots also trace back to the youth movements of the MSI. She joined Youth Front (FdG) in 1992 and became the leader of Student Action (*Azione Studentesca*), National Alliance’s student organization, in 1996.⁴⁶ She continued her climb through the leadership ranks of the party’s youth organizations in the 2000s—in 2000 she became the national director (*dirigente nazionale*) of Youth Action (*Azione Giovane*), which replaced Youth Front (FdG); in 2001, Fini named her the coordinator of the group’s national committee (*comitato nazionale*); and in 2004 she was elected president of the group during its national congress. She was elected to parliament in 2006 for AN and became youth minister in Berlusconi’s last government (2008–11). While she followed Fini into the People of Freedom (PdL) in 2009, she grew disaffected when the party supported Mario Monti’s technocratic government (2011–13), which had replaced Berlusconi’s cabinet in November 2011. After failing to win her bid for leadership of PdL, she joined Ignazio La Russa and Guido Crosetto (b. 1963) in founding Brothers of Italy in December 2012.⁴⁷

⁴² Rizzini, Marianna. 2017. “La destra e la ‘reaccensione’ della fiamma secondo Isabella Rauti.” *Il Foglio*, December 12. <https://www.ilfoglio.it/politica/2017/12/12/news/la-destra-e-la-riaccensione-della-fiamma-secondo-isabella-rauti-168387/>; “Profilo.” <https://www.isabellarauti.it/profilo/info/>.

⁴³ Rizzini, 2017, “La destra.”

⁴⁴ Pino Rauti’s departure from MSFT was tumultuous. Beginning in the early 2000s, he engaged in a power struggle with the rising Luca Romagnoli (b. 1961). Following the February 2002 party congress, Romagnoli replaced Rauti as secretary—with Rauti moving to the role of president. However, Rauti’s election as president was contested by Romagnoli’s supporters—in October 2003, a Rome court invalidated the election. Romagnoli used the opportunity to push his proposed merger of MSFT with Alessandra Mussolini’s (b. 1962) Alternativa Sociale (est. 2004), which Rauti opposed. In late 2003, Rauti was expelled for his opposition to Romagnoli’s takeover of the party.

⁴⁵ For the Pino Rauti Study Center, see: <http://pinorauti.org/>.

⁴⁶ Giubilei, Francesco. 2020. *Giorgia Meloni: La rivoluzione dei conservatori*. Rome: Giubilei Regnani.

⁴⁷ Lanaro, Manolo. 2012. “Salva La Russa, l’ex An presenta nuovo partito: ‘Mi salva da solo e candidato I 2 Marò’.” *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, December 21. [https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2012/12/21/salva-russa-lex-an-presenta-nuovo-partito-mi-salvo-da-solo-e-candido-due-mar0/214974/](https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2012/12/21/salva-russa-lex-an-presenta-nuovo-partito-mi-salvo-da-solo-e-candido-due-mar0/); NA. Crosetto e Meloni dal Pdl a ‘Fratelli d’Italia’: trattativa con La Russa su nome e simbolo.” *La Repubblica*, December 20. https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2012/12/20/news/crosetto_meloni_via_dal_pdl-49183057/.

While the Italian (neo)fascist Right had undergone numerous organizational and leadership changes over the past century, it has maintained a particular emphasis on cultivating its culture among the youth. Through youth organizations, the far right recruits new members, indoctrinates them into far-right's ideology, and trains them for political mobilization (and sometimes, even violent confrontation). The fact that so many prominent members of the current Italian government emerged from the far-right youth milieu—most notably, Giorgia Meloni herself—attests to these organizations' enduring influence on Italian politics. Yet it is not only the formal organizations affiliated with party structures that have such an impact; as the following chapters will discuss in detail, party-adjacent movements have also played a notable role in continuing the mobilization of the Far Right's youth—with a prominent contemporary example being Francesco Giubilei's Nazione Futura.

Chapter II: Francesco Giubilei

“Rather than burning his memorabilia from the fascist period, he kept them in the attic: membership cards, diplomas, photos, even his rifle and helmet. The day he showed them to me, I was enchanted.”

—Francesco Giubilei⁴⁸

As the previous discussion of youth groups demonstrated, Italy’s far-right and neofascist political environment is composed of an extensive network of parties, leaders, and subsidiary organizations, which regularly merge, split, and jostle with one another. Since its founding in 2017,⁴⁹ *Nazione Futura* has emerged as an increasingly important node in this wider network, with its founder, Francesco Giubilei⁵⁰ (b. 1992), playing a key role linking *Nazione Futura* to other actors in the Italian Far Right—including the Brothers of Italy and the Tatarella Foundation.

To understand how Giubilei came to represent such a critical node in the Italian Far Right, this chapter dives into his personal background. Despite his repeated assertions that his ancestors were “antifascist,” there is good reason to believe that both his paternal grandfather and great-grandfather were involved in fascist politics during the *Ventennio*, the twenty years of Mussolini’s fascist rule. With his own acknowledgement that his grandfather was perhaps the biggest influence on his life, it becomes less puzzling as to how he embarked on right-wing publishing ventures in his teenage years, founded *Nazione Futura*, and was chosen to be the youthful face of the Tatarella Foundation, a cultural organization founded in honor of a prominent MSI leader.

Giubilei Family History

According to Francesco Giubilei, his paternal grandfather, Italo Giubilei (1923–2007), was the most influential figure in his childhood. In interviews, he regularly praises his grandfather for inspiring his love of books and history, as well as teaching him the values by which he lives.⁵¹ When questioned about his family’s activities during the fascist period, Giubilei has consistently stated that they were “antifascist” from the start. However, in an interview given in 2010 (at the age of 18), he gave a different version of events. The passage is so revealing that it deserves to be quoted in full:

“Yes, [my grandfather] was an early antifascist. A friend of Don Luigi Sturzo, he had founded the Popular Party in Gualdo Tadino. Once the war was over, he didn’t need to pretend, like the rest of the Italians, that he had never been what he actually was. So, rather than burning his memorabilia from the fascist period, he kept them in the attic: membership cards, diplomas, photos, even his rifle and helmet. The day he showed them to me, I was enchanted...There was also in the attic the score of the anthem of the

⁴⁸ Lorenzetto, 2010. “Giornalisti e medici.”

⁴⁹ *Nazione Futura*. 2023. “Chi siamo.” <http://www.nazionefutura.it/about/>.

⁵⁰ Giubilei was born in 1992 in Cesena, Emilia-Romagna to Giuseppe Giubilei (b. 1954) and Clara Maria Faedi; he also has one sister, Margherita (b. 1995). See: Redazione. 2022. “Francesco Giubilei nominato Consigliere del Ministro della Cultura.” *GualdoNews*, November 27. <https://gualdonews.it/2022/11/27/francesco-giubilei-nominato-consigliere-del-ministro-della-cultura/>; Candoli, Raffaella. 2018. “Cesenante si laurea con lode negli Stati Uniti.” *Il Resto del Carlino*, May 21. <https://www.ilrestodelcarlino.it/cesena/cronaca/margherita-giubilei-89c9de6a>.

⁵¹ Redazione. 2018. “Francesco Giubilei nuovo president della Fondazione Tatarella.” *Gualdo News*, January 14. <https://gualdonews.it/2018/01/14/francesco-giubilei-fondazione-tatarella/>.

National Fascist Party, as well as yellowed copies of *Corriere della Sera* and *Il Messaggero* with historical events on the front page, from the signing of the Lateran Pacts to Adolf Hitler's visit to Rome on May 3, 1938."⁵²

This is perhaps the most detailed description of his grandfather Giubilei has given to the media. Most of his subsequent commentary has focused on briefly disavowing any fascist sympathies and jumping to discuss his grandfather's legacy as a beloved schoolteacher in postwar Gualdo Tadino (a small, mountainous town in Umbria).⁵³ Clearly, there is an unacknowledged inconsistency between claiming his grandfather was an antifascist during the Ventennio and then reveling in the considerable amount of memorabilia that he apparently hoarded in his attic for more than 50 years after the war. While the plain meaning of his statement seems clear—further research into specific aspects adds additional depth to his family's story.

First, in both this interview and other sources, Giubilei regularly cites his family's connection to Don Luigi Sturzo (1871–1959)⁵⁴ and the Italian Popular Party (PPI, *Partito Popolare Italiano*)⁵⁵ as evidence that they were antifascist. But this reference is less revealing than Giubilei appears to believe. The PPI was founded in 1919 (four years before his grandfather was born) and forcibly dissolved by Mussolini's government in 1926 (when his grandfather was three years old). Giubilei has since clarified that it was his great-grandfather, Giuseppe Giubilei (b. ca. 1900), who was involved in the PPI—but this is not evidence of his antifascist credentials. While PPI founder Sturzo strongly opposed Mussolini and went into exile from 1924–46, the same cannot be said for all members of the PPI. In fact, numerous PPI members of parliament supported the infamous Acerbo Law of November 1923—designed to rig the electoral system in favor of Mussolini's National Fascist Party in advance of the 1924 elections.⁵⁶ Following Sturzo's departure in 1924, most PPI members joined the pro-Mussolini National Union party,⁵⁷ and others were associated with *Azione Cattolica* (Catholic Action), which developed an accommodationist stance with the fascist regime.⁵⁸ Thus, a more probable version of events may be that Giubilei's great-grandfather was initially involved in the PPI in the aftermath of World War I, but sided with the pro-fascist and accommodationist division within the party. As the split between the two sides grew, his great-grandfather abandoned his relationship with Sturzo and joined one of the pro-Mussolini organizations that were on the rise at the time—National Union and/or *Azione Cattolica*.

Second, Giubilei's way of explaining his grandfather's decision to hold on to fascist memorabilia requires linguistic acrobatics to understand.⁵⁹ He contrasts his grandfather from the "rest of the Italians," as he did not need to "pretend" to "have never been what he actually was." Presumably, many

⁵² Lorenzetto, 2010. "Giornalisti e medici."

⁵³ For example, in December 2022 a journalist uncovered this long-lost interview and republished parts of it—which led Giubilei to restate his version of events in a long Twitter thread. For the article, see: Landi, Paolo. 2022. "Francesco Giubilei, fenomenologia del re delle banalità di destra." *Tag43*, December 18. <https://www.tag43.it/francesco-giubilei-twitter-polemiche/>. For Giubilei's response, see: <https://twitter.com/giubileif/status/1605169908186288128>.

⁵⁴ De Rosa, Gabriele. 1996. *Storia del Partito Popolare Italiano*. Bari: Laterza.

⁵⁵ De Rosa, 1996, *Partito Popolare Italiano*.

⁵⁶ De Leo, Francesco. 2022. "Storie di Storia / 13. 1924: le ultime elezioni prima del fascismo." *La Repubblica*, September 20.

https://www.repubblica.it/cultura/2022/09/20/news/storie_di_storia_13_1924_le_ultime_elezioni_prima_de_l_fascismo-366489965/.

⁵⁷ Blinkhoorn, Martin. 1990. *Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe*. New York: Routledge.

⁵⁸ Baruzzo, Enrico. 2007. "Azione Cattolica e Fascismo." *Sintesi Dialettica*, April 11.

<https://www.sintesidialettica.it/azione-cattolica-e-fascismo/>.

⁵⁹ The original Italian reads: "Finita la guerra, non ebbe bisogno di fingere, come il resto degli italiani, di non essere mai stato ciò che invece fu." See: Lorenzetto, 2010. "Giornalisti e medici."

Italians had to “pretend” to have never been supporters of Mussolini’s regime—making it appear that Giubilei’s grandfather did not need to pretend, thus justifying his maintenance of the memorabilia. While clearly meant to burnish his grandfather’s antifascist credentials, this statement appears to add more confusion about why an antifascist would hold on to fascist memorabilia.

Third, the range of items mentioned by Giubilei—almost certainly an incomplete list—is astounding. For example, the terminology used to describe his grandfather’s rifle (*fulcile da balilla*) is a specific reference to the scaled-down version of the Italy army rifle commissioned to ONB members—making it likely that his grandfather was a member of the organization (which would make sense, given his age during the Ventennio). Likewise, the preserved newspapers suggest that the fascination with fascist memorabilia was a family affair and not confined only to the grandfather; for example, the Lateran Pacts were signed in 1929 when Giubilei’s grandfather was six years old—making it likely that this item (and others) were collected and preserved by his parents.

Giubilei’s ties to historical fascism also run through other branches of the family tree. His father, Giuseppe Giubilei (b. 1954), recounts in his autobiography that as a child in the 1950s and 1960s he spent summers at the country home of his uncle, Gippetto Novaro (1901–82), “...from whom he received valuable educational messages and amplified his sensibility...”⁶⁰ Novaro was a painter and disciple of the aforementioned Futurist Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, who strongly supported Mussolini and co-authored the 1919 Fascist Manifesto. Likewise, both Francesco and Giuseppe suggest that grandfather Italo played a critical role in Francesco’s upbringing. In Giuseppe’s autobiography, he writes, “[Italo] felt a moral duty to pass on as much knowledge as possible to his grandchildren...”;⁶¹ “The grandparents...helped [Giuseppe’s] wife and with enthusiasm and enjoyment gave lessons to the children...The two old teachers had transformed the [family’s] ranch into a workshop where instruction in moral values for life, books, and entertainment were the gears on which the day moved”;⁶² “When the grandfather-teacher projected educational ‘films,’ even some friends brought over their children who, in a respectful silence, interestedly watched the projection.”⁶³

Thus, despite his repeated protestations to the contrary, it appears that Francesco Giubilei’s family was not “antifascist.” In fact, his grandfather held on to the legacy of fascism—including physical memorabilia—to pass down from generation to generation. As illustrated in Table 1, this background explains where Giubilei was first exposed to the far-right ideas he now promotes—the next section further explores how his supportive family structure played a critical role in his professional development and entry into the world of far-right politics.

Table 1: Giubilei Family

Family Member	Key Biographical Features
Giuseppe Giubilei (b. ca. 1900)	Affiliated with Italian People’s Party in early 1920s. Sided with accommodationist faction within PPI. Joined pro-fascist National Union and/or Catholic Action in mid-1920s.
Italo Giubilei (b. 1923)	Joined fascist youth organization <i>Opera Nazionale Balilla</i> as a child. Maintained fascist memorabilia in family’s attic.

⁶⁰ Giubilei, Giuseppe. 2016. *L’amico del dottore*. Historica Edizioni: 23.

⁶¹ Giubilei, 2016, *L’amico del dottore*, 46.

⁶² Giubilei, 2016, *L’amico del dottore*, 49.

⁶³ Giubilei, 2016, *L’amico del dottore*, 51.

	<p>Played key role in raising his grandchildren, especially Francesco.</p>
<p>Giuseppe Giubilei (b. 1954)</p>	<p>Spent childhood summers at the home of uncle Gippetto Novaro, a disciple of Futurist Marinetti who authored the “Fascist Manifesto” in 1919. Entrusted education of his children to father Italo. Supported son Francesco’s initial forays into far-right publishing.</p>
<p>Francesco Giubilei (b. 1992)</p>	<p>Founded two right-wing publishers—Historica (2008) and Giubilei Regnani Editore (2013).</p> <p>Founded Nazione Futura in 2017.</p> <p>Appointed to Scientific Committee of New Direction Italia in September 2017.</p> <p>Became President of Tatarella Foundation in 2018.</p> <p>Co-founded Alliance for the Common Good in 2021.</p> <p>Appointed as visiting fellow at the Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Budapest from May–August 2021.</p> <p>Served on Editorial Board of <i>The European Conservative</i> starting in 2021.</p> <p>Named special adviser to FDI Culture Minister in November 2022, left role in June 2023.</p>

Source: author’s research

Francesco Giubilei’s Activities

Giubilei’s first forays into the right-wing political space came through publishing—a passion he attributes to the influence of his aforementioned paternal grandfather. In 2008, at the age of 16, he launched an online cultural magazine and book publisher called Historica.⁶⁴ According to his father, Francesco first approached him with his business proposal in June 2008 and after workshopping it over the summer, he gave his son the green light to launch the venture in August. When the company was first founded, Francesco was too young to officially register as the owner—so his maternal grandmother, Norina Battelli (b ca. 1938), did so for him.⁶⁵ However, the first few years of the business were rocky—by 2010, he was about €500 in debt. It was at this time that his father funded his participation in the 2010 Modena Book Fair (March 13–14, 2010) at which he met Giorgio Regnani, the

⁶⁴ For the publisher’s website, see: <https://www.historicaedizioni.com/>.

⁶⁵ Lorenzetto, 2010. “Giornalisti e medici.”

owner of balsamic vinegar producer VR Aceti.⁶⁶ Regnani had some prior publishing experience⁶⁷ and following their meeting, he invested in Giubilei's *Historica Edizioni*, pumping much needed capital into the firm.⁶⁸ Their partnership grew and, in 2013, the two co-founded the publishing house Giubilei Regnani Editore, which specializes in the publication of conservative authors from Europe and the US (see more below).⁶⁹

As he was building his own right-wing publishing company, Giubilei was simultaneously contributing to far-right cultural production by authoring an astonishing number of books (as well as papers and articles). Among the books he authored are:

- *Leo Longanesi: The Borghese Conservative*: Published by Odoya⁷⁰ in 2015, this book offers a biography of the fascist-era writer Leo Longanesi (1905–57), known for his support for Mussolini's regime and the nostalgic view of fascism taken in his postwar works.⁷¹
- *Sovereignist Europe: From Salvini to Meloni, from Orbán to Le Pen*: Published by Giubilei Regnani in 2019, this book offers a complimentary look at sovereigntism.
- *Giorgia Meloni: The Conservatives' Revolution*: This book was published by Giubilei Regnani in 2020, "in collaboration with" the Tatarella Foundation.⁷²
- *Great Country*: Published by Odoya in 2021, this is one of his most recent books, which examines the history and impact of the *Strapaese* and artistic movement that blossomed in fascist Italy.

The topics of Giubilei's books reveal not only an interest in contemporary far-right politics, but also a deep knowledge of—and fluency in—the language and ideas of historical fascism. Specifically, his focus on the *Strapaese* movement—and Longanesi as one of its principal exponents—evinces a fascination with how historical fascism expressed itself through cultural currents. His focus on Longanesi is even more revealing—the reference to the "Borghese conservative" in the book's subtitle alludes to the right-wing magazine *Il Borghese* founded by Longanesi in 1950 and edited by him until his death in 1957. In turn, the magazine's name is derived from the conservative Italian noble family, whose members include Prince Junio Valerio Borghese (1906–74). Borghese led the infamous Italian Naval

⁶⁶ NA. 2012. "Ha vent'anni e una casa editrice." *A metà tra la terra e il Cielo* [Blog], October 19.

<https://musiccogemma.wordpress.com/2012/10/19/il-piu-giovane-editore-ditalia-20-anni-e-una-casa-editrice/>; NA. 2010. "Calendario di Eventi." Provincia di Modena. <https://www.provincia.modena.it/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Gli-eventi-turistici-2010.pdf>.

⁶⁷ Prior to this meeting, Regnani had funded the publication of at least one book, *The Classics that Made Italy* by Fabrizio Govi. The book's publisher—Giorgio Regnani Editore (Modena)—does not appear to have published other works and may not be an actual publishing house. The book's author, Govi, is an antiquarian bookseller in Modena, Regnani's hometown. For the book, see: <https://www.oakknoll.com/pages/books/104769/fabrizio-govi/classici-che-hanno-fatto-litalia-per-un-nuovo-canone-bio-bibliografico-degli-autori-italiani-i>.

⁶⁸ NA, 2012, "Ha vent'anni."

⁶⁹ For the publisher's website, see: <https://www.giubileiregnani.com/>.

⁷⁰ Odoya is an Italian publishing house founded in 2007. It initially focused on re-publishing historical essays in translation (particularly from the US, UK, France, and Germany), but has since developed a specialization in "cultural history." For the publisher's website, see: <https://www.odoya.it/chi-siamo.html>.

⁷¹ Montanelli, Indro, and Marcello Staglieno. 1984. *Leo Longanesi*. New York: Rizzoli; Giubilei, Francesco. 2015. *Leo Longanesi: il Borghese conservatore*. Rome: Odoya.

⁷² Redazione. 2020. "Esce il saggio 'Giorgia Meloni. La rivoluzione dei conservatori' di Francesco Giubilei, primo testo sull'ascesa dei Fratelli d'Italia." *L'Immediato*, December 1. <https://www.immediato.net/2020/12/01/esce-il-saggio-giorgia-meloni-la-rivoluzione-dei-conservatori-di-francesco-giubilei-primo-testo-sullascesa-dei-fratelli-ditalia/>.

flotilla Decima MAS (*Xª MAS*) during the Second World War, to which the Futurist Marinetti even dedicated his last composition. After the war, he was convicted of collaboration with the Nazis—but he continued his activism in the nascent neofascist circles of the postwar period, even earning the moniker the *Black Prince*. For example, he served as president of MSI from 1952–54 and he wrote the introduction to the 1972 edition of Evola’s *Men Among the Ruins*. Perhaps most notably, he led the aborted coup attempt of December 7–8, 1970, which was orchestrated alongside Delle Chiaie’s *Avanguardia Nazionale* and various far-right elements of the Italian armed forces. Following the failed coup, Borghese spent the final years of his life in Franco’s Spain, where he continued to work with Delle Chiaie and other far-right terrorists on operations spanning Europe and even South America.

It was in the midst of this work as a writer and publisher that Giubilei founded *Nazione Futura* in the spring of 2017, was chosen as the president of the Tatarella Foundation in 2018, and rapidly became a central figure in numerous far-right organizations both in Italy and abroad. Chapters III and IV address *Nazione Futura* and the Tatarella Foundation in depth—but the following subsections highlight several additional roles Giubilei has acquired over the past several years.

Brothers of Italy

Following the formation of the FdI-led government in October 2022, Francesco Giubilei was appointed special advisor for the Italian Minister of Culture Gennaro Sangiuliano (b. 1962).⁷³ Sangiuliano himself emerged from the far-right youth groups discussed in Chapter I—he was a member of the MSI’s Youth Front (FdG) and later became a MSI district counselor (*consigliere circoscrizionale*) in Soccavo, Naples, from 1983–87.⁷⁴ Sangiuliano’s leadership of the ministry has been marked by several controversial decisions and statements that highlight the government’s links to the neofascist milieu. As minister, Sangiuliano gave an interview to the right-leaning newspaper *Il Messaggero* in which he praised several historical fascist figures, including Giovanni Gentile—who Mussolini once described as the “philosopher of fascism.”⁷⁵ Sangiuliano also drew attention by requiring employees of his ministry to work during the April 25 holiday, which commemorates the Resistance movement and eventual defeat of the Nazi-backed fascist regime in Italy in 1945.⁷⁶ Giubilei’s work at the ministry was short-lived, however. In June 2023, he resigned from his position after it was revealed that the ministry had awarded a €46,000 grant to the Tatarella Foundation, of which Giubilei is the president.⁷⁷

Activity in Hungary

Giubilei has also developed ties to the Hungarian government and its subsidiary organizations, such as the Center for Fundamental Rights. For example, in October 2023 he traveled to Budapest for the

⁷³ Redazione, 2022, “Francisco Giubilei nominato consigliere del Ministro della Cultura.”

⁷⁴ Salvatori, Clarida. 2018. “Consiglio Regionale, per FI-FdI-Lega ora spunta l’idea Sangiuliano (Tg1).” *Corriere della Sera*, January 8.

https://archive.ph/20200116085852/https://roma.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/18_gennaio_08/fi-fdi-lega-ora-spunta-l-idea-sangiuliano-tg1-f4ea5c6e-f3dc-11e7-aa70-8e209e058724.shtml?refresh_ce-cp.

⁷⁵ Ajello, Mario. 2022. “Sangiuliano: «Dante, Leopardi e Gramsci, rilanciamo la cultura italiana. Basta sacerdoti del politicamente corretto.»” *Il Messaggero*, October 23.

https://www.ilmessaggero.it/politica/gennaro_sangiuliano_ministro_cultura_governo_meloni_intervista_cosa_ha_detto-7006321.html.

⁷⁶ NA. 2023. “Sangiuliano, lettera ai direttori generali del ministero” *Il Messaggero*, April 26.

https://www.ilmessaggero.it/politica/sangiuliano_lettera_direttori_ministero_ferie_ponte_25_aprile_pranzo_15_agosto-7366724.html.

⁷⁷ Redazione. 2023. “Dop Levi tocca a Giubilei: si dimetta da consigliere di Sangiuliano dopo le polemiche sul finanziamento alla Fondazione Tatarella.” *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, June 11.

<https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2023/06/11/dopo-levi-tocca-a-giubilei-si-dimette-da-consigliere-di-sangiuliano-dopo-le-polemiche-sul-finanziamento-alla-fondazione-tatarella/7190515/>.

“Europa Nostra” summit, which brought together Italian and Hungarian conservative think tanks to establish international partnerships. As stated by Miklós Szánthó, the event’s organizer and director general of the Center for Fundamental Rights, “our cultural sovereignty is under comprehensive attack, because the left-liberal forces want to destroy Europe’s Judeo-Christian roots in the name of the woke...” For his part, Giubilei used this opportunity to decry the tide of “illegal immigrants” arriving in Europe from North Africa and the Middle East. At the conclusion of the meeting, Giubilei signed a partnership agreement (on behalf of Nazione Futura) with Szánthó (Center for Fundamental Rights), Péter Töröcsi (Oeconomus Economic Research Foundation), and Daniele Scalea (Centro Studi Machiavelli).

Giubilei was also a visiting fellow at Budapest’s Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC) from May–August 2021.⁷⁸ The MCC is known to be tightly linked to Viktor Orbán and the ruling Fidesz party⁷⁹ and has even been described as “designed to breed right-wing intellectuals.”⁸⁰ Several other visiting fellows⁸¹ alongside Giubilei have recently published in *The European Conservative*, including Rod Dreher⁸² and Gladden Pappin⁸³ (and, of course, Giubilei himself⁸⁴).

New Direction

Giubilei also has links to New Direction, the think tank of the European Conservatives and Reformists party that was founded by Margaret Thatcher in 2009—and has been led by Meloni since 2020. He was appointed to the Scientific Committee of New Direction Italia upon the subsidiary organization’s founding on September 12, 2017.⁸⁵ He also also been featured at New Direction’s events, including the “Young Leaders Academy” held in Eskilstuna, Sweden, from July 16–18, 2023.⁸⁶ He was also slated to speak at the New Direction conference in Madrid in September 2023 but canceled his attendance.

Francesco Giubilei’s rapid rise to a prominent position in the Italian Far Right did not happen by accident. On the contrary, from a young age he was steeped in Italy’s fascist history—which, in his own words, he found “enchanting.” After being raised in large part by his grandfather, his professional endeavors were supported (and partly funded) by his parents. This activity first led him to far-right publishing and then on to broader leadership within the far-right cultural environment. As discussed in the next two chapters, this work is most clearly evident in his establishment of Nazione Futura and his leadership of the Tatarella Foundation.

⁷⁸ For Giubilei’s profile on the MCC website, see: <https://mcc.hu/en/person/francesco-giubilei>.

⁷⁹ Hopkins, Valerie. 2021. “Campus in Hungary is Flagship in Orban’s Bid to Create a Conservative Elite.” *New York Times*, June 28. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/europe/hungary-orban-university.html>.

⁸⁰ Hopkins, 2021, “Campus in Hungary.”

⁸¹ For a list of MCC visiting fellows, see: <https://mcc.hu/en/organisation/visiting-fellows>.

⁸² Dreher, Rod. 2023. “What Kind of Conservative Am I?” *The European Conservative*, July 10. <https://europeanconservative.com/articles/commentary/what-kind-of-conservative-am-i/>.

⁸³ Pappin, Gladden, 2023. “A New Migration Fight Is Looming in Europe.” *The European Conservative*, June 29. <https://europeanconservative.com/articles/commentary/a-new-migration-fight-is-looming-in-europe/>.

⁸⁴ Giubilei, Francesco. 2023. “‘Pride Month’ Has an Enemy: Giorgia Meloni.” *The European Conservative*, June 30. <https://europeanconservative.com/articles/commentary/pride-month-has-an-enemy-giorgia-meloni/>.

⁸⁵ Sansonetti, Veronica. 2017. “New Direction Italia, chia ha fondato il neonato centro studi super thatcheriano.” *Formiche*, September 12. <https://formiche.net/2017/09/new-direction-italia-chi-ha-fondato-il-neonato-centro-studi-super-thatcheriano/>; NA. 2017. “Fondazioni: nasce ‘New Direction Italia’. La dirige daniele Capezzone.” *Affaritaliani*, September 12. https://www.affaritaliani.it/politica/palazzo-potere/fondazioni-nasce--new-direction-italia-498663.html#google_vignette.

⁸⁶ For an Instagram advertisement of Giubilei’s participation, see: <https://www.instagram.com/p/CsyMvLTtFcK/?hl=en>.

Chapter III: Nazione Futura

“Nazione Futura has a...manifesto of values, which goes from reaffirming the centrality of the traditional family as a cornerstone of society to the reaffirmation of law and respect for institutions.”

—Francesco Giubilei⁸⁷

While often described as a “movement,” Nazione Futura is officially registered as a newspaper (*testata giornalistica*). Its registration was processed in February 2017 and the first edition of the *Nazione Futura* journal was published in April 2017.⁸⁸ The journal’s expansion into a larger “movement” officially began on April 17, 2018, when Giubilei introduced the organization’s manifesto, “Values for the Future Italy,” and launched the formation of local groups (so-called “circles”) around the country.⁸⁹ The launch event was held in Rome in Piazza Venezia, a location best known as the backdrop for Mussolini’s speeches to large crowds.

Giubilei also began describing Nazione Futura as a “cultural movement” or a “movement of ideas” focused on mobilizing the youth and ordinary citizens to move the country forward. Yet as previously mentioned, the organization’s notions of “youth,” “progress,” and “future” are deeply rooted in the neofascist past. While always careful to cloak its ideas in seemingly innocuous terms, Nazione Futura reflects many features of the postwar neofascist Right—from its critique of modernity (especially seen in the group’s positions on family, education, and environment) to its historical nostalgia.

Nazione Futura’s Organizational Structure

Nazione Futura engages in several different areas of work, all related to the production and dissemination of conservative and neofascist ideas. Five aspects of this organization merit particular attention: its leadership, its publications, its headquarters/study center, its publishing house, and its international collaborators.

Leadership

In addition to Giubilei, the leadership of Nazione Futura includes: Vice President Ferrante de Benedictis (b. ca. 1981); Secretary General Davide Gabriele; Editorial Director Pasquale Ferraro (b. 1994); Marco Mestriner; Francesco Ciro Miale (b. 1976); and Nausica Cangini.⁹⁰

Publications

Nazione Futura produces and disseminates several right-wing publications. The organization maintains a daily online newsletter⁹¹ and also publishes a print quarterly magazine (also called *Nazione Futura*).⁹² The magazine’s current editor in chief is Jacopo Ugolini (b. ca. 2000),⁹³ who assumed the position in September 2023.

⁸⁷ See the Nazione Futura website: <https://www.nazionefutura.it/about/>.

⁸⁸ See the footer on the Nazione Futura website for registration details: <https://www.nazionefutura.it/>.

⁸⁹ Giubilei, Francesco. 2018. “Nazione Futura, nasce la rete culturale per far ripartire la politica dai contenuti.” *Formiche*, April 9. <https://formiche.net/2018/04/nazione-futura-partito/>.

⁹⁰ See the organizational chart on the Nazione Futura website: <https://www.nazionefutura.it/organigramma/>.

⁹¹ Nazione Futura. 2023. *Quotidiano*. <http://www.nazionefutura.it/quotidiano-online/>.

⁹² See the website for the *Nazione Futura* magazine: <https://www.nazionefuturarivista.it/>.

⁹³ See Ugolini’s LinkedIn page: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/jacopo-ugolini-97a294202/>.

The magazine typically features articles by Giubilei and the organization's other leaders, along with various Italian far-right figures, although it does occasionally cast a broader net across the European Far Right. For example, the Summer 2023 edition included an article by Alain de Benoist (b. 1943) (entitled "Recognition of Others or Denial of Differences?" (see "Publishing House" below for more on de Benoist)).⁹⁴ The magazine also has notable links with *The European Conservative*: the Fall 2022 edition included an interview with *The European Conservative* editor Alvino-Mario Fantini (b. ca. 1968)⁹⁵ and *The European Conservative's* writers Sven R. Larson (b. ca. 1974)⁹⁶ and Carlos Perona Calvete (b. ca. 1990)⁹⁷ regularly appear in the pages of the *Nazione Futura* magazine. (See below for more on *The European Conservative*.) The organization also publishes short reports and white papers written by its leaders on a wide range of subjects.

Headquarters/Study Center

Nazione Futura's headquarters is located at the Casa dei Conservatori in Rome.⁹⁸ This same location also hosts the organization's study center (*Centro Studi Nazione Futura*), which is directed by Pasquale Ferraro (b. 1994) and was opened in November 2021.⁹⁹ Among its activities, the Study Center publishes the aforementioned quarterly journal and hosts a variety of events, including conferences, presentations, and debates.

Publishing House

Nazione Futura is affiliated with the publishing house Giubilei Regnani Editore, which publishes a range of conservative authors from Italy, Europe, and the US.¹⁰⁰ Tellingly, during the spring and summer of 2023 its homepage featured a large banner advertising the new Italian edition of Alain de Benoist's *The Death of Identity (La scomparsa dell'identità)*, published in May 2023. As previously mentioned, the publishing house was cofounded by Giubilei and Giorgio Regnani in 2013—after the two had formed a partnership when Regnani invested in Giubilei's first publishing business, *Historica*. Among the many well-known far-right authors published by the two publishing houses associated with Giubilei and Nazione Futura—*Historica* and Giubilei Regnani Editore—is Vincenzo Sofo (b. 1986) (*Sovereignism: An Opportunity for Europe*), an FDI MEP and husband of Marion Maréchal Le Pen (b. 1989) (niece of National Rally leader Marine Le Pen and Vice Chair of Éric Zemmour's (b. 1958) far-right Reconquête! party).

International Collaborators

Nazione Futura lists several international collaborators, including *The European Conservative*, the Edmund Burke Foundation,¹⁰¹ the National Conservatism Conference,¹⁰² and the Alliance for the Common Good.¹⁰³ (See below for more on these partnerships.)

⁹⁴ Benoist, Alain de. 2023. "Riconoscimento degli altri o negazione delle differenze." *Nazione Futura* 20: 82–84.

⁹⁵ See Fantini's LinkedIn page: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/alvinomariofantini/>.

⁹⁶ See Larson's LinkedIn page: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/sven-larson-685aa190/>.

⁹⁷ See Calvete's LinkedIn page: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/carlos-perona-calvete-274a64197/?originalSubdomain=lu>.

⁹⁸ See the Center's LinkedIn page: <https://www.linkedin.com/company/centro-studi-nazione-futura/about/>.

⁹⁹ Redazione. 2021. "A Roma Nazione Futura apre la Casa dei Conservatori." *Destra*, November 15. <https://www.destra.it/home/a-roma-nazione-futura-apre-la-casa-dei-conservatori/>.

¹⁰⁰ For more on Giubilei Regnani Editore, see Chapter II.

¹⁰¹ For the Burke Foundation, see: <https://burke.foundation/>.

¹⁰² For the National Conservatism Conference, see: <https://nationalconservatism.org/>.

¹⁰³ For the Alliance for the Common Good, see: <https://theafcg.com/en/>.

Linkages to the Italian Far Right

Beyond its organizational structure and the links it provides to right-wing circles, *Nazione Futura*'s leaders are also largely drawn from the networks surrounding FdI and its affiliated organizations. As previously mentioned, Giubilei was appointed a special advisor to the FdI Minister of Culture immediately after the Meloni government took office in October 2022. Other members of leadership further illustrate these links to FdI.

Nazione Futura Vice President **Ferrante de Benedictis** (b. ca. 1981) is an FdI member of the Torino City Council—he ran on the FdI list in the 2021 local election but did not win a seat;¹⁰⁴ however, he was appointed to the city council in June 2023 to replace the outgoing FdI counselor Paola Ambrogio.¹⁰⁵ In 2020, he also published a book with Giubilei Regnani Editore entitled, *Man, the Guardian of Nature*. Additionally, the organization's Regional Director, **Francesco Ciro Miale** (b. 1976), has been the FdI Director of Communications in Puglia since 2021.¹⁰⁶

Linkages to the European Far Right

Just as *Nazione Futura* serves as a key hub of conservative cultural production and activity for the Italian Far Right, so too does it play a central role as a nexus between the Italian and European Far Right. Several prominent linkages are as follows:

The European Conservative

The European Conservative is published “in collaboration with” *Nazione Futura*, Bibliothek des Konservatismus in Berlin, and CEDI/EDIC in Vienna. Giubilei has been listed as a member of the editorial board of the journal since 2021. Furthermore, the Iliad Institute also lists the journal as a partner, linking *Nazione Futura* to the French New Right of Dominique Venner (1935–2013), Alain de Benoist (b. 1943), and Jean-Yves Le Gallou (b. 1948). As mentioned above, several writers frequently contribute to both *The European Conservative* and *Nazione Futura* (magazine), including Sven R. Larson (b. ca. 1974)¹⁰⁷ and Carlos Perona Calvete (b. ca. 1990).¹⁰⁸

Alliance for the Common Good

Nazione Futura is one of five far-right think tanks that founded the Alliance for the Common Good, which was publicly launched during a gathering in Warsaw, Poland, on October 21, 2021.¹⁰⁹ The formation of the Alliance was spearheaded by the Center for Fundamental Rights (Hungary)¹¹⁰ and

¹⁰⁴ NA. 2021. “Elezioni Comunali 2021 – Risultati Comune di Torino (Piemonte). *La Stampa*, October 18. <https://elezioni.lastampa.it/2021/elezioni-comunali/piemonte/torino>; for his personal website, see: <https://www.ferrantedebenedictis.it/>.

¹⁰⁵ Redazione. 2023. “Torino, Ferrante De Benedictis entra in consiglio comunale: sostituisce Paola Ambrogio.” *Torino Today*, June 12. <https://www.torinotoday.it/politica/ferrante-de-benedictis-consigliere-comunale-fratelli-d-italia.html>.

¹⁰⁶ Redattore. 2021. “Grottaglie: Ciro Francesco Miale e il nuovo responsabile della comunicazione di Fratelli d'Italia.” *RTM*, January 10. <https://www.rtmweb.it/grottaglie-ciro-francesco-miale-e-il-nuovo-responsabile-della-comunicazione-di-fratelli-d-italia/>.

¹⁰⁷ For Larson's LinkedIn, see: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/sven-larson-685aa190/>.

¹⁰⁸ For Calvete's LinkedIn, see: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/carlos-perona-calvete-274a64197/?originalSubdomain=lu>.

¹⁰⁹ For an overview of the Alliance for the Common Good, see: <https://theafcg.com/en/>; <https://theafcg.com/en/press/alliance-for-the-common-good-the-center-for-fundamental-rights-announces-a-new-european-cooperation/>.

¹¹⁰ For the Center for Fundamental Rights, see: <https://alapjogokert.hu/en/>.

Ordo Iuris (Poland),¹¹¹ which are close to the far-right Fidesz and PiS parties in Hungary and Poland, respectively. They were joined by three additional cofounding organizations, Human Rights and Family Policy Institute (Slovakia),¹¹² Alliance for the Family (Czech Republic), and Nazione Futura (Italy).¹¹³

At the founding event, the Alliance's vice president, Miklós Szánthó (Director of the Center for Fundamental Rights), stated that the organization sought to defend "God, Family, and Country" in the midst of the new "ideological Cold War."¹¹⁴ The organization's mission statement declares its support for "Christian values" and "human rights based on natural law." It advocates for strongly conservative positions on typical culture war issues, such as same-sex marriage and reproductive rights.

Edmund Burke Foundation and National Conservatism Conference

The Edmund Burke Foundation¹¹⁵ is a think tank that promotes "national conservatism." It was founded in January 2019 and quickly built an international network by hosting conferences in London (May 13, 2019),¹¹⁶ Washington, DC (July 14–16, 2019),¹¹⁷ and Rome (February 3–4, 2020).¹¹⁸ The speakers at the Rome conference included a who's-who of European and Italian far-right figures, including Giorgia Meloni, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Marion Maréchal Le Pen, Francesco Giubilei, Alvino-Mario Fantini, and John O'Sullivan. Since these initial gatherings, the Edmund Burke Foundation has held additional National Conservatism (NatCon) Conferences¹¹⁹ in Orlando (2021), Brussels (2022), Miami (2022), and London (2023).

Nazione Futura entered the political scene in 2017 as an organization promising a grassroots, youthful, and citizen-centered approach to politics. Publicly, it disavowed traditional party politics and promised citizens an opportunity to be heard by those in power. Yet, upon closer inspection, these talking points were little more than a façade to disguise a rigidly conservative agenda. As the organization gained its footing in the years after its founding, its true colors became clearer—its close connections with FdI, its new relationships with far-right think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe, and Giubilei's rising star in far-right circles all promise to return Italian politics "back to the future."

¹¹¹ For Ordo Iuris, see: <https://en.ordoiuris.pl/>.

¹¹² For the Human Rights and Family Policy Institute, see: <https://www.hfi.sk/>.

¹¹³ For the Alliance for the Family, see: <https://alipro.cz/>.

¹¹⁴ For the press release announcing the formation of the Alliance for the Common Good, see: <https://theafcg.com/en/press/alliance-for-the-common-good-the-center-for-fundamental-rights-announces-a-new-european-cooperation/>.

¹¹⁵ For the Burke Foundation, see: <https://burke.foundation/>.

¹¹⁶ For the London speakers, see: <https://nationalconservatism.org/natcon-london-2019/>.

¹¹⁷ For the Washington speakers, see: <https://nationalconservatism.org/natcon-dc-2019/>.

¹¹⁸ For the Rome speakers, see: <https://nationalconservatism.org/natcon-rome-2020/>.

¹¹⁹ For an overview of the National Conservatism Conference, see: <https://nationalconservatism.org/about/>.

Chapter IV: Tatarella Foundation

“...on a political level, I took [lessons] in particular from a man who taught me the values of dialogue and harmony: the Honorable [Giuseppe] Tatarella.”

—Ignazio La Russa¹²⁰

Beyond his links to FdI, Francesco Giubilei and his *Nazione Futura* are also embedded in the network of organizations that surround the party. Most notably, since 2018 Giubilei has been president of the Tatarella Foundation, a neofascist archive and cultural organization named in honor of the longtime MSI figure Giuseppe Tatarella (1935–99).¹²¹ Its stated aim is to “conserve the patrimony of the Italian Right” and the organization views Tatarella as “father of the Italian democratic Right and point of reference for the entire Italian center-right and moderates.”¹²² As mentioned in Chapter I, both Tatarella brothers were longtime leaders of MSI and Giuseppe was a founder of *Giovane Italia*. Furthermore, their foundation continues to keep the legacy of the MSI alive through courses, events, a growing archive, and other activities to preserve the memory of the neofascist Right and support its contemporary political heirs.

Background on Giuseppe Tatarella

Giuseppe Tatarella (1935–99) was the oldest of four children born to Cesidio Tatarella (1908–84) and Anna Melluso Tatarella (1912–93).¹²³ While the family was not known to have been particularly politically active or invested in the fascist cause, it sympathized with the Right and was active in the conservative Catholic subculture of the Ventennio. Giuseppe in particular was active in his parish chapter of *Azione Cattolica* as a boy, where he is known to have developed a strong anti-communism that animated his future endeavors.¹²⁴ Furthermore, he was allegedly close with his school principal, who was a fascist sympathizer and early supporter of MSI.¹²⁵ Thus, through a confluence of influences, Giuseppe entered university in the early 1950s with a strongly conservative, anti-communist political vision. He quickly translated his ideas into action after falling in with the nascent youth groups forming around the MSI. As previously stated, he was among the founding members of *Giovane Italia* in 1954, which brought together various organizations under a single, unified structure. During the same period, he was active in the newly created FUAN and represented the group in the Italian National University Representative Union.

Throughout his career, Giuseppe Tatarella was known to be among the “mainstream” members of the MSI who supported the electoral path to power and represented the party in the Chamber of Deputies from 1979 until his death in 1999 (he also served in elected roles in regional government beginning 1962). Most importantly, he was a critical supporter of Fini’s transformation of the party in 1994—his

¹²⁰ Sanfrancesco, Antonio. 2022. “Tatarella, il Papa e l’omaggio a segre. Chi è il president del Senato.” *Famiglia Cristiana*, October 13. <https://www.famigliacristiana.it/articolo/ignazio-la-russa-ecco-chi-e-il-nuovo-presidente-del-senato->.aspx.

¹²¹ “Chi siamo.” Fondazione Tatarella. <https://www.fondazionegiuseppetatarella.it/chi-siamo/>.

¹²² “Chi siamo.” Fondazione Tatarella. <https://www.fondazionegiuseppetatarella.it/chi-siamo/>.

¹²³ His siblings were Nicola (b. 1936), Matteo (b. 1940), and Salvatore (b. 1947).

¹²⁴ Reports suggest Giuseppe did not participate in the fascist youth program “Balilla,” discussed in Chapter I. Given his age, this is possible. See: Giubilei, Francesco (ed.). 2019. *Pinuccio Tatarella: Passione e intelligenza al servizio dell’Italia*. Rome: Giubilei Regnani. <https://www.fondazionegiuseppetatarella.it/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Pinuccio-Tatarella.pdf>.

¹²⁵ Giubilei, 2019, *Pinuccio Tatarella*.

alleged ability to finesse and coax opponents to his viewpoint earned him the nickname “minister of harmony.” In terms of actual ministerial roles, he served as Deputy Prime Minister in Silvio Berlusconi’s first cabinet (1994–95) and he chaired National Alliance’s parliamentary group from 1995–99.

Giuseppe Tatarella’s political career encapsulates the transformation and mainstreaming that characterized the MSI/AN of the 1990s—and even more so, the FdI of the 2020s. His roots were clearly in the neofascist milieu of the immediate postwar years, but he managed to spin his ideology and personal history as “democratic Right” or “center Right.” In fact, only three days before his death he boldly asserted, “I have never been fascist, I have always been nationalist, Catholic, democratic, and anti-communist.”¹²⁶ While to those looking closely this assertion is hard to believe—his public reception, especially across the Right, suggests he largely succeeded in remaking the image of not only himself, but the party to which he dedicated his career.

The Foundation

The Tatarella Foundation was established in 2002 by Salvatore Tatarella in honor of his brother, Giuseppe.¹²⁷ The organization’s original purpose was to serve as an archive for the papers of the recently deceased Giuseppe (d. 1999), who spent approximately 50 years in Italian politics. Yet as it grew, its collection increasingly incorporated materials relevant to the entire history of the MSI. It currently serves as a cultural hub for the Italian Far Right, offering a variety of activities and services. The headquarters, in the Tatarella family’s hometown of Bari, regularly holds evening “political formation” classes and also hosts a library with hundreds of volumes (in addition to the contents of the Tatarella archive). The foundation’s website also provides a variety of digitized archival material—such as speeches delivered by Tatarella, copies of the MSI’s and AN’s election manifestos, and historical photos from the MSI’s history.¹²⁸

Upon its founding in 2002, the Foundation’s president was Emilio Nicola Buccio (b. 1940), a member of MSI/AN who was a senator from 2006–08 and mayor of Matera from 2007–09. Upon Giubilei’s appointment as president in January 2018, he was joined on the board (*consiglio di amministrazione*) by: Fabrizio Tatarella (son of Salvatore) as Vice President; Lorenzo Ranieri as Deputy Vice President; Angiola Filipponio (widow of Giuseppe); and Anna Tatarella (niece of Giuseppe). Among those also appointed to the scientific committee were: FdI senator Adolfo Urso and then-journalist (current Minister of Culture) Gennaro Sangiuliano.¹²⁹ On January 28, 2023, Giubilei and all the members of the board were reconfirmed for another 5-year term.¹³⁰ While no one was removed, the board was expanded to include Francesco Divella (b. 1944) (administrator for the region of Puglia). Accountant Giovanni Furioso was named auditor.

¹²⁶ Ciccarelli, Enrico. N.d. *L’onorevole Giuseppe Tatarella*. Città di Cerignola.


¹²⁷ For more on the Foundation, see: <https://www.fondazionegiuseppetatarella.it/la-fondazione/>.

¹²⁸ “Archivio della Destra.” Fondazione Tatarella. <https://www.fondazionegiuseppetatarella.it/archivio-della-destra/>; “Foto gallery.” Fondazione Tatarella. <https://www.fondazionegiuseppetatarella.it/foto-giuseppe-tatarella/>.

¹²⁹ For a complete list, see: <https://www.fondazionegiuseppetatarella.it/chi-siamo/>.

¹³⁰ Redazione. 2023. “Fondazione Tatarella, nominato il nuovo Cda: Francesco Giubilei confermato presidente.” *Bari Today*, January 30. <https://www.baritoday.it/attualita/fondazione-tatarella-nominato-nuovo-cda-francesco-giubilei-confermato-presidente.html>.

Graph 1. Tatarella family tree



Source: author's research

The Tatarella Foundation reveals in stark terms the lineage linking the postwar neofascist Right and the contemporary Italian Far Right. It was founded by a prominent member and leader of MSI in honor of his brother (a yet more central figure in the party's history), serves as an archive storing the party's physical legacy and promoting its heritage, and is now led by a rising star on the Italian far right who is active in a variety of organizations both within Italy and around Europe. Yet at the same time, it underscores the neofascist Right's relative success in "mainstreaming" itself in Italian politics. Few in the Italian media or political space would immediately connect Tatarella and today's FdI to the remnants of Mussolini's regime who founded MSI in 1946. Yet as this report has detailed, these connections do exist and are vital to understanding the Italian Far Right—not only its past, but its potential future.

Conclusions

“...right-wing culture has developed in recent years thanks to authors who were trained during the fascist period, but at the same time...fascism was not right-wing, or better yet, it was also right-wing but not only that, because it was made up of various souls and currents...”

—Francesco Giubilei¹³¹

More than one hundred years after Mussolini’s rise to power, the enduring legacy of Italian fascism has not been completely eclipsed. The victory of the Brothers of Italy in the September 2022 elections, the normalization of neofascist politicians, and the burgeoning network of far-right leaders, publications, and think tanks all suggest the political heirs of Il Duce are still a potent force in the Italian political environment.

Taking a close look at the legacy of right-wing youth organization—from the youth groups of the Ventennio, to the MSI’s youth recruitment and training structure, to today’s Nazione Futura—reveals a striking consistency in both the emphasis placed on “youth” among the Italian Right and the importance of new generations in keeping the movement robust and politically relevant. While numerous specific conclusions may be drawn from the preceding chapters, three particularly noteworthy findings stand out: (1) today’s Italian far right has striking linkages to historical fascism; (2) Nazione Futura and its founder, Francesco Giubilei, were clearly molded by such forces; and (3) Giubilei’s personal trajectory sheds light on the complex web of interconnections among both the Italian and European Far Right.

First, this investigation reinforces the notion that today’s Italian far right is not only ideologically, but also organizationally, descended from the fascism of the interwar years and the neofascism of the early postwar era. As has already been established, FdI is a direct heir of the MSI—which itself emerged as a vehicle for the remnants of Mussolini’s regime to reconstitute themselves after the war and reenter Italian politics. Likewise, the network of youth organizations and training camps established by the MSI from the 1950s onward were critical in launching the careers of numerous influential leaders—particularly Giorgia Meloni. And despite its promise of youthful renewal, Nazione Futura stands to serve a similar role in the Italian Right of the twenty-first century.

Yet, this evident lineage is often a stumbling block for individuals in the Italian far right, who struggle to articulate their relationship to historical fascism. As illustrated by the epigraph opening this chapter, Francesco Giubilei goes to great lengths in his writings to reject the association with fascism—although he struggles to do so and winds up admitting that fascism was, indeed, a phenomenon of the Right (perhaps involving various “souls and currents” of the Right, but on the Right nonetheless). Likewise, his adamant claims that his family was “antifascist” are belied by his grandfather’s veritable collection of memorabilia from the Ventennio—items that clearly illustrate the family’s fascist sympathies.

Second, Nazione Futura and Francesco Giubilei’s professional trajectory reflect the Evolian current that has existed in neofascist youth movements for more than 70 years. His rise to prominence in far-right publishing and development as a nodal figure within a burgeoning far-right network (both within Italy and across Europe) make him a poster child for the “new ruling class...of believers and fighters” envisioned by Evola (quoted in Chapter I). Perhaps most notably, Giubilei’s leadership of the Tatarella Foundation makes his links with the MSI and Evola’s legacy indisputable (recall that the MSI’s youth

¹³¹ Giubilei, Francesco. 2018. *Storia della Cultura di Destra*. Historica Edizioni: 6.

organization, *Giovane Italia*, was co-founded by Giuseppe Tatarella in 1954 and adopted as its manifesto Evola's "Youth Charter").

Third, *Nazione Futura* sheds light on the robust transnational linkages between various groups of the European Far Right. For example, the organization is a "collaborator" in the publication of *The European Conservative*—linking it to other partner organizations, specifically the Bibliothek des Konservatismus in Berlin and CEDI/EDIC in Vienna. Additionally, *The European Conservative* partners with the Iliade Institute, further linking *Nazione Futura* to the French Nouvelle Droite of Venner, De Benoist, and Le Gallou. Likewise, the organization has also looked eastward to develop similar partnerships—*Nazione Futura* is a founding member of the Alliance for the Common Good and Giubilei has represented the organization in Hungary on numerous occasions. The sheer multiplicity of activities in which *Nazione Futura* is involved attests to the truly transnational nature of today's European Far Right.

Thus, the story of *Nazione Futura* is one of historical continuity, not change; of the past, not the future. More worryingly, *Nazione Futura* is not unique—it is one of a growing number of organizations across Europe intent on collaborating in order to realize their shared goal of overcoming the progress achieved over the past century and sending Europe "back to the future."