



Framing of Hungarian Youth Resistance Movements by Pro-Government Media under the Illiberal Orbán Governments

ESZTER KIRS

Abstract

The post-2010 Orbán governments and the pro-government media have systematically run smear campaigns targeting political parties, independent institutions, and civil society, depicting them as enemies of the nation or Hungarian people. Youth resistance movements have not been exempted from this illiberal, populist practice. From 2010 on, all major student protests against governmental policies have been responded to with negative communication campaigns aimed at discrediting protesters in the eyes of the broader public. How protests impact public opinion largely depends on the type of media coverage. Marginalization techniques applied in the government-dependent mass media can have a devastating effect on their ability to influence public discourse. Arguments and messages of youth resistance movements regarding public affairs fall out of focus and are replaced by the identity of the protesters. In this context, through a qualitative discourse analysis of Hungarian print and online written media outlets, I explored and identified the most frequent marginalization techniques applied in newspaper reports by Hungarian pro-government media while framing four waves of post-2010 youth protests. I demonstrate with illustrative examples how these techniques—namely authentic sources used in a biased way, depicting protesters as puppets of internal and external enemies, emphasizing unacceptable behavior of protesters, and ridiculing the events—serve the governmental goal of discrediting protesters.

Keywords: youth resistance, marginalization techniques, protest paradigm, illiberalism, populism, Hungary

Eszter Kirs,
Associate Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary
eszter.kirs@uni-corvinus.hu

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Youth resistance movements under the illiberal post-2010 Orbán governments have been subjected to multiple smear campaigns disseminated through pro-government media. Negative communication depicting them as non-autonomous entities manipulated by opposition political parties and the foreign liberal elite fits into illiberal and populist narratives on enemies of the nation. Creating and using enemy images provide a regular tool in general political discourse. In illiberal political systems, this tool is applied in extreme forms. Political adversaries and outcast social groups are presented as existential threats in the Hungarian governmental rhetoric, threats to the nation or to the Hungarian people. This framing aims to strengthen loyalty to the government, to depict the illiberal leader as the protector of the nation and the people, to polarize society, to maintain the illusion of the necessity of extraordinary governmental measures, and to shrink the space of political opponents in potentially impacting the public discourse. Under the post-2010 Orbán governments, media benefiting from the illiberal political system is expected to enhance governmental messages and to promote the illiberal narratives.¹ They have regularly applied marginalization techniques to frame post-2010 youth protests and to serve the governmental objective to discredit protesters. The present paper explores the marginalization techniques most frequently applied by government-dependent media while reporting on protests organized by youth, namely, the 2012–13 protests of the Student Network (Hallgatói Hálózat, HaHa), demonstrations organized for Central European University (CEU) in 2017–18, the FreeSZFE protests in 2020 (SZFE: Színház- és Filmművészeti Egyetem, University of Theatre and Film Arts), and 2022–23 peaceful assemblies organized by the United Student Front (Egységes Diákfront: EDF). I conducted a qualitative discourse analysis through a random selection of articles from print and online written media outlets covering youth protests in their most intense periods. The discussion of the findings will be preceded by a contextual introduction of the strategy of enemy-making in the illiberal political system of Hungary and an explanation of the term ‘youth resistance movements’ under the post-2010 Orbán governments.

Illiberal Narratives of Enemies

Democracy is not only a set of procedures simply serving the goal of selecting a leader who then can govern as a central power without consideration being given to the social and political reality of pluralism. In a pluralistic democracy, competing political groups acknowledge each other’s legitimate standing in politics. If they lose in democratic elections, they accept the outcome until the next round of contests. If they win the majority of votes, they do not question the legitimacy of political opponents, and acknowledge the interests of those citizens who got into the political minority at the ballot boxes.² This rule of the democratic game bears no value for illiberal populist actors who strive for the centralization of power based on majoritarian arguments. They claim to be the sole representatives of the people and describe political opponents as a malevolent elite misrepresenting its interests, thereby questioning their legitimacy in representing any citizens’ interests. According to the Schmittian notion of democracy³ embraced by populist, illiberal

¹ András Sajó, *Ruling by Cheating: Governance in Illiberal Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 110.

² Michael Ignatieff, “The Politics of Enemies,” *Journal of Democracy* 33, no. 4 (October 2022), 7, <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-politics-of-enemies/>.

³ According to the 20th-century German political philosopher Carl Schmitt, democracy is the self-rule of people, in a democratic system, meaning that the decisions of the ruler express the will of the people. He dissociated democracy from liberalism, and claimed that democracy itself has no political content: it is only an organizational form that can be used to justify whatever kind of political goals the people may want—be they liberal, conservative, socialist, or anything else.

leaders like Viktor Orbán, an unconstrained leader embodies the homogeneous mass of the people, and democracy is nothing more than a set of formal procedures serving his selection.⁴

In the autocratization process of illiberal democracies, the concentration of political power needs to be justified. This is largely facilitated by populist and nativist rhetoric, and the identification of enemies.⁵ Political rhetoric generally can be distanced from actual social realities, as it aims to create plausible narratives for the persuasion of voters.⁶ In an illiberal political system based on the exclusion of pluralism, the narratives of the illiberal ruler and the beneficiaries of its patronage system⁷ are based on the denial of the legitimate standing of opponents or the interests of citizens not belonging to the homogeneous, ethnocentric, nativist notion of the people. This does not reflect social realities; the narratives on enemies do not build on divisions in society or the beliefs of its members. As Ignatieff has put it, “it may be a language game not to represent grievance, but to create it, and to polarize for the sake of political advantage.”⁸

Creating and using enemy images in the political discourse are not new phenomena and do not merely characterize illiberal political systems. In illiberal democracies, enemy-making is strongly characterizing the political narrative; the enemy is usually depicted as dishonest, amoral, and disloyal, and as an existential threat to the community. While the enemy was traditionally an external actor, in modern politics, the enemy is externalized because it is an enemy. Maintaining enemy images contributes to the maintenance of the imagined political community represented by the illiberal government. In the Hungarian illiberal political system, this imaginary community is the nation in political rhetoric targeting foreign enemies, and real Hungarians in case of internal opponents. Collective enemy images, by triggering strong emotions and strengthening loyalty, facilitate mobilization by the illiberal ruler.⁹

Populists in power apply conflictive narratives qualifying political adversaries not as opponents but enemies, not only to trigger in-group identity but also to maintain the illusion of the constant need for extraordinary executive measures, to strengthen the charisma of the leader as the ultimate protector of the people,¹⁰ and to undermine the legitimacy of domestic opponents and thereby limit their opportunity to effectively disseminate views or mobilize against their power.¹¹ The aim might not be to annihilate the enemies but to undermine their chances to impact public discourse,

4 Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, Xie Libin, Haig Patapan, Gábor Halmai, Acar Kutay, Petra Guasti, and William E. Scheurman, “Carl Schmitt and Democratic Backsliding,” *Contemporary Political Theory* 22 (March 2023), 426–427. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-023-00625-5>.

5 Andrea L. P. Pirro and Ben Stanley, “Forging, Bending, and Breaking: Enacting the ‘Illiberal Playbook’ in Hungary and Poland,” *Perspectives on Politics* 20, no. 1 (2022), 90. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592721001924>.

6 Ignatieff, “The Politics of Enemies,” 13.

7 Sajó, *Ruling by Cheating*, 110–111.

8 Ignatieff, “The Politics of Enemies,” 15.

9 Márton Gerő, Piotr P. Plucieniczak, Alena Kluknavska, Jiri Navrátil, and Kostas Kanellopoulos, “Understanding Enemy Images in Central and Eastern European Politics: Towards an Interdisciplinary Approach,” *Intersections: East European Journal of Society and Politics* 3, no. 3 (September 2017), 15–18. <https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v3i3.365>.

10 Ákos Kopper, Zsolt Körtvélyesi, Balázs Majtényi, András Szalai, “The ‘Insecurity Toolbox’ of the Illiberal Regime: Rule by Law and Rule by Exclusion,” *Political Anthropological Research on International Social Sciences* 1, no. 2 (December 2020), 217–218. <https://doi.org/10.1163/25903276-BJA10012>.

11 Ákos Kopper, Pál Susánszky, Gergely Tóth, and Márton Gerő, “Creating Suspicion and Vigilance: Using Enemy Images to Hinder Mobilization,” *Intersections: East European Journal of Society and Politics* 3, no. 3 (January 2017), 109–112. <https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v3i3.366>.

to exclude them, as illegitimate actors, from any meaningful role in politics.¹² Their legitimacy is challenged based on one of the essential characteristics of the system, namely the rejection of pluralistic political views.¹³

This phenomenon has been discussed also in the framework of delegitimization strategies in conflict-related studies. The concept is applied to putting groups into extreme negative social categories resulting in their exclusion from society or even humanity. Delegitimization enhances the differentiation of the in-group or the exploitation of the out-group. Its methods include political labeling where the out-group is defined as affiliated with a rejected political group (for example, Communists), out-casting (treating groups as violators of law and social norms), trait characterization, and the exploitation of the delegitimized to delegitimize others (devaluation by association with a despised group).¹⁴

In the illiberal political system of the post-2010 Orbán governments, opponents have been framed as internal traitors or external enemies serving the post-Communist and international liberal elite's interests.¹⁵ Key targets have been the International Monetary Fund (IMF), George Soros,¹⁶ the European Union (EU), migrants, the LGBTQIA+ community, domestic Socialist and liberal political parties, opposition politicians, civil society organizations,¹⁷ journalists, and protest movements. In the focus of this "soft conspiracy theory"¹⁸ stands Orbán the charismatic leader protecting the independence and freedom of the authentic Hungarian people, true Hungarians. This nativist concept of society is excluding and labeling certain vulnerable social groups (for example, immigrants, the Roma, or the LGBTQIA+ community, any "aliens" by nativist standards).¹⁹

The illiberal, populist force in power denies the political opponents' legitimacy, and the standing of marginalized groups as part of the nation, thereby undermining their right to be believed or to be taken seriously.²⁰

Youth Resistance Movements Targeted by Hostile Rhetoric

For the present article, narratives on political opponents will be the context of discussion. The Orbán government and the government-dependent media have systematically run smear campaigns targeting political parties, independent institutions, and civil society as political opponents misrepresenting the interests of

¹² Sajó, *Ruling by Cheating*, 137.

¹³ András Körösiényi, Gábor Illés, and Attila Gyulai, *The Orbán Regime: Plebiscitary Leader Democracy in the Making* (London: Routledge, 2020), 51.

¹⁴ Chiara Volpato, Federica Durante, Alessandro Gabbiadini, Luca Andrighetto, and Silvia Mari, "Picturing the Other: Targets of Delegitimization across Time," *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 4, no. 2 (December 2010), 272–273, <https://doi.org/10.4119/ijcv-2831>; Joanna Rak, "Delegitimization strategies as a means of policing protesters online during the pandemic in Poland," *Revista de Sociologia e Política* 30, no. 7 (October 2022), 5, <https://doi.org/10.1590/1678-98732230e007>.

¹⁵ Körösiényi, Illés, and Gyulai, *The Orbán Regime*, 59–60.

¹⁶ George Soros is a Hungarian-born American financier, author, philanthropist, founder of the Open Society Foundations, and influential supporter of liberal social causes.

¹⁷ Márton Gera, "Here, the Hungarian people will decide how to raise our children': Populist rhetoric and social categorization in Viktor Orbán's anti-LGBTQ campaign in Hungary" *New Perspectives* 31, no. 2 (2023), 106–109. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X231164311>

¹⁸ Kopper, Susánszky, Tóth, and Gerő, "Creating Suspicion and Vigilance: Using Enemy Images to Hinder Mobilization," 120.

¹⁹ Pirro, "Forging, Bending, and Breaking," 94.

²⁰ Ignatieff, "The Politics of Enemies," 16.

Hungarian citizens. Youth in resistance have not been exempted from this illiberal practice. From 2010 on, all major student protests against governmental policies were responded to by negative communication campaigns aiming at discrediting protesters in the eyes of the public and trampling upon their right to be heard or to be taken seriously.

Hostile political propaganda framing political opponents as enemies can be disseminated by multiple actors of an illiberal political system: governmental figures, state authorities, and pro-government media. Media, especially with an extensive outreach to the Hungarian society, is particularly important not only regarding mass manipulation of voters but also the social function of peaceful protests, regular tools of collective dissent in a functioning democracy. Discrediting young protesters through such media has the potential to undermine the goal of protesters to communicate their views to the wider public, advocate for change and the peaceful demonstrations likely cease to be an inclusive forum of democratic debate.

Several beneficiaries of the patronage system maintained by the illiberal government of Hungary are expected to run a pro-government media to serve its interests in gaining public support.²¹ Government-dependency of the media in Hungary is based on major revenue from state advertising, ownership of governmental cronies, or centralized management of reporting aimed to promote governmental policies and narratives.²² Therefore, the exploration of government-dependent media reports also provides insight into illiberal narratives about youth resistance movements.

What do I mean by “youth resistance movements” under the post-2010 Orbán governments? There have been four major waves of youth resistance: protests organized by the Student Network (Hallgatói Hálózat, hereinafter HaHa) in 2012–13, for CEU in 2017–18, the FreeSZFE (SZFE: Színház- és Filmművészeti Egyetem, University of Theater and Film Arts) movement in 2020, and the more recent protests of secondary school students and the United Student Front in 2022–23.

The HaHa was established in 2006 and reinvigorated in 2011. In 2011, its first protest took place in June in response to governmental plans for the reorganization of the Corvinus University of Budapest. In October 2011, several smaller protests occurred in multiple university towns, including Budapest, against the governmental plans related to higher education. In 2011, a new governmental concept on higher education was issued.²³ The government planned a drastic restriction of admissions to state-funded programs (decreasing the number of state-funded places to 25%), the introduction of a student contract (obliging those attending state-funded programs to remain in the country for a fixed term after graduation), and the cut in public funding especially of programs in the social sciences and humanities. In 2012, sporadic protests were organized by the HaHa, but the most intensive period of HaHa actions started at the end of 2012. On December 10, a forum was held at the Eötvös Loránd University’s (ELTE) Faculty of Social Sciences followed by a spontaneous demonstrative march and the blockade of a bridge. The movement

²¹ Sajó, *Ruling by Cheating*, 110–111.

²² Gábor Polyák, “Media in Hungary: Three Pillars of an Illiberal Democracy,” in *Public Service Broadcasting and Media Systems in Troubled European Democracies*, eds. Eva Polonska and Charlie Beckett (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019): 279–303; Attila Bátorfy and Ágnes Urbán, “State Advertising as an Instrument of Transformation of the Media Market in Hungary,” *East European Politics* 36 no. 1 (January 2020): 44–65, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1662398>; Ildikó Kovács, Gábor Polyák, Ágnes Urbán, “Media Landscape after a Long Storm: The Hungarian Media Politics since 2010,” *Mertek Booklets* 25 (December 2021): 1–64, <https://mertek.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/MertekFuzetek25.pdf>.

²³ Index, “Kész a felsőoktatási törvény koncepciója,” Index (news site), September 14, 2011, https://index.hu/belfold/2011/09/14/kesz_a_felsooktatasi_torveny_koncepcioja/.

repeatedly organized protests until March 2013.²⁴ On February 11, 2013, following a mass demonstration in downtown Budapest, the protesting crowd led by the HaHa marched to the building of the ELTE Faculty of Humanities and occupied it. For 45 days, they stayed in one of the lecture halls, which provided the base for forums of democratic debate and the preparation of protests, flash mobs, and other collective demonstrative acts. Decisions of the movement were based on direct democratic procedures in plenary forums from the very early phase of protests. HaHa cells and protests were also organized in several college towns outside Budapest, in some cases joined by secondary school students. However, these units and the Budapest ones ceased their intense protesting operation and could not get to the next stage of organizational development.²⁵ The “first Hungarian university blockade” was terminated upon an agreement with the ELTE management about the constant availability of the lecture hall for future forums.²⁶ In January 2013, the government convened a series of roundtable discussions to involve the official representative bodies of higher education in negotiations. The HaHa was not invited. However, the government addressed multiple demands of protesters, and most importantly, the number of admissions for state-funded programs was increased.²⁷

The second wave of youth protests was related to Central European University. The institution’s degree programs were accredited in the United States, but as a university, it was also accredited in Hungary, having had its campus in Budapest. In 2017, CEU was targeted by a special law. The amendments to the Hungarian national higher education law forced CEU to offer programs in the state of New York. The legislation also required an international treaty to be concluded within six months of the publication of the law and to register programs in the institution’s country of origin within less than nine months. There was not sufficient time to comply with these requirements. The expectations were not based on any considerations regarding potential educational benefits and would have incurred needless financial and human resource costs.²⁸ The law was adopted at the time of an extensive governmental smear campaign against CEU, and its founder, George Soros, unfoundedly charging it with fraud, illegitimate privileges gained by corruption, and illegal acts.²⁹ It was embedded in the illiberal, populist governmental strategy to distract by speaking about external enemies and to create an image of the government as the protector of the people. Minister of Human Resources Zoltán Balog, who submitted the bill in Parliament, publicly stated that “it is in Hungary’s interest to support the existence of a strong, autonomous and internationally acknowledged university, but it is not in her interest to support people serving foreign interests, who work against the democratically elected government, such as the Soros organizations.”³⁰ At the same

24 Márton Gerő and Pál Susánszky, “Hallgatói mozgalmak és felsőoktatási politika,” *Educatio* 1 (Spring 2014), 123–125, <http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/17842>.

25 Pál Susánszky and Márton Gerő, “A Hallgatói Hálózat mobilizációs jellemzői,” in *Racionálisan lázadó hallgatók II.: Apátia - radikálizmus - posztmaterializmus a magyar egyetemisták és főiskolások körében*, ed. Andrea Szabó (Budapest: Belvedere Meridionale, 2014), 136–137.

26 Eduline, “Így ért véget a másfél hónapos egyetemfoglalás az ELTE-n” *Eduline*, March 27, 2013, https://eduline.hu/felsoktatasi/Igy_ert_veget_a_masfel_honapos_egyetemfoglalo_VEIQ81.

27 Index, “Felsőoktatási kerekasztal alakul,” Index (news site), January 11, 2013, <https://index.hu/belfold/2013/01/11/balog-hook/>.

28 Central European University, “Summary of the Legislative Changes and Their Impact on the CEU,” April 7, 2017, CEU website, https://www.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/attachment/basic_page/18010/summaryoflegislativechangesandimpact7.4.17.pdf.

29 Balázs Trencsényi, Alfred J. Rieber, Constantin Iordachi, and Adela Hincu, “Academic Freedom in Danger: Fact Files on the ‘CEU Affair’” *Comparative Southeast European Studies* 65, no. 2 (July 2017), <https://doi.org/10.1515/soeu-2017-0024>.

30 HVG, “Balog Zoltán először szólalt meg a CEU ügyében,” HVG.hu (news site), April 4, 2017, https://hvg.hu/itthon/20170404_Balog_Zoltan_eloszor_szolalt_meg_a_CEU_ugyeben

time, CEU's persecution by the illiberal Orbán government was perceived as another shocking governmental attack on higher education by many Hungarians, including youth. CEU programs have attracted a high number of Hungarian students, its library has provided an excellent location for work by Hungarian researchers, and its events have enriched the academic and public discourse in Budapest. Thousands of Hungarian lecturers, researchers, students, and other citizens joined the CEU community in protests and other collective actions of resistance in 2017–2018.³¹ In 2020, the European Court of Justice held Hungary responsible for the violation of EU law,³² but the damage had been done, and CEU transferred its main location from Budapest to Vienna and launched its US-accredited degree programs there in 2019.³³

Between 2019 and 2021, almost all Hungarian universities were impacted by an overall reform of the higher education sector, the so-called model change. They were transformed from state-funded institutions into private ones managed by public interest trusts. These universities are now controlled by their boards of trustees. Real estate used for the universities' operation was transferred from the state to them or the trusts. The reform was carried out without any consultation with those affected, excluding students and faculty from the decision-making process. The selection of trustees was not transparent; they were appointed by the government. The boards of trustees were filled with members of the government, and government-friendly political and economic stakeholders, which has been subject to official criticism by European institutions due to rule-of-law-related concerns and the protection of the EU budget.³⁴ The decision-making power of the senates of universities has been significantly restricted.³⁵ In August 2020, the government also established the board of trustees of the University of Theater and Film Arts. On September 1, 2020, all decision-making power of the SZFE Senate was transferred to the board of trustees without consultation with the representatives of the university. Leaders and lecturers of the SZFE resigned in protest. Students organized a street farewell party for the resigning faculty, thousands of supporters joined them, and the event grew into a demonstration and the occupation of the main SZFE building by students. The blockade of the university's central building lasted for 71 days, until November 9, 2020, when the government closed the university buildings due to the coronavirus pandemic, which decision the protesters complied with based on public health considerations. The majority of SZFE students and thousands of external supporters attended the collective actions during the blockade. The protesters created learning spaces within their "Education Republic," decision-making forums and their professional skills enabled them to apply innovative, theatrical tools, and street performances as new forms of protest in the Hungarian context. The government ignored the demands of the protesters, and the model change was implemented. The FreeSZFE protest community transformed into the FreeSZFE Association to provide

31 CEU, "Timeline of Events," <https://www.ceu.edu/istandwithceu/timeline-events>.

32 Commission v Hungary, Judgment, European Court of Justice (C-66/18), October 6, 2020.

33 Zsolt Enyedi, "Democratic Backsliding and Academic Freedom in Hungary," *Perspectives on Politics* 16, no. 4 (November 2018): 1067–1074, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592718002165>.

The Middle States Commission on Higher Education granted reaccreditation to CEU in June 2019. Central European University, "CEU Is Reaccredited as a US Degree Granting Institution," July 1, 2019, CEU website, <https://www.ceu.edu/article/2019-07-01/ceu-reaccredited-us-degree-granting-institution>.

34 Council of the European Union, Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506, December 15, 2022.

35 Gergely Kováts and Zoltán Rónay, *Academic Freedom in Hungary* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2021); Gergely Kováts, András Derényi, Gabriella Keczer, and Zoltán Rónay, "The Role of Boards in Hungarian Public Interest Foundation Universities," *Studies in Higher Education* (published ahead of print, July 12, 2023): 368–381, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03075079.2023.2234941>; András László Pap, "Academic Freedom: A Test and a Tool for Illiberalism, Neoliberalism, and Liberal Democracy," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* xxvi, no. ii (May 2021): 2–18; Andrew Ryder, *The Challenge to Academic Freedom in Hungary: A Case Study in Authoritarianism, Culture War and Resistance* (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2022).

an autonomous creative space worthy of the traditions of the former SZFE. By the FreeSZFE movement, I mean the collective of individuals who actively contributed to the 2020 series of protests and the blockade.³⁶

After the 2012–13 HaHa, the 2017–18 CEU, and the 2020 FreeSZFE protests, the fourth wave of youth resistance under the post-2010 Orbán governments started in 2022. In 2022–23, the main organizer on the students' side was the United Student Front (Egységes Diákkfront: EDF). The movement was born in the fall of 2022 around protests related to systemic problems in secondary education. The main concerns were the lack of proper funding for schools, the deterioration of material conditions, the low pay of teachers, the infringement on autonomy, the centralized determination of teaching content, and the extreme fluctuation among teachers with a high number of vacant posts. The students demanded an overall reform of the secondary education system aimed at resolving these problems, and they also demanded full respect for the right to strike.³⁷ (In 2022, teachers were dismissed from their teaching positions due to their strike related to the above systemic problems.) The EDF was active in public protests and marches, flash mobs, and sit-ins. Informal parents' and teachers' groups supported several actions of the EDF, and it operated in collaboration with other civil actors (especially those representing teachers), which facilitated mobilization for public protests. The government's response was limited to the perspective of wages, while the EDF organized collective protest actions with a broader focus on autonomy in secondary education.³⁸

Marginalization Techniques in the Pro-Government Media

All four communities of youth resistance were subjected to definite framing by government-dependent media outlets. Frames are essential for social movements. They enable us to identify and label social phenomena; they guide individual and collective actions. Framing is needed for self-identification and mobilization by social movements. Communication strategies built on frames are regular tools of their operation.³⁹ They facilitate the diagnoses of social or political occurrences, the planning of possible responsive strategies, motivations for action, the definition of the self, and opponents. A key element of the efficient application of frames by social movements is credibility, since they determine what messages reach public audiences and are held legitimate.⁴⁰ However, frames-based communication of social movements does not stand in isolation from other actors' framing in public discourse. Negative framing by the media can impact both the credibility and legitimacy of social movements in the eyes of the public and thereby the efficiency of their communication strategies. Since 2011, youth resistance movements in Hungary

36 See my article on the personal motivations of the members of the FreeSZFE movement based on interview-based research at: Eszter Kirs, "Historical reflection as a source of inspiration for youth resistance in illiberal regimes – A qualitative study of the FreeSZFE movement in Hungary," *Journal of Youth Studies* (published ahead of print, September 27, 2023): 1–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2023.2261861>.

37 Kitti Földi, "Öt pontból álló követeléslistát fogalmazott meg az Egységes Diákkfront" 444.hu (news site) October 23, 2022, <https://444.hu/2022/10/23/ot-pontbol-allo-kovetelest-fogalmazott-meg-az-egyseges-diakfront>.

38 Örs Székely and Ferenc Kőszeghy, "Egységes Diákkfront: Folytatják az országos ellenállást a tanulók," *Mérce* (news site), October 27, 2022, <https://merce.hu/pp/2022/10/27/nemcsak-budapestet-olelik-kerbe-a-tanarokert-tuntetok-harminc-tankerulet-mozdul-meg-percrol-percre-a-mercen/egyseges-diakfront-folytatjak-az-oroszagos-ellenallast-a-tanulok/>; HVG, "Egységes Diákkfront: Szánalmas, hogy a kormány az uniós támogatásoktól tette függővé a pedagógusok bérét" HVG.hu (news site), January 14, 2024, https://hvg.hu/jitthon/20240114_Egyseges_Diakfront_Szanalmas_hogy_a_kormany_az_unios_tamogatásoktol_tette_fuggove_a_pedagogusok_beret.

39 Robert D. Benford, "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement," *Social Forces* 71, no. 3 (March 1993): 678–679, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2579890>.

40 Manuela Caiani, "Framing and Social Movements," *Discourse Studies* 25, no. 2 (2023): 196–199, <https://doi.org/10.1177/14614456231154734>.

must have calculated such an impact of marginalization techniques applied by the illiberal, pro-government media.

The protest paradigm and framing theories provide an ideal basis for identifying marginalization and discrediting techniques applied in the cases of protests organized by them. Negative media coverage can decrease the perceived legitimacy of a politically deviant protesting group.⁴¹ According to the protest paradigm, groups that threaten the status quo (in an illiberal setting, the existing political system itself) are more likely to receive negative treatment from the media. The extent to which such a group poses a threat has been referred to as the “level of deviance.”⁴² The more deviant a group is, the more negative, critical, and even degrading media coverage it can expect, while mass media has extensive power to shape political reality.⁴³ Social movements and protesters depend on media while trying to communicate their arguments to the broader public and obtain legitimacy.⁴⁴ Protests impact public opinion and public policy depending on the amount and type of media coverage, and the framing of the protests has a significant influence on the relevant public discourse.⁴⁵ Therefore, negative media coverage endangers their goals since it is characterized by framing techniques⁴⁶ that aim to marginalize or even discredit protesters by presenting them as a ridiculous, disorganized, as the decadent mob.⁴⁷

Framing techniques applied in negative media coverage targeting young protesters fit into the toolkit of an illiberal, populist government. They point to the essence of public affairs as the government expects its citizens to see, and they suggest how individuals should think about it. In this context, the governmental actions or failures subjected to dissent fall out of focus and are replaced by the identity of the protesters. In this narrative, threatening behavior is broadly interpreted, including not only acts of violence but also peaceful demonstrations. Emphasis is put on the decadence of protesters in a broad behavioral sense. Previous research has demonstrated that the mass media in the hands of the Hungarian populist government frequently uses marginalization techniques explored in the protest paradigm. Pro-government media was found to differ from government-critical media in its use of derogatory language aimed to introduce frames of illegitimacy.⁴⁸ Protest is seen and shown not as a regular tool of a democratic society, but as an existential threat to the nation. Marginalization techniques applied by the pro-government media exist in a harsher

41 Frank E. Dardis, “Marginalization Devices in U.S. Press Coverage of Iraq War Protest: A Content Analysis,” *Mass Communication & Society* 9, no. 2 (2006): 117–135, https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327825mcs0902_1.

42 Michael P. Boyle and Cory L. Armstrong, “Measuring Level of Deviance: Considering the Distinct Influence of Goals and Tactics on News Treatment of Abortion Protests,” *Atlantic Journal of Communication* 17, no. 4 (November 2009): 167, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15456870903156134>.

43 Joseph Man Chan and Chin-Chuan Lee, “The Journalistic Paradigm on Civil Protests: A Case Study of Hong Kong,” in *The News Media in National and International Conflict*, ed. Andrew Arno and Wimal Dissanayake (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984): 183–202.

44 David A. Weaver, Joshua M. Scacco, “Revisiting the Protest Paradigm: The Tea Party as Filtered through Prime-Time Cable News,” *International Journal of Press/Politics* 18, no. 1 (January 2013): 61–84, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161212462872>.

45 Shannon Campbell, Phil Chidester, Jamel Bell, and Jason Royer, “Remote Control: How Mass Media Delegitimize Rioting as Social Protest,” *Race, Gender & Class* 11, no. 1 (January 2004): 158–176.; Maria Kyriakidou, Jose Javier Olivás Osuna, “The Indignados Protests in the Spanish and Greek Press: Moving beyond the ‘Protest Paradigm?’” *European Journal of Communication* 32, no. 5 (July 2017): 457–472, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323117720342>.

46 Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (September 1993): 51–58.

47 Boyle and Armstrong, “Measuring Level of Deviance”: 166–183.

48 Pál Susánszky, Ákos Kopper, Frank T. Zsigó, “Media Framing of Political Protests: Reporting Bias and the Discrediting of Political Activism,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 38, no. 4 (April 2022): 312–328, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2061817>.

form in illiberal political systems than in established democracies; they aim not only to marginalize but to discredit protesters. They are framed as enemies of the nation, and as the kind of Hungarians who should be excluded from legitimate participation in politics. My analysis aims to fill the gap in the academic discourse regarding discrediting techniques used by the Hungarian illiberal government while targeting youth resistance movements.

Qualitative Discourse Analysis of Print and Online Media

For my qualitative discourse analysis, I randomly selected articles from print and online written media outlets covering youth protests in their most intense periods. They include 2012 and 2013 reports in the daily newspapers *Magyar Hírlap* and *Magyar Nemzet* regarding the HaHa; 2017–2018 articles in the daily newspaper *Magyar Idők*, and the online news portal Pesti Srácok, regarding the CEU-related protests; 2020 reports on the FreeSZFE protests by the online news portal Origo and by county news portals belonging to the Central European Press and Media Foundation (Közép-Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány: KESMA, established in 2018); and 2023 reports in the *Magyar Nemzet* and on Origo about the secondary school student demonstrations. The analysis does not cover the social media presence of these media outlets since some of them did not have any social media profiles at the time of the demonstrations in focus (for example, the *Magyar Hírlap* reporting on the 2012–13 protests, created its Facebook profile in 2023). All the selected media outlets have either received almost all their advertising revenue from state advertising and thereby are financially dependent on the government, or they are closely tied to it by ownership.⁴⁹ I selected these marginalization techniques from the ones discussed in the relevant academic discourse that fit into the political context of the illiberal governance in Hungary, and analyzed the content of the articles to identify these techniques within the texts.

Based on the context-driven pre-selection of marginalization techniques, I found that in government-dependent media of the Hungarian illiberal political system, the following have been most frequently applied: (1) authentic sources applied in a biased way; (2) ridiculing the event; (3) emphasis on unacceptable (unlawful or decadent) behavior of protesters downplaying their arguments related to public affairs; and (4) depicting protesters not as autonomous, legitimately dissenting citizens, but as puppets of internal and external enemies serving their anti-governmental agenda instead. Members of youth resistance movements appear in the articles of pro-government media as non-autonomous, aggressively or decadently behaving individuals serving opposition political parties or foreign interests. In the following section, I will demonstrate these techniques by illustrative examples from randomly selected newspaper reports published during the protests and directly before or after them by pro-government, social, online and print media.

Decadent Youth Partying for the Enemies' Interests

Distorted use of authentic sources

Protesters can be marginalized through the unbalanced usage of official sources

49 Gábor Polyák, "Media in Hungary: Three Pillars of an Illiberal Democracy," in *Public Service Broadcasting and Media Systems in Troubled European Democracies*, eds. Eva Polonska and Charlie Beckett (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019): 279–303; Attila Bátorfy and Ágnes Urbán, "State Advertising as an Instrument of Transformation of the Media Market in Hungary," *East European Politics* 36, no. 1 (January 2020): 44–65; Ildikó Kovács, Gábor Polyák, and Ágnes Urbán, "Media Landscape after a Long Storm: The Hungarian Media Politics since 2010," *Mertek Booklets* 25 (December 2021): 1–64.

to enhance official narratives. However, the usage of authentic sources (revelation of the views and arguments of protesters or other individuals close to them) does not automatically result in balanced, unbiased reporting. The information gained from authentic sources can be distorted, and they can be applied in a biased way. For example, in the following report about the CEU protests, they were used to demonstrate that even persons close to the circles of protesters are worried about the irresponsible behavior of the protesters. “The Hungarian Times [Magyar Idők] was approached by a worried mother. She complained that her child, who is attending one of the elite private high schools of Budapest, is obliged to participate in protests because in this school, those who do not want to attend these ‘programs’ and thereby destroy team spirit, are excluded from the community. By the way, it is not surprising since numerous private high schools are financed by the Open Society.”⁵⁰ In another CEU-related report, the protesters’ statements were presented as not reliable, and exaggerated. “ ‘Protesters came from all over the country,’ shouted Gáspár Békés, who was involved in the public mood triggering CEU protest. He did not even reveal the whole truth: people came even from other countries. In fact, the super protest announced to be nationwide was pale. Where there were no music trucks, there was essentially nothing.”⁵¹ The report not only undermined the credibility of protesters but also ridiculed the event.

Ridiculing the event

The marginalization technique of ridiculing the event is one of the techniques, which has been most frequently applied by pro-government media while reporting about protests of youth resistance movements. They describe the protesters as infantile individuals marching on the streets for parties and not for the collective expression of dissent against governmental measures. Some articles, like the following one related to the CEU protests, even expressly suggest that protesters by nature cannot raise any reasonable or legitimate concern on public affairs, since they are incapable of consciously reflecting on them. “The majority of the crowd was just moving to Kossuth Square to demonstrate that they do not have too many ideas other than anti-Orbán and anti-Áder slogans, even though they routinely demanded entry to the Parliament. We can confidently interpret them singing the national anthem as indirectly admitting their inabilities, but since it would have been even more embarrassing for them to sing it for a third time, they opted for concealing their lack of ideas through repeated walks. They left large amounts of trash, especially empty bottles and cans of beer behind them, and returned to the Oktogon probably because of its strategic importance due to national tobacco shops and fast-food restaurants. There, the thing turned into a disco for good. ... The winners of the evening were, in order of successfulness, national tobacco shops selling beer, gyro sellers, homeless people collecting empty bottles, and last but not least, youth who attended the first large outdoor party at the Oktogon instead of Budapest Park.”⁵²

Protesters advocating for the protection of CEU were characterized as most worried about alcohol, tobacco, and food as essential conditions of their party while turning public spaces into bars and dance floors. According to these reports, there were sporadic attempts by organizers to speak up and pretend that a protest was

50 Kata Jurák, “Kormányellenes tüntetésekre mozgósítják a középiskolásokat is,” *Magyar Idők* (Budapest), November 23, 2018, <https://www.magyaridok.hu/belfold/kormanyellenes-tuntetesekre-mozgositjak-a-kozepiskolasokat-is-3695588/>.

51 László Vésey Kovács, “Így nem ment semmire a legújabb ‘gigatüntetés’ sem,” *Pesti Srácok* (news site), May 22, 2017, <https://pestisracok.hu/igy-nem-ment-semmire-legujabb-gigatuntetes-sem/>.

52 László Vésey Kovács, “Elzúgtak forradalmaink,” *Pesti Srácok* (news site), April 12, 2017, <https://pestisracok.hu/elzugtak-forradalmaink/>.

happening. In an article about a 2020 FreeSZFE protest, emphasis was similarly put on the alleged primary desire of protesters to party, by indicating that their behavior was not only infantile but also irresponsible considering public health concerns due to the covid-19 pandemic: “The coronavirus also appeared at the University of Theater Arts, but they still planned to have the street festival. The march, which was organized for the autonomy of the University of Theater and Film Arts, was launched at Heroes Square today at 5:00 p.m. The march ended at the University’s occupied building on Vas Street in a ‘carnival mood.’ No speeches were delivered.”⁵³

Focus on the decadent behavior of protesters

Pro-government media coverage downplays the arguments and causes behind the demonstrations, and instead emphasizes the outrageous or ridiculous characteristics and behavior of protesters. Words in these articles (such as troublemakers, aggressive protesters, attacks against the police) might shock or even scandalize the readers. These negative feelings can result in the rejection of protesters as a group no matter how most of the protesters behave or what public concerns are at stake. An article with the title, “Troublemakers Provoking the Police Might Get Away with It: They Do Not Find the Aggressive Protesters of Last Year’s Demonstration for CEU” went on to report: “Four investigations were carried out in the case of attacks against the police at the demonstration for CEU that took place on Lajos Kossuth Square on April 9, 2017. Only one resulted in a court hearing in the case of a perpetrator who hit one of the police in the head with a flagpole. Those who threw plastic bottles at the police were not found, just like the woman who pushed and provoked a young policeman.”⁵⁴ Negative characterization includes labeling, like in an early example related to the HaHa, where the political label of “Communist” was applied to trigger negative emotions for the protesters: “It is very telling about their political motivations that they frequently refer to the Paris student revolt of 1968, which knowingly occurred under the flag of Communist slogans.”⁵⁵

Since the CEU protests, pro-government media outlets’ reports have become harsher in their tone and more biased than earlier articles covering the HaHa protests, like the following one from 2013 (the early phase of the illiberal political system), which negatively characterizes a protester, though not in a degrading way: “Activist Márton Fogl—who admitted that he has no time to study due to the protests—said once again that the government exploits the future of youth; therefore, the collective actions must continue.”⁵⁶ In more recent articles, such as those on the FreeSZFE, stronger terms appear overshadowing sporadically mentioned messages of the protesters. Emphasis is put not only on confrontation with the police, or on unlawful or violent behavior (where civil disobedience is presented as unlawful behavior without consideration to potentially legitimate causes) but also more broadly on decadent behavior, to undermine sympathy for the protesters: “... last night, the rebellious SZFE students ‘blockaded’ (meaning arbitrarily occupied) also the building of the

53 KESMA, “Érdektelenségbe fulladt az SZFE melletti tüntetés,” *Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Vármegyei Hírportál* (news site), September 27, 2020, <https://www.boon.hu/orszag-vilag/2020/09/erdektelensegbe-fulladt-az-szfe-melletti-tuntetes>.

54 Pesti Srácok, “Nem találják a rendőrök a tavalyi CEU-s demonstráció agresszív tüntetőit,” *Pesti srácok* (news site), May 18, 2018 <https://pestisracok.hu/nem-talaljak-a-rendorok-a-tavalyi-ceu-s-demonstracio-agressziv-tuntetoit/>.

55 Balázs Pintér, “Önjelölt szakpolitikai érdekvédők” *Magyar Hírlap* (newspaper, Budapest), January 23, 2013.

56 Adrienn Csókás, “Balog pénteken tárgyal a HÖÖK-kal – A tiltakozó diákok nem vesznek tudomást a kormányzati intézkedésekről,” *Magyar Nemzet* (newspaper, Budapest), January 8, 2013.

SZFE ... on Szentkirályi Street.”⁵⁷ Another report described the scene as: “Just like in a run-down pub, or more correctly not even there since the district municipality would close it down if human shit would be found in it.”⁵⁸

Currently, the radical degrading language used by governmental talking heads is part of the mainstream discourse published in the pro-government media, like the following article, connecting negative characteristics of protesting secondary school students with their openness to manipulation by political parties in an extreme populist tone:

Especially the silly kids from Budapest elite gymnasiums (whatever that means today) were softly...tching and d...ckheading in front of the Office of the Prime Minister. They came directly from the mommy hotel, from among the soft pillows of the middle and upper middle class. They have never experienced any real problems or distress. They don't know hardship from the news either. Everything has always been put under their buttocks; they are soft, having no will of their own, but they are bored, so they can be very well exploited by the brainless mosquito stallions calling themselves politicians, traitor bastards, and insignificant nobodies.⁵⁹

Biased usage of authentic sources, ridiculing the demonstrations, and focusing on suggested negative characteristics and the unacceptable behavior of protesters, all enhance the marginalizing messages of these articles. At the same time, this discrediting picture of government-critical movements also had to be embedded in the broader illiberal governmental narrative of enemies.

Accusation of an anti-governmental agenda

According to the pro-government media reports about youth protests, the protesters' main goal is not to advocate for the protection of autonomy and appropriate or fair management of affairs in secondary or higher education but to achieve a radical change in the political system. Protests have been presented as if organized with the primary intention to overthrow the Orbán government. Consequently, they suggest that demonstrations are not legitimate platforms of collective expression of dissenting opinions on public affairs, but part of a toolbox of internal and external enemies of the nation, and the Hungarian people. Protesting youth have not been presented as autonomous, independent citizens, but as puppets of those enemies, such as George Soros and the Open Society, leftist opposition political parties and professors, or fake NGOs.

This populist framing appeared in reports covering all youth resistance movements—first, the HaHa:

57 KESMA, “Újabb épületet foglaltak el önkényesen az SZFE hallgatói,” Csongrád-Csanád Vármegyei Hírportál (news site), October 1, 2020, <https://www.delmagyar.hu/orszag-vilag/2020/10/ujabb-epuletet-foglaltak-el-onkenyesen-az-szfe-hallgatoi>.

58 Origo, “Emberi ürülék a padlón, rengeteg alkohol és csikk a Színművészeti elfoglalt termeiben a blokád alatt - megdöbbentő képek,” Origo (news site), October 27, 2020, <https://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20201027-szinmuveszeti-kepek.html>.

59 Zsolt Bayer, “Nincs itt semmiféle generáció,” *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), May 6, 2023, <https://magyarnemzet.hu/velemenyt/2023/05/nincs-itt-semmifele-generacio>.

The names of both György Soros and Gordon Bajnai can be raised regarding the HaHa activists. ... The Magyar Nemzet [Hungarian Nation, a daily newspaper] published first, based on information from the internal correspondence of the HaHa, that community organizers who arrived from the United States were assisting the students of the network. The experts among others prepare the students on how to pressure the government or how to mobilize. The trip of the American lecturers to Budapest was managed by the Civil College Fund, but in the background, all threads lead to György Soros, the businessman of Hungarian origin.⁶⁰

Later, similar allegations were promoted in the case of the CEU and FreeSZFE protests. Another article, titled “Secondary School Students Are Recruited to Anti-Government Protests: Capitol Private Elite Gymnasiums Are Also in the Net of George Soros,” reported: “Documents obtained by the Hungarian Times prove that protests organized for the reform of public education and CEU are in fact anti-Fidesz demonstrations and they aim to overthrow the government. Those in leading positions are far from independent and not even civil individuals.”⁶¹ Another news outlet put it this way: “The organization called aHang sent out invitations to the protest about which so far had been said that it was organized by students at the University of Theater and Film Arts against the unlawfully elected board, according to a document obtained by Origo. It should be kept in mind that the aHang was the organizer of the preliminary elections for mayor of Budapest, so it is clearly a leftist political party organization.”⁶²

This narrative-enhancing marginalization technique (depicting protesters as non-autonomous individuals serving the interests of enemies) is not used in isolation from other techniques discrediting peaceful assemblies and protesters. The message of ridiculing the event is also woven into the text focused on the revelation of the “real” motivations behind the demonstrations. “Ágnes Kunhalmi,⁶³ the Imre Nagy⁶⁴ of the 21st century, ran to assist the protesters and stood up in the forefront of the community of her revolutionary comrades. She hung the EU flag out of her window, but since Viktor Orbán remained the prime minister, she came down to deliver a speech.”⁶⁵ Youth protesters have been presented as incapable tools of malicious actors, like opposition political parties who are misusing the young age of protesters: “Obviously, the students in their twenties are not responsible for all this. They are abandoned or rather manipulated by the left and the professors. The real guilty are

60 Magyar Nemzet, “HaHa – Soros a háttérből irányít, Bajnai a „beszélgetőtárs,” *Magyar Nemzet* (newspaper, Budapest), February 11, 2013, <https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold-archivum/2013/02/haha-soros-a-hatterbol-iranyit-bajnai-a-beszeltotars>.

61 Jurák, “Kormányellenes tüntetésekre mozgósítják a középiskolásokat is.”

62 Origo, “Kiderült: a Gyurcsány irányította főpolgármester-előválasztást lebonyolító aHang szervezi a baloldali tüntetést,” Origo (news site), October 22, 2020, <https://www.origo.hu/itthon/20201022-szfe-tuntetes-kuratorium.html>.

63 MP of the Hungarian Socialist Party since 2014, and one of its current leaders.

64 Imre Nagy was a Hungarian Communist politician and university professor, Head of Government from 1953 to 1955, and leader during the 1956 Hungarian Uprising. Due to his active role in the Uprising, he was executed following a show trial. His reburial in 1989 was an important mass event in the change of regime in Hungary.

65 Kata Jurák, “Orbánnak elég lenne egy fejlődés” – Már tüzet nyitnának a CEU mellett tüntetők” Pesti Srácok (news site), April 5, 2017, <https://pestisracok.hu/orbannak-eleg-lenne-egy-fejloves-mar-tuzet-nyitnanak-ceu-mellett-tuntetok/>.

Ferenc Gyurcsány,⁶⁶ who ordered the blockade, and professors holding on to their power and decades-long positions.⁶⁷

Young protesters have been infantilized, and described as non-autonomous, immature individuals who are manipulated by internal and external enemies of the nation. These enemies are accused of pushing young protesters even into unlawful behavior to reach their destructive goals, like in the following report about a protest of the EDF: “Politicians and fake NGOs leading and organizing the demonstration incited these young people, many of them even under the age of 18, to confront the police. They themselves, of course, stayed one step behind so that they didn’t get hurt in any way.”⁶⁸ Concluding summaries also appeared in reports about the EDF protests reflecting on youth resistance movements under the illiberal Orbán governments as if they were all exploited by political parties: “It is not the first time that the opposition has used minors, and students during their political actions. In our experience, the different student movements (Student Network, Independent Student Parliament, Free Education, and now the United Student Front) ... sooner or later go down the drain after being badly exploited.”⁶⁹

Conclusion

Due to the lack of political openness fundamentally characterizing the illiberal political system of recent Hungary, peaceful protests are an important tool of advocacy for youth resistance movements, just like any other civil actors in dissent. The potential impact of these protests on public opinion can be limited if they are marginalized, and their legitimacy is questioned in the pro-government mass media. Future research should reveal the extent of negative impact of discrediting reports by the illiberal governmental media on public opinion related to youth protest. The present paper aimed to identify the discrediting techniques most frequently applied in reports published by government-dependent media outlets. In the analyzed reports, governmental actions or failures subjected to criticism of youth resistance movements fall out of focus and are replaced by the identity of the protesters. In the Hungarian government-dependent media, four marginalization techniques have been most frequently applied to discredit youth protesters: (1) authentic sources applied in a biased way, (2) ridiculing the events, (3) emphasis on unacceptable behavior of protesters downplaying their arguments related to public affairs, and (4) depicting protesters as puppets of internal and external enemies serving their anti-governmental agenda. Members of youth resistance movements appear in the articles of pro-government media as non-autonomous, aggressively, or decadently-behaving individuals serving opposition political parties or foreign interests. Their legitimacy as citizens collectively expressing their government-critical opinion is challenged in the eyes of the broader public, which can have a negative impact on the ability of protests to fulfill their social function as regular tools of democracy.

66 Prime Minister of Hungary from 2004–2009 as a member of the Hungarian Socialist Party, currently the leader of the opposition political party Democratic Coalition.

67 Origo, “Emberi ürülék a padlón, rengeteg alkohol és csikk a Színművészeti elfoglalt termeiben a blokád alatt.”

68 Zsolt Jeszenszky, “Bántják a fiatalokat ...” *Magyar Nemzet* (newspaper, Budapest), May 27, 2023, <https://magyarnemzet.hu/velemeny/2023/05/bantjak-a-fiatalokat>.

69 Origo, “Újabb összefonódásra bukkantak a diáktüntetések és a külföldről pénzelt szervezetek között,” Origo (news site), May 15, 2023, <https://www.origo.hu/ithon/20230515-tuzfalcsoport-diaktuntetesek-kulfoldrol-penzelt-szervezetek.html>.

