The Illiberal Shield: Hungary’s Role in Averting EU Democracy Promotion in Georgia

The Illiberal Shield: Hungary’s Role in Averting EU Democracy Promotion in Georgia

By Anastasia Mgaloblishvili

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Keywords: EU enlargement, democracy promotion, illiberal actors, negative conditionality, Hungary, Georgia

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The revival of the European Union’s (EU) enlargement policy following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine reinvigorated policy and academic interest in EU enlargement. In an increasingly contested liberal international order, scholars questioned how much the EU could still export liberal democracy abroad when its own member states challenged these values domestically.[1] This question has become particularly pressing given Hungary’s control of the EU enlargement portfolio in the EU’s 2019–2024 legislative term, as well as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s openly declared goal of “occupying” Brussels and hollowing out its commitment to liberal democracy.[2] Although growing number of scholars have increasingly recognized and flagged illiberal member states’ threat to EU enlargement,[3] much of the work thus far remains theoretical—raising important questions but offering limited empirical answers.

This paper offers an empirical contribution to the new research agenda on EU enlargement by exploring how Hungary shaped the Union’s conditionality policy toward Georgia, and how the Georgian government used Hungary’s support to deflect EU pressure and preserve a democratic façade. Unlike Moldova and Ukraine, Georgia is led by an illiberal government and has been backsliding in terms of democracy since 2016,[4] with the process especially intensifying following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This has led the EU to make considerable efforts in combatting democratic backsliding in the country through negative conditionality. Measures have included delaying candidate status to Georgia until it meets the EU’s 12 recommendations for preparing for accession, and stopping funding to the government and canceling meetings with ruling Georgian Dream party officials until Georgia returns to the EU integration path.  

The EU’s conditionality policy has long been regarded as one of its most powerful tools in promoting democracy.[5] By offering rewards for compliance and threats of sanctions for noncompliance, conditionality has served as an effective instrument in motivating candidate states to meet the EU’s accession criteria.[6] The tremendous benefits of membership and the high costs of exclusion have incentivized many EU candidate states to reform their systems and comply with the EU’s acquis communautaire, or body of law.[7] Research on the effectiveness of the EU’s use of conditionality has found it to work most successfully, however, when the European Union is credible in its promise to reward compliance and its threat to sanction noncompliance.[8] The EU’s credibility, in turn, stems from the EU being able to speak with one, consistent voice to its candidate states.[9]  

Over the past decade, a substantial body of literature has demonstrated how the EU’s enlargement fatigue and conflicting objectives have weakened the credibility of its conditionality policy. Multiple crises within and outside the EU, as well as waning public support for enlargement among EU citizens, has led the European Union to take a less consistent approach toward its candidate states and prioritize stability over democracy in its enlargement policy.[10] In candidate states like Serbia, the EU’s inconsistent conditionality policy has led to the emergence of so-called “stabilitocracies”—or regimes that maintain formal commitment to EU integration while eroding democratic standards.[11] The EU’s decision to revive the enlargement process in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, has overcome the EU’s enlargement fatigue and partially restored its credibility. As a result, the academic debate has begun to shift toward a new concern: the implications of a more geopolitically-driven enlargement in an era of illiberal member states within the EU.

While Hungary—one of the EU’s most vocal illiberal member states—has historically supported EU expansion,[12] it openly and vociferously advocates against strengthening the liberal international order.[13] This makes enlargement, a tool used to promote liberal democracy in the EU’s neighborhood, a natural target. Although illiberal member states may not oppose expanding the Union, they tend to seek decoupling EU enlargement from liberal-democratic norms. As full EU members, they have several tools at their disposal to do so: (1) blocking rewards for liberal-leaning candidates, (2) shielding illiberal candidates from sanctions, and (3) eroding the EU’s normative appeal by highlighting its perceived double standards and hypocrisy. Investigative reports suggest that Hungary pursues these strategies, with Politico alleging that Hungarian Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi softened the European Commission’s criticism of Serbia, an illiberal candidate state.[14] Yet despite such reports, there remains a lack of systematic empirical research on how illiberal member states shape the EU’s conditionality policy and, by extension, its capacity to promote democracy in candidate countries.

This article aims to fill these gaps by examining Hungary’s influence on EU enlargement policy toward Georgia in two steps. In the first step, this paper examines how Hungarian officials responded to each instance in which the EU placed negative conditionality on Georgia, looking both at Hungary’s actions at the EU level and its bilateral actions towards Georgia. The analysis not only assesses whether Hungary blocked EU decisions but also whether it undermined the EU’s ability to speak with one, consistent voice in its foreign policy towards Georgia during this period. This is especially important because another EU member state speaking at “cross-purposes”[15] at a time when the EU is exerting pressure can weaken that pressure and sow confusion among the public. The analysis of Hungarian officials includes high-level Hungarian government actors as well as Enlargement Commissioner Várhelyi. The second level of analysis examines how Imedi TV, has covered Hungary’s relations with Georgia. This is done through an analysis of the channel’s Facebook page. Imedi TV is co-owned by Georgian Dream founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili’s business partner, Irakli Rukhadze, who is a vocal supporter of the party. The channel refuses to invite government-critical groups to its shows and openly echoes Georgian Dream propaganda. Therefore, it has widely been considered a pro-government channel in Georgia. Using MAXQDA,[16] the paper identifies the main themes and messages from Hungarian officials that the channel chose to cover and amplify.

The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, in the field of European Union studies, it offers new empirical insights into how illiberal actors challenge the EU’s enlargement policy. While recent scholarship has begun to focus on the illiberal turn within the EU and its implications for enlargement, much of the work remains theoretical, raising important questions but offering limited empirical answers. By examining Hungary’s impact on the EU’s conditionality policy toward Georgia, this paper contributes to this emerging research agenda and provides concrete answers to timely and policy-relevant questions. In the broader field of illiberalism studies, analyzing how Hungary influences the EU’s ability to export liberal democracy can offer new, valuable insights into the strategies illiberal actors use to impede the proliferation of liberal democracies in the world and, by doing so, how they strengthen the presence and dominance of the illiberal international network. In this article, “the illiberal international” refers to a loose transnational network of states, political parties, and movements that share nationalist, majoritarian, and anti-liberal values and collaborate—formally or informally—to erode liberal-democratic norms, weaken liberal international institutions, and advance sovereignty-centered models of governance.

The first section of this paper reviews gaps in the literature on EU enlargement and illiberalism and proposes a framework for studying the impact of illiberal actors on EU enlargement. The second section outlines the case selection and research design. The third section provides background on the relations between Hungary and Georgia. The subsequent empirical sections analyze how Hungary has challenged the EU’s conditionality policy and how Georgian Dream has leveraged this support to neutralize EU pressure. The final section concludes with recommendations for future research.

Toward a Framework for Studying Illiberal Influence on EU Enlargement

In 2010, Viktor Orbán came to power in Hungary and soon declared his ambition to build an “illiberal state.”[17] In the years that followed, he used mostly democratic instruments—including a Parliamentary supermajority—to consolidate power.[18] A supermajority, meaning control of more than two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament, allowed his party to unilaterally amend the Constitution and other key laws. Orbán’s ambitions, however, extended beyond Hungary. Unlike many far-right leaders in the EU who advocated for leaving the bloc, Orbán sought to “occupy” and “fix” it from within.[19] “The progressives have taken over Brussels. They rule Brussels. Unless we change this, we’ll soon have to watch Europe fall apart,” he warned.[20]

Orbán’s agenda of challenging and undermining the liberal international order resonated with other authoritarian and illiberal powers, whose cooperation often centers on this shared goal.[21] The liberal international order threatened illiberal and autocratic actors both at home and abroad. The global hegemony of liberalism required autocrats to abide, at least formally, by certain democratic norms in order to participate in trade agreements and receive financial benefits.[22] Domestically, the strength of the liberal international order increased the risk of democracy also spreading across their own borders and hence challenging their power bases. The liberal world order especially endangered countries who were members of the EU. As Bozóki and Hegedűs argue, the EU membership “constrained” Hungary in how explicitly it could deviate from democratic norms,[23] as there was, according to Kelemen, only so much “strategic forbearance”[24] the EU was willing to exercise toward noncompliant countries. The EU’s liberal values especially constrained Orbán’s Hungary after 2022, when the EU finally activated its rule-of-law conditionality and froze funds earmarked for Hungary and Poland, due to their deviation from the EU’s fundamental values. This made Orbán especially determined to deprive the EU of liberal democracy and abuse his country’s veto power in both the European Council and the Council of the European Union to undermine the EU’s unity and strength on the international stage. Moreover, the threat of Hungary’s voting rights being suspended and funds withheld further motivated Orbán to advocate for the accession of illiberal candidate states that could shield him from such measures. Orbán was not alone in his goal of undermining the liberal foundations of the EU: authoritarian great powers like Russia have been especially motivated to challenge the liberal international order by cultivating a network of allies and sympathizers within the EU to achieve this goal.[25] 

Despite an extensive body of scholarship on how external actors like Russia challenge the EU and undermine the liberal international order, literature on how illiberal actors within the EU itself impact the Union has been rather scarce and limited to a few empirical articles.[26] Much of the existing literature on Hungary focuses on how Orbán governs domestically.[27] On the EU side, scholars have primarily examined why and how the Union has failed to contain democratic backsliding within its own ranks. Some highlight the limited effectiveness of the EU’s pre-accession conditionality in securing democratic consolidation in its new member states,[28] while others stress the Union’s weak post-accession enforcement mechanisms, attributing these to politicized institutions, intergovernmental norms, and a flawed institutional design.[29]

This body of work has enriched scholarly understanding of both Orbán’s domestic power base and the EU’s institutional weaknesses. However, it offers limited insight into how an illiberal regime within the EU affects the Union’s credibility and functioning as a liberal-democratic actor abroad. This question is especially pressing as enlargement once again returns to the top of the EU’s political agenda. Enlargement has historically been the Union’s most powerful foreign policy tool, central to its ability to project influence and support democratic transformation beyond its borders.[30]

The effectiveness of this policy, however, has historically depended on a liberal consensus within the EU. The Union’s “passive leverage”[31]—its appeal as a prosperous community of liberal democracies—encouraged candidate states to pursue membership.[32] Its “active leverage”[33]—credible, merit-based conditionality—offered tangible rewards for democratic reform. For conditionality to work, candidate countries must trust the EU to reward compliance, while existing member states must trust it to penalize deviation.[34] This, in turn, requires the EU to act consistently and speak with one voice—something only possible if member states share a commitment to liberal-democratic values.

Illiberal member states within the EU now possess multiple instruments to undermine both passive and active leverage, and thus the Union’s ability to promote liberal democracy abroad. In terms of passive leverage, illiberal governments weaken the EU’s appeal simply by existing within it as illiberal democracies.[35] As Meunier and Vachudova argue, their presence creates an excuse for candidate states to resist reforms: “Why should they allow an independent media, tolerate civil society, bolster checks and balances, treat opposition parties fairly, or dismantle rent-seeking networks when others are doing even worse within the EU?”[36]

Illiberal governments also actively discredit the EU by accusing it of hypocrisy and double standards—a tactic frequently employed by both Orbán and Putin.[37] Unlike the post-Cold War era, when liberal rhetoric was deployed to support democratization, today’s illiberal actors often instrumentalize liberal norms to undermine the liberal order itself.[38] Such campaigns can diminish the EU’s credibility and attractiveness to both candidates and current members. A less attractive EU, in turn, may reduce candidate states’ willingness to pursue accession, thereby weakening the effectiveness of conditionality as an instrument of reform.

In terms of active leverage, illiberal member states can weaken the credibility of the EU’s conditionality policy. The Union’s intergovernmental nature gives member states multiple tools to thwart collective action. They can veto key decisions requiring unanimity such as granting candidate status, opening accession talks, or sanctioning backsliding states. They can also pursue their own foreign policies independently, given the lack of constraints under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).[39] Furthermore, illiberal governments can place loyalists in supranational institutions, as each member state gets to select one EU commissioner.[40] For the 2019–2024 term, Hungary appointed Olivér Várhelyi as Commissioner for Enlargement—providing Orbán with new tools/instruments with which to shape the enlargement agenda.

Although the abovementioned threats to the EU’s enlargement policy have been increasingly recognized as enlargement returns to the forefront of EU politics, no comprehensive analysis of how illiberal actors shape the EU’s enlargement policy has thus far been conducted. Existing work is limited to media reports on subjects such as how former Commissioner Várhelyi’s role affected Serbia’s accession process. This article addresses this gap by empirically investigating Hungary’s impact on EU enlargement policy toward Georgia.

Table 1 below summarizes the tools available to illiberal member states to undermine EU’s leverage and weaken its democratizing power.

table 1. Mechanisms of illiberal influence on EU enlargement

Target	Goal	Means/methods	Possible impact
EU’s passive leverage   (EU’s appeal)	Weaken EU’s image as a liberal-democratic union	Preaching illiberalism at homeHighlighting EU hypocrisy and double standards	Reduced motivation of candidates to join the EU
EU’s active leverage   (Positive conditionality)	Transform the EU into a bloc dominated by illiberal member states by blocking liberal candidate states from advancing in the EU integration process.	Vetoing European Council the Council of the EU decisions requiring unanimity	Diminished EU credibility   Fewer incentives for candidates to reform
EU’s active leverage   (Negative conditionality)	Transform the EU into a bloc dominated by illiberal member states by advancing illiberal candidate states in the EU accession process.	Vetoing European Council and Council of the EU  decisions requiring unanimityUndermining the EU’s ability to pursue a coherent foreign policy Watering down critical European Commission reports (in the case of an illiberal member state controlling the EU’s enlargement portfolio)	Diminished EU credibility   Limited pressure on illiberal candidate states to comply with the EU

While these tools have always existed, the hegemony of the liberal international order in the post-Cold War period restrained member states from abusing them. During the “Big Bang” enlargement—the EU’s largest enlargement wave, in 2004, during which 10 states from Central and Eastern Europe joined the bloc—or instance, candidate states were able to “strategically use” member states’ commitment to liberal values and norms to “entrap” them into accepting them into the EU, thereby preventing skeptical member states from using the veto against them.[41] In today’s increasingly contested liberal international order, however, illiberal member states openly advocate against the liberal order and therefore are no longer so restrained by the EU’s liberal values.[42]

Further enabling this trend is the EU’s limited toolkit for sanctioning its backsliding member states. Although the EU eventually activated its rule-of-law conditionality, allowing it to freeze EU funds earmarked for illiberal member states that deviate from its fundamental values, Hungary has been able to blackmail the EU into unfreezing parts of this funding by threatening to use its veto power against European Council decisions requiring unanimity.[43] Hungary’s veto power, in turn, remains a major headache for the EU, as Article 7, which allows for the suspension of a member state’s voting rights, requires the unanimous agreement of the other states on the European Council.[44] Because there have consistently been at least two illiberal states in the EU—first Hungary and Poland, and, after the government change in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia—they have been able to shield one another and effectively block the activation of Article 7. Meanwhile, the politicization of EU institutions has enabled illiberal actors to gain allies within the European Parliament and the Commission.[45] For example, Orbán’s Fidesz party’s longstanding affiliation with the European People’s Party (EPP) group in the European Parliament delayed any serious disciplinary action against him until 2021. Finally, the European Court of Justice has limited jurisdiction over violations related to the EU’s fundamental values.[46]

Taken together, while rule-of-law conditionality has pushed Orbán to make some cosmetic changes in Hungary, he has continued to wield the veto threat in order to regain access to EU funds and diminish the effectiveness of rule-of-law conditionality.

Case Selection

Hungary was selected as the illiberal EU member state to examine due to its openly declared ambition to transform the EU from within and hollow out its commitment to liberal democracy. This makes EU enlargement—Brussels’ key foreign policy tool for promoting liberal democracy in its neighborhood—a likely target. While Slovakia has at times voted alongside Hungary and contributed to undermining EU unity, it has played a more passive role, especially on enlargement. Hungary, by contrast, has actively sought to reshape EU foreign policy, forming alliances with illiberal candidate states and advancing positions at odds with those of the majority of the EU’s members. Importantly, it held the enlargement portfolio in the 2019–2024 Commission, giving it direct influence over the EU’s accession policy and assessments.

While the paper notes Slovakia’s involvement when relevant, the primary focus is on Hungary, which has played a more consistent and visible role. Still, the findings are not specific to Hungary alone. They point to broader vulnerabilities in the EU’s enlargement policy, as any member state with the will and institutional access could replicate Hungary’s actions.

Georgia was selected as the candidate country for two main reasons. Amongst Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova—who became known as the “Association Trio” after coupling and formalizing their EU integration process in 2021—Georgia has been the one towards which the EU most systematically applied negative conditionality in response to democratic backsliding. This has created repeated openings for illiberal member states to intervene and dilute EU pressure. As argued above, while illiberal governments have limited formal tools to block positive conditionality (rewards), they have greater informal discretion when it comes to undermining negative conditionality. This includes pursuing independent foreign policy lines and speaking at cross-purposes with respect to EU institutions. A member state framing a candidate as being on the right track while the rest of the EU is trying to send the opposite message can muddy the waters and reduce the EU’s overall leverage.

Second, the EU has strong leverage over Georgia due to its population’s overwhelming public support for EU integration (around 86% in 2024, according to the Institute of Social Studies and Analysis (ISA)[47] and the Georgian Dream government’s consistent strategy (at least until November 2024, when Georgian Dream halted EU integration) of using pro-EU rhetoric to legitimize its rule. This makes EU conditionality particularly consequential for Georgia, and Hungary’s role in neutralizing it especially important. If EU pressure can be weakened in a case where the conditions for conditionality to succeed are strong, this has wider implications for EU enlargement policy.

Research Methods

The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, it examines how Hungary responded to the EU’s negative conditionality on Georgia during two key periods: June 2022 and April–October 2024. The analysis draws on statements and actions by high-level officials in Orbán’s government and by Commissioner Várhelyi during the 2019–2024 legislative term. While the commissioner is formally expected to act in the EU’s interest rather than that of any particular country, investigative reports suggest Várhelyi may have been aligned with Budapest’s agenda, making his role important to examine. To assess this, his speeches at two EU–Georgia Association Council meetings are compared with those of Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The analysis identifies and contrasts the themes and priorities emphasized by each.

Second, the paper analyzes how Hungary’s messaging was reported on Imedi TV during the same periods. Using MAXQDA, a ground-up thematic coding was conducted to identify the main messages Hungarian officials conveyed and which of these were amplified by Imedi. This helps reveal not just what Hungary said, but what the Georgian government chose to highlight, and how EU pressure was neutralized in the media sphere.

Two Instances of the EU’s Negative Conditionality on Georgia

The revitalization of the EU’s enlargement policy following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine provided the European Union with new instruments with which to promote democracy in its partner countries. By granting EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and designating Georgia as a prospective EU future candidate country, the EU brandished its most valuable reward, EU membership, and could now use it as a tool with which it could incentivize its candidate states to comply with its values by enforcing their conditionality. The EU could use prospective membership as a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it could reward states in compliance by starting accession talks and opening new chapters in the enlargement process (positive conditionality); on the other hand, it could withhold this reward by halting the accession process and freezing accession talks in case of noncompliance or democratic backsliding in a candidate country (negative conditionality). Depending on how valuable EU membership is to citizens and political groups in EU candidate countries, the EU’s use of conditionality could have varied effects on them.[48] In countries where support for EU integration is high, the EU rewarding candidate states’ governments for compliance is likely to lead to increased support for the incumbent parties. On the other hand, the EU withholding rewards from its candidate states not in compliance is likely to mobilize citizens against their government and hold them accountable for their failures.

In Georgia, EU conditionality had the potential to become a powerful force in shaping the country’s political trajectory. Public support for EU integration has consistently remained at or above 86%,[49] meaning that the EU’s power to grant or withhold rewards has had the potential to significantly affect public attitudes toward the Georgian government. Since coming to power in 2012, the Georgian Dream government has paid lip service to EU integration, making it particularly vulnerable to public shaming in cases where its actions diverge from its declared goal of joining the EU.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marked a turning point that tested the potential of EU conditionality in Georgia. Although Georgia was once a frontrunner in the Eastern Partnership (a joint initiative between the EU and five Eastern European and South Caucasian partner countries aimed at bringing these countries closer to the EU) its democratic trajectory has been in decline under the Georgian Dream government—a process that accelerated after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[50] Russia’s invasion, and the prospect of EU membership this opened up for Georgia, increased pressure on the Georgian Dream government to match its pro-Western rhetoric with concrete reforms. The EU’s new recommendations for Georgia, required for it to obtain candidate status and advance along the EU path, demanded far more comprehensive and costly reforms than did the Association Agreement. Since Georgian Dream has often been accused of maintaining its grip on power by capturing state institutions,[51] implementing measures such as creating a truly independent judiciary could threaten it. As a result, Georgian Dream began to roll back its democratic commitments and instead shift to engaging in anti-Western rhetoric, even accusing the EU of trying to “drag Georgia into war”[52] by urging it to take a stronger stance against Russia. In response, the EU applied negative conditionality on Georgia twice, withholding rewards that had long been sought by the public, in order to pressure the country back on track.

Yet, as the previous chapter demonstrated, EU conditionality is most effective when the Union speaks with one clear and consistent voice toward its prospective partner countries, leaving little room for public misinterpretation of its words and actions. During this period, however, Hungary has actively sought to undermine the EU’s unity and credibility. On the one hand, the EU had frozen funds to Hungary in December 2022 using its new rule-of-law conditionality for Orbán’s deviation from EU fundamental values.[53] A year earlier, in March 2021, Orbán had pre-emptively left the European People’s Party before the group could expel him[54]—leaving Hungary politically isolated and exposed within the EU. At the same time, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine intensified pressure on Hungary to align with EU positions and reduce its gas dependence on Russia. This combination of external pressure and internal vulnerability made Hungary especially motivated to challenge EU unity, highlight what it portrayed as the EU’s double standards, and weaken the EU’s commitment to liberal democracy. Perhaps more importantly, this motivated Orbán to advocate for membership of like-minded illiberal EU candidate states who would shield Hungary from EU sanctions.

Negative Conditionality 1: Excluding Georgia from EU Candidacy

The first time the EU applied negative conditionality against Georgia was when it rejected Georgia from receiving candidate status despite giving it to the other countries from the same enlargement group (Ukraine and Moldova) in the summer of 2022.[55] This decision was based on years of democratic backsliding in the country that culminated in the government’s arrest of the founder of one of the largest government-critical TV channels, Nika Gvaramia, a few weeks after the country’s submission of its application for EU membership.[56] Instead of granting Georgia candidate status, the EU granted Georgia status as a prospective future member state, with 12 recommendations to follow to be reconsidered for candidacy. Speaking at a press conference after announcing the decision, European Council President Charles Michel stated: “If there is a political will, in the political landscape within Georgia, it could be possible for them to make huge progress because I know that they know exactly what’s needed in order to take steps in the right direction.”[57] Denying Georgia’s application for candidacy, but leaving the door wide open in the event that the EU’s 12 recommendations were met, represented the EU’s clear attempt to get Georgia back on a democratic track by using negative conditionality. Given how valuable EU membership was viewed by the citizens as well as by the political class of Georgia, the EU’s negative conditionality had the potential of pressuring the Georgian Dream government to return the country to a democratic trajectory.

Hungary’s Intergovernmental Response

Although bargaining mechanisms within the EU most likely led Hungary to vote in favor of denying Georgia’s application for candidate status, Orbán’s government used its own foreign policy discretion to criticize the EU’s decision abroad. Between June 2022 and December 2023 (when Georgia was granted EU candidacy), at least six high-level meetings were held between Georgian and Hungarian officials. In these meetings, the Hungarians especially praised Georgia’s progress and blamed Brussels for being unfair, discriminatory, and basing its decision on “double standards.” What is especially notable is that on the day the EU announced its decision to deny Georgia’s application for EU candidacy, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó was in Tbilisi holding different meetings with Georgian officials and condemning the EU’s “unfair” decision toward Georgia. “We in Hungary are very well aware of Brussels’ double standards, which, unfortunately, our Georgian friends had to experience firsthand today,” Szijjártó stated.[58]

This rhetoric was further amplified by Orbán during his meetings with then Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili. During this period, Georgia and Hungary signed a strategic cooperation agreement on trade, the economy, and energy.[59] According to Radio Free Europe’s correspondent in Brussels, when the EU was reassessing if Georgia should be granted candidacy a year-and-a-half after its initial decision to deny the country’s request to be part of its next enlargement group, Orbán threatened to veto the EU’s decision to open accession talks with Ukraine unless candidate status was granted to Georgia.[60] How much this influenced the EU’s decision to grant Georgia EU candidate status is unclear, and the consensus is more that the EU’s decision was based on geopolitical considerations aimed at not losing influence over Georgia. Nonetheless, this example still demonstrates the potential influence Hungary could also have had in this decision.

Figure 1 below demonstrates the main themes in Hungarian officials’ messages to Georgia during the period the country was denied EU candidacy status. The analysis is based on all Hungarian officials’ statements shared on Imedi TV’s Facebook page from June 2022 through December 2023.

As the analysis demonstrates, three themes especially prevailed in Hungary’s statements vis-à-vis Georgia: (1) praise and support for Georgia, (2) portrayal of Brussels in a negative light, and (3) Hungary’s formal support for Georgia from within the former’s positions within EU institutions. A breakdown of these themes into subcategories further demonstrates that the basis for Hungary’s praise for Georgia was mostly based on Georgia’s ability to defend its sovereignty and its traditions, Georgia’s economic growth, and Georgia’s resilience—in other words, all areas devoid of liberal-democratic principles and resembling Orbán’s definition of an “illiberal democracy.” Furthermore, the main reasons behind Hungary portraying Brussels in a negative were based on the EU’s perceived double standards, the EU’s illogical and subjective decisions, and the EU’s discriminatory enlargement policy.

figure 1. This figure illustrates the main themes found in statements made by Hungarian officials during intergovernmental meetings with Georgian counterparts, covering the period from June 2022 (when the EU withheld candidate status from Georgia) through December 2023 (when candidate status was finally granted). The analysis is based on posts from the Facebook page of TV Imedi. The graph reflects not only the narratives promoted by Hungarian officials, but also those selectively amplified by Georgian Dream-aligned media. The thickness of the lines connecting the themes indicates how frequently each theme appeared in Hungarian statements about Georgia. 

Supranational Response

Together with Prime Minister Orbán and Foreign Minister Szijjártó, EU Enlargement Commissioner Várhelyi has also played a role in contesting EU policy toward Georgia during the period when the country was refused candidate status. Given his duties as commissioner, Várhelyi had less discretion in openly challenging the EU over its decision. However, he used his status as an enlargement commissioner to pay a visit to Georgia soon after the country was denied candidacy and give relatively positive assessments of the Georgian Dream government—despite increased democratic backsliding reported by democracy watchdogs and Georgia’s international partners during this period.

Várhelyi’s first encounter with Georgian Dream officials following the EU’s decision to not grant Georgia EU candidacy was at the EU-Georgia Association Council meeting in September of 2022. The Association Council is an annual meeting between high-level officials of Georgia and the EU that is aimed at discussing progress and assessing bilateral relations between the two partners. Both Várhelyi and EU High Representative Joseph Borrell were present at this meeting and gave their assessment of the state of relations between the EU and Georgia, which allows for an insightful comparison of the different priorities and messages that the two EU actors voiced toward Georgia.

As an analysis of the speeches by the two EU leaders demonstrates, the main difference between them lies in their assessments of how Georgia is doing. Although both Borrell and Várhelyi pointed out multiple times that more should be done by the Georgian government, Várhelyi spoke of Georgia’s progress almost the same amount as he did about the work that still needs to be done. Similarly, while Borrell mentioned the backsliding and regression by the Georgian government, Várhelyi did not mention it. Finally, whereas Borrell placed most of the emphasis of his speech on EU support for Georgia, the inclusivity of the EU integration process, and the EU’s 12 recommendations to Georgia, Várhelyi’s speech touched on a bit on everything without any particular emphasis on the 12 recommendations.

A further breakdown of the areas in which actors positively or negatively assessed Georgia further shows that Várhelyi’s positive assessments of Georgia were mostly based on trade and economics, developments in Georgia-EU relations, and connectivity and visa-free travel. On the other hand, Borrell’s positive assessments were based on progress in Georgia-EU relations and Georgia’s role in facilitating dialog between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The visuals below both show a comparison of the themes the two leaders touched upon and how they assessed Georgia’s progress. The maps that follow show a breakdown of how positively or negatively each leader assessed Georgia’s progress in the areas that they touched upon. Although this period does not coincide with the EU’s negative conditionality policy towards Georgia, this paper also includes as visuals the difference between Várhelyi and Borrell’s speeches at the 2024 Association Council meeting, since the difference there is starker and the different priorities of the two EU officials is made even clearer.

table 2: Frequency of topics mentioned by Borrell and Várhelyi at the Georgia-EU Association Council in September 2022

Note: The size of each circle represents how often a topic was mentioned, with larger circles indicating higher frequency.
Source: Author’s analysis of https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-229436; https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-229436.

table 3: Frequency of topics mentioned by Borrell and Várhelyi at the Georgia-EU Association Council in 2024

The size of each circle or square represents how often a topic was mentioned, with larger shapes indicating higher frequency.
Source:https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-after-association-council_en; https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_24_952.

A few months after the Association Council meeting in 2022, Várhelyi visited Tbilisi and held multiple meetings with Georgian Dream leadership. Throughout his visit, Várhelyi mostly praised Georgia for its progress with respect to the EU’s 12 recommendations. He specifically noted that he was “pleased to see that steps are already being made” and highlighted out judicial reforms and the fight against corruption.[61] These assessments were made despite continued democratic backsliding in the country and reports by civil society organizations that Georgia was not complying with the EU’s recommendations.[62] Furthermore, he praised Georgia’s economy during his trip, stating that it was “booming” and that “progress” was visible.[63] His positive assessments of Georgia’s progress sparked controversy among some leaders of the country’s opposition, who pointed out in media interviews that Várhelyi was a Commissioner appointed by Orbán and that he therefore represented an “outsider” within the EU.[64] The opposition’s criticism of Várhelyi, in turn, resulted in Georgian government-linked (and most-watched) media channel Imedi publishing a post on its Facebook page stating that “Oliver Várhelyi provided positive assessments [of Georgia] and the entire opposition attacked him. It directly slipped out from their [the opposition’s] mouths that they are against any positive movement towards EU candidacy.”[65]

Várhelyi’s next meeting with Georgian leadership took place in Brussels in July 2023, after which he posted on Twitter/X that Georgia’s then Foreign Minister Ilia Darchiashvili had assured him that the country’s “progress on 12 priorities is well on track.”[66] Again, this happened despite reports by civil society organizations and democracy watchdogs that Georgia had only fulfilled three out of the EU’s 12 recommendations for candidacy.[67] Finally, his last meeting with Georgia’s then Prime Minister Garabashvili before Georgia received EU candidacy was granted was in October 2023, after which Várhleyi tweeted that “the efforts of Georgia is [sic] well received. Georgia belongs to the EU family & it will get all the support on its EU path.”[68] The Georgian Dream party’s chairman, Irakli Kobakhidze, issued a statement following the meeting that Várhelyi’s assessment was yet another proof that a positive decision would be made by the EU regarding Georgia’s candidate status.[69]

figure 2. Main themes found in statements made by Várhelyi on Georgia from June 2022 (when the EU withheld Georgia’s candidate status) through December 2023 (when candidate status was finally granted).

Note: The number in parentheses and the thickness of the lines indicate how frequently each message was mentioned by the speaker.

The analysis is based on posts from the Facebook page of TV Imedi. The graph reflects not only the narratives promoted by Várhelyi, but also those selectively amplified by Georgian Dream-aligned media. The thickness of the lines connecting the themes indicates how frequently each appeared in Hungarian statements about Georgia.

Negative Conditionality 2: Halting Georgia’s EU Integration, Freezing Funds

The second time the EU withheld its rewards and applied negative conditionality to Georgia was after Georgia had already become an EU candidate country. In this period, the Georgian government reintroduced a controversial “foreign agents” bill that closely mirrored the Russian law aimed at silencing and repressing civil society organizations.[70] The bill was reintroduced despite multiple warnings from the EU that this would jeopardize Georgia’s EU path and despite the government promising not to bring back the bill after attempting to introduce it the year before. During this period, the EU took multiple steps to signal to the government of Georgia that its actions were putting distance between it and the European Union. Borrell and Várhelyi issued a joint statement warning that Georgia’s EU integration was being put at risk as a result of this bill.[71] Once the law was passed, the European Parliament issued a resolution calling on the Commission and EU member states not to start accession talks with Georgia until the law was repealed,[72] and Georgian Dream’s anti-Western rhetoric only intensified. In response, EU Ambassador to Georgia Paweł Herczyński announced that Georgia’s EU integration had been “stopped for now” and that the EU would be freezing €30 million in EU support to Georgia.[73] Finally, a month before Georgia’s parliamentary elections, the ambassador said the EU had decided to stop all high-level meetings with Georgia’s current government and reiterated that EU integration would be impossible under Georgia’s current leadership.[74]

Hungary’s Intergovernmental Response

During this period, Hungarian leadership also played an active role—in preventing the EU from speaking with one clear voice vis-à-vis Georgia. On the day that the European Parliament adopted a resolution stating that no further integration should happen with Georgia unless the bill were dropped, Hungary’s Prime Minister Orbán was praising Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) held in Budapest, where the Georgian Prime Minister was an invited speaker. Orbán compared him to a “great chess player” in Georgian politics given his ability to “preserve national identity and culture in [his] country despite all [the] difficulties.”[75]

This praise was seconded by Viktor Orbán’s political director, Balasz Orbán (no relation to the prime minister himself), soon after Georgia passed the controversial law. “Our intention is not to veto Georgia’s Law on the Transparency of Foreign Influence, but to encourage the introduction of similar laws across the EU. Protecting one’s sovereignty from unwanted foreign interference is not a threat but a precondition for democracy—this is what the law is about, and instead of condemning it, EU should perhaps also follow the lead,” [sic] he posted on Twitter/X.[76]

Hungary’s contestation of EU policy toward Georgia did not only come in the form of statements contradicting those coming from the EU, but also by abusing Hungary’s voting power on the European Council and the Council of the European Union. On the day that the “foreign agents” law was adopted on its third and final reading, Hungary and Slovakia blocked the Council of the European Union from issuing a joint statement condemning the bill. This resulted in the EU remaining silent on the day that the law was adopted despite having earlier warned Georgia of consequences coming from the EU if such a bill were to be adopted. The veto forced the EU to respond in a different format: instead of member states, the final statement on the “foreign agents” bill was issued by EU’s High Representative Josep Borrell (who had also been working with Olivér Várhelyi).[77]

Finally, the Hungarian leadership continued to legitimize and support the Georgian government in the period that the EU announced additional measures against Georgian officials by cutting off funding and meetings. Ten days after the announcement, Georgia’s then Foreign Minister Ilia Darchiashvili visited Hungary and the leadership of the two countries signed an investment-protection agreement.[78] Hungary’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Szijjártó, whose country was holding the Council of the European Union’s rotating presidency at the time, pledged to support Georgia’s EU integration with “all its might” during the meeting.[79] The Hungarian Foreign Minister also spoke of the benefits the EU would gain from Georgia’s membership in terms of its competitiveness and energy security.[80]

Figure 3 below demonstrates the main themes of Hungary’s messages to Georgia as covered by Georgian government-favoring channel Imedi TV during the period that Georgia was passing the controversial foreign-agents legislation.

Figure 3. This illustrates the main themes found in statements made by Hungarian officials during meetings with their Georgian counterparts, covering the period from April 2024 (when Georgian Dream reintroduced the “foreign agents” bill) to October 2024 (when the EU announced its measures to halt funding to Georgia and stop high-level meetings). The analysis is based on posts from the Facebook page of TV Imedi. The graphic reflects not only the narratives promoted by Hungarian officials, but also those selectively amplified by Georgian Dream-aligned media. The thickness of the lines connecting the themes indicates how frequently each appeared in Hungarian statements about Georgia. 

Note: The number in parentheses and the thickness of the lines indicate how frequently each message was mentioned by the speaker.

Supranational Response

Whereas Várhelyi was more positive about Georgia’s progress the first time the EU applied negative conditionality to the country, a combination of factors most likely led him to adopt a stricter approach toward Georgia in the year that followed. On the one hand, the leadership in Georgia had changed, with Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze replacing Irakli Gharibashvili. As Georgian experts working on Hungary pointed out,[81] during Gharibashvili’s term as Prime Minister from 2021 to 2024, he had much better personal ties with Orbán’s officials than does Kobakhidze, who succeeded Gharibashvili in 2024. In addition, Georgia’s “foreign agents” legislation contradicted EU values so blatantly that Várhelyi did not have as much freedom to take a contrary position regarding this law without openly breaching his obligation as an impartial EU commissioner. Therefore, he mostly issued statements in collaboration with Borrell during this period, in which the two leaders condemned the law, called on the government to withdraw it, and underlined its negative impact on Georgia’s prospects for EU integration.

After the introduction of the “foreign agents” legislation, Commissioner Várhelyi no longer issued any more positive assessments of the Georgian Dream government. On the contrary, relations between the Georgian Dream government and Várhelyi were further strained after Prime Minister Kobakhidze accused Várhelyi of threatening him with the same fate as Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico (who had been shot four times) if the government did not retract the “foreign-agents” legislation.[82] Following Kobakhidze’s comments, Várhelyi issued a statement clarifying that his words were “taken out of context” by him.[83]

Similarly, in comparison to the previous period, the Georgian government-affiliated channel Imedi TV did not cover critical statements made by Várhelyi after the foreign-agents law was passed, and therefore a comprehensive thematic analysis of Várhelyi’s statements on Georgian media is not possible for this period. The only instance when one of Várhelyi’s statements was posted on TV Imedi’s Facebook page is when the Commissioner clarified that he did not threaten Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze with the same fate as Slovakia’s Prime Minister Fico.

Discussion of Results

The analysis of the Hungarian leadership’s statements and actions during the period when the EU applied negative conditionality on Georgia allows us to draw conclusions about how Hungary undermined the credibility of EU conditionality and how the Georgian government leveraged this to neutralize the EU’s democracy promotion efforts.

First and foremost, Hungary prevented the EU from delivering a unified and credible message on enlargement, both through the EU’s intergovernmental and supranational channels. When the EU denied Georgia’s application for candidacy and increased pressure on the Georgian government to stop traveling down the illiberal path it has followed, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Foreign Affairs Minister Szijjártó, and EU Enlargement Commissioner Várhelyi all sent messages that contradicted the EU’s stance by offering support to the Georgian government despite the EU’s criticism. Notably, on the day the EU announced its decision to deny Georgia’s application for candidate status, Szijjártó visited Tbilisi and condemned Brussels for its “double standards.” While Orbán and Szijártó mainly accused Brussels of being discriminatory and unfair toward Georgia, Várhelyi—bound by a stricter EU mandate—focused on praising Georgia’s progress.

Furthermore, Hungary and Slovakia both used their vetoes on the Council of the European Union to block the adoption of a critical statement on Georgia after the passage of the controversial “foreign agents” law. Additionally, an EU correspondent from Brussels reported that Orbán had threatened to veto the opening of EU accession talks with Ukraine unless Georgia was granted candidate status. While the extent of Orbán’s influence on Georgia receiving candidacy in 2023 remains unclear, it is likely that geopolitical considerations played a more significant role in the granting of candidacy for Georgia than did Orbán’s threat. Similarly, while it is uncertain how much Várhelyi influenced the wording and intensity of the European Commission’s reports on Georgia, a Politico report on his softening of EU reports on Serbia suggests that similar actions could have occurred regarding European Commission’s reports on Georgia during his term.

Beyond weakening the effectiveness of EU conditionality, Hungary’s actions also aimed to transform enlargement into a policy devoid of liberal-democratic values. In most instances when Hungary praised Georgia, the focus was on principles of “illiberal democracy” such as Georgia’s defense of traditions and sovereignty, its “booming” economy, and resilience to international pressure. While Hungary’s statements at the intergovernmental level praised Georgia for its preservation of sovereignty and traditions, Várhelyi’s positive assessments were more related to Georgia’s progress in its relations with the EU. While the High Representative of the EU, Josep Borrell, repeatedly stressed the need for further democratic reforms and emphasized the need for Georgia’s compliance with EU democratic criteria, Várhelyi primarily focused on the progress Georgia had already made on trade, its economy, and connectivity, steering clear of the stronger calls for reform that Borrell highlighted.

The limits of the EU Enlargement Commissioner’s ability to shield Georgia from EU’s negative conditionality became clear when Georgia passed its “foreign agents” law. Given how blatantly the law violated EU foundational principles, Várhelyi—tasked with representing the Commission’s stance impartially—had no choice but to criticize the bill and call for its withdrawal. Despite the law’s clear contradiction of EU democratic values, Hungarian officials continued to praise and legitimize it.

The analysis of Hungarian officials’ statements through the Georgian government-affiliated channel Imedi TV demonstrated not only the main themes of Hungary’s messages to Georgia but also how a government-affiliated media outlet used these assessments to attempt to diminish the impact of the EU’s negative conditionality on Georgia. The main themes from Hungary’s statements, as revealed by an analysis of Imedi, focused on Brussels being unfair, on Georgia’s success, and Hungary’s support for the country. Given the overwhelmingly high public support in Georgia for the country’s EU integration, Georgian Dream long relied on a pro-EU façade to maintain its popularity. Hungary’s positive assessments of Georgia’s EU path therefore likely helped the party preserve its pro-EU credentials, at least among part of its electorate. This effect was reinforced by the fact that such favorable evaluations came not only from an EU member state but also from an EU Commissioner. On the other hand, Hungary’s negative assessments of the EU itself most likely played a role in reducing public support for and trust in the European Union among at least a portion of the Georgian electorate. Most importantly, Hungary’s statements and the Georgian media’s amplifications of these statements diminished the EU’s ability to send strong and credible messages to its prospective partner country that no EU integration would be possible given Georgia’s current trajectory.

Conclusion

The European Union’s revitalization of its enlargement policy after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine brought democracy promotion back to the forefront of EU politics after a decade of enlargement fatigue. This brought new challenges to illiberal actors globally who feared the expansion of liberal democracy either in their own countries or emanating from the European Union and turned EU enlargement into a target for contestation for the illiberal international network.

Although outside powers like Russia had always challenged the EU’s foreign policy in their shared neighborhood, this period stood out since the contestation of the EU’s enlargement policy came from one of the EU’s own member states, Hungary. As a country facing mounting pressure and possible sanctions from the EU itself for deviating from the Union’s foundational liberal-democratic values, Hungary’s goal has been to empty the EU of liberal democracy and transform it into an economic union that is full of like-minded states. While scholars have increasingly recognized the need to study how an illiberal member state within the EU can impact the EU’s ability to promote liberal democracy abroad, such an empirical study had not yet been conducted, since the EU remained mostly dormant regarding enlargement during this period. A few exceptions include media articles on how Hungary has been supporting the EU’s illiberal candidate state, Serbia.[84] Although such articles raise awareness of Hungary’s support for illiberal EU candidate states, they do not delve deeper into what strategies Hungary has been using to undermine the EU’s approach to democracy promotion through enlargement and how this has affected EU candidate states.

The renewal of the EU’s enlargement policy in 2022 has allowed this paper to fill the existing gap by researching how Hungary has been challenging the EU’s enlargement policy toward Georgia. Hungary has been undermining the credibility of EU conditionality on Georgia both on the intergovernmental level through Prime Minister Orbán and Foreign Minister Szijjártó, and on the supranational level through Hungarian EU Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi. The analysis found that the Hungarian actors have used all the discretionary tools available to them within the European Union—Hungary’s right to pursue an independent foreign policy, its discretion to veto in the European Council and the Council of the European Union’s decisions requiring unanimity, its ability to send a commissioner from Hungary—to challenge the EU’s attempts to speak with one voice regarding Georgia, and thereby disconnect the EU enlargement from liberal-democratic values.

An analysis of government-affiliated media’s coverage of Hungarian officials’ statements further demonstrated that these were used by Georgian Dream to neutralize the impact of the EU’s negative conditionality on the party’s grip on power. By amplifying Hungary’s praise for Georgia and criticism of the EU on Georgia’s most-watched media channel, the Georgian Dream government tried to reduce the impact of EU conditionality on the Georgian public’s support for the government. How effective Georgian media was in using Hungary to diminish citizens’ criticism of their government and influence their perceptions of the EU would be an interesting topic for further research.

The findings of this article provide important insights on both the EU and illiberalism studies. First, in the field of European Union studies, it offers new empirical insights into how illiberal actors undermine and weaken EU enlargement as a democracy promotion tool. While recent scholarship has begun to explore illiberal states’ impact on EU enlargement, much of this remains theoretical. By focusing on Hungary’s influence over the EU’s conditionality policy in Georgia, this paper provides concrete and policy-relevant answers to this debate. Second, in the broader field of illiberalism studies, it sheds light on the strategies illiberal actors use to obstruct the spread of liberal democracy and strengthen the growing illiberal international network.

Appendix

List of speeches analyzed

Olivér Várhelyi’s press statement following EU-Georgia Association Council meeting, February 19, 2024	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_24_952	Accessed September 10, 2024
Josep Borrell’s press statement following EU-Georgia Association Council, February 20, 2024	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-after-association-council_en	Accessed September 10, 2024
Olivér Várhelyi’s press statement following EU-Georgia Association Council meeting, September 6, 2022	https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-229436 [0:00–08:05]	Accessed September 10, 2024
Josep Borrell’s press statement following EU-Georgia Association Council, September 2022	https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-229436 [12:20-17:57]	Accessed September 10, 2024

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[27] Scheppele, “How Viktor Orbán Wins”; Péter Krekó and Zsolt Enyedi, “Orbán’s Laboratory of Illiberalism,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (July 2018): 39–51, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0043.

[28] Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Politics of EU Conditionality: The Norm of Minority Protection during and beyond EU Accession,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 6 (2008): 842–860, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760802196580; Lise Esther Herman, James Dawson, and Aurelia Ananda, “A Climate of Optimism? EU Policy-Making, Political Science and the Democratization of Central and Eastern Europe (2000–2015),” Comparative European Politics 22, no. 3 (June 2024): 329–351, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-023-00364-2; Antoaneta L. Dimitrova, “The New Member States of the EU in the Aftermath of Enlargement: Do New European Rules Remain Empty Shells?,” Journal of European Public Policy 17, no. 1 (2010): 137–148, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760903464929.

[29] Kelemen, “The European Union’s Authoritarian Equilibrium”; De Búrca, “Poland and Hungary’s EU Membership”; Bozóki and Hegedűs, “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime.”

[30] Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe, the Second Superpower,” Current History 109, no. 725 (March 2010): 91–98, https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2010.109.725.91; Meunier and Vachudova, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Illiberalism and the Potential Superpower of the European Union”; Vachudova, Europe Undivided.

[31] Vachudova.

[32] Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (June 2002): 235–258, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00353.

[33] Vachudova, Europe Undivided.

[34] Frank Schimmelfennig, ed., The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “The Europeanization of Eastern Europe.”

[35] De Búrca, “Poland and Hungary’s EU Membership.”

[36] Meunier and Vachudova, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Illiberalism and the Potential Superpower of the European Union.”

[37] Leuffen et al., “Rhetorical Action in a Liberal International Order in Crisis.”

[38] Leuffen et al.

[39] Orenstein and Kelemen, “Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy.”

[40] De Búrca, “Poland and Hungary’s EU Membership.”

[41] Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 47–80, https://doi.org/10.1162/002081801551414.

[42] Leuffen et al., “Rhetorical Action in a Liberal International Order in Crisis.”

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[44] Herman, Dawson, and Ananda, “A Climate of Optimism?”

[45] Kelemen, “The European Union’s Authoritarian Equilibrium”; Herman, Dawson, and Ananda, “A Climate of Optimism?”

[46] Herman, Dawson, and Ananda, “A Climate of Optimism?”

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[49] Civil Georgia, “Poll: Majority of Georgians Support Demands of Ongoing Protests, Blame Ruling Party for Political Crisis.”

[50] Freedom House, “Georgia,” in Nations in Transit 2024 (Washington DC: Freedom House, 2024),https://freedomhouse.org/country/georgia/nations-transit/2024.

[51] Transparency International Georgia, “Is Georgia a Captured State?” Transparency International Georgia, December 11, 2020, https://transparency.ge/en/blog/georgia-captured-state.

[52] EUvsDisinfo, “Twists and Turns: Georgian Dream Rhetoric on the EU,” EUvsDisinfo (website), October 23, 2024, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/twists-and-turns-georgian-dream-rhetoric-on-the-eu/.

[53] Netherlands Helsinki Committee, “EU to Freeze €7.5 Billion in EU Funds to Hungary over Rule of Law Concerns,” Netherlands Helsinki Committee, December 2, 2022, https://www.nhc.nl/eu-to-freeze-e7-5-billion-in-eu-funds-to-hungary-over-rule-of-law-concerns/.

[54] Maïa de La Baume, “Orbán’s Fidesz Quits EPP Group in European Parliament,” Politico, March 3, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/epp-suspension-rules-fidesz-european-parliament-viktor-orban-hungary/.

[55] European Commission, “Press Corner: European Commission Recommends Granting EU Membership Perspective [sic] to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia,” European Commission Press Release, June 17, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3790.

[56] Shota Kincha, “Director of Pro‑Opposition TV Channel Jailed for 3.5 Years in Georgia,” OC Media (news site), May 16, 2022, https://oc‑media.org/director‑of‑pro‑opposition‑tv‑channel‑jailed‑for‑3‑5‑years‑in‑georgia/.

[57] Open Caucasus Media, “EU Denies Georgia Candidate Status,” OC Media (news site), June 23, 2022, https://oc-media.org/eu-denies-georgia-candidate-status/.

[58] Péter Szijjártó, “Georgia Not Being Granted EU Candidate Status ‘Harmful, Wrong,’ ” Budapest Times, June 24, 2022, https://www.budapesttimes.hu/diplomacy/szijjarto-georgia-not-being-granted-eu-candidate-status-harmful-wrong/.

[59] “Georgian, Hungarian PMs Sign Declaration on Strategic Partnership,” Civil Georgia (news site), October 27, 2022, https://civil.ge/archives/513138.

[60] Civil Georgia, “Jozwiak: Georgia’s EU Candidacy Could Be ‘Collateral Damage’ of Hungary’s Resistance to Ukraine Accession Talks,” Civil Georgia (news site), December 11, 2023, https://civil.ge/archives/573857.

[61] Civil Georgia, “EU Enlargement Commissioner Visits Georgia,” Civil Georgia (news site), November 15, 2022, https://civil.ge/archives/514893.

[62] Civil Society Foundation, EU Candidacy Check 5.0: How Is Georgia Progressing towards Fulfilling the 12 Priorities Defined by the EU? Civil Society Foundation website, July 31, 2023, https://csf.ge/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Candidacy-Check-5.0-eng-final.pdf.

[63] Civil Georgia, “EU Enlargement Commissioner Visits Georgia.” 

[64] Interpressnews, “Salome Samadashvili: More Than 90% of Citizens Will Agree with Us That the European Commissioner’s Assessment That ‘the Economy Is Booming’ Is Out of Touch with Reality,” Interpressnews (news site), November 16, 2022, https://www.interpressnews.ge/en/article/122546-salome-samadashvili-more-than-90-of-citizens-will-agree-with-us-that-the-european-commissioners-assessment-that-the-economy-is-booming-is-out-of-touch-with-reality-his-statement-that-he-does-not-know-the-problems-described-in-the-documents-of-the-european-parliament-was-also-strange/.

[65] TV Imedi, Facebook page, November 17, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=5876233019135234&set=a.356936234398301.

[66] Oliver Varhelyi (@OliverVarhelyi), “Discussed #Georgia’s progress on its EU path. Minister Darchiashvili assured me that progress on the 12 priorities is well on track,” Twitter/X, May 11, 2023, https://x.com/OliverVarhelyi/status/1681687313955299329.

[67] Civil Society Foundation, “EU Candidacy Check 5.0: How Is Georgia Progressing Towards Fulfilling the 12 Priorities Defined by the EU?” July 31, 2023, https://csf.ge/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Candidacy-Check-5.0-eng-final.pdf.

^[67] Civil Georgia, “EU Enlargement Commissioner Visits Georgia,” Civil Georgia (news site), November 16, 2022, https://civil.ge/archives/514893.

[68] Oliver Varhelyi (@OliverVarhelyi), “Was good to meet PM @GharibashviliGe. We discussed Georgia’s EU path and the efforts are well received. Georgia belongs to the EU family & will get all the support on its EU path,” Twitter/X, October 27, 2023, https://x.com/OliverVarhelyi/status/1716847348314206347.

[69] Civil Georgia, “PM Garibashvili Visits Brussels, Meets EU Commissioner Várhelyi,” Civil Georgia (news site), October 25, 2023, https://civil.ge/archives/565415.

[70] Rayhan Demytrie and Emily Atkinson, “Georgia Approves Controversial ‘Foreign Agent’ Law, Sparking More Protests,” BBC News, May 14, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-69007465.

[71] Interpress News, “Josep Borrell and Olivér Várhelyi: EU Urges Georgia to Refrain from Adopting Legislation That Could Compromise the Country’s Path to the EU,” Interpress News (news site), April 17, 2024, https://www.interpressnews.ge/en/article/130915-josep-borrell-and-oliver-varhelyi-eu-urges-georgia-to-refrain-from-adopting-legislation-that-could-compromise-the-countrys-path-to-the-eu/.

[72] European Parliament, “Motion for a Resolution on Attempts to Reintroduce a Foreign Agent Law in Georgia and Its Restrictions on Civil Society,” European Parliament, April 22, 2024, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-2024-0246_EN.html.

[73] Civil Georgia “EU Accession Process Halted, Aid to MoD Frozen, Relations at a Low Point, Ambassador Herczyński Regrets,” Civil Georgia (news site), July 9, 2024, https://civil.ge/archives/615670.

[74] Civil Georgia, “EU Amb. Herczyński Ties Georgia’s Future to Elections, Slams GD’s Propaganda,” Civil Georgia (news site), October 4, 2024, https://civil.ge/archives/627226.

[75] JAMNews, “Georgian and Hungarian Authorities against the West,” JAMnews (news site) , April 26, 2024, https://jam-news.net/georgian-and-hungarian-authorities-against-the-west/.

[76] Balázs Orbán (@BalazsOrban_HU), “Our intention is not to veto #Georgia’s Law on the Transparency of Foreign Influence, but to encourage the introduction of similar laws in other countries,” Twitter/X, May 11, 2023, https://x.com/balazsorban_hu/status/1791352262226215318.

[77] European Commission, “Statement by High Representative Josep Borrell with the European Commission on the Adoption of the ‘Transparency of Foreign Influence’ Law in Georgia,” European Commission, May 15, 2024, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-european-commission-adoption-transparency-foreign-2024-05-15_en.

[78] Civil Georgia, “FM Darchiashvili Meets Hungarian Colleague Szijjártó,” Civil Georgia (news site), July 19, 2024, https://civil.ge/archives/616948.

[79] Péter Szijjártó, “FM: Hungary Will Provide Georgia with Support to Protect Its Sovereignty,” About Hungary (news site), July 22, 2024, https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/fm-hungary-will-provide-georgia-with-support-to-protect-its-sovereignty.

[80] Szijjártó, “FM: Hungary Will Provide Georgia with Support to Protect Its Sovereignty.” 

[81] Author’s conversation with a Georgian diplomat, Signal call, January 9, 2025.

[82] Georgian Government Facebook page, “Premier Ministri Irakli Kobakhidzis Gantskhadeba,” Facebook, May 15, 2025, https://www.facebook.com/GeorgianGovernment/posts/pfbid02tCnS5fjFfRAwtbYLMtfPU4wuZr7yDG5w1gPSaNsrviSpSWXUo9zwb2WVTsEyYbjBl.

[83] Civil Georgia, “Commissioner Várhelyi Denies Threatening PM Kobakhidze over Agents’ Law,” Civil Georgia (news site), May 23, 2024, https://civil.ge/archives/609107.

[84] Zosia Wanat and Lili Bayer, “Olivér Várhelyi: Europe’s Under‑Fire Gatekeeper;” Srđan Cvijić, “Hungary’s Illiberal Infection of the Western Balkans,” Politico Europe, May 15, 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/hungarys-illiberal-infection-of-the-western-balkans-viktor-orban/.