Kill the Bill: Ordo Iuris and the Ratification of the Istanbul Convention in the Czech Senate

Kill the Bill: Ordo Iuris and the Ratification of the Istanbul Convention in the Czech Senate

By Lenka Bustikova and Petra Guasti

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Keywords: Ordo Iuris, Czech Senate, Istanbul Convention, right-wing mobilization, anti-gender advocacy, transnational networks, gender ideology

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On January 30, 2024, Ordo Iuris, a Polish Catholic conservative legal network, boasted that it prevented the ratification of the Istanbul Convention by the Czech Senate on January 24, 2024.[1] The vote failed to reach a quorum, in part due to the aggressive campaign against the ratification that targeted Czech senators. In the view of the Polish conservative organization, the reason why the Czech Senate voted against the convention was “because they read the analysis of Ordo Iuris.”[2] Nikodem Bernaciak, a lawyer and a Senior Analyst at the Ordo Iuris Research and Analysis Centre, wrote: “Czech senators, perhaps thanks to Ordo Iuris analyses, understood that the effective protection against domestic violence does not require ratification of the Istanbul Convention. The International Convention of the Family Rights is an alternative free from gender ideology, also for Poland.”[3] The saying, “victory has a thousand fathers,” befits the Ordo Iuris claim, which we investigate in this article.

The spread of conservative ideology across borders often occurs through coordinated transnational networks that translate shared repertoires of frames, talking points, and advocacy tactics into nationally resonant campaigns.[4] The ratification process of the Istanbul Convention was preceded by an aggressive campaign that targeted Czech senators and deployed a playbook similar to that used by conservative transnational networks.

Yet failed ratification process cannot be reduced to an institutional veto that followed conservative mobilization. The bill failed due to the lack of a quorum. Rather than a formal rejection, the Senate’s inability to ratify was the product of strategic inaction and intra-party divisions within confessional parties. Transnational anti-gender advocacy networks, notably Polish Ordo Iuris, claimed victory, but the reality is more complex. The rejection followed a perfect storm of effective advocacy that intersected with dormant cleavages among the right-wing parties within the governing pro-democratic coalition.  

The Istanbul Convention, which enshrines protection against domestic violence, was signed by Poland in 2012 and ratified in April 2015.[5] Since then, it has become a permanent eyesore for Polish conservative networks, including politicians from the Law and Justice party as well as ultra-conservative Catholic groups, who tried and failed to withdraw from it in 2020.[6] Czechia signed the Istanbul Convention in 2016 and the Czech Senate was scheduled to vote on its ratification in January of 2024.  

The official position of the Czech government, led by the Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana: ODS), was that Czechia is committed to the prevention of violence against women and domestic violence, and thus supports the ratification. However, despite a robust majority of the ruling coalition in the Senate, the vote failed as a quorum was not reached. So far, forty-five European countries have signed the Istanbul Convention, as did Czechia. However, Czechia remains one of the very few countries in Europe that have not ratified it.[7]

Ratification is associated with countries that have strong feminist advocacy networks, liberal civil society, and lean secular. In addition, ratification is more likely in countries with egalitarian norms, pro-European governments, and weak anti-gender mobilization.[8] In countries with competing advocacy coalitions, the Istanbul Convention becomes contested and reframed as a cultural threat by opponents.[9] According to this logic, Czech Republic should have been an early adopter of the Istanbul Convention, but it was not. The Istanbul Convention returned to the agenda with Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s conservative-liberal coalition, as a concession to the liberals.

How was the bill killed? In this paper, we explain how. In doing so, we bring attention to the importance of transnational advocacy of illiberal groups and culture wars. The failure of the Istanbul Convention in Czechia is also a testament to the growing division emerging among mainstream confessional parties on identity issues. The rising political influence of illiberal, uncivil and socially conservative groups has recently received attention, however conservative influence is mostly viewed as a phenomenon related to domestic issues.[10] It rarely considers spillover effects across countries or even a possibility of advocacy groups launching a campaign that targets an uncontroversial, non-salient Senate vote in a neighboring country.

Our goal is to raise awareness of the influence of transnational advocacy networks and their alignment with broader shifts among confessional parties toward radicalized conservatism by examining the failed ratification of the Istanbul Convention in the Czech Republic. Our analysis includes plenary debate, voting, and emails sent to the inboxes of Czech senators exclusively provided to us by Senator X [anonymous], which we consequently map onto the debate on the Senate floor.

Ordo Iuris’ alleged targeted campaign occurred alongside an internal split in the strongest party of the ruling coalition, ODS, which includes a socially conservative faction. Fiala, who led both the governing coalition and ODS, represents a socially conservative wing of the party but rarely voices it publicly. This reluctance to advocate socially conservative positions stems from the fact that ODS also attracts fiscally conservative but socially progressive voters who have little appetite for culture wars like those surrounding the Istanbul Convention.

Despite the origins of the Civic Democrats as a party that launched privatization and wants to be associated with effective economic reforms and prudent state management, ODS has become susceptible to mobilizing around issues seemingly unrelated to voters’ economic interests. The rejection of the Istanbul Convention indicates the rise of a conservative faction in the party and its assertiveness.  The vote not only revealed an emerging realignment of ODS on cultural issues, but also emboldened its small socially conservative wing, enabled in part by the advocacy of Ordo Iuris.

Ordo Iuris made a bold claim about influencing domestic affairs of Czechia, a move that helped bolster its reputation as a transnational actor with growing reach.[11] In reality, however, the advocacy campaign followed a familiar conservative playbook, relying on well-rehearsed talking points and generic email accounts of concerned citizens. Regardless of their precise origins, these advocacy efforts ultimately empowered a small but vocal socially conservative faction within the ruling coalition.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the increasing power of transnational advocacy in the context of radicalization of mainstream parties. Then we briefly discuss Ordo Iuris and the politicization of the Istanbul Convention. Afterward, we proceed with the analysis of the vote, the debate in the Senate, and how it maps onto the anti-Istanbul Convention narratives emailed to senators. We conclude with implications for future research on socially conservative transnational advocacy.

Transnational Advocacy of Ordo Iuris

The Ordo Iuris Institute for Legal Culture (known as Ordo Iuris: OI) is a Polish nongovernmental pro-life organization established in 2013. Although not directly affiliated with the Catholic Church, Ordo Iuris presents itself as an independent and faith-based legal organization that “gathers academics and legal practitioners with the aim of promoting a legal culture based on respect for human dignity and rights. Ordo Iuris pursues its objectives by means of research and other academic activities, as well as advocacy and litigation.”[12] 

Established by the Piotr Skarga Institute for Social and Religious Education Foundation (the Piotr Skarga Foundation), Ordo Iuris is tightly intertwined with the larger transnational fundamentalist movement of the Piotr Skarga Foundation and the Catholic radicals of the Tradition, Family, and Property (TFP) movement. Many of OI’s board members are directly connected with TFP and the Piotr Skarga Foundation.[13] In Chapter 6, Article 20 of its bylaws, the Piotr Skarga Foundation is eligible for activity control of the OI.[14]

As a faith-based legal advocacy actor, the OI views itself as a watchdog. Ordo monitors changes in law and sounds a call to action when an initiative emerges that OI believes undermines traditional family values or national sovereignty.[15] Imitating strategies of American Christian right legal advocacy organizations, the OI utilizes three tools that include: (1) a broad understanding of legal action, (2) formal status within international organizations, and (3) an international coalition of support. 

Ordo Iuris focuses on writing recommendations for politicians and preparing legal expertise or authors’ open letters and petitions. This is what it mirrored in the campaign that targeted the Czech Senate. Its broad understanding of a family issue (LGBTQ+, the so-called gender ideology, domestic violence, abortion, marriage) allows the organization to speak broadly and address a variety of social issues. Ordo Iuris has acted on the defense side as it has pursued litigation against formal and informal political actors.[16] The vast majority of its advocacy is in Poland.

Ordo Iuris claims to have successfully influenced Polish politics and policymaking in the following initiatives:

• the 2016 Abortion Law[17]
• a bill that criminalizes comprehensive sexuality education[18]
• a bill that restricts in-vitro fertilization[19]
• the Charter that created what it calls LGBTQ-free zones[20]

Ordo Iuris operates beyond the Polish borders as part of a broader movement. It has strong international connections and, as such, is a member of the socially conservative transnational movement. Ordo Iuris is part of the broader phenomenon of the global Christian right, an international network of Christian right pro-life organizations. This has allowed OI to build an international coalition to support its own projects. Its cooperates with other Christian right groups such as the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ), the European Centre for Law and Justice, the Center for Family and Human Rights (C-Fam), and the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF). They have garnered status and influence by participating in international organizations via official means, such as consultative status at the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) since 2017 and are active at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Ordo Iuris activities stirred controversy in the European Parliament. In January 2023, members of the European Parliament expressed concern about the selection of Ordo Iuris as a member of the European Social Fund Plus monitoring committee expressing concern that the “OI has actively worked to undermine gender equality and fundamental rights of women and LGBTQ+ communities,” as established in a 2021 EP resolution.[21] 

The Istanbul Convention is a prime issue for conservative transnational advocacy. Because it is implemented across diverse domestic contexts, it becomes especially vulnerable to transnational networks that target legislation applying simultaneously in multiple countries. However, most of the advocacy for its demise has so far come from domestic circles, but transnational networks increasingly aspire to influence policy and laws in neighboring countries. In Czechia, transnational advocacy was reflected in the debates on the Senate floor.[22] The demise of the Istanbul Convention in Czechia follows a string of socially conservative advocacy activity in Poland, Slovakia, and most recently in Latvia.[23] In Poland, efforts to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention failed, and following the loss of power by the Law and Justice party, the issue of withdrawal was temporarily put to rest by Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government.[24] In Slovakia, after a heavy lobbying of conservative groups, the Istanbul Convention was also rejected when the Parliament voted against ratification.[25] The next section explores how socially conservative advocacy has become intertwined with debates over the Istanbul Convention in more detail.

The Istanbul Convention

The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, commonly known as the Istanbul Convention, is a significant human rights treaty that was opened for signature on May 11, 2011, in Istanbul, Turkey. The convention aims to prevent violence, protect victims, and hold perpetrators accountable. In practice, however, the treaty is narrowly framed around two core objectives: ensuring gender equality, and establishing protections against domestic violence. Its provisions focus on criminalizing domestic abuse, guaranteeing support services for survivors, and obligating states to adopt preventive measures. Far from advancing an expansive ideological project, the Convention centers on principles that might otherwise be considered uncontroversial commitments to human rights and personal safety. However, the Istanbul Convention has been weaponized in campaigns against so-called gender ideology, with opponents misrepresenting the Convention as tool for reversing gender roles, undermining traditional family structures and endangering child-rearing practices. By March 2019, it had been signed by 45 countries and the European Union.

However, the path to ratification in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been marked by resistance and debate. Five CEE countries have yet to ratify the Istanbul Convention and face opposition. In Armenia, the government approved signing the convention in December 2017, but public opposition and claims that it contradicted traditional values stalled the ratification process.[26] Bulgaria faced backlash after the Council of Ministers proposed ratification in January 2018, leading to a Constitutional Court ruling in July 2018 that declared the convention incompatible with the Bulgarian Constitution.[27] In Lithuania, the Istanbul Convention was signed in June 2013. However, successive political shifts delayed ratification, with the issue still politically unresolved, even after the Lithuanian Constitutional Court ruled it did not contradict the country’s constitution.[28] Similarly, in Hungary and Slovakia, conservative factions have vehemently opposed ratification, citing concerns over LGBTQ+ rights and the preservation of traditional family structures.[29]

In Slovakia, the opposition to the Istanbul Convention reached a critical point on February 25, 2020, when the National Council rejected the convention by a vote of 17 to 96.[30] This rejection followed intense lobbying from conservative and nationalist groups who opposed the Convention’s provisions regarding LGBTQ+ rights, framing them as threats to traditional values.[31] On March 6, 2020, President Zuzana Čaputová sent a letter to the Council of Europe informing it that Slovakia would not become a party to the Istanbul Convention, emphasizing the constitutional requirement for parliamentary consent for ratification.[32]

While Poland is one of the 12 CEE countries that ratified the Istanbul Convention, its contested adoption reveals important regional patterns, namely the populist radical right’s politicization and instrumentalization of the Convention. The Polish journey toward the adoption of the Istanbul Convention began when President Bronislaw Komorowski formally ratified it on April 13, 2015, with the treaty entering into force on August 1 of that year.[33] However, following the rise of the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: PiS) party to power, opposition to OI emerged. In November 2015, PiS criticized the treaty for its provisions on gender education and its stance against using cultural justifications for violence. In July 2020, the Law and Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro announced plans to withdraw from the Convention, labelling it as harmful and “an invention, a feminist creation aimed at justifying gay ideology.”[34]

This narrative was most forcefully put forward by an ultra-conservative group, Ordo Iuris, that was inspired by the Slovak lead and was hoping that de-ratification would follow a legislative or judicial path.[35] However, unlike in Slovakia, in Poland this attempt by PiS faced public backlash, with protests occurring in Warsaw against the withdrawal.[36] Nevertheless, after a change in government in late 2023, the intention to withdraw was abandoned. The new prime minister, Donald Tusk, reaffirmed the commitment to the Istanbul Convention, stating that the protection of women and children from violence should not be a matter of political debate.[37] Conservative circles remained vigilant as they looked for an opportunity to undermine the Istanbul Convention, and the ratification vote in Czechia in January 2024 presented them with an opening.

Analysis: Kill the Bill

The Czech Republic’s pathway toward the non-ratification of the Istanbul Convention reflects a complex interplay of domestic and transnational advocacy, political hesitancy, and evolving public discourse. The country signed the convention on May 12, 2016, following significant pressure from human rights organizations like the Czech Women’s Lobby and the League of Human Rights.[38] These groups campaigned for its adoption, emphasizing the need for stronger protections against domestic violence and support for victims. Initially, ratification was anticipated by mid-2018; however, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš postponed discussions of the topic.[39]

In June 2023, a renewed push to ratify the Convention emerged after the EU prodded Czechia to move forward.[40] The new coalition government led by “Together” agreed to advance the ratification process. Government Commissioner for Human Rights Klára Šimáčková Laurenčíková expressed the cabinet’s commitment to the convention.[41] However, in January 2024, the Czech Senate rejected the ratification, which highlighted the ongoing tensions between traditional societal values and the push for enhanced protection against domestic violence.[42] The process was marked by intense polarization. Senators were flooded by unprecedented and coordinated campaigns by the opponents of the Istanbul Convention. With an absolute majority in the Senate, Fiala’s coalition parties failed to fulfil one of their campaign promises and government goals. The onus of the failure is fully on the ruling government, whose senators, while deploying various strategies (voting and abstention), were deeply divided. The next section delves into the process in which the Istanbul Convention failed. First, we describe the outcome of the vote; second, we explain the pathway in which the bill failed and analyze the debate in the Senate that preceded the vote.

Kill the Bill: The Vote

The bill that would have ratified the Istanbul Convention in Czechia was killed by abstention, not by overt opposition. What was Polish Ordo Iuris’ role in the campaign to derail the bill? On the surface, ratification was officially supported by the government, which comfortably controlled the Senate. Previous governments did not view the ratification of the Istanbul Convention as salient. In 2021, most of the public (74%) did not know what it was. Only one-seventh of the citizens had knowledge. More than one-fifth thought that the Istanbul Convention should be ratified, but 71% had no views whatsoever.[43] This suggests that the issue of ratification was not salient, as it was a blank canvas for the public. The public view was not against it, it was indifferent.

This indifference indicates that Czechia was not embroiled in culture wars, contrary to neighboring Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria. When compared to Poland, the home of Ordo Iuris, Czechia is less polarized on cultural issues, and overall, less socially conservative. At the same time, violence against women and domestic violence is highly tolerated in Czech society and it is widespread. According to the representative survey of organization proFem, every fifth Czech woman was raped and over half of Czech women experience sexual violence during their lifetime.[44] The ratification of the Istanbul Convention would have sent a strong signal that the governing coalition supports shift in norms and is committed to the reduction of violent sexual offenses against women.

The Istanbul Convention was debated in January 2024 and was expected to pass. Figure 1 shows the result of the vote after the Senate debate: 71 of the 81 senators were present; therefore, the quorum for adoption was 36. The vote was 34 for, 28 against, and nine refrained. In sum, 23% of senators (19) did not express their opinion. Out of the nineteen, ten abstained, thus lowering the adoption quorum, and can be regarded as mild proponents—they did not want to vote for the bill but were sympathetic to it; hence, their absence lowered the quorum. Therefore, absent senators could have helped the bill to pass. However, senators who did not vote, but were present, harmed the bill. Out of the nineteen, nine senators refrained from voting; with their presence, they increased the quorum and contributed to killing the bill. All nine present nonvoters hailed from the two Together coalition parties—ODS and Christian Democrats. Only three of the nine faced the voters to run again in 2024.

figure 1. Bill rejected: Voting on the Istanbul Convention on January 24, 2024, in the Czech Senate

Source: n = 81, authors, based on voting data of the Czech Senate.[45]

Figure 1 shows four distinct patterns of support: strong support—voting for it (34). The category of abstain (19) had two groups: weak support—abstention to lower the quorum (10) and weak rejection—Senators were present but refrained from voting (9). The fourth group of senators rejected the bill and voted against it (28). The bill needed two more votes to be adopted as the quorum was 36.

Figure 2 shows the vote split by the government parties and opposition parties. Among the 34 proponents were 13 of the 48 Together senators and 19 of the 24 PirSTAN senators. Two of the six members of the opposition from ANO/social democrats also voted for the bill. Among the 28 opponents voting no, there were 21 of the 48 Together senators, and 1 of the 24 PirSTAN senators. For the opposition senators voting no, three out of six were from ANO/social democrats and independents.

figure 2. Bill rejected: Voting on the Istanbul Convention by Government and Opposition on January 24, 2024, in the Czech Senate

Source: n = 81, authors, based on voting data of the Czech Senate [46]

Although the governing coalition’s endorsement should, in principle, have guaranteed a smooth ratification process and minimized the likelihood that the Istanbul Convention would become a wedge issue within a major ruling party, this was not the case. At the end, the vote went against the position of the governing coalition that comfortably controlled the Senate. The analysis of the Senate debate reveals the split among the confessional parties of the ruling coalition.

Kill the Bill: The Debate

The Senate floor discussion featured polarizing language. The debate raised the stakes for the so-called “normie” senators (with heteronormative views), whose private and public politics are incongruent. The debate was preceded by recommendations of the government and Senate committees. The Istanbul Convention was submitted to the Czech Senate on June 29, 2023. The core committee to deliberate on the bill was the Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, headed by a strong opponent of the bill and a self-proclaimed “anti-woke warrior,” Zdeněk Hraba[47]. Hraba is from the party of former Prime Minister Fiala (ODS). Hraba’s committee was divided and did not reach any conclusion. As a result, the committee could neither recommend adoption nor rejection. However, Hraba made it very clear in his statement that he was opposed, which undermined the Convention from the start and signaled divisions in the governing coalition.[48]

Other committees that deliberated the bill at the committee stage were the Committees on Education, Science, Culture, Human Rights and Petitions (the committees recommended adoption, Rec. 76/2023).[49] The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security was divided and would not adopt recommendation for or against the adoption, however the rapporteur Václav Láska expressed his strong support. [50] Láska is from the Pirate Party, a member of the ruling coalition during the vote. The Committee on EU Affairs was also divided and could not adopt a recommendation for or against the adoption. Like Láska, the rapporteur for the Committee on EU Affairs, Adéla Šípová, expressed her strong support.[51] Šípová is an independent Senator who represented the Pirate Party from the ruling coalition.

The plenary debate was scheduled for January 24, 2024. At that time, the government was a multiparty coalition of three plus two parties (in total, five parties). Three parties formed an alliance, Together (SPOLU), which included the party of the Prime Minister, ODS. The three Together parties governed alongside two additional parties, the Pirates and Mayors. Whereas the Pirates and Mayors are progressive parties, the parties in Together—especially the Christian Democrats and the socially conservative wing of the Civic Democrats—represented the conservative pole of the ruling coalition.

The bill was presented by Minister of Justice Pavel Blažek from ODS. The position of the government and its coalition agreement was clear: the ratification of the Istanbul Convention was one of the agreed-upon concessions the more conservative three-party coalition Together made to their liberal two-party coalition PirSTAN allies.

The role of the minister of justice was to present the basic facts of the bill and the government’s position. Although Minister Pavel Blažek from the ruling governing coalition fulfilled this obligation in three sentences, he went on to speak at length, voicing his personal opposition to the bill and portraying it as futile, ineffective, and a manifestation of “deranged woke” politics that he claimed threatened the country’s rule of law.[52] His intervention, while inappropriate, was also symptomatic of the broader dynamics surrounding the procedure: opponents of the Convention simultaneously dismissed it as futile, banal, and ineffective, yet depicted it as pernicious and dangerous.

Therefore, the Senate debate on the Istanbul Convention was started by Minister Blažek, who framed it as part of an ongoing public debate about sexual violence, emphasizing the need for rational discussion instead of emotional reactions. Blažek critiqued extreme positions in public discourse, particularly the notion that men are automatically viewed as perpetrators of violence. He referenced a court ruling in Brno that sparked public outrage, cautioning against premature judgements. While he outwardly maintained a neutral façade, his criticism of the Istanbul Convention was clear. He suggested it would spark unproductive debates and argued that current Czech laws already provide adequate protection. His repeated expressions of doubt made his opposition and skepticism clear.[53]

The debate surrounding the ratification of the Istanbul Convention in the Czech Republic was marked by three intertwined narratives presented predominantly by its opponents, particularly the five senators who articulated these views. To provide a coherent narrative of the polarized debate between proponents and opponents, we focus on the winning side: the opponents. Five senators stood up among the opponents: two female independent senators, Daniela Kovářová and Jana Zwyrtek Hamplová; two members of the coalition Together, conservative males Jiří Oberlfalzer (ODS) and Jiří Čunek (Christian Democrats); and one independent member of the conservative groups, Zdeněk Hraba.

The opponents’ argumentation can be distilled into three intertwined narratives:

1. Traditional gender identity roles arguments: fear of criminalization of men, danger to children from trans activism;
2. Sovereignty argument: Istanbul Convention as a Trojan horse of sovereignty and a violation of state sovereignty, clash of the domestic and international law, commitment to spending money on NGOs, EU gender ideology import, and lost control;
3. Redundancy and ineffectiveness arguments: domestic laws on the books and the Istanbul Convention did not reduce violence against women in countries that previously adopted it; this erroneously equates increased reporting with increased violence for a traditionally most underreported type of criminality.

The first narrative views the Istanbul Convention as a threat to traditional gender roles. It revolves around the fear of criminalizing men and perceived threats to children posed by trans activism. This perspective underscores a belief that the Convention could disrupt established gender norms and family structures, leading to societal chaos. Senators Jana Zwyrtek Hamplová and Daniela Kovářová, both vocal opponents, emphasized this narrative by questioning the Convention’s implications for existing laws and the potential for vagueness in legal interpretations.[54] Their arguments are rooted in their identities as culture warriors, using social media to amplify their messages.

The second narrative focuses on sovereignty, wherein the Istanbul Convention is portrayed as a threat to national autonomy. Opponents argue that its provisions would undermine domestic laws and impose foreign ideologies. Senators Jiří Oberfalzer and Jiří Čunek articulated concerns about the Convention’s influence on Czech legislation, highlighting a clash between international mandates and national sovereignty.[55] This narrative intertwines with the third argument about redundancy and ineffectiveness. It posits that existing laws are sufficient, and that the Convention has failed to reduce violence against women in countries that adopted it. This point is echoed by several senators, including Zdeněk Hraba, who argues that the Convention reflects a political agenda rather than offering practical solutions.[56]

In combining these narratives, the opponents framed their arguments to reinforce their overarching message: the Istanbul Convention threatens traditional values and the Czech Republic’s autonomy while being ineffective in its purported goals. The influential conservative senators leveraged their positions to promote these intertwined narratives, drawing on the rhetoric of organizations like Ordo Iuris. While Senators Zwyrtek Hamplová and Kovářová hold limited political power, the significant standing of Senators Oberfalzer, Čunek, and Hraba within their parties allows them to shape the discourse on gender issues and resist progressive reforms, demonstrating the complex interplay of ideology and politics in this contentious debate.[57]

Senators Zwyrtek Hamplová and Kovářová are culture warriors. The opposition to the progressive agenda on social media, which the Istanbul Convention symbolizes, won them their mandates. Both are too extreme to exercise meaningful political power. (Kovářová, though, is influential among ultraconservatives, and Zwyrtek Hamplová less so). Their statements are largely to feed their social media and strengthen their personas as crusaders. Their argumentation mostly covers the first two narratives and significantly overlaps with Ordo Iuris’ public statements and justifications for opposing the ratification of the Convention.[58]

Senator Jana Zwyrtek Hamplová expressed her opposition to the Istanbul Convention during her speech, emphasizing that while it claims to address violence against women and domestic abuse, its vague wording could lead to various interpretations and potentially harmful consequences. She argued that existing laws in the Czech Republic are sufficient to address such issues without the need for the Convention, and she voiced concerns that it might introduce unnecessary legal complexity and interfere with traditional family structures. Hamplová also criticized the influence of nonprofit organizations and international oversight in implementing the Convention, warning that it could impose social norms that do not align with Czech values, particularly in areas such as gender identity and education.[59]

Senator Kovářová criticized the arguments for the ratification of the Istanbul Convention, calling them manipulative and superficial.[60] She disputed the claim that ratification would reduce violence against women, citing countries where violence has increased, particularly from migrants. Kovářová argued that the Convention would require changes to national laws, such as adding aggravating circumstances in domestic violence cases and prohibiting mediation in cases not currently part of Czech law.[61] She also warned of the influence of “gender ideologues” and the financial implications, questioning where funds for implementation will come from. She opposed the idea that gender stereotypes should be eradicated and challenged the claim that ratifying the Convention will prevent violence, instead seeing it as a political tool that would impose unnecessary regulations.[62]

Deputy Chairman of the Senate Jiří Oberfalzer emphasized the legal precedence of the Istanbul Convention over national laws and potential implications for Czech legislation. He expressed concerns that the Convention’s framing of gender-based violence, particularly its recognition of gender as a social construct distinct from biological sex, challenges traditional views on gender roles and family structures. Oberfalzer argued that the Convention promotes ideological shifts, notably the dismantling of gender binaries, which could lead to societal and legal changes beyond addressing violence against women.[63] His statements closely align with Ordo Iuris’ arguments, which oppose the Convention on similar grounds, emphasizing threats to national sovereignty, traditional family values, and concerns over introducing so-called gender ideology into legal frameworks.

Senator Hraba’s speech against the ratification of the Istanbul Convention also closely aligned with conservative narratives promoted by groups like Ordo Iuris. He portrayed the Convention as a deceptive document that, while ostensibly addressing violence against women, actually promotes a hidden agenda centered around gender ideology.[64] Hraba argued that the Istanbul Convention introduces concepts that undermine traditional family and biological structures, such as non-stereotypical gender roles, which he interprets as advocacy that men can become mothers and women can become fathers—an idea he views as extreme. He raised concerns about the Convention’s integration into the Czech law, highlighting that it would bind courts to interpret national legislation in accordance with international definitions of gender, which he sees as a loss of national sovereignty and a dangerous imposition of foreign ideological frameworks.[65]

Hraba also questioned the financial implications of the Convention, particularly its requirement for states to fund NGOs that work on gender-related issues, which, in his view, could lead to the misuse of public resources. Hraba further supported his position by pointing to crime data from countries that have ratified the Convention, claiming it has not reduced violence against women and thus framing the treaty as ineffective and ideologically driven rather than practically useful. In sum, his argument reflected a defense of traditional gender roles, skepticism of international treaties that challenge national legal autonomy, and a preference for domestic legal solutions—all themes that resonate with Ordo Iuris’ broader ideological stance.[66]

Senator Čunek’s speech against the ratification of the Istanbul Convention drew heavily on traditional Christian values and critiques of modern societal shifts in gender and family dynamics. He started with a personal anecdote, humorously commenting on his wife’s control over their finances to underline the importance of relationships built on trust and love. He contrasted this with what he perceived as the Istanbul Convention’s focus on individual needs rather than those of families or society, arguing that this undermines trust in relationships.[67]

Čunek invoked Christian teachings, emphasizing the importance of mutual love and understanding within families, which he believes has been lost in modern legal frameworks. He suggested that the Convention, by promoting rigid laws and gender equality frameworks, overlooks cultural and religious foundations that shape relationships in the Czech Republic. Čunek also pointed to international examples, like Germany and France, where he argued that similar laws have failed to address violence and instead catered to societies with larger populations from non-Christian, culturally diverse backgrounds. He asserted that the Czech Republic, with its different demographic and cultural composition, should not be following this path.[68]

Furthermore, Čunek also warned against positive discrimination and quotas for women, seeing them as harmful to meritocratic principles and potentially demeaning to women. He expanded his critique to broader European policies like the Green Deal, suggesting that forcing unnatural changes in societal structures, just as in environmental policies, will ultimately backfire. In conclusion, Čunek rejected what he viewed as an attempt to distort natural laws and societal norms, affirming his opposition to the Convention and similar reforms.[69]

The five short summaries highlight the main arguments against the ratification by the strongest opponents of the Istanbul Convention and the degree to which they overlap with the Ordo Iuris rhetoric and reports. While the power of Senators Zwyrtek Hamplová and Kovářová is limited as they are independent senators, Senators Oberfalzer, Čunek, and, to a lesser degree, Hraba, are considerably more powerful. They all are the conservative stalwarts in their party. In Hraba’s case, his radicalization led him to leave the Mayor’s (STAN) party, and he joined the conservative faction (SPOLU) in 2022. This enabled Hraba to broaden his influence due to committee chairmanship and close ties with the strongest group in the Senate.

The Emails

According to the Czech lawyer Kristýna Benešová, specializing in EU and human rights law, “most of the Czech society is not aware that the debate about the Istanbul Convention was marred by a very strong disinformation campaign” initiated by transnational ultraconservative organizations, such as Ordo Iuris or Alliance for Family.[70] Senator Láska publicly shared one of the emails he received during the debate in the Senate: “We all know that the main goal of this [Istanbul Convention] is to separate children from families … Please be aware that family is a cornerstone of state. Do not take away the right to family, which consists of a man, a woman, and children from the people.”[71] These arguments that the Istanbul Convention destroys families, by removing the aggressor from the family, was reflected in Senate debates.

Similar arguments were used in a string of emails that we received from a female Senator X [anonymous]. One of them reads: “Honorable Ms. Senator, I would like to ask you not to agree with the ratification of the Istanbul Convention … Today, when the traditional model of family is in crisis (father, mother, children) … this legal arrangement … creates a wedge between men and women (it designates men as perpetrators due to their nature) … The implications are horrific, [the ratification] will indoctrinate the Czech education system, modify free time activities of youth and it will lead to compulsory eradication of national tradition and customs.”[72] Although there were many themes and arguments against the Istanbul Convention, one stood out: whether the Czech legal system is robust enough to punish perpetrators of domestic violence and violence (committed mostly against women).

One line of argumentation against the Convention was of the view that the Czech legal system has sufficient tools at its disposal to address violence. The second line of argument suggested that violence against women should be tolerated, because the preservation of family is a greater good. Therefore, violent men (and occasionally women) should not be punished or removed from their victims since the family unit needs to be kept intact for the benefit of children.

Although the Istanbul Convention was not ratified in Czechia, it nevertheless brought issues of violence, rape, and domestic abuse to the forefront of Czech political discourse. Moreover, the debate eventually contributed to strengthening the legal environment and prompted stepped-up law enforcement efforts to better protect and support rape survivors, victims of sexual assault, and victims of domestic abuse in the Czech Republic.

The Aftermath

In April 2024, only a few months after the failure of the Istanbul Convention ratification, the Czech Republic significantly revised its rape legislation and modified definitions of rape.[73] The reform increased jail time for raping children under fifteen years old to up to fifteen years. For raping a child between 15 and 18 years, the maximum punishment was increased from 10 to 12 years and the minimum from two to three years. The reform introduced a strict concept of “no” and addressed situations when the victim is defenseless (due to intoxication, mental illness, as well as “freezing” due to the stress experienced during assault).[74] Paradoxically, these reforms primarily address child and adolescent rape, aligning with the broader emphasis on children’s well-being promoted by actors who politicize the Istanbul Convention.

The success of the reform was driven by three factors.[75] First, civil society activism and advocacy significantly improved public awareness and changed legislative frameworks to address sexual violence and victim support for the better. Second, effective framing of sexual violence, especially against children and adolescents, as a public rather than private issue, facilitated broader political support across ideological lines. Third, a combination of civic activism and increased awareness of the issue due to the debates that followed in the aftermath of the rejection of the Istanbul Convention resulted in legislative and institutional improvements despite ongoing societal and political polarization.

The rape law reform in 2024 was enabled by inclusive and broad-based advocacy coalitions, involving not only feminist and human rights NGOs but also professional stakeholders such as police representatives and legal experts. These coalitions extended beyond traditional activist circles and helped to reframe gender-based violence as a matter of public safety, legal protection, and human dignity, rather than private morality.

The second enabling condition was strategic public framing. Rape reform was embedded in discourses resonating with mainstream public sensibilities, particularly protecting vulnerable victims, modernizing the legal system, and international commitments. Rather than invoking polarizing frames, the reform campaign emphasized universal principles such as fairness, human rights, and the need to address systemic injustices. This alignment with broad societal consensus facilitated cross-party cooperation and minimized ideological resistance.

Finally, organized opposition was limited or marginal during the short timeframe. Rape law reform occurred at a time when the conservative bloc was preoccupied with other legislative battles, and its discursive arsenal had not fully mobilized against the proposed reform. Debates around the Istanbul Convention heightened public awareness of the regulatory framework governing rape investigations and legal measures addressing domestic violence. Thus paradoxically, the failure to ratify the Istanbul Convention contributed to the improvements in the Czech legal system’s capacity to address rape and violence that disproportionately affects girls, teenagers, and women.

Conclusion

In January 2024, the ratification of the Istanbul Convention should have sailed through the Czech Senate. The governing coalition signaled its commitment, it held a majority in the chamber, and the Istanbul Convention was not a major point of contention among the electorate. Yet the bill was killed. The Czech Senate did not reject the Istanbul Convention through formal institutional vetoes but through strategic inaction. Ambivalence toward the Istanbul Convention within the conservative-liberal coalition government was the primary reason of its failure. However, a coordinated campaign by domestic and transnational anti-gender advocacy groups played a crucial role in transforming an otherwise non-controversial treaty into a flashpoint of culture wars, deepening internal divisions within mainstream confessional parties.

The government killed the bill by sending a minister of justice to the Senate floor. Blažek was opposed to the ratification due to his personal, private convictions, although he was supposed to advocate for the government’s position. This created a permissive structure to break the coalition agreement with a veil of plausible deniability. The senators were left free to act upon their own views, not coalition agreements. In addition, they were exposed to chain emails and a highly mobilized campaign to kill the bill. Seemingly out of the blue, the opponents of the Istanbul Convention exerted an extreme pressure on both opponents and proponents using both partisan channels and conservative advocacy groups, including transnational networks such as Ordo Iuris.

The Czech case exemplifies how backlash can succeed in relatively secular and liberal contexts through procedural sabotage and discursive escalation rather than institutional blockage. As a crucial case, it highlights the diffusion of anti-gender mobilization across borders and its adaptability to different political environments, making it essential for understanding how gender politics intertwines with broader trends of autocratization and democratic backsliding in contemporary Europe.

Although the ratification did not directly trigger backsliding and autocratization, it opened avenues for democratic erosion by enabling the politicization of cultural issues and heteronormative norms that are often used to delegitimize opponents and deflect attention from substantive policy debates. The failure to ratify also undermined cohesion within mainstream right-wing parties by empowering more radical factions and alienating voters within the pro-democratic coalition. By falling short of the expectations of its progressive base, the non-ratification indirectly contributed to the coalition parties’ defeat in the fall 2025 parliamentary elections.

Although the Istanbul Convention was not ratified, it nevertheless brought issues of violence, rape, and domestic abuse to the forefront of Czech political discourse. Paradoxically, the debate contributed to strengthening the legal environment and prompted stepped-up law enforcement efforts to better protect and support rape survivors, victims of sexual assault, and victims of domestic abuse in the Czech Republic.

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The work on this article was supported by the NPO “Systemic Risk Institute” (grant number: LX22NPO5101), funded by the European Union—Next Generation EU (Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, NPO: EXCELES).

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[1]  We thank Payton Capes Davis and Lan Turner for research assistance. We want to thank Senator X and their staff for the anonymized emails and for their important work. We also thank an anonymous reviewer for comments and the participants at the Illiberal International conference on October 24, 2024, at The George Washington University for feedback.

[2] Ordo Iuris, “Czeski Senat przeciwko ratyfikacji genderowej Konwencji stambulskiej. Senatorowie czytali analizę Ordo Iuris,” Ordo Iuris website, January 30, 2024, https://ordoiuris.pl/informacje-prasowe/czeski-senat-przeciwko-ratyfikacji-genderowej-konwencji-stambulskiej-senatorowie-czytali-analize-ordo-iuris/, emphasis added.

[3] Ordo Iuris, “Czeski Senat przeciwko ratyfikacji genderowej Konwencji stambulskiej. Senatorowie czytali analizę Ordo Iuris,” translation by the authors. Original: „Czescy senatorowie, być może dzięki analizom Ordo Iuris, zrozumieli, że skuteczna ochrona przed przemocą domową nie wymaga ratyfikowania Konwencji stambulskiej. Wolną od ideologii gender alternatywą, także dla Polski, jest Międzynarodowa Konwencja Praw Rodziny” – podsumowuje adw. Nikodem Bernaciak, starszy analityk w Centrum Badań i Analiz Instytutu Ordo Iuris.

[4] Neil Datta, “Restoring the Natural Order”: The Religious Extremists’ Vision to Mobilize European Societies against Human Rights on Sexuality and Reproduction (Brussels: European Parliamentary Forum on Population & Development, 2018).

[5] Council of Europe, “Poland,” Istanbul Convention: Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence,” Council of Europe website, https://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbul-convention/poland1, accessed September 15, 2025.

[6] Bartosz Zalewski, Łukasz Bernaciński, and Michał Naszkiewicz, “Analysis of the Doctrinal and Anthropological Conditions of the Istanbul Convention and Selected GREVIO Documents,” Ordo Iuris website, https://en.ordoiuris.pl/analysis-doctrinal-and-anthropological-conditions-istanbul-convention-and-selected-grevio-documents. See Andrea Krizsán, Conny Roggeband, and Michael C. Zeller, “Who Is Afraid of the Istanbul Convention? Explaining Opposition to and Support for Gender Equality,” Comparative Political Studies 58, no. 10 (2025): 2161–2201, https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140241290205.

[7] “Istanbulskou úmluvu podepsalo 45 států, sedm zemí včetně ČR chybí,” Česká justice, July 2, 2023, https://www.ceska-justice.cz/2023/07/istanbulskou-umluvu-podepsalo-45-statu-sedm-zemi-vcetne-cr-chybi/.

[8] Andrea Krizsán, Andrea, Conny Roggeband, and Michael C. Zeller. “Who is afraid of the Istanbul Convention? Explaining opposition to and support for gender equality.” Comparative Political Studies 58, no. 10 (2025): 2161-2201.

[9] Anna Gwiazda and Lora Minkova, “Gendered Advocacy Coalitions and the Istanbul Convention: A Comparative Analysis of Bulgaria and Poland,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 26, no. 1 (2024): 31–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2023.2214566.

[10] Marlene Laruelle, “Illiberalism: A Conceptual Introduction,” East European Politics 38, no. 2 (June 2022): 303–327, https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2037079; Michael Bernhard, “What Do We Know about Civil Society and Regime Change Thirty Years after 1989?” East European Politics 36, no. 3 (July 2020): 341–362, https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1787160; Béla Greskovits, “Rebuilding the Hungarian Right through Conquering Civil Society: The Civic Circles Movement,” East European Politics 36, no. 2 (January 2020): 247–266, https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1718657; Marta Kotwas and Jan Kubik, “Symbolic Thickening of Public Culture and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Poland,” East European Politics and Societies 33, no. 2 (April 2019): 435–471, https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325419826691.

[11] Curanović, Alicja. “The International Activity of Ordo Iuris: The Central European Actor and the Global Christian Right,” Religions 12, no. 12 (2021), 1038.

[12] Ordo Iuris, “Who We Are,” Ordo Iuris website, accessed September 15, 2025, https://ordoiuris.pl/en/who-we-are/. On Ordo Iuris and conservative civil society, see  Marta Kotwas and Jan Kubik, “Beyond ‘Making Poland Great Again’: Nostalgia in Polish Populist and Non‐Populist Discourses,” Sociological Forum 37, no. 4 (2022): 1360–86, https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.12842. On instrumental use of religion, see Lotem Halevy and Lenka Buštíková, “Confessional Illiberalism in Europe,” Politics and Governance 13, no. S4 (July 2025), https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.9675.

[13] Julia Dauksza, Anna Gielewska, Konrad Szczygieł, Sarunas Cerniauskas, Migle Kranceviciute, Liucija Lenkauskaite, Lukas Diko, Tomas Madlenak, Masenjka Bacic, Oliver Kund, Holger Roonemaa, Márton Sarkadi Nagy, and Dennis Mijnheer, “The Golden Lion Roars from Cracow,” VSquare, December 30, 2020, https://vsquare.org/the-golden-lion-roars-from-cracow/.

[14] Ordo Iuris, “Statut Fundacji Instytut na rzecz Kultury Prawnej Ordo Iuris,” Chapter 6, Article 20, December 2020, https://ordoiuris.pl/sites/default/files/inline-files/Statut%20jednolity%20grudzien%CC%81%202020.pdf.

[15] Węgierskie Centrum Praw. Podstawowych przeciwko przysta˛pieniu UE do Konwencji stambulskiej. 2020. Available online: https://ordoiuris.pl/rodzina-i-malzenstwo/wegierskie-centrum-praw-podstawowych-przeciwko-przystapieniu-ue-do-konwencji, (accessed on 5 September 2025).

[16] According to Curanović, OI is pursuing lawsuits against journalists Tomasz Piątek and Klementyna Suchanow, former minister of foreign affairs Radosław Sikorski, film director Agnieszka Holland, Polish MP Anna Maria Zukowska, Polish leftist politician Joanna Senyszyn, Polish MEP Robert Biedroń, and MEP Guy Verhofstadt, the Secretary of the European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights Neil Datta. Curanović, “The International Activity of Ordo Iuris: The Central European Actor and the Global Christian Right.”

[17] Vanessa Gera, “Why an Abortion Law Ruling Triggered Mass Protests in Poland,” AP News, October 28, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-poland-abortion-courts-europe-2f99633e9c504b302855ea9848037cb2.

[18] Bartosz Zalewski and Marcin Olszówka, “W sprawie projektu zmiany art. 200B Kodeksu karnego ustawą przedłożoną przez komitet ‘Stop pedofilii,’ ” https://www.thelegalculture.com/legal/article/view/80/99

[19] Bill proposal, o zmianie niektórych ustaw w związku z ochroną zdrowia i życia dzieci poczętych

metodą in vitro, Polish Parliament (Sejm) website, https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-przeciw-ograniczeniu-in-vitro-tylko-do-malzenstw.

[20] On Ordo Iuris and the so-called LGBTQ zones, see Ordo Iuris, “Samorządowa Karta Praw Rodzin,” Ordo Iuris website, accessed September 15, 2025, https://ordoiuris.pl/informacje-prasowe/samorzadowa-karta-praw-rodzin/; Wojciech Rafałowski, “Proposing Anti-LGBTQIAP Resolutions at the Municipal Level in Poland: Meeting the Social Demand or Making Use of the Available Resources?” East European Politics and Societies 37, no. 02 (2023): 627–655, https://doi.org/10.1177/08883254221082133; Matthew Stenberg and Conor O’Dwyer, “When Do Local Governments Discriminate? Lessons from the Diffusion of ‘LGBT Free Zones’ in Poland,” Urban Affairs Review (2025), https://doi.org/10.1177/10780874251382453.

[21] European Parliament, “Selection and Pre-Selection of Ordo Iuris as a Member of EU Fund Monitoring Committees,” E-000258/2023, January 27, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2023-000258_EN.html.

[22] On conservative transnational playbook, see Neil Datta, “Restoring the Natural Order”: The Religious Extremists’ Vision to Mobilize European Societies against Human Rights on Sexuality and Reproduction (Brussels: European Parliamentary Forum on Population & Development, 2018)

[23] Alicja Curanović, “The International Activity of Ordo Iuris: The Central European Actor and the Global Christian Right,” Religions 12, no. 12 (2021), 1038,
https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12121038; Anna Gwiazda and Lora Minkova, “Gendered Advocacy Coalitions and the Istanbul Convention: A Comparative Analysis of Bulgaria and Poland,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 26, no. 1 (2024): 31–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2023.2214566; Ciarán Burke and Alexandra Molitorisová, “Reservations/Declarations under the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (cedaw) in Light of Sex/Gender Constitutional Debates,” International Human Rights Law Review 8, no. 2 (2019), 188–214, https://doi.org/10.1163/22131035-00802002; Zuzana Očenášová, “Poison in the Juice: “Gender Ideology” and the Istanbul Convention in Slovakia,” Politické Vedy 24, no. 4 (2021), 38–55.

[24] Gwiazda and Minkova, “Gendered Advocacy Coalitions and the Istanbul Convention,” 31–53. Agnieszka Graff and Elżbieta Korolczuk, Anti-gender politics in the populist moment, (Taylor & Francis: 2022).

[25] Očenášová, “Poison in the Juice,” 38–55; Burke and Molitorisová, “Reservations/Declarations under the Council of Europe Convention,” 188–214.

[26] Council of Europe. Armenia’s Path to Ratification of the Istanbul Convention: Progress and Challenges. Council of Europe, 2025, https://rm.coe.int/arm-2025-armenias-path-to-ratification-of-the-istanbul-convention-fina/native/48802854d2.

[27] Miriana Ilcheva, “Bulgaria and the Istanbul Convention – Law, Politics and Propaganda vs. the Rights of Victims of Gender-based Violence,” Open Journal for Legal Studies 3, no. 1 (2020), 49–68, https://doi.org/10.32591/coas.ojls.0301.04049i; Burke and Molitorisová, “Reservations/Declarations under the Council of Europe Convention,” 188–214.

[28] Jorune Linkeviciute, “The perception of the Istanbul Convention in the Lithuanian Mainstream Media: Is “Gender Ideology” on the Rise?,” Politické Vedy 24, no. 4 (2020), 16–37, https://doi.org/10.24040/politickevedy.2021.24.4.16-37; Burke and Molitorisová, “Reservations/Declarations under the Council of Europe Convention,” 188–214.

[29] Sandra Duffy, ““Ideological colonising”: The influence of anti-gender movements on domestic and international human rights law,” in Queer Encounters with International Law: Lives, Communities, Subjectivities eds. Tamsin Phillipa Paige and Claerwen O’Hara , (London, Routledge: 2024), 175–199);  Conny Roggeband and Andrea Krizsán, “The Violent Implications of Opposition to the Istanbul Convention,” Societies 14, no. 6 (2024), 92, https://doi.org/10.3390/soc14060092;  Elif Tektas and Asuman Özgür Keysan, “Conservative civil society organizations (CSOs) and anti-gender issues in Croatia, Slovakia, and Poland,” Alternatif Politika 13, no. 1 (2021), 114–145.

[30] National Council of the Slovak Republic, “Voting Record: Parliamentary Vote no. 43645,” National Council of the Slovak Republic, accessed September 25, 2025, https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Page.aspx?sid=schodze/hlasovanie/hlasklub&ID=43645.

[31] Očenášová, “Poison in the Juice,” 38-55.

[32] “President Informed Council of Europe about Slovakia’s Stance on the Istanbul Convention.” STVR News, (March 6, 2020). Accessed December 15, 2025, https://enrsi.stvr.sk/articles/news/219271/president-informed-council-of-europe-about-slovakias-stance-on-convention.

[33] Office of the President of the Republic of Poland. “Poland Ratifies Anti-Violence Convention.” Accessed December 15, 2025. https://www.president.pl/archives/bronislaw-komorowski/news/poland-ratifies-anti-violence-convention,39095.

[34] Gwiazda and Minkova, “Gendered Advocacy Coalitions and the Istanbul Convention,” 31–53.

[35] Ordo Iuris, Analysis of the Doctrinal and Anthropological Conditions of the Istanbul Convention and Selected Grevio Documents, (October 2, 2020), https://ordoiuris.pl/en/analyses/analysis-of-the-doctrinal-and-anthropological-conditions-of-the-istanbul-convention-and-selected-grevio-documents/.

[36] Vanessa Gera, “Why an Abortion Law Ruling Triggered Mass Protests in Poland,” AP News, October 28, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-poland-abortion-courts-europe-2f99633e9c504b302855ea9848037cb2.

[37] Notes from Poland, “Tusk Withdraws Former Government’s Challenge to European Convention on Domestic Violence,” January 30, 2024, Accessed December 15, 2025, https://enrsi.stvr.sk/articles/news/219271/president-informed-council-of-europe-about-slovakias-stance-on-convention.

[38]  István Tóth and Márton Szabó, “Same Same, but Different: Domestic Conditions of Illiberal Backlash Against Universal Rights in the Czech Republic and Slovakia,” In Anti‑gender Politics in the Populist Moment, eds. Agnieszka Graff and Elżbieta Korolczuk, (Springer: 2021).

[39] Başak Yirmibeşoğlu, “The Istanbul Convention: A Continuing Source of Political Division in Several European Countries,” Brno Daily, July 31, 2021. https://brnodaily.com/2021/07/31/lifestyle/the-istanbul-convention-a-continuing-source-of-political-division-in-several-european-countries/.

[40] Michaela Rambousková, “Váhání s Istanbulskou úmluvou nás negativně poškozuje, tvrdí zmocněnkyně.” Seznam Zprávy, September 20, 2023, https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/clanek/domaci-politika-vahani-s-istanbulskou-umluvou-nas-negativne-poskozuje-tvrdi-zmocnenkyne-237147.

[41] Michaela Rambousková, “Váhání s Istanbulskou úmluvou nás negativně poškozuje, tvrdí zmocněnkyně,” September 20, 2023, https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/clanek/domaci-politika-vahani-s-istanbulskou-umluvou-nas-negativne-poskozuje-tvrdi-zmocnenkyne-237147.

[42] Petr Janyška, “Osmadvacet senátorů stačilo, aby ČR odmítla Istanbulskou úmluvu

 Deník Referendum,“ Deník Referendum, January 29, 2024, https://denikreferendum.cz/clanek/36042-osmadvacet-senatoru-stacilo-aby-cr-odmitla-istanbulskou-umluvu.

[43] Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění (CVVM), “Občané ČR o tzv. Istanbulské úmluvě – červen 2021,” press release, July 13, 2021, https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/cz/tiskove-zpravy/politicke/politicke-ostatni/5401-obcane-cr-o-tzv-istanbulske-umluve-cerven-2021.

[44] https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/clanek/domaci-zivot-v-cesku-znasilneni-zazila-kazda-pata-zena-pachatele-vetsina-z-nich-znala-246375 Magdalena Kulaová, “Znásilnění zažila každá pátá žena. Pachatele většina z nich znala,” Seznam Zprávy, February 22, 2024, https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/clanek/domaci-zivot-v-cesku-znasilneni-zazila-kazda-pata-zena-pachatele-vetsina-z-nich-znala-246375. 58% of women in Czechia encounter sexualized violence during their lifetime.

[45] Voting Record – Fifteenth Parliamentary Term (2024–2026) in the Czech Senate. Hlasování – Patnácté funkční období 2024-2026  https://www.senat.cz/xqw/xervlet/pssenat/hlas.

[46] Voting Record – Fifteenth Parliamentary Term (2024–2026) in the Czech Senate. Hlasování – Patnácté funkční období 2024-2026  https://www.senat.cz/xqw/xervlet/pssenat/hlas.

[47] Tomáš Pancíř, “Hraba: Pomoci obětem násilí stát musí, Istanbulská úmluva ale používá gumovou definici genderu,” iRozhlas, January 26, 2024, https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/hraba-pomoci-obetem-nasili-stat-musi-istanbulska-umluva-ale-pouziva-gumovou_2401260010_cen.

[48] Analysis of the Senate transcript of the debate on the Istanbul Convention by the authors. Source: Czech Republic, Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, Stenographic Record of the Senate Debate on the Ratification of the Istanbul Convention, 24 January 2024, https://www.senat.cz/xqw/xervlet/pssenat/hlasovani?action=steno&O=14&IS=7383&D=24.01.2024#b25317.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Vojtěch Gavriněv, “Mailové schránky senátorů zaplavily desítky řetězových mailů, říká právnička,” Seznam Zprávy, January 27, 2024, https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/clanek/domaci-politika-mailove-schranky-senatoru-zaplavily-desitky-retezovych-mailu-rika-pravnicka-244575, translation by the authors.

[71] Gavriněv, “Mailové schránky senátorů zaplavily desítky řetězových mailů, říká právnička,” translation by the authors.

[72] Source: Correspondence obtained by authors from the Office of the [anonymous] Senator. Translation: authors.

[73] Vladimír Řepka, “Poslanci jednomyslně schválili redefinici znásilnění,” Ministerstvo spravedlnosti České republiky, April 10, 2024, https://msp.gov.cz/en/web/msp/tiskove-zpravy/-/clanek/poslanci-jednomyslnne-schvalili-redefinici-znasilneni-kopirovat-.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Petra Guasti, “Dynamics of Progress and Resistance: Gender Equality Reforms in the Czech Republic (2006–2024)”, Conference Paper, ECPR, Joint Sessions in Prague (2025).