Using the label “far-right extremism” (or “extremism” more generally) in a Western context to describe political movements, groups, individuals, or sets of beliefs often conveys—implicitly or explicitly—a normative judgment of condemnation. Extremism is a relational term for socio-political phenomena that we position at the fringes, something that sits outside of what we regard as our current societal or political norms. We like to disassociate “us,” the good people in the center of our societies, from “them” on the extreme edges, who pursue—in the case of far-right extremism—an agenda of white superiority and hatred.
As in the case of other complex socio-political movements, there is no unanimously agreed upon definition of far-right extremism. However, as British extremism scholar Elisabeth Carter concluded in her analysis of various influential academic definitions of right-wing extremism, “there is actually a high degree of consensus.” It is often defined by a combination of several (although not necessarily all) of the following ideological features: “strong state or authoritarianism, nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and populism or anti-establishment.”
If we accept these attitudinal factors as definitional markers, our common judgement that situates far-right extremism on the fringes of society is challenged. We are urged to acknowledge that the far right—at least from such an attitudes-based perspective—is closely embedded in society. My new book, Democracy Strikes Back: Understanding and Countering the Rise of the Far-right, argues that the common tendency to relegate extremism to the societal margins undermines our ability to acknowledge how far-right extremism is much more closely tied to the “mainstream,” both historically and today, than we think. It sanitizes the societal center, feeds misplaced complacency and is one of the reasons why we are struggling to effectively counter the ongoing appeal—or rise—of illiberal and anti-democratic far-right movements.
The common tendency to relegate extremism to the societal margins undermines our ability to acknowledge how far-right extremism is much more closely tied to the “mainstream” than we think.
Far-Right Extremists: They Live Among Us?
It may be confronting and discomforting for many of “us,” but there is clear empirical evidence that the attitudinal markers of far-right extremism are (and always have been) more salient in society than we may want to admit. This applies to most Western societies.
Let’s take, for example, authoritarian attitudes as an indicator of far-right extremism. Surveys have consistently found that in many Western democracies, substantial proportions of the population express distinct authoritarian views. A US study, published in 2020, found that 31% of Americans agreed that “having a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections is a good way of governing the United States.” MacWilliam, the author of that study, concluded that 18% of Americans are “highly disposed to authoritarianism” and a further 23% are “attitudinally just one step below them on the authoritarian scale.” Surveys in other countries, like Australia or Germany, come to similar conclusions.
Other ideological features of far-right extremism, such as anti-establishment attitudes, nationalism, and racism, are also relatively widespread, as countless studies—too many to cite here—have shown. Maybe only a short reference to demonstrate (biological) racism is not limited to a small minority: An analysis of the 2014-2018 General Social Survey (GSS) in the US found that 21% in the white-only sample were of the view that “whites are more intelligent than blacks,” and in the UK, one in five were convinced that “some races are less intelligent.”
There is no doubt that attitudes associated with far-right extremist ideologies reach deeply into the center of our societies. Accepting this forces us to reconsider our view of the elusive “mainstream” as a stable place of liberal democratic convictions and as a reliable bulwark against extremism.
There is no doubt that attitudes associated with far-right extremist ideologies reach deeply into the center of our societies. Accepting this forces us to reconsider our view of the elusive “mainstream” as a stable place of liberal democratic convictions and as a reliable bulwark against extremism. And it urges us to rethink how we address, prevent, and counter the far-right, shifting our attention to the appeal of their extremist agenda with broader segments of society.
Of course, not everyone who holds authoritarian, anti-establishment, nationalist, and/or racist views is automatically a far-right extremist. If we were to assume that, we might cast the net too wide, putting an estimated 20 or 30% of the population (depending on specific definitions and national contexts) in the extremism basket. However, those who hold such views are likely to be more receptive to the mobilization and recruitment efforts of far-right extremist groups and networks—or at least less repelled by their anti-democratic white nationalist agenda. And some far-right extremist groups would not even accept anyone who doesn’t share their core ideology.
Radicalization is not driven purely, and possibly not even primarily, by the salience of certain attitudes that are aligned with far-right extremist ideologies. The paths into these extremist groups and movements are unique, and non-ideological factors often play a central role. Democracy Strike Back discusses two central explanatory models that have been prominent in the extremism scholarship—and both of these models point to susceptibilities across large segments of society.
Modernization Losers: Feeling Left Behind
One of these two models has been referred to as the “losers of modernization” theory, arguing how structural transformation processes affect, on the micro level, individuals’ sense of status and position in society. It posits that “modernization grievances” among those segments of societies that have struggled to keep up with profound socio-structural and technological changes in post-industrial, globalized “knowledge or information societies” contribute to greater susceptibility to far-right narratives and mobilization. As the renowned US political philosopher Michael Sandel wrote in his 2020 book The Tyranny of Merit, “the age of globalization has bestowed its rewards unevenly, to say the least”: While the “winners” benefit from new opportunities, the “losers” of these transformation processes— often white working-class men with lower formal education—face intergenerational challenges of socioeconomic stagnation or downward mobility. This fuels their sense of being left behind despite their hard work and deprived of the societal recognition that they used to receive and feel they still deserve. As Sandel and others argue, this has contributed to the “upsurge of populist nationalism” and the appeal of far-right movements.
Since the early days of the scholarship on the far right, going back to Lipset’s work in the 1950s, “status anxiety” has been considered a vulnerability factor. This has never been regarded as a purely economic matter of objective disadvantage but also a psychological one of “injured social status,” in Sandel’s formulation. In this context, Gest and colleagues coined the term “nostalgic deprivation”—“the discrepancy between individuals’ understanding of their current status and their perceptions about their past”—as a key factor that increases people’s receptiveness to the far right.
The sentiments of marginalization, voicelessness and victimhood are further aggravated in a sociopolitical climate where, one the one hand, some groups—women, racialized minorities, immigrants, LGBTQI+ communities and others—may have made small steps in their long struggle for recognition and equality, while, on the other hand, those who used to be unchallenged in their power and ability to define cultural norms becoming increasingly fearful of “cultural displacement” (Sandel again) and are feeling like “strangers in their own land,” as Arlie Hochschild described it.
These developments affect not only small radical fringe groups but also have the potential to fuel grievances in significant parts of society. That does not make them all far-right extremists, of course, but it contributes to increasing the appeal of far-right (especially white, male) victimhood narratives.
“Quest for Significance”: The Human Desire for Social Recognition
The second prominent model to explain vulnerability to radicalization, as discussed in my book, shifts our focus towards basic human needs; that is, it centers personal meaning and recognition as factors in the radicalization process. Kruglanski and his team, who are credited with introducing this “Quest for Significance” theory into the academic discussion on extremism, describe the “desires to gain respect, competence, esteem and meaning in life [as] definitive of the human conditions.” They argue that any extremist narratives or networks would have very limited traction among people who have these socio-psychological needs met elsewhere. Noting that “personal meaning and social needs are emerging as a promising avenue of research in the study of extremist motivation,” this urges us to view far-right susceptibility not as a psychological pathology but as being linked to difficulties of ordinary citizens to fulfill basic needs that we all have.
In such an unfavorable social environment, more and more people may find it difficult to fulfill their human needs for recognition and social worth.
Opportunities to meet these needs have been diminishing. For decades, this has been discussed in often rather abstract terms by critical theorists and other scholars as existential loneliness and social alienation in (post-)modern, capitalist societies. But there is also concrete evidence for this trend. Empirical studies have identified declining rates of engagement in pro-social spaces such as volunteering or community sports and increasing rates of social isolation and loneliness, described as an epidemic of modern times. Representative surveys from the US and across OECD countries show how social connectedness has drastically diminished in recent years, also during the COVID-19 pandemic and especially among young people. In such an unfavorable social environment, more and more people may find it difficult to fulfill their human needs for recognition and social worth. This points to increased levels of susceptibility among growing segments of society to the mobilization of far-right extremist groups with their false promises of brotherhood, respect, and purpose.
Countering the Far Right’s Appeal
If we accept the diagnosis that significant and increasing segments of our society may, in principle, be susceptible to far-right messaging as well as ideologically open to their core narratives, what does that mean for our strategies to counter the appeal of the far right? How can we effectively strengthen resistance to the mobilization and recruitment attempts of far-right, white nationalist, or supremacist groups and networks?
I argue that the key lies in revitalizing a broad societal commitment to liberal democratic principles and processes, highlighting four areas of action.
Taking education seriously
“Democracy is the only form of government that has to be learned,” German social philosopher Oskar Negt once noted. Education offers indispensable opportunities to build commitment to fundamental liberal democratic principles of equal human dignity—principles that stand in contrast to the ideological agenda of far-right groups. Anti-racism and history education (“truth-telling”) can help significantly reduce the risk that the narratives of white supremacist groups fall on fertile ground and increase the chances that individuals feel repelled by these ideological messages.
Moreover, civics education as well as programs to build critical thinking and digital literacy skills can equip people with the insights and tools to identify threats to democratic processes and false allegations or conspiracy claims often used by far-right networks online to lure people into their sphere of influence.
Education is not the panacea for structural and systemic problems. This is especially true given that ideological alignment is not the only, maybe not even the main, reason that many people join a far-right network. But, nonetheless, it must be part of a holistic prevention strategy to counter the far right.
Creating spaces for dissenting democratic voices
Research has consistently shown that a growing sense of being marginalized and silenced in public debates can make people more likely to seek alternative spaces to articulate their concerns, including far-right anti-publics, where they may feel heard and seen. Many of those who end up in far-right circles had previously tried to make their voices heard elsewhere but felt ignored and disregarded. To address this risk factor, it is crucial to create more spaces where people can express their views and concerns and feel listened to and where conflicts and disagreements can be negotiated in a robust, democratic way. The Belgian political philosopher Chantal Mouffe, a proponent of agonistic pluralism and models of radical democracy, referred to this as “liberal-democratic tolerance” where our political opponent is not seen as “an enemy to be destroyed but as an ‘adversary’…whose ideas we combat, but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question.”
It is crucial to create more spaces where people can express their views and concerns and feel listened to and where conflicts and disagreements can be negotiated in a robust, democratic way.
In practical terms, this means rewinding recent legislative trends towards diminishing spaces for public protests and criminalizing dissent as well as exploring and implementing alternative ways of citizens’ engagement and deliberation beyond the “practice of one-way consultations,” especially but not only on the local level, for example through various forms of citizens’ assemblies or juries.
Facilitating civil society counter-movements
A vibrant civil society has been described by many thinkers and scholars—from Alexis de Tocqueville to Robert Putnam—as a core pillar of a healthy democracy; as such, it functions as an antidote to the anti-democratic far right. One reason for this assessment is that civil society organizations not only play a key role in holding government accountable; they also often provide opportunities for individuals to develop positive relationships of trust, connectedness (“social capital”), and to find recognition in a pro-social environment. Moreover, civil society organizations and more informal grassroots networks are often well placed to publicly mobilize against far-right actions, where the intervention from governments may be less effective, especially in a societal climate where government trust is low and anti-government grievances are rising. This draws attention to the important role of government as “back-seat facilitators” in strengthening civil society capacity and diverse, well-connected, and independent pro-democratic civil society structures.
Expanding pro-social opportunities for recognition
The positive role of civil society organizations in building social capital is also related to the fourth area of action. Based on the key premise of the Quest for Significance theory, a person who feels their human “desire to matter, to be ‘someone’ and to have meaning in one’s life” is fulfilled, is much less susceptible to the lures of far-right groups. This highlights the preventative power of any measures that expand opportunities where people can realize their needs for personal meaning and social recognition in a pro-social and democratic way. There are countless ways to do that—from strengthening civic engagement and volunteering, to supporting local neighbourhood initiatives, to investing in public infrastructure that facilitates informal community sports or other cross-community activities and social connections.
The personal account of a former member of a Swedish white supremacy group illustrates how important such social infrastructure and opportunities can be. Recalling his path into the far-right extremist group, he said: “[It was] the comradeship. I don’t think politics really played a big part for me… They could just as well have joined Sweden’s biggest skateboard club. This group just happened to be about xenophobia and the extreme right.”
Without a Healthy Democracy, it’s an Uphill Battle
While these proposed areas of action address some of the key ideological, psychological, and social factors that increase people’s susceptibility to far-right narratives and movements, they would normally not appear in a narrowly defined counter-extremism prevention program. Nor should they be regarded merely through a preventing or countering (violent) extremism (P/CVE) lens, as they all have potential for much broader positive effects on strengthening liberal-democratic commitment, processes, and structures.
Without addressing these underlying susceptibility factors and broadening our prevention repertoire, any attempts to counter the far-right as a problem on the fringes of our society will continue to face an uphill battle.
And they certainly are not meant to replace the crucial work of security and intelligence agencies, law enforcement, or various specialized engagement and deradicalization practitioners. All that said, without addressing these underlying susceptibility factors and broadening our prevention repertoire, any attempts to counter the far-right as a problem on the fringes of our society will continue to face an uphill battle.
Mario Peucker is an Associate Professor and Principal Research Fellow at the Institute for Sustainable Industries and Liveable Cities at Victoria University in Melbourne, Australia. He is an executive member of the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (CRIS), as well as a steering committee member of the Addressing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation to Terrorism (AVERT) Research Network. Mario has undertaken qualitative and quantitative research on dissent and citizenship, hate crime and racism as well as radical political movements, in particular on the far-right fringes, since 2003, both in Europe and in Australia. He has published six academic books, including his latest monograph Democracy Strikes Back: Understanding and Countering the Rise of the Far-right (2024, Palgrave Macmillan).
