Illiberal Repurposing of International Cooperation: Explaining the Polish-Hungarian Opportunistic Partnership

Illiberal Repurposing of International Cooperation: Explaining the Polish-Hungarian Opportunistic Partnership

By Aleksandra Dzięgielewska

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Keywords: Poland, Hungary, rule of law, conditionality mechanism, migration

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The cases of Poland and Hungary are prominent examples of the triumph of illiberalism in Central and Eastern Europe.[1] They also depict illiberal cooperation. For it was the Hungarian systemic transformation on which the Law and Justice (PiS) party in Poland based its illiberal constitutional project. This did not come as a surprise given that to “turn Warsaw into Budapest” has been an explicit objective of the party’s leader, Jarosław Kaczyński.[2] What remains of central interest for the present inquiry is the fact that the Polish-Hungarian partnership quickly escalated and gained an international dimension. The two countries cooperated mainly within the international forum of the European Union (EU), where on many occasions they manifested reciprocal political support.

This paper’s main objective is to conceptualize the Polish-Hungarian relationship and dissect the reasons for its development. To this end, the analysis engages critically with the prevailing scholarly positions discerning genuine connection between the countries based on shared historical experiences and cultural similarities. While acknowledging certain commonalities that developed for obvious geopolitical reasons, this article argues that these must not be understood as foundational for the Polish-Hungarian relationship noticeable during the last decade. The paper suggests, on the contrary, that these two countries’ cooperation developed because of shared political goals and for purely illiberal gains. The verification of this claim is undertaken by reference to the fundamental assumptions of illiberalism which, for the purpose of this inquiry, is understood simply as the antithesis of liberal constitutionalism[3]—that is, as a legal, political, and social phenomenon repudiating the institutional and moral logic of liberal constitutionalism.[4]

The central argument suggesting opportunism as the explanation for the Polish-Hungarian relationship builds on concrete examples of both countries’ activity in the international arena of the EU. More precisely, it claims that Poland and Hungary united most visibly in order to, first, reject the EU’s legal measures adopted in relation to the 2015 refugee crisis, and second, to counter the imposition of financial liability for systemic violations of the rule of law, by invoking the argument of national identity. When engaging more closely with these two cases, it becomes clear that Poland and Hungary were cooperating to bolster their national illiberal agendas. For hostility towards migrants[5] and abuse of fundamental liberal-democratic values, such as the rule of law, make up the very essence of illiberalism. This straightforward alternative explanation for their illiberal cooperation is neither historical, cultural, nor socio-economic, and refers to the mutuality of the countries’ illiberal goals. Consequently, the main contribution that this article seeks to make is to demonstrate, concerning the case of Poland and Hungary, that as far as illiberal jurisdictions are concerned, such international cooperative arrangements serve the primary aim of upholding their shared illiberal agenda.

This paper is structured as follows. The first section argues in favor of a joint consideration of the Polish and Hungarian legal transformation in the context of illiberalism and conceptualizes the countries’ relationship. It engages with the existing literature tackling the various underpinnings of the Polish-Hungarian cooperative arrangement and questions their role for the development of the studied partnership. The second section makes the case for the cooperation being rooted in illiberalism. It analyzes in depth two cases in which Poland and Hungary united against EU institutions and their fellow member states. The third section comments on the demise of the Polish-Hungarian partnership, while the fourth one summarizes the main argument.

Explaining the Polish-Hungarian Partnership

Poland and Hungary figure prominently as the leading exemplars of illiberalism within the European Union.^[6] Hungary initiated the EU illiberalization processes in 2010 by launching a massive rearrangement of the domestic legal-political order. With regard to Poland, the PiS party’s electoral victory in 2015 marked the beginning of an illiberal era. As soon as the new political majority came into office, it turned to Hungary as a template for illiberal change and implemented a series of institutional reforms mimicking those previously introduced in that country by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party. In this sense, the success of the constitutional dismantling in Hungary paved the way for a similar overhaul in Poland, in that it demonstrated which illiberal techniques must be followed in order to achieve illiberalization efficiently.^[7]

The similarity of the Polish and Hungarian paths to illiberal transformations can be easily discerned when looking at the targets, techniques, and outcomes of the adopted institutional reforms. Both countries began with the dismantling of the justice system. First, they captured the constitutional courts as the most powerful counter-majoritarian institutions providing checks on the legislative and the executive branches.[8] This choice was not incidental, as illiberal leaders are aware that to control constitutional courts means to decide on the content of constitutional jurisprudence.^[9] Accordingly, the Polish and Hungarian constitutional courts were packed with politicized judges ready to realize the will of the incumbent. In the next step, with the aim of gaining influence over the ordinary courts’ jurisprudence, the National Council of the Judiciary was reformed in Poland, allowing the incumbent government to effectively decide on all judicial appointments, while in Hungary, the government seized control over the appointment of the ordinary courts’ presidents.[10] Beyond the justice system, in both Hungary and Poland, the civil service was politicized and staffed with incompetent loyalists, and public media outlets were subordinated to the incumbent and turned into pro-government propaganda machinery.[11]

While Hungary and Poland undoubtedly make good comparators, it is crucial to point out that their illiberal trajectories, especially the stage of advancement of their respective transformations, differ in some respects. First, taking on a broad, systemic perspective, it must be reiterated that the government formed by the PiS party lacked the parliamentary supermajority allowing for a formal change of the constitution, contrary to the distribution of political power in Hungary which enabled the adoption of multiple constitutional amendments.[12] Consequently, in the context of Poland, we merely speak of an informal, de facto constitutional change resulting from the incompatibility of statutes passed by the PiS government with the overarching liberal constitutional order.

Second, taking the example of press freedom, the Hungarian government managed to gradually seize full control over all media outlets, whether public or commercial,^[13] which has never been the case in Poland.[14] Serious limitations on press freedom were implemented with respect to public television and radio broadcasters. Commercial media were subject to routine verbal attacks and threats of losing their broadcasting licenses, but they nevertheless managed to remain independent.

Finally, scholars also emphasize the diverging roles of public stakeholders, including civil society and the political opposition, in the domestic legal-political orders of Hungary and Poland.[15] The power of the latter’s agents to exert pressure on their domestic political actors is crucial in the context of the entrenchment and sustainability of non-liberal regimes, as well as their potential collapse. During the eight years of consistent illiberalization, Poland’s civil society and political opposition remained united and strong, which was most evident during the so-called “Black protests”^[16] condemning the imposition of restrictions on abortion.[17] Moreover, massive opposition-led demonstrations have routinely taken place in cities and smaller towns all over Poland, protesting the introduction of legal reforms such as those altering the structure of the Supreme Court or the National Council of the Judiciary. The significance of this aspect for the overturning of illiberal power came to light when the massive public mobilization culminated in an unprecedently high voter turnout during the parliamentary elections of 2023, which led to political change in Poland. In Hungary, by contrast, civil society and the political opposition have never had comparable momentum, and the impact of their resistance to illiberal rearrangements has been marginal.^[18] Hence, while the methods employed to reject the pre-existing liberal constitutional system might have been the same for both countries, their implications for legal and social structures differed dramatically.

This brief stock-taking is needed to demonstrate the undeniable analogies but also to signal several crucial dissimilarities between the illiberal transformations in Poland and Hungary. From here on, however, this analysis will no longer be interested in these individual national illiberal trajectories. What it seeks to inquire is, rather, why Hungary and Poland became partners and how this partnership was manifested to the international public. Hence, the remainder of this paper opposes the common premise that Poland and Hungary must be studied as two standalone examples of illiberalism, by showcasing that they afford a paradigmatic illustration of a Central and Eastern European illiberal cooperation.

Historical, Cultural, and Socio-Economic Factors

It is beyond any doubt that, since 2015, when the PiS government was formed, Poland and Hungary became political bedfellows. The countries’ highest political representatives spoke of a close cooperation, held joint meetings, and when seeking to legitimize a controversial new policy, they would often rely on the status quo in the other country.[19] The Polish-Hungarian friendship was obvious to outside observers who spoke of clear analogies in the two countries’ respective national agendas.^[20]

The starting point for determining the origins of the Polish-Hungarian partnership would be to dive into the varied explanations offered by the existing scholarship. Indeed, there is no lack of literature attempting to decipher the nature of this relationship. However, there is by no means a consensus theory regarding the background of this studied friendship. Scholars tend to emphasize the significance of the countries’ similar historical experiences and common cultural heritage, including the crucial role of their attachment to Catholic Christianity,^[21] compatible national identities and hierarchies of values, or even parallel domestic intellectual landscapes.^[22] In essence, the argument goes, the correlations between the political and socio-economic settings, as well as similar historical trajectories, cannot be overstated when trying to understand the recent partnership. The following paragraphs provide a brief recapitulation of these academic narratives.

First, the scholarship suggests that similar historical trajectories explain the partnership.^[23] According to this view, the very first true Polish-Hungarian alliance dates back to the Middle Ages when, over two short periods, the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdom of Poland were bound by the so-called personal union, according to which they were governed by the same monarch while their territories remained separate.^[24] Several hundred years later, their shared experiences in the 20th century have led to similarly tragic consequences for both nations, once again uniting the countries. Especially over the past century, these states are claimed to have developed a shared sense of victimhood.[25] With regard to Hungary, this is said to have occurred following the First World War, with the Treaty of Trianon, which dictated significant limitations on the Kingdom of Hungary’s territory and left millions of ethnic Hungarians outside of the borders of the newly-created titular nation-state.[26] The later experience of Communism only deepened this negative sentiment. Likewise in Poland—a nation which was deprived of sovereignty for over 120 years, and which since winning back its independence had only enjoyed freedom for two decades until finding itself under Soviet control—the victim mentality has penetrated society. It is argued that Communism was a disastrous experience to which only some European countries can fully relate, and this contributed to the rise of a Polish-Hungarian relationship based on a deep mutual understanding.

Another significant historical commonality that cannot be overlooked is the fact that Poland and Hungary underwent the transition from Communism to liberal democracy simultaneously.^[27] As a result, scholars assert, there was a need to copy the proposed Western democratic structures.[28] The claim is that, gradually, the societies of Poland and Hungary started to question the idea which constituted a basic prerequisite for a successful transformation, namely the acknowledgement of a foreign, Western legal-political culture as being superior to one’s own and the need to consider it as the single best legal-political order. Backlash against this orthodoxy and the ensuing rejection of Western liberal democracy as an ideal worthy of implementation, followed. On top of this, a sense of disenchantment with the outcomes of democratization was also widespread in Hungary and Poland.[29] Hungarians and Poles found it hard to accept that their new liberal-democratic institutions struggled to resolve everyday issues, and the slow-paced socio-economic development governed by free-market forces did not automatically translate into prosperity for all.^[30]

These historical and socio-economic factors are, in turn, claimed to have contributed to the creation of similar national identities.^[31] Both societies cultivate their attachment to tradition and conservative values, among which religion, patriotism, and family are of crucial importance. This hierarchy is common for the whole Central and Eastern European region^[32] and has not been affected by the liberal-democratic transition. Quite the contrary, the gravity of conservative moral attitudes increased proportionately to the disappointment with the new liberal-democratic reality. In both countries, politicians capitalized on the resurgence of moral conservatism, which translated into concrete policy approaches such as, for instance, a full-blown rejection of egalitarianism as a moral ideal, a shift which over the last years has been visible especially with regard to women and LGBTI community.[33] Further examples of the political influence of conservative moral orthodoxy include public support for restrictions on abortion access[34] and in vitro fertilization, lack of recognition and protection of same-sex couples, or policy choices reversing the previous achievements in the field of gender equality.[35]

Next, a Catholic Christian heritage is argued to have played a central role in connecting the countries.[36] In Poland, the separation of Church and state as guaranteed by Article 25(2) of the Constitution,^[37] exists only on paper. In practice, the role and political influence of the Catholic Church remain immense. The Church contributed to the fall of Communist rule and was therefore admitted to the Roundtable Talks deciding on the social, political, and legal arrangement of the future state. Perhaps the most illustrative example of the Church’s true authority has been the domestic regulation of abortion availability, effective from 1993 through 2020.[38] This legislation, allowing women to undergo an abortion procedure only in three circumstances,[39] has been called an “abortion compromise,” an expression referring to the agreement made by negotiation between other political forces and the Catholic Church, which had a decisive vote on the regulation of this matter.

Historically speaking, in Hungary, neither the Church nor the Catholic Christian tradition have played quite as big a role as in Poland.[40] In particular, scholars underscore that, unlike in Poland, the Church was never as engaged in combating Communism in Hungary. However, the national approach to religion changed when the Orbán government took power in 2010.^[41] In one of his speeches in which he reaffirmed Hungary’s commitment to illiberal democracy, Orbán declared that his vision of Christian democracy is illiberal by definition, because the very notion of Christian democracy, rejecting multiculturalism, is not a liberal one.^[42] Currently, the deep rootedness of Hungarian culture in Christianity finds an explicit reflection in the text of its constitution, known as the Fundamental Law. The constitutional amendment of 2018 provided that “protection of Hungary’s self-identity and its Christian culture is the duty of all state organizations.”[43] Apart from this, in its current reading, achieved through multiple amendments, the Hungarian Constitution adheres to Roman Catholic doctrine. This takes place, for instance, when the Fundamental Law defines community and the traditional family,[44] or when it explicitly stipulates the protection of unborn life.^[45] Overall, these historical, cultural, and socio-economic commonalities, further reinforced by the two countries’ recent increasingly conservative politics, are argued to have stood behind their partnership.

Illiberalism as a Unifying Factor

In light of the above, it is undeniable that Poland and Hungary are culturally, historically, and religiously compatible. The question remains, however, whether this has been a cause of their reinvigorated cooperation. The following analysis seeks to challenge the idea that these countries bonded over their similar history and culture. For when engaging closely with these factors, especially the historically- and culturally-induced set of values comprising the countries’ national identities, among which adherence to Christianity, traditional family attitudes and, more generally, rejection of the liberal orthodoxy,[46] take center stage, it is notable that they represent more than just a basis for the Polish-Hungarian cooperative arrangement. They form part of a broader agenda of illiberalism, defined as a legal, political, and social phenomenon repudiating not merely institutional[47] but, equally so, the moral tenets of liberal constitutionalism.[48] To be more precise, these aspects constitute the moral, values-driven dimension of illiberalism.^[49] In other words, this paper asserts that the historical, socio-economic and cultural factors  determined the respective illiberal shifts in Hungary and Poland and allowed illiberalism to thrive in those countries. Once the illiberal governments took power in both countries, the illiberal values-preferences and the drive for the realization of a specific illiberal agenda was decisive for the launch and the incremental deepening of the partnership.[50]

To assert the viability of this explanation, according to which, in the specific context of Polish-Hungarian cooperation, cultural, historical, and socio-economic factors are not to be seen as drivers of international partnerships so much as catalysts for the creation of illiberal moral agendas, we need to reread them through the lens of illiberalism. More precisely, the significance of these varied factors for the development of illiberalism, as well as their role under illiberal governance, must be explored.

First, to spot the connection between illiberalism and the historically- and culturally-informed conservative hierarchy of values embedded in both societies, we must outline illiberalism’s broader moral commitments. One of the most overexploited claims regarding illiberalism is that it opposes the values of liberal constitutionalism. It is rarely explained what this opposition means and how it is advanced in practice. The understanding of illiberalism adopted in this paper asserts that foundational to the activity of an illiberal incumbent is a concrete hierarchy of values and, where necessary, a rejection of their liberal understanding. To begin with, illiberalism is fundamentally at odds with the traditional liberal notions of pluralism, personal autonomy, openness, and tolerance as placing too much emphasis on the individual and his or her rights versus those of the state. The latter impinge upon the majoritarian nature of illiberal rule^[51] and hinder the way towards the achievement of the “common good.”^[52] Adhering to the notions of autonomy and pluralism, allowing individuals to pursue their varied, and possibly modern, lifestyle choices is seen as potentially threatening national culture, religion, and identity.^[53] In place of liberal values, “illiberal societies prioritize community interests and actively promote a particular vision of communal life.”^[54] Under these headings, illiberal polities of Central and Eastern Europe typically underscore the importance of the traditional family as a basic social structure responsible for cultivating national identity. They also prioritize the value of religion and the institution of the Church.[55] As such, illiberalism marks links to conservative thought.^[56]

Regarding the broad spectrum of other values which figure prominently in liberal constitutions, but whose understanding does not advance illiberal objectives, these become repurposed to suit illiberal ambitions. Illiberal interpretations of liberal constitutional values such as equality, gender equality, or constitutional identity, are context-based and, through both the lawmaking and adjudication processes, can advance any given illiberal political end.[57] This is the primary illiberal mechanism deployed “to remove the liberal content from constitutionalism.”^[58] For instance, as will be shown later in the analysis, national identity can be invoked to deny the domestic effectiveness of international law and to legitimize reforms contrary to EU law.^[59] To cite a different example, illiberal governments reinterpret gender equality to introduce outdated policies which hinder the achievement of substantive, de facto, equality between men and women.^[60]

A further consequence of these value-related commitments is a particular social arrangement actively pursued by illiberal governments. An illiberal vision of the social order constitutes a response to the threats emerging in modern societies, following from conceptions of multiculturalism and non-heteronormativity. To preserve national culture and tradition, illiberal governments attach great weight to the cultivation of a traditional understanding of family. In the Central and Eastern European context, this means reliance on the Christian conceptions of family and marriage. The latter, for instance, is understood exclusively as a union between a man and woman. With its strong attachment to patriarchal roots, illiberalism demands respect for traditional gender roles stipulating women’s responsibility for bearing children and viewing men’s role as being to provide for the family. Illiberalism pursues implementation of such a family structure through legal, mostly gender-conservative means, because “social policies are treated not only in financial but also in ideological terms. It is about creating a normative vision of the family as the basis of society.”^[61] Illiberalism therefore expands family policy in ways discouraging women from engaging in professional work. For instance, it will not invest in development of daycare facilities or otherwise incentivize women’s labor market participation, but rather, as it used to be the case with the 500+ program in Poland,[62] hand out direct cash subsidies, discouraging new mothers from re-entering labor market.^[63] In this context, illiberalism must be considered an anti-gender phenomenon because it actively hinders the achievement of gender equality.^[64] Illiberal emphasis on the traditional family values equals simultaneous hostility towards different, especially non-heteronormative, family models. Illiberalism is strongly against gay marriages and same-sex parenting. Moreover, it rejects informal ways of cohabitation and nontraditional family arrangements.

Hence, the relationship between illiberalism and the conservative moral attitudes of the Polish and Hungarian societies reflecting the countries’ historical experiences and cultural patterns is one of mutual reinforcement. The respective national identities provided fertile ground for the triumph of illiberal value preferences, while the inherently illiberal moral commitments further entrenched the conservative, gendered, anti-egalitarian national structures.

A similar connection occurs between illiberalism and the crucial socio-economic issues present in Hungary and Poland.[65] As mentioned previously, both societies have been disappointed with the outcomes of the post-Communist transition to liberal democracy. To many, the post-Communist reality was quite the opposite of what was advertised to the public in the beginnings of the democratic transition process. In Poland, harsh neoliberal economic policies of subsequent political majorities culminated in, among others, extreme precarity of labor, an ineffective social security system with no family support, low pension payments including virtually no assistance directed to persons with disabilities and their caregivers, poor accessibility of healthcare services exacerbating housing unaffordability and social housing inaccessibility, and an unjust taxation system with almost no tax deductions for families or single parents.[66]

Scholarship asserts that the lack of adequate political response to accumulating socio-economic problems has played a significant role in the electoral victory of the illiberal political formations.^[67] Research indicates that in Poland the shift took place owing to the Law and Justice party’s commitment to pursue thorough state reforms aimed at improving the general welfare.^[68] Politicians amplified the mounting social dilemmas. And since the general conviction was that the standard of social rights protection had failed to keep up with the countries’ economic development, the new governing majority came to power with a strong mandate to implement wide-ranging reforms of all kinds. Hence, disappointment with the outcomes of democratization processes must be seen as creating susceptibility to illiberal arguments, and therefore, a fertile environment for the illiberal shifts of 2010 and 2015 in Hungary and Poland, respectively.

Overall, historical, cultural, and socio-economic factors have enabled illiberalism to thrive in Hungary and Poland. The remainder of the analysis explains that the countries’ mutual objective of implementing their illiberal agenda, of which illiberal values form an inalienable part, was decisive for the formation of the Polish-Hungarian partnership.

Polish-Hungarian Opportunistic Cooperation at the EU Level

To illustrate the opportunistic nature of this illiberal international cooperation, we will now analyze Polish-Hungarian activity within the forum of the EU. For it is crucial to note that the Polish-Hungarian partnership was most visible when confronted with the obligations stemming from EU law. Two developments will be examined in depth, demonstrating that this cooperation was opportunistic to the extent that its ultimate aim was to bolster their inherently illiberal goals.[69] First, the countries’ shared opposition to the EU’s compulsory mechanism for the relocation of migrants will be considered against the backdrop of the broader theme of illiberal hostility toward migrants and opposition to immigration. Second, the Polish-Hungarian joint attempt to veto the passage of the conditionality mechanism, linking the receipt of EU funds by member states with rule-of-law compliance, will be explored through the lens of the illiberal repurposing of the national identity principle.

Backlash against the EU’s Emergency Relocation Scheme

The first occasion to demonstrate Polish-Hungarian unity with regard to a matter of transnational significance came soon after the PiS party gained power in Poland. For this event coincided with the first massive influx of migrants to the EU. The scale of migration experienced by the countries of Southern Europe in 2015 was unprecedented. Greece and Italy became incapable of securing their maritime borders. It soon became clear that the EU’s migration policy was no longer effective. Specifically, the Dublin Regulation, which in essence stipulated that asylum applications can only be examined by the national authorities of the country where the application was filed,[70] proved inadequate and led to the overburdening of some member states.

To ensure a fair and balanced participation of all EU members in resolving the crisis, but primarily to unburden Greece and Italy which, due to their geographic location, received disproportionately more refugees than other countries, an emergency distribution scheme, also referred to as the refugee quota system, was elaborated in late 2015.^[71] It aimed to distribute refugees among each of the EU countries by indicating concrete quotas calculated with reference to several factors, such as a country’s population size, GDP, and other socio-economic indicators of receiving capacity.^[72] It also provided a technical framework for the management of the relocation process. While the EU’s call for solidarity and more equal burden-sharing was understandable, it is nevertheless worth mentioning that the obligatory nature of the relocation mechanism meant a major paradigm shift and a retreat from the previously effective regulations of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).

Poland and Hungary^[73] protested the mandatory nature of the scheme and refused to participate in this relocation.^[74] The countries explicitly called themselves “rebels” opposing the implementation of the scheme.^[75] The Hungarian government claimed that its lack of compliance with the mandatory refugee quota mechanism was motivated by religion and the need to protect “Christian civilization” from “Islamic invasion.”^[76] Thus argued, the countries’ opposition to complying with these legal obligations was considered unacceptable by the EU institutions. Consequently, in 2017, the European Commission launched an infringement procedure based on an alleged failure to implement EU law.^[77] Due to the countries’ unwillingness to resolve the issue during the pre-trial stage, the case was eventually referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

First, the defendant states questioned the case’s admissibility. These claims were successfully rejected which, however, required the CJEU to develop an elaborate argumentation delving deep into the very nature of infringement proceedings^[78] and the division of competences between member states and the EU institutions. As concerns substantive arguments crafted by Hungary and Poland, they were mostly grounded in Article 72 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 4(2) of  the Treaty on European Union (TEU), with reference to which these states claimed that, since the exclusive competence to decide on matters of domestic security belongs to member states and not to the EU institutions, the latter could not force participation in the relocation scheme upon member states.

The Court of Justice of the European Union rejected this assertion and observed that, contrary to the claims formulated by the defendant countries, national security was accounted for in the relocation procedure.^[79] It clarified that the member states could make use of the exception provided in TFEU Article 72 only once they gave clear reasons as to why the granting of an exception was needed.^[80] In the case at hand, this meant that the states could only refuse to relocate individually-specified refugees, and when doing so, they needed to show “reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to their national security or public order.”^[81] Additionally, the expression “reasonable grounds” was to be understood as requiring an individual, case-by-case assessment of the threat posed to national security by any given refugee. In light of this reasoning, in a ruling of April 2020, the CJEU held that by refusing to comply with the temporary mechanism for the resettlement of applicants for international protection, Poland and Hungary had failed to fulfil their obligations under EU law. Even since the ruling became effective, Poland and Hungary have not accepted a single refugee under the relocation mechanism.^[82]

However, it is not only international legal action that remains important for capturing the role of anti-immigrant rhetoric and its connection to illiberal politics. It is equally vital in this respect to pay attention to the domestic debates on the issue. When the infringement procedure was still underway at the EU level, in their respective national orders, Hungary and Poland organized far-flung anti-immigration campaigns, fueling national hostility toward refugees.[83] Just to cite a few examples of this anti-refugee rhetoric, by amending Article 353(a) of the Criminal Code and Article 46(f) of the Law on the police Hungary adopted the so-called “stop Soros” law, criminalizing aid to asylum-seekers, specifically aiming to target the NGOs engaged in assisting the refugees.[84] This legislation was later scrutinized by the captured Constitutional Court of Hungary, which ruled that it was is in accordance with the Fundamental Law.^[85] To justify its position, the Court referred to the constitutional obligation of protecting Hungary’s sovereignty and constitutional identity as well as the necessity of securing the external borders of the Schengen area, a 29-member-state border-free zone within Europe.^[86] Moreover, in 2016, a referendum was held asking Hungarians if they wanted to “allow the European Union to mandate the relocation of non-Hungarian citizens to Hungary without the approval of the National Assembly.”^[87] Scholars underscore that this referendum should never have taken place, as according to the Fundamental Law, referendums can only be held concerning issues that fall under the competence of the Parliament.^[88] A similarly hostile narrative was built around migration issues in Poland. Especially around elections, the anti-migrant discourse intensified and became more violent. A vivid example of this rhetoric was Kaczyński’s infamous statement, made just days before the parliamentary elections of 2015, portraying refugees as carriers of “very dangerous diseases.”[89]

The Polish and Hungarian attitude toward migration is representative of illiberalism. To be more precise, it is characteristic of the essential illiberal value preferences against multiculturalism and in favor of cultural homogeneity.[90] Illiberal leaders are known for their common usage of anti-immigrant language, tapping into the most common anxieties of the national population: most notably, the fear of foreigners. To this end, illiberals employ the captured public media as propaganda machinery and spread disinformation driving anti-refugee sentiment. They meddle with the public perception of migrants. One of the most exploited narratives occurring in this context is to depict refugees from the Middle East as Islamic terrorists.[91] Moreover, the above-reiterated claim that immigration constitutes a threat to Christian values holds a prominent space in the illiberal critique of the EU migration policies. The arguments are socio-economic as well, built around the negative implications of the influx of migrants for the social well-being of the native population. These consequences are said to include fewer employment opportunities, lower wages, and inaccessible or lower social security benefits. Against this backdrop, illiberal opponents of migration call upon their policymakers to restrict social welfare eligibility to the native population, a phenomenon studied under the term of “welfare chauvinism.”^[92] It is against this backdrop that the Polish-Hungarian backlash against the EU migration scheme crops up as an emanation of illiberalism’s broader migrant-hostile, anti-multiculturalist preferences.

Rejection of the EU’s Conditionality Mechanism

Simply put, the EU measures adopted with respect to Poland and Hungary as part of the rule-of-law framework of TEU Article 7 proved ineffective in countering both states’ descent into illiberalism. This realization laid the groundwork for the adoption of a new mechanism that would enable the EU institutions to make the payment of EU funds contingent on a given state’s rule-of-law performance.^[93] Hungary and Poland did everything in their power to hinder the implementation of the scheme, but these attempts proved unsuccessful. Lengthy deliberations held within the EU eventually led to the passage of the General Regime of Conditionality for the Protection of the Union Budget, the so-called conditionality mechanism.^[94] Soon afterward, Hungary and Poland brought an action before the CJEU requesting the annulment of the scheme.^[95]

Poland and Hungary formulated 20 arguments against the mechanism’s legality. They asserted, for instance, that TFEU Article 322(1)(a) did not provide an adequate legal basis for the introduction of the conditionality mechanism and that the scheme was essentially duplicating a similar procedure of TEU Article 7.[96] However, substantive claims of central interest for the present analysis that looks for illiberalism within the Polish-Hungarian rejection of the conditionality regime were quite different. The countries resorted to a particular illiberal strategy frequently employed in international courts or, nationally, by the respective captured constitutional courts themselves. This technique implies an abuse of the meaning of fundamental yet notoriously ambiguous principles, so as to repurpose them to serve illiberal ends.^[97] In the case at hand, the illiberal repurposing was used with respect to the principle of national identity.

When seeking the annulment of the conditionality mechanism before the CJEU, Poland and Hungary argued that the definition of the rule of law varies across different jurisdictions and that EU law, in principle, accommodates these kinds of discrepancies under TEU Article 4(2), proclaiming respect for different national identities. Poland noted that, “In view of the differences between the Member States as regards their national identities, their constitutional and legal systems and their legal traditions, the EU legislature cannot specify, for all the principles of the rule of law, the means by which the objectives which they pursue may be achieved.”^[98] The countries, therefore, opposed the idea that the conditionality mechanism could decide on the existence of rule-of-law irregularities in a given country while referring to the requirements representing only one view of the concept of the rule of law, chosen beforehand by the EU institutions.

The CJEU rejected this argument, thus effectively countering the illiberal strategy of redefinition and abuse of fundamental principles. In a ruling of February 2022[99] confirming the legality of the conditionality mechanism, the CJEU clarified that respect for the rule of law requires a commitment to the achievement of a certain result: “The Member States adhere to a concept of ‘the rule of law’ which they share, as a value common to their own constitutional traditions, and which they have undertaken to respect at all times.”^[100] Thus, countries may vary with regard to the means they employ to reach the end goal of a state governed by law, but the result must be the same. A reference to clear assessment criteria to evaluate this performance is therefore possible.^[101]

Concerning the principle of national identity, the CJEU reversed the claim made by Hungary and Poland by stating that the rule of law forms part of the constitutional identity of the EU itself.[102] Consequently, the national identity of the member states cannot be invoked to justify their lack of compliance with the central value of the rule of law. Therefore, the CJEU set clear boundaries for relying on the national identity principle and, for the first time, elucidated the essence of the EU’s own constitutional identity. It distinguished between “constitutional” and “unconstitutional” invocations of the national identity principle.^[103] The main conclusion to be drawn from the Court’s reasoning is that the CJEU protects neither an illiberal national identity nor an illiberal reliance on a purported interpretation of the national identity principle.^[104]

The argumentative strategy employed by the countries was inherently illiberal, exploiting the ambiguities of liberal-democratic values with the aim of upholding an illiberal agenda. Nevertheless, in this case, the CJEU managed to effectively counter this abuse, pointing to a correct reading of a fundamental principle underlying the EU’s legal order.

The Demise of the Polish-Hungarian Partnership

Before drawing the substantive part of the analysis to a close, the argument built above, confirming the veracity of the central claim regarding the inherently illiberal nature of the Polish-Hungarian cooperative arrangement, can be further strengthened by zooming in on recent political developments.

Since the beginning of 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the Polish-Hungarian relationship has begun to loosen, which was evident when observing the countries’ reactions to the war’s outbreak. Poland’s and Hungary’s visions of foreign policy diverged in this respect. Whereas Poland strongly condemned Russian aggression from day one and offered full support for Ukraine, opening its borders to accept hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees while also engaging in the large-scale supplying of weaponry and serving as the primary hub for distributing foreign aid to the country, the Hungarian stance on this conflict has been different.[105] From the outset, it assumed Ukraine’s weaker position in the war and it has suggested that the EU’s aid and its overall engagement in the matter is unproductive and will not increase Ukraine’s chances of winning.[106] On the level of Polish-Hungarian relations, this led to the final dissolution of the cooperative arrangement, especially following the October 15, 2023 Polish elections, which led to a new government taking power.

Hungary’s position on the war has not changed. Hungary and Slovakia have become Russia’s only reliable partners within the EU. Orbán’s meeting with Putin in Moscow in July 2024 caused widespread outrage in Europe, including among the EU’s political leaders. The European Parliament explicitly condemned Orbán for talking to Putin and distanced itself from his views that were supposedly based on the idea of “economic neutrality.”[107] This public condemnation was crucial as, at the time, Hungary held the rotating EU presidency and Orbán’s activity on the international stage could give the wrong impression of representing the position of the EU as a whole. In a resolution adopted by the overwhelming majority of the European MPs, the meeting was described as amounting to a “blatant violation of the EU’s Treaties and common foreign policy.”[108] Another consequence of the Hungarian position on the war in Ukraine was also the fact that the EU member states’ vote to launch Ukraine’s EU accession process took place without Hungary, during the absence of the Hungarian Prime Minister.[109] It remains unclear whether, during the talks, Orbán left the room intentionally so as not to be present during the voting, or whether he was tricked into leaving the room, but his absence allowed for the unanimous vote needed to formally jumpstart Ukraine’s accession journey.

After Poland’s October 2023 elections, Poland and Hungary went their separate political ways not only with regard to the war in Ukraine, but increasingly so on contentious political and social issues. Recently, following the decision of the Hungarian government to grant asylum to former Polish Deputy Minister of Justice Marcin Romanowski, who was under investigation due to an alleged misuse of public funds and had fled the country to avoid prosecution, Polish-Hungarian relations have become even more tense. Poland’s government regarded this as a direct affront when Orbán stated that he would “offer refuge to anyone facing political persecution in his country.”[110] What is more, several months after the Polish Parliament proposed a historic bill to introduce civil partnership which, if passed, would grant formal recognition and legal protection as well to same-sex couples, Hungary passed a constitutional amendment further curbing the rights of LGBTQ+ community,[111] thus implementing yet another sign of what Marlene Laruelle has aptly called “the cultural script of illiberalism.”[112]

The overarching objective following the change in power in Poland has been to bring the legal-political system back in line with the rule of law. Although the precise shape of the domestic justice system reforms has been disputed and the implementation of new legal solutions is taking more time than initially presumed, the EU appreciates Poland’s well-intentioned attempts to restore liberal constitutionalism, a crucial sign of which was the unlocking of the EU funds suspended during the PiS government. By contrast, Hungary’s legal-political system has been continuously decaying and is becoming increasingly at odds with the EU’s general rule-of-law requirements. This growing divergence between Poland and Hungary must be seen as a direct consequence of the ongoing retreat by the former of these countries from illiberalism, back to liberal constitutionalism.

What the above means for the analysis conducted in this paper is that it confirms the veracity of the main argument. For had a contrary explanation asserting the importance of the cultural, historical, and socio-economic issues been accurate, the rotation in power and the ensuing diverging political paths would not have mattered for the persistence of the relationship. In reality, however, after illiberalism being the unifying factor collapsed in Poland, the connection proved impossible to sustain.

Conclusion

The analysis demonstrated that the opposition to the compulsory mechanism for the relocation of refugees among the EU member states served to bolster the domestic anti-migrant narrative. On the other hand, the joint attempt to veto the adoption of the conditionality mechanism, argued by reference to the national identity principle, was a classic example of the abuse of liberal constitutional principles. Thus, on a more general note, it was demonstrated that the cases over which the countries united at the EU level marked substantive ties to the basic assumptions of illiberalism. What follows, the partnership was a consequence of Poland and Hungary having espoused the illiberal values-preferences imposed by their respective political majorities ruling in these countries, and this was decisive for the renewal of their cooperation.

As such, the offered interpretation for the studied international relationship is quite straightforward. Illiberalism is known for its pragmatism consisting of offering simple solutions to complicated issues.[113]  It is this pragmatic quality of illiberalism that likewise explains its propensity for building international partnerships with other illiberal polities. In other words, it does not require looking into the history or grasping the cultural intricacies of the Central Eastern European region, to explain the origins of the Polish-Hungarian friendship. It suffices to understand that illiberalism prioritizes the implementation of its own, unique legal-political and moral, values-driven, agenda. Hence, the analysis has taught us one more thing about illiberalism, namely that it is not only concerned with winning the national audiences but, with an aim of effectively pursuing its political ends, it is also inclined to form international partnerships.

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[1] Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała, “Illiberal Constitutionalism: The Case of Hungary and Poland,” German Law Journal 20 (December 2019): 1140–1146, https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2019.83; Wojciech Sadurski, “How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding,” Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 18 (January 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3103491; Gábor Halmai, “Illiberalism in East-Central Europe,” in Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism, ed. András Sajó, Renáta Uitz and Stephen Holmes (London: Routledge, 2022): 813–821.

[2] Neil Buckley and Henry Foy, “Poland’s New Government Finds a Model in Orban’s Hungary,” Financial Times, January 6, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/0a3c7d44-b48e-11e5-8358-9a82b43f6b2f.

[3] By contrast, illiberalism is also frequently defined as being in opposition to political liberalism; Marlene Laruelle, “Illiberalism: A Conceptual Introduction,” East European Politics 38, no. 2 (June 2022): 303–327, https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2037079.

[4] Halmai, “Illiberalism in East-Central Europe,” speaks similarly of the illiberal rejection of liberalism’s value-laden ideals and constitutionalism’s institutional tenets.

[5] Leila Hadj-Abdou, “Illiberal Democracy and the Politicization of Immigration,” in The Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism, András Sajó, Renáta Uitz, and Stephen Holmes, eds. (Abingdon: Routledge 2022), 299–312.

[6] With respect to Poland, illiberalism covers the entirety of the legal, political, and social reforms introduced by the PiS party between October 2015 and October 2023. The opposition’s success in the parliamentary elections of October 2023 is considered a symbolic endpoint of illiberalism in Poland, even if the country is still struggling to adopt pertinent reforms to comply with the EU’s standards on the rule of law.

[7] Wojciech Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 3; Anna Grzymala-Busse, “Poland’s Path to Illiberalism,” Current History 117, no. 797 (March 2018), 97; Kim Lane Scheppele, “Autocratic Legalism,” University of Chicago Law Review 85, no. 2 (2018), 552–553; Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, “Illiberalism within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU,” Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (December 2017), 6, https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2017.9.

[8] Wojciech Sadurski, “Polish Constitutional Tribunal Under PiS: From an Activist Court, to a Paralysed Tribunal, to a Governmental Enabler,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 11, no. 1 (2019): 63–84, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40803-018-0078-1.

[9] Pablo Castillo-Ortiz, “The Illiberal Abuse of Constitutional Courts in Europe,” European Constitutional Law Review 15, no. 1 (March 2019):48–72, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019619000026.

[10] Scheppele, “Autocratic Legalism,” 553.

[11] Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown, 138–140.

[12] Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, “Illiberal Constitutionalism,” 1146.

[13] Reporters without Borders, country report on Hungary, 2025, https://rsf.org/en/country/hungary.

[14] Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała, Illiberal Constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary: The Deterioration of Democracy, Misuse of Human Rights and Abuse of the Rule of Law (London: Routledge, 2022), 2.

[15] Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 556; Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, Illiberal Constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary, 4, 7–10.

[16] Dorota Szelewa, “Recurring Ideas: Searching for the Roots of Right-Wing Populism in Eastern Europe,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 23, no. 6 (2020), 994, https://doi.org/10.1177/1367549420921400.

[17] Atina Krajewska, “Connecting Reproductive Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law: Lessons from Poland in Times of COVID-19,” German Law Journal 22, no. 6 (September 2021): 1072–1091, https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2021.56.

[18] Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 556.

[19] Henry Foy and Neil Buckley, “Orban and Kaczynski Vow ‘Cultural Counter-Revolution’ to Reform EU,” Financial Times, September 7, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/e825f7f4-74a3-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a; Agata Kondzińska and Bartłomiej Kuraś, “Antyunia bratanków: Tajemnicze spotkanie Kaczyński-Orbán,” Gazeta Wyborcza, January 7, 2016, https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,19436211,antyunia-bratankow-tajemnicze-spotkanie-kaczynski-orban.html.

[20] Kristina Stoeckl and Phillip Ayoub, “Transnational Illiberal Networks,” in Marlene Laruelle, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024): 827–848; Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, Illiberal Constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary, 4–10.

[21] Mirosław Wyrzykowski and Michał Ziółkowski, “Illiberal Constitutionalism and the Judiciary,” in András Sajó, Renáta Uitz and Stephen Holmes, eds., Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism (London: Routledge, 2022): 525–526.

[22] This concerns specifically the national critique of liberalism considered as an origin of illiberal thought. The leading representatives of this strand of political discussion are Ryszard Legutko in Poland, as well as András Lánczi and Gyula Tellér in Hungary. Paul Blokker, “Conservative Populism in Defiance of Anti-Totalitarian Constitutional Democracy,” in Martin Krygier, Adam Czarnota and Wojciech Sadurski, eds., Anti-Constitutional Populism, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022): 318–319; Halmai, “Illiberalism in East-Central Europe,” 815.

[23] Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, Illiberal Constitutionalism, 1143.

[24] This took place from 1370 to 1382 under Louis I of Hungary, and from 1440 to 1444 under Vladislaus III of Poland. Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, Illiberal Constitutionalism, 1144.

[25] Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias and Anna Śledzińska-Simon, “Victimhood of the Nation as a Legally Protected Value in Transitional States: Poland as a Case Study,” SSRN Paper (September 2016), 8, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3120407; Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała, “Illiberal Legality,” in Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała, eds., Rule of Law, Common Values, and Illiberal Constitutionalism: Poland and Hungary within the European Union (London: Routledge, 2021), 232; Tímea Drinóczi, “Illiberalism,” in Mortimer Sellers and Stephan Kirste, eds., Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer Nature, 2023), 3.

[26] Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, Illiberal Constitutionalism, 1143.

[27] Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, “Explaining Eastern Europe: Imitation and Its Discontents,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (July 2018), 118, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0049.

[28] Halmai, “Illiberalism in East-Central Europe,” 814.

[29] Michał Stambulski, “Constitutional Populism and the Rule of Law in Poland,” in Martin Krygier, Adam Czarnota and Wojciech Sadurski, eds., Anti-Constitutional Populism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 361; Dariusz Adamski, “The Social Contract of Democratic Backsliding in the ‘New EU’ Countries,” Common Market Law Review 56, no. 3 (2019), 627, https://doi.org/10.54648/cola2019051.

[30] Gábor Halmai, “From Liberal Democracy to Illiberal Populist Autocracy: Possible Reasons for Hungary’s Autocratization,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 16 (May 2024): 441, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00231-6.

[31] Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała, “Illiberal Constitutionalism in Central and Eastern European States,” in Marlene Laruelle, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024): 555–582.

[32] Ronald F. Inglehart and Christian Welzel, “Changing Mass Priorities: The Link between Modernization and Democracy,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 (June 2010), 553; Blokker, Conservative Populism, 300.

[33] Elżbieta Korolczuk, “The Fight against ‘Gender’ and ‘LGBTQ+ Ideology’: New Developments in Poland,” European Journal of Politics and Gender 3, no. 1 (2020): 165–167, http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251510819X15744244471843.

[34] Marta Bucholc, “Abortion Law and Human Rights in Poland: The Closing of the Jurisprudential Horizon,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 14, no. 1 (2022): 73–99, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-022-00167-9.

[35] Anna Śledzińka-Simon, “Populists, Gender and National Identity,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 18, no. 2 (2020): 451, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moaa047.

[36] Halmai, “Illiberalism in East-Central Europe,” 817.

[37] To be more precise, this article of the Polish Constitution speaks of the impartiality of public authorities “in matters of personal conviction, whether religious or philosophical, or in relation to outlooks on life.”

[38] The Act of 7 January 1993 on Family Planning, Protection of the Human Fetus, and Conditions Permitting Pregnancy Termination (Journal of Laws of 1993, no. 17, item 78); Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias and Wojciech Sadurski, “The Judgment That Wasn’t (but Which Nearly Brought Poland to a Standstill): ‘Judgment’ of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 22 October 2020, K1/20,” European Constitutional Law Review 17, no. 1 (2021): 130–153, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019621000067.

[39] In cases of rape or incest which have been certified to the police; incurable and severe fetal abnormality, the so-called fatal fetal abnormality (FFA); or on grounds of the danger to the woman’s life or health.

[40] Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, Illiberal Constitutionalism, 1143.

[41] Halmai, “Illiberalism in East-Central Europe,” 817; Gábor Halmai and Nora Chronowski, “The Decline of Human Dignity and Solidarity through the Misuse of Constitutional Identity: The Case of Hungary since 2010,” in Daniel Bedford et al., eds., Human Dignity and Democracy in Europe (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2022): 177–199.

[42]Reuters, “Hungarian PM Sees Shift of Illiberal Christian Democracy in 2019 European Vote,” Reuters (news agency), July 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/hungarian-pm-sees-shift-to-illiberal-christian-democracy-in-2019-european-vote-idUSKBN1KI0BX/; Rita Chin, “Illiberalism and the Multicultural Backlash,” in András Sajó, Renáta Uitz and Stephen Holmes, eds., Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism (London, UK: Routledge, 2022): 280–298.

[43] Seventh Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, adopted June 20, 2018.

[44] The Fundamental Law of Hungary, Foundation, Article L(1).

[45] Fundamental Law of Hungary, Freedom and Responsibility, Article II; Blokker, Conservative Populism, 323.

[46] Anna Śledzińska-Simon, “Public Reason and Illiberal Democracy,” in Uladzislau Belavusau and Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias, eds., Constitutionalism under Stress (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 298.

[47] Halmai, “Illiberalism in East-Central Europe,” 814.

[48] In this context, it is crucial to note that illiberalism combines legal-political elements with particular moral attitudes, to which Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała have referred as a predefined constitutional identity. See Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała, “The Transition from Liberal to Illiberal Constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary: The Language of Rights and Equality,” in A. James McAdams and Samuel Piccolo, eds., Far-Right Newspeak and the Future of Liberal Democracy (London: Routledge, 2024), 92; Drinóczi, “Illiberalism,” 3; Tímea Drinóczi, “The Unfolding Illiberalism in Hungary,” Review of Central and East European Law 47, nos. 3–4 (2022): 354, https://doi.org/10.1163/15730352-bja10071.

[49] Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (November/December 1997): 22–43, https://doi.org/10.2307/20048274.

[50] I wish to thank the anonymous reviewer for their suggestion to reflect more deeply on the broader role of illiberal values and moral judgements in the development of Poland and Hungary’s cooperation.

[51] For an overview of the majoritarian concept of democracy endorsed by illiberal regimes, see Agnieszka Bień-Kacała, “Legislation in Illiberal Poland,” The Theory and Practice of Legislation 9, no. 3 (June 2021), 278, https://doi.org/10.1080/20508840.2021.1942364.

[52] Ruzha Smilova, “The Ideational Core of Democratic Illiberalism,” in András Sajó, Renáta Uitz and Stephen Holmes, eds., Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism (London: Routledge, 2022), 193.

[53] Paul Blokker, “Populism and Illiberalism,” in András Sajó, Renáta Uitz and Stephen Holmes, eds., Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism (London: Routledge, 2022), 269.

[54] Li-Ann Thio, “Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities,” in Michael Rosenfeld and András Sajó, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 134.

[55] Śledzińska-Simon, Public Reason, 298.

[56] Blokker, Populism and Illiberalism, 268.

[57] Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, “The Transition from Liberal to Illiberal Constitutionalism,” 88.

[58] Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 556.

[59] Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 14 July 2021, P 7/20.

[60] Agnieszka Bień-Kacała, Julia Kapelańska-Pręgowska, and Anna Tarnowska, “Rise and Fall of Gender Equality in Poland,” in Irene Spigno, Valentina Rita Scotti and Janaína Lima Penalva da Silva, eds., The Rights of Women in Comparative Constitutional Law (London: Routledge, 2023): 85–101.

[61] Stambulski, Constitutional Populism, 348; Guglielmo Meardia and Igor Guardiancich, “Back to the Familialist Future: The Rise of Social Policy for Ruling Populist Radical Right Parties in Italy and Poland,” West European Politics 45, no. 1 (2022): 129–153, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1916720.

[62] A monthly family benefit delivered in cash, initially amounting to 500 Polish złoty (around US $135 at the time of writing) per child, granted until the child turns 18 and disbursed to families with at least two children. The scope of the program was extended in 2019, and the allowance has since been granted even for the first child. In January 2024, the amount of the benefit was increased to 800 Polish złoty (around US $220).

[63] Śledzińka-Simon, Populists, Gender and National Identity, 451.

[64] There is a growing body of literature classifying illiberalism as an “anti-gender movement,” sucgh as Andrea Pető, “Gender and Illiberalism,” in András Sajó, Renáta Uitz and Stephen Holmes, eds., Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism (London: Routledge, 2022), 319; Agnieszka Graff and Elżbieta Korolczuk, “Gender and Illiberal Politics,” in Marlene Laruelle, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024): 373–392; Susanna Mancini and Nausica Palazzo, “The Body of the Nation: Illiberalism and Gender,” in András Sajó, Renáta Uitz and Stephen Holmes, eds., Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism (London: Routledge, 2022): 403–422.

[65] Bojan Bugarič, “The Populist Backlash against Europe: Why Only Alternative Economic and Social Policies Can Stop the Rise of Populism in Europe,” in Francesca Bignami, ed., EU Law in Populist Times: Cases and Prospects (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019): 477–504.

[66] Linda Cook and Tomasz Inglot, “Central and Eastern European Countries,” in Daniel Béland et. al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 884.

[67] Bugarič, The Populist Backlash, 477.

[68] Stambulski, Constitutional Populism, 339; Adamski, The Social Contract, 627.

[69] Smilova, The Ideational Core of Democratic Illiberalism, 194; Kim Lane Scheppele, “The Opportunism of Populists and the Defense of Constitutional Liberalism,” German Law Journal, no. 3 (April 2019), https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2019.25.

[70] Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi, “Relocation Blues—Refugee Protection Backsliding, Division of Competences, and the Purpose of Infringement Proceedings: Commission v. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic,” Common Market Law Review 58, no. 6 (2021): 1822, https://doi.org/10.54648/cola2021113.

[71] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 13 May 2015, “A European Agenda on Migration,” COM (2015), 240.

[72] Martin Hagen, “Refugee Relocation: A Mechanism Design Approach,” Economic Journal 134, no. 663 (2024): 3027, https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueae028.

[73] As well as Czechia.

[74] Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 185.

[75] Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 31 October 2019 in cases C‑715/17, C‑718/17 and C‑719/17, at 141, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62017CC0715.

[76] Halmai, “Illiberalism in East-Central Europe,” 818.

[77] The procedure was also launched with respect to Czechia.

[78] CJEU judgement in joined cases C‑715/17, C‑718/17 and C‑719/17, Commission v Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic of 2 April 2020; Tsourdi, “Relocation Blues,” 1825.

[79] CJEU judgement in joined cases C‑715/17, C‑718/17 and C‑719/17, at 149.

[80] CJEU judgement in joined cases C‑715/17, C‑718/17 and C‑719/17, at 147

[81] CJEU judgement in joined cases C‑715/17, C‑718/17 and C‑719/17, at 160.

[82] European Commission, “Relocation: Commission Launches Infringement Procedures against the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland,” June 14, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/da/ip_17_1607.

[83] Drinóczi, “The Unfolding Illiberalism in Hungary,” 366.

[84] The law was found incompatible with EU law; CJEU judgement in the case C-821/19, Commission v Hungary of 16 November 2021.

[85] Judgement of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, 3/2019. (III. 7.) AB.

[86] Gábor Halmai, “Populism or Authoritarianism? A Plaidoyer against Illiberal or Authoritarian Constitutionalism,” in Martin Krygier, Adam Czarnota and Wojciech Sadurski, eds., Anti-Constitutional Populism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 392.

[87] Drinóczi, “The Unfolding Illiberalism in Hungary,” 366; Halmai, “Populism or Authoritarianism?” 309.

[88] Andras Jakab and Eszter Bodnár, “The Rule of Law, Democracy, and Human Rights in Hungary Tendencies from 1989 until 2019,” in Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała, eds., Rule of Law, Common Values, and Illiberal Constitutionalism: Poland and Hungary within the European Union (London: Routledge, 2021), 114.

[89] Politico, “Migrants Carry ‘Parasites and Protozoa,’ Warns Polish Opposition Leader,” Politico Europe, October 14, 2015, https://www.politico.eu/article/migrants-asylum-poland-kaczynski-election/.

[90] Laruelle, “Illiberalism,” 309.

[91] Elżbieta M. Goździak and Péter Márton, “Where the Wild Things Are: Fear of Islam and the Anti-Refugee Rhetoric in Hungary and in Poland,” Central and Eastern European Migration Review 7, no. 2 (2018), 127, http://dx.doi.org/10.17467/ceemr.2018.04.

[92] Norris and Inglehart, Cultural Backlash, 189.

[93] Vestert Borger, “Constitutional Identity, the Rule of Law, and the Power of the Purse: The CJEU Approves the Conditionality Mechanism to Protect the Union Budget: Hungary and Poland v. Parliament and Council,” Common Market Law Review 59, no. 6 (2022): 1771–1802.

[94] Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Dec. 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget, 2020, OJLI 433/1.

[95] Laurent Pech, “No More Excuses: The Court of Justice Greenlights the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism,” Verfassungsblog, February 16, 2022, https://verfassungsblog.de/no-more-excuses/; Borger, “Constitutional Identity,” 1781.

[96] Pech, No More Excuses.

[97] Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, “The Transition from Liberal to Illiberal Constitutionalism,” 88; Drinóczi, “Illiberalism,” 2; Borger, “Constitutional Identity,” 1799.

[98] CJEU judgement in the case C-157/21, Poland v. Parliament and Council of February 16, 2022, at 68.

[99] CJEU judgements in cases C-156/21, Hungary v. Parliament and Council and C-157/21, Poland v. Parliament and Council of February 16, 2022.

[100] CJEU judgement in the case C-157/21, at 255-256.

[101] CJEU judgement in the case C-156/21, at 235.

[102] Marco Fisicaro, “Protection of the Rule of Law and ‘Competence Creep’ via the Budget: The Court of Justice on the Legality of the Conditionality Regulation,” European Constitutional Law Review 18, no. 2 (June 2022): 347, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019622000128.

[103] Borger, “Constitutional Identity,” 1800.

[104] Pietro Faraguna and Tímea Drinóczi, “Constitutional Identity in and on EU Terms,” Verfassungsblog, February 21, 2022, https://verfassungsblog.de/constitutional-identity-in-and-on-eu-terms/.

[105] Daniel Tilles, “Differences over Ukraine Clear as Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Slovak PMs Meet,” Notes From Poland (news site), February 27, 2024, https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/02/27/differences-over-ukraine-clear-as-polish-hungarian-czech-and-slovak-pms-meet/.

[106] Veronika Jóźwiak, “Hungary Maintains Course on Russia One Year after the Invasion of Ukraine,” Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 4, 2023, https://pism.pl/publications/hungary-maintains-course-on-russia-one-year-after-the-invasion-of-ukraine.

[107] Stuart Lau, “Hungary Flirts with Putin and Snubs NATO Meeting,” Politico Europe, October 30, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-viktor-orban-flirts-vladimir-putin-snubs-nato-meeting/.

[108] Resolution of the European Parliament of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine (2024/2721(RSP), 2024, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6129/oj/eng, 4.

[109] European Pravda and Ukrainska Pravda, “ ‘Orbán Left the Room When We Voted’: EU Official Explains How Decision to Open Accession Talks with Ukraine Was Made,” Ukrainska Pravda, December 14, 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/12/14/7433111/.

[110] Michal Gostkiewicz, “Poland, Hungary: How Two Close Allies Came to Be Estranged,” February 6, 2025, Deutsche Welle, https://www.dw.com/en/poland-hungary-how-two-close-allies-came-to-be-estranged/a-71530372.

[111] Nick Thorpe and Tom Bennett, “Hungary’s Parliament Votes to Limit Rights of Dual Nationals and LGBTQ+ People,” April 14, 2025, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yrpe51pkwo.

[112] Laruelle, “Illiberalism,” 312.

[113] Illiberalism Studies Program, “Sheri Berman on Populism’s Causes and Effects, Neoliberalism, and the ‘Fascism Debate,’ ” Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, The George Washington University, September 18, 2023,https://www.illiberalism.org/sheri-berman-on-populisms-causes-and-effects-neoliberalism-and-the-fascism-debate/ where it was mentioned in the context of economy.