As anthropologists often do, I will begin my article with something seemingly distant from its immediate topic. In the summer of 2024, the congress of the European Association of Social Anthropologists was held in Barcelona. I rarely attend such events, since I occupy a relatively peripheral position in this organization and the academic community. Nevertheless, I was struck by how much the atmosphere had changed in the 11 years since I last attended; this congress was filled with disputes and divisions and even boycotts were discussed. This was the result of a changing discipline: social anthropology is going through its decolonial moment. It is from this vantage point that I look at the decolonial struggle of Pan-Slavists, who denounce the West’s attempts to “control everything” and presumably siphon resources from Slavic countries.
The most important part of defining the decolonial moment is distinguishing it from anti-colonial and post-colonial struggles. The anti-colonial epoch in anthropology was associated with people fighting for independence from colonial powers. The postcolonial phase involves criticizing and challenging the remnants of colonial structures and inequalities inherited by formally independent states and societies. Decolonization, by contrast, assumes that, even when the colonial past has been formally overcome, it is still latent in the architecture of academic institutions, language, and practices of knowledge dissemination, publishing, and teaching. It is a long-term project of creating alternative forms of educational cooperation, including dismantling colonial structures and mindsets and promoting gender and racial diversity within the academy itself. Ribeiro suggests that decoloniality should be seen not simply as a kind of reform of anthropological knowledge but as a utopian idea for a future post-imperialism.
The decolonial moment makes an almost personal attack on members of the older generation, who are perceived as accomplices of the latent colonial regime of knowledge production. The politics of decoloniality in anthropology is not without its critics, who sometimes go so far as to claim that the process of decolonization itself paradoxically suffers from “Northern-centrism” and allows new faces to occupy prestigious positions within the academy without changing the dominance and control of the Global North over the system of knowledge production. Researchers have observed that, in academic communities far from the cosmopolitan centers, the discourse of decoloniality is perceived as a Western-imposed debate that is only picked up by academics willing to self-colonize and fully accommodate themselves to this externally imposed language and mode of thinking.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a moment of critical rethinking for the notion of decoloniality. Firstly, it became apparent that the academic community was unprepared for what was happening; deeply engaged in analyzing the survivability of the remnants of colonial empires of the past, it could not acknowledge the existence of a real and living empire in the present. The Eurocentricity of Western decolonial scholars prevents many from seeing Ukraine’s struggle as anti-colonial and recognizing its sovereignty, instead of seeing it as a buffer zone. “Decoloniality” within the analysis of the war in Ukraine became a political rather than an analytical issue, such that even the recognition of Ukraine’s anti-colonial struggle was problematized by many after its supporter, NATO, decided to also back Israel in its Gaza operation. Furthermore, the fact that Ukraine has received support from the Global North, and is somewhat ignored by the Global South, also requires us to reconsider analytical notions of anti-colonial and decolonial struggles, as it is clear that we are dealing with a multifaceted phenomenon in which these discourses are intertwined and often interchanged. This complexity can also be weaponized: it has long been noted that the Soviet Union carried out a project to recolonize the territories of the Russian Empire under the slogan of the struggle against imperialism. This tradition of turning concepts upside down has proven to be very effective now in Putin’s Russia.
My research on the supporters of Pan-Slavic ideas in Slovakia has shown that anti-colonial and decolonial discourses are not exclusive to progressive intellectuals. Pan-Slavist groups are also sincerely fighting against what they see as the colonial oppression and attacks of the West. Though the polarization of broader society has meant that these groups occupy a radical right-wing position, there are nevertheless very different and often incompatible views of this struggle between them. The more traditional nationalist organization Matica Slovenska associates itself with more of a 19th-century tradition of Pan-Slavism and retains the ethos of a small Slovak nation surviving and fighting for its sovereignty, first against the Austro-Hungarian Empire and now against some all-Western empire. The newly formed Night Wolves biker clubs represent the Slovaks as part of a larger Slavic community, led by Russia as the strongest Slavic country, which also fights back against pro-Western forces and imperialist initiatives, just as this Slavic community fought back Hitler’s attack on the USSR and Eastern Europe in 1945. Situational alliances are possible between these Pan-Slavic organizations and clubs but, on the whole, they are not very compatible with each other.
Polarized Slovakia: Oscillations between East and West
I came to Slovakia a month before the fateful elections of September 2023, when Robert Fico would win and turn the country’s course sharply towards friendship with Russia and conflict with the European Union. This was not the first time Fico had come to power; he had been Prime Minister three times before, each time losing his post to scandals. From 2018, a coalition of liberal and progressive forces had been in power. During this period, Slovakia unequivocally supported Ukraine, provided aid to Ukrainian refugees, and transferred much of its arms there. Fico won the 2023 election on a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment and a pro-Russian political program. Previously, he had used populist methods but had never associated himself so much with Viktor Orban and Vladimir Putin.
Figure 1. An anti-government protest in May 2024. Photo by Tatyjana Szafonova used with permission of the author.
I was looking for accommodation in Bratislava and constantly crossed the city from end to end, often passing a small park in front of the ministries and government buildings. In September 2023, people were living in this park, mostly middle-aged men, in tents on the lawns; these were refugees who had previously been released from camps in Hungary. Orban had released them because it was too expensive for the Hungarian state to keep them. Rumors circulated in the country that the illegal migrants were deliberately released at the Slovak border and directed to go to the capital as part of a pre-election ploy to create anti-immigrant panic in Slovakia. The news was indeed full of reports about illegal migrants spotted on the streets. It is hard to say whether this played a role in the election results, but Fico won, and the migrants disappeared from the park as if they had never been there.
Anti-colonial and decolonial discourses are not exclusive to progressive intellectuals. Pan-Slavist groups are also sincerely fighting against what they see as the colonial oppression and attacks of the West.
The following months were marked by a growing conflict between urban cosmopolitan society and the government, which had gained its mandate through the votes of rural Slovakia. The government appointed its ministers, who rushed to implement changes loudly; society responded with protests, which by January 2024 had become an almost weekly event in Bratislava. The first trigger was a set of decrees amending the criminal code and reducing the statute of limitations for certain crimes, especially those of a sexual nature. The government also tried to crack down on investigators prosecuting cases that involving members of the government and those close to them. Relatives of the investigators, artists, and members of the press addressed the gathered crowds. People brought Slovak flags, as well as EU and LGBTQ+ flags. The rallies often took place in different parts of Bratislava’s Old Town, before gradually moving toward the largest square in the capital. Dissatisfaction with the government’s judiciary changes was intensified by anger over a new Ministry of Culture that aimed to redirect funding to support only a very conservative form of culture and to exclude liberal programs. Further protests focused on Fico and his cabinet’s crackdown on television and the free press. By the end of April 2024, the country was reeling from these confrontations; the internet was full of memes and hate speech, and the protests, while peaceful, were filled with increasingly vitriolic speeches.
On May 15, 2024, an assassination attempt was made on Fico during a visit to Handlová. The assailant fired several shots and wounded the Prime Minister. Fico was transported to a hospital and subsequently recovered. The first reaction from Fico’s supporters was to blame the progressive media, for allegedly fueling hatred. However, it soon became clear that the shooter was an ambiguous figure, once a supporter of conservative forces and now an active opposition figure who strongly sympathized with Ukraine. He was more of a disillusioned former government supporter than the stereotypical cosmopolitan opposition figure, so the liberal-blame theory quickly faded. Nevertheless, passions raged on the Internet, and the police even had called for users to refrain from making accusations related to the crime on the Internet. Fico’s supporters organized rallies in support of the Prime Minister under the windows of his hospital room while his opponents took a break and cancelled the usual Bratislava demonstrations.
A month later, the rallies resumed as society began to polarize again. According to various estimations, one of the largest rallies attracted between 40,000 and 60,000 people. In the meantime, Fiсo strengthened his friendship with Russia, traveled to Moscow, and refused to cooperate with the EU and Ukraine about gas supplies—he argued that only Russian gas could provide Slovakia with energy and national sovereignty. Many Pan-Slavist groups supported Fico in this lurch toward the East. Strangely though, each of them saw the friendship differently, and often disagreed with each other so much that Fico’s support, though strengthened by many voices, did not sound in unison.
Matica Slovenska: Guarding the National Heritage of Historical Pan-Slavism
The Slovak Matica (Matica Slovenska) played a huge role in developing Slovak culture. It first appeared at the same time as the Serbian Matica, which was founded in 1820. It turned into a fully functioning organization a decade later, in parallel with the Czech Matica’s growth. All these primarily cultural organizations were linked to the rise of Slavic national identity in the Habsburg Empire and were often encouraged by the authorities as counterbalances to growing Hungarian influence. Matica Slovenska did much to codify the Slovak language and adopt one standard grammar, though they later distanced themselves from its creator, Ludovit Štúr, to avoid being associated with Pan-Slavic ideas he adopted later. After the agreement between the Austrians and Hungarians in 1867 (known as The Austro-Hungarian Compromise) transformed the centralized Austrian Empire into a union of two equal sovereign states (Austria and Hungary), Slovak culture underwent Magyarization; by 1869, Matica Slovenska had lost its headquarters in Martin, which was occupied by Hungarian troops. Investigations based on suspicions of Matica Slovenska’s Pan-Slavist views began, and in 1874, the Hungarian Home Ministry officially closed Matica Slovenska.
Many Pan-Slavist groups supported Fico in [his] lurch toward the East. Strangely though, each of them saw the friendship differently, and often disagreed with each other so much that Fico’s support, though strengthened by many voices, did not sound in unison.
In 1919, following the end of World War I and the creation of the new state of Czechoslovakia, Matica Slovenska was restored. This time, the organization was given broad powers by the state. Among its members was Andrej Hlinka, the founder of the Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, a far-right clerico-fascist political party. After Hlinka’s death, the party was led by Jozef Tiso, who became the leader of the first Slovak Republic in 1939, which emerged through cooperation with Hitler. From that moment on, the role of Matica Slovenska grew even more. They enjoyed extensive contacts within the government and served as a kind of Ministry of Culture, providing the new state with “correct” literary works, textbooks for schools, newspapers and magazines. They participated in Aryanization, taking over a publishing house with which they previously worked, from a Jewish owner. Some of the members of Matica Slovenska and their relatives were also members of the so-called Hlinkova Garda, paramilitary units that provided security for the new regime. After the fall of Nazi Germany, the leadership of Matica Slovenska was almost entirely forced to emigrate for fear of persecution.
Nevertheless, Matica Slovenska survived the transition period. By 1954, it had transformed, its team embedded into the leadership of the new Slovak National Library. It focused on popular Slovak culture becoming, by the 1970s, the central book catalog and museum studies center in the Slovak part of restored Czechoslovakia. The third golden period of Matica Slovenska coincided with the government of Vladimir Meciar from 1991 to 1998. They took over a printing house, organized several international festivals for Slovak youth, and received state funding for its activities. During these years, many members of Matica Slovenska associated with Tiso’s rule were rehabilitated. In the courtyard of the main building of the Matica Slovenska, a pantheon of popular cultural heroes was created, including the Pan-Slavists Ludovit Štúr and Andrej Hlinka.
Figure 2. A provocative poster by the Pavol Országh Hviezdoslav Theatre. Photo by Tatyjana Szafonova used with permission of the author.
The golden years ended with Meciar’s time at the head of government. Immediately after he departed, members of Matica Slovenska were separated from the National Library and lost control of the folk culture museum in Martin. The organization lost its position in Slovak society, being seen now as a remnant of the old world, unreflective of the demand for a modern, more cosmopolitan culture. They preserved their newspaper, on whose pages one can still find feelings of resentment and confusion, as well as the desire for revenge and a return to the golden years.
In search of its identity and role in society, Matica Slovenska focused on the cult of Štúr and the promotion of conservative values. A month before the elections, at the end of September 2023, members actively fought against a poster put up by the main drama theater (Figure 2). The poster, which played on the style of the stained-glass windows that decorate the theater building, depicted people walking with LGBTQ+ and Ukrainian flags, as well as a flag with the cross of Hlinka Garda crossed out with a red stripe. One person is carrying a head resembling Štúr’s. The poster was provocative, and Matica Slovenska organized a small rally and wrote about in its newspaper. They inveighed against the “desecration” of the theater that bears the name of the poet Pavol Országh Hviezdoslav—even though he was pretty progressive for his time, criticizing wars and the exploitation of the peasants by aristocrats. They argued that, based on the organization’s long history and contribution to preserving Slovak culture, they should speak for Slovak culture and protect it from outside influence.
[Matica Slovenska] cannot harmoniously fit into the modern Pan-Slavist discourse promoted primarily by the Russian state. [Its] history […] in World War II forever excludes it from the dominant discourse that the Slavs are one people, demonstrated by their unity against fascism in the mid-20th century.
The outrage over the beheaded Štúr can be understood by examining the events that Matica Slovenska holds each year. Most of them are connected to the figure of Štúr, with symbolic visits to memorial sites, celebrations for his birthday, and remembrance events on the day of his death. In April, they organize a trip to the Devin Fortress, where participants sing songs and place flowers at the memorial plaque that commemorates the declaration of Štúr and his friends of their intention to reclaim the Slovak language, celebrate Slovak culture, and maintain Slovak national identity. Matica Slovenska considers this ritual as part of its duty to preserve Slovak culture. Similarly, they organise memorial meetings at the Štúr monument in Levice, where Štúr’s pupils went to protest after his removal from his position at the Bratislava Gymnasium in the 1840s. Matica Slovenska is constantly expanding the repertoire of stories from Štúr’s life that can be reenacted and commemorated, turning the life of the Pan-Slavist linguist into a script for their cultural events.
Nevertheless, Matica Slovenska does not pay much attention to Štúr’s most famous work: his treatise on the Slavs, in which he proposes that Slovaks seek help from the Russian tsar to establish a Slovak state. When recalling Štúr, Matica Slovenska emphasizes his contribution to the Slovak national movement, while trying to ignore the distinct Pan-Slavism of this writer. This is partly because they cannot harmoniously fit into the modern Pan-Slavist discourse promoted primarily by the Russian state. The history of Matica Slovenska in World War II forever excludes it from the dominant discourse that the Slavs are one people, demonstrated by their unity against fascism in the mid-20th century.
In their newspaper published immediately after Fico’s 2023 electoral victory, correspondents collected several cases of Antifa and the progressive opposition supposedly harassing Matica Slovenska’s employees and sympathizers. They described how Antifa allegedly broke into a bookstore selling Matica Slovenska publications, how Matica representatives were called names and insulted in public, and how ultra-left activists tried to start fights and even hit protesters during a meeting in front of the theatre over the scandalous poster. All these stories were ignored by the police, allowing Matica Slovenska to be cast as a victim of hatred and harassment. With these complaints, and others related to the cutting of their budget by the previous government, leaders of the organization went to the new minister of culture, Martina Simkovicova, in the first days of her taking office, winning a promise for renewed funding. The next day, during her official presentation to the government, Simkovicova shared her vision of cultural policy: Slovak culture was separate and should not be mixed with others, and cultural workers should preserve Slovak traditions and heritage. Other national groups should be tolerant and recognize that the Slovak nation has a national culture. She also spoke of respect for other cultures based on a recognition of the separateness and difference of their identities. Fico supported the new minister of culture and added that Matica Slovenska is a “jewel” of the Slovak nation that must be preserved.
Matica Slovenska made their absolute support for the new government clear on the pages of their newspaper; the new government was described as being “genuinely of the people.” Their accompanying photograph showed the heads of the parties signing the coalition agreement in the Parliament building against the background of a famous picture of Štúr speaking in the Hungarian Diet (Figure 3). The illustration looked as if Štúr himself was part of the new coalition. Throughout the rest of Fico’s rule, Matica Slovenska unconditionally supported all of his initiatives, publishing critical articles about supporting Ukraine and LGBTQ+ rights, rife with pejorative portrayals of the opposition, though they continued to avoid expressing direct solidarity with Russia. Matica Slovenska even reestablished a university department for Slavic studies, which had been abolished in the mid-1950s. Although it proclaimed its mission to study global Slavism, the department included Serbian and other foreign researchers. Consequently, their Slavic studies program was focused on a relatively small regional level and did not become a bridge for integration into the Pan-Slavic movement led by the Russian state. Thus, despite associations with Pan-Slavism, Matica Slovenska stands on a nationalist position, presenting Slovak culture as a national treasure that needs purification from external influence and thorough support from the new, “people’s” government.
Figure 3. The front page of the Matica Slovenska’s newspaper following the signing of 2023 government coalition agreement. Photo by Tatyjana Szafonova used with permission of the author.
Night Wolves: Split Between Two Packs
The Night Wolves appeared unofficially in the Soviet Union in 1989, led by Alexander Zaldastanov, nicknamed “Surgeon.” The club gravitated toward the informal rock scene, apolitical and noisy nighttime runs through cities, outrageous behavior and shock value. Since 2008, however, the club became actively involved in pro-government propaganda, started to receive direct funding from the state, and signed cooperation agreements with representatives of the Orthodox Church. The club adheres to a Pan-Slavist ideology in which Russians are the older brothers of all Slavs. It was the Russians, they say, who liberated Europe from fascist oppression in 1945. To honor this, one of the Night Wolves’ most notable activities was their motorcycle rallies to places of memory of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) from Russia through Eastern Europe to Berlin, which attracted significant attention and publicity. In 2014, the Night Wolves did not just support the occupation of Crimea but also participated in the so-called defense of the peninsula as part of self-organized brigades which led to Zaldastanov being placed on the European Union’s sanction lists. The Night Wolves began to grow local and regional clubs in Europe, mainly in Slavic countries.
Jozef Hambalek, a biker and motorcycle distributor in Slovakia, had initially been sympathetic to the Night Wolves. In the early 2010s, he bought a former state farm in the village of Dolná Krupá, which he turned into a motorcycle school. He also opened a museum dedicated to World War II and put together a collection of old military equipment. In 2018, this location became the official residence—and meeting place—of the Night Wolves in Europe, as the Russian Embassy in Slovakia announced. Hambalek was the head of the Slovak branch; he thus also grew ties with the Belarusian, Czech, Serbian, and Bulgarian branches. After 2022, Hambalek was also placed on the EU sanctions lists, becoming the only EU citizen on it. The activities of the Night Wolves in Slovakia were paralyzed, as the Slovak state had to freeze all Hambalek’s assets and forbid him from leaving the country. To Hambalek’s delight, in 2023, Fico returned to power and personally organized the lifting of sanctions against Hambalek in March 2024.
[The Night Wolves initially] gravitated toward the informal rock scene, apolitical and noisy nighttime runs through cities, outrageous behavior and shock value. Since 2008, however, the club became actively involved in [Russian] government propaganda.
However, by this time, the Night Wolves in Slovakia had split into two factions. Hambalek’s rivals were the new biker club Brother for Brother (Brat za Brata), led by Matus Alexa. who has always maintained strong ties with Russia; in 2023, he even traveled to Moscow and received the Eternal Flame in Red Square from the hands of Sergei Naryshkin, director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, to take to Europe. His club’s name directly refers to the Russian version of Pan-Slavism, in which all Slavic nations are fraternal. The two almost identical biker clubs formally lead similar actions, including motorcycle rallies in Slovakia. Each organization has its own style and signature however, so it’s hard to imagine them participating in events together going forward, though many bikers and fans attend the events of both clubs.
Figure 4. Jozef Hambalek and Night Wolves Europe at the Slavin War Memorial in Bratislava, May 2024. Photo by Tatyjana Szafonova used with permission of the author.
Hambalek now keeps a relatively low profile, rarely commenting directly on political events in the country; since the sanctions against him were lifted, he has been busy rebuilding his motorcycle business. His base in Dolná Krupá reportedly continues to operate as a motorcycle school, but no Night Wolves events are known to be held there now. Nevertheless, Hambalek organizes motorcycle rallies, both “traditional” ones related to the commemoration of the Soviet victory in World War II and the liberation of Slovakia, as well as “extra-curricular” ones, including one for the health of Fico after the attempt on his life. The motorcycle rally ended in front of the hospital where Fico was treated, with participants standing in a circle and praying for the Prime Minister’s recovery. Hambalek wears standard Night Wolves clothing at the traditional rallies and uses Russian flags; his speeches advocate a Slovak nationalist political stance. His rallies feature Slovak national songs written to the poems of a 19th-century Pan-Slavist poet.
The growth of the Brother for Brother biker club is entirely due to the activism of Matus Alexa who represents a type of leader quite different from Hambalek. Whereas Hambalek is more of a manager and an activist, Alexa is first and foremost a social media content creator. Alexa regularly makes TikTok videos, records Facebook video posts, and has set up a dedicated website about the club’s activities. Often, his posts are monotonous, include some banal phrases, and are very abstractly formulated; advocating for everything “good”, and against everything “bad.” Alexa usually uses specific filters, so all his videos and photos have a somewhat unnatural color, giving them a unique aesthetic. There are also a lot of AI-generated illustrations on Brother for Brother’s pages, alongside pictures depicting national prototypes of Slavic countries as wolves or bears and romantic images of nature and national symbols. Sometimes Alexa reposts memes, usually aimed at ridiculing the opposition.
Matus Alexa […] represents a type of leader quite different from Hambalek. Whereas Hambalek is more of a manager and an activist, Alexa is first and foremost a social media content creator.
In early May 2024, Brother for Brother held its motorcycle rally with visits to Soviet monuments like the memorial cemetery of Soviet soldiers in Bratislava. In this ceremony, the bikers arrived at the foot of the mountain, went up to the monument, and, in small groups, went down on one knee or just bowed at the memorial’s main entrance. The Night Wolves had done the same a week before but, at the Brother for Brother event, everything took place under the sound of a professional portable sound system blasting Russian songs and poems, especially the music of SHAMAN, a state-backed pop singer in Russia, chosen to be a kind of icon of resistance to the West. Most of the audience did not understand what they were hearing. After everyone had bowed to the fallen, a small political rally began in front of the monument, at which a representative of the Russian embassy in Slovakia spoke, as well as two members of parliament from Fico’s party. Alexa gave a speech and proved to be a very eloquent speaker; he later exchanged gifts with the invited politicians. Although the Night Wolves ceremony a week earlier had a larger turnout, Brother for Brother organized a more high-profile affair.
While Hambalek and his Night Wolves were fighting their anxiety by riding around the hospital where Fico was lying in intensive care after the assassination attempt, Alexa was writing on Facebook, reposting the opposition’s accusations of what had happened, collecting versions of what happened on his page, investigating, and posting accusations and suspicions—despite an appeal by police for calm and warning against premature accusations . It was a great time for content creators, and Alexa’s page likely gained a lot of new readers and subscribers. After Fico returned to his duties, Alexa reverted to his usual style of posts: in the summer of 2024, Brother for Brother supported an initiative collecting signatures in favor of a referendum on lifting sanctions against Russia. The signatures were collected quite quickly, and, by March 2025, there were about 450,000. A petition for a referendum was submitted, but the President rejected it due to incorrect wording. Slovakia could not lift the sanctions adopted at the European Union level.
As long as [Pan-Slavist groups] have a single patron in the person of authoritarian populist leader like Fico, [their splintering] is not visible from the outside and does not weaken their coalition of forces. Nevertheless, the trend toward disunity is underway and, as time goes by, it is becoming increasingly difficult to reverse
The next media event that brought Alexa into the limelight was a Facebook video in January 2025, where he reacted to the Prime Minister saying that the opposition protests, which had gained a lot of momentum, represented an attempted coup. Alexa appealed to the nation to set up armed self-defense groups across the country to prevent this. Although made in the author’s usual performative style, this call was interpreted as a direct threat by the opposition, which had previously known little about these biker groups: thus, rumors started circulating in opposition groups and media that Matus Alexa would organize attacks on protesters. Alexa was dumbfounded by this newfound coverage and sought to shift public discussion away from rumors of violence. His posts for the week hinted that he would not attend opposition rallies, he posted pictures of himself with his two sons and captioned them that the most essential thing in life is family, and had Brother for Brother initiated a campaign to help the needy and then posted photos of themselves distributing food. As such, motorcycle and car rallies do not play as significant a role for Brother for Brother now as they do for the Night Wolves; instead, they are performative actions.
Recursive Polarization in Slovakia
It is commonly believed that right-wing populist parties are the primary beneficiaries of affective and social polarization in society, as they attract negative emotions and actively channel them. Such parties need to foment polarization to grow, as it is the reason for their existence. However, as we see in the example of the right-wing conservative forces in Slovakia, polarization also affects these forces themselves. Different Pan-Slavist groups are gradually splintering while maintaining seemingly unified goals. As long as they have a single patron in the person of authoritarian populist leader like Fico, this polarization is not visible from the outside and does not weaken their coalition of forces. Nevertheless, the trend toward disunity is underway and, as time goes by, it is becoming increasingly difficult to reverse.
The silence about Matica Slovenska’s cooperation with the Tiso government during World War II and the emphasis on the role of the Soviet Union in the liberation from fascism by the Night Wolves prevent these two Pan-Slavist organizations from joining forces. The generational shift in leadership within the Night Wolves, as well as the degree to which they are willing to associate directly with Russia and risk new sanctions, creates a split within the once-united biker club. As it happens, each group, while sharing a common Pan-Slavist ideology, takes its own unique position on a spectrum ranging from seeing Slovaks as a national minority struggling against the colonial forces around it to associating Slovaks with another larger Slavic nation, which in turn can itself act as an alternative to the colonial forces. Matica Slovenska gravitates toward the image of Slovakia as a small, unique nation-fortress. Brother for Brother presents an alternative, where Slovakia is led out of the abysses of Western colonization by Russia, as the older brother. The old Night Wolves group led by Hambalek occupies a position somewhere in the middle between these points, suggesting Slovakia stick together with its small Slavic peers, such as the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Belarus, orientated toward Russia but without losing its national specificity.
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101061661.
Tatyjana Szafonova is a social anthropologist and visiting researcher at the Institute of Social Anthropology, Comenius University. She has also been a research fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Budapest. Her latest project at Comenius University (2023–2025), titled “Pan-Ideologies in Central Europe: Paradoxes of Right-Wing Self-Orientalism,” was supported by a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions postdoctoral fellowship. In 2025, she edited a special issue of the Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, entitled “Paradoxes of Historical Revisionism in Authoritarian States.”
Image made by John Chrobak using “Obal Matica” by Peter Zelizňák licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0; “Ночные Волки (1)” by www.volganet.ru licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0; “Jozef Hambalek and Night Wolves Europe at the Slavin War Memorial in Bratislava, May 2024” by Tatyjana Szafonova used with permission of the author. All other assets used are in the public domain.
