Yannis Stavrakakis, thank you for joining us and congratulations on your new book Populist Discourse: Recasting Populism Research! It comes at a time when it feels like the European “populist zeitgeist” of the late-2010s has been petering out; an increasing number of academic voices even seem content to stop using the concept altogether. A popular argument suggests populism really just refers to a type of rhetoric—an “empty shell,” in one leftist thinker’s words—and that using it risks over-complicating an otherwise surface-level phenomenon. What is the value of the concept of “populism”?
Thanks a lot for the invitation and for your kind words, it is a pleasure! You are right, the debate on populism and its various implications comes and goes. Sometimes, people talk about “the populist moment” as if it were a single momentary occurrence. Very often, it is presented as a novel phenomenon, as something that makes its appearance felt all of a sudden and then is bound to disappear in a similar fashion, leaving no traces in our political structures. What is disavowed here are the structural operations of populism; the fact that it accompanies representative systems as their shadow, to draw on Margaret Canovan’s important work, repeatedly bringing to the fore the redemptive dimension of democracy, especially when it has been sidelined by its pragmatic, technocratic dimension.
When the latter happens, it tends to destabilize the paradoxical articulation upon which representative systems were premised (Chantal Mouffe’s “democratic paradox”), extending the oligarchic tendencies already present within organized representation. As a result, frustration and indignation accumulates, especially on the part of (popular, plebeian) sectors that feel excluded from the decision-making process. Then, when a leader, a movement or a party assumes the task of representing such frustrations, calling on “the people” to mobilize in the name of the oft-forgotten constitutional principle of “popular sovereignty”—in order to redress injustice and inequality—such oppositional forces are denounced by established forces as “populist.” As you can understand, this choreography is ingrained in the operation of representative systems, it is far from novel and is not likely to disappear. It re-emerges in cycles following the meanders of political antagonism within what are effectively polyarchies.
In this sense, the phenomenon of populism indicates a type of politics characteristic of representative democratic antagonism, when the latter enlists the grammar of political modernity in order to articulate and mobilize collective fronts, passionate identifications and associated processes of contestation against a perceived threat (the economic and political establishment) that is seen as usurping the institutional apparatus and betraying the nominal democratic commitment to “popular sovereignty.”
Now, obviously this has to do with the mediation and articulation of political discourse, but it is only through such mediations that economic and socio-cultural factors are comprehensively articulated and affect real people. It is only through such symbolic and affective mechanisms that complex socio-economic dynamics overdetermine political struggle and hegemony. Emptiness, utilizing ambiguity to facilitate receptivity, to invite new articulations and, eventually, increase political salience, could be very important here: this is why Ernesto Laclau introduces the concept of the “empty signifier” as a potent catalyst allowing a performative unification process linking particular frustrations and demands and thus providing a strategic impetus for sectors that cannot acquire hegemonic potential one by one, in their concrete particularity.
None of that is particularly novel, but it often feels unsettling and/or scandalous because we have been used to misrecognizing politics through a variety of theoretico-political biases (the fantasies of purity, rationalism, positivism, unmediated representation, etc.), both on the left and on the right. What I am trying to show in my book is that the scandal (both the aversion and the mystique) disappears as soon as we employ a reflexive understanding of political life taking into account the importance of discourse (affectively invested meaning-making practices with material implications), its performative articulation and the emotional dynamics it involves, and its continuous interaction with negativity and impurity.
The phenomenon of populism indicates a type of politics characteristic of representative democratic antagonism.
Now, whether all that should be debated as “populism” or as something else is an open question. Certainly, at least in most cases, I don’t think it should be debated under the rubric of “extremism” or any kind of pathologizing jargon as it belongs to a field closer to the multiple choreographies of representation and to the exact shape that salient distributions and interactions between unequal economic and socio-political positionalities (for example, the many and the few, democratic and oligarchic dynamics) acquire within political modernity.
Of course, most scholars are not outright rejecting the term “populism.” Rather, it seems like other concepts have just become more popular for discussing today’s far-right: concepts like authoritarianism, fascism, or, of course, illiberalism. In a sense, the academic mood has caught up with your argument that far-right movements are primarily nationalist and only secondarily populist. Why is this differentiation important? Could you walk us through your view that “populism proper” is necessarily inclusive?
Precisely because populist articulations rely on the re-activation of the promise of “popular sovereignty” and aim at the mobilization of a collective subject—“the people”—able to voice frustrations from the operation of the representative system, a quick historical and comparative overview amply demonstrates that the global populist canon has been diachronically egalitarian and largely progressive and pro-democratic. The American populists of the 1890s, who claimed the term “populist” for themselves attributing to it a positive connotation, provide an emblematic case in point.
From this point of view, the (often exclusive) identification of populism with the far-right is largely based on the ignorance and arrogance, to quote Comer Vann Woodward, of certain parts of the elite and intellectuals, who refrain from doing their proper homework, for whatever reason. Of course, there is no normative copyright regulating the use of signifiers like “popular sovereignty” and “the people” in everyday politics; in addition, no one guarantees that they are always used in a sincere and consistent fashion (something affecting, of course, all ideological families). And thus, far-right movements and parties have increasingly utilized them, first and primarily in Europe and then internationally, although their ideological profile is inconsistent—if not outright hostile—towards popular empowerment and democratic participation. Operating, even unconsciously, from within a more or less Eurocentric intellectual horizon has allowed certain scholars to elevate this European (rather idiosyncratic) displacement into the ideal-type of all populism(s).
At any rate, formulating and utilizing clear and robust criteria could help us determine if the discourse employed by a given leader, movement and/or party under examination is populist or not and to what degree. Here, people-centrism and anti-elitism constitute our two minimal criteria, two dimensions that need to be simultaneously present to qualify something as “populist.” But then, as soon as we can conclude that our case is populist, we need to enquire as to the type of populism at work. The importance of typology is paramount. It is very useful thus to ask: (1) What exactly do you mean when you refer to “the people”? Who belongs?, and (2) What type of antagonism, what form of dichotomic frontier, is predominantly shaping your rhetoric against the elite? What elite? Who is the adversary?
Operating, even unconsciously, from within a more or less Eurocentric intellectual horizon has allowed certain scholars to elevate this European (rather idiosyncratic) [far-right co-optation of populist signifiers] into the ideal-type of all populism(s).
When “the people” is considered as an open-ended, inclusionary, and receptive type of collectivity in the making, to which new frustrated groups and identifications can be added (operating as Laclau’s “empty signifier,” a signifier without a fixed signified, constructing a potentially long chain uniting and linking diverse political demands), then we are likely dealing with (predominantly inclusionary, democratic) populism tout court. When, however, “the people” operates as a signifier attached to a supposedly foundational signification presupposing significant exclusions (like blood, race, the nation, etc.), then, in most cases, populism is secondary, peripheral and/or instrumental, usually a mere reference in the service of nationalist and nativist political projects. Along similar lines, when the central dichotomy espoused is vertical (the establishment up there vs. the people, the underdog, down there), we are mostly dealing with something consistent with the populist egalitarian canon. Inversely, when a horizontal dichotomy predominates (ingroup vs. outgroup designated in ethnic and/or nativist terms) then we are likely dealing with a predominantly nationalist project. Needless to say, populist-nationalist hybrids also exist.
We always ask guests how useful they find the concept of “illiberalism” to be. I think this question is especially interesting, given your argument about how the “people” constructed by far-right parties is never really opposed to an “established power bloc.” Does the illiberalism frame perhaps suggest such an Other for the far-right? A global system of bureaucrats, cultural and multilateral institutions, and cosmopolitan urban populations whose interests are orthogonal to those of the “people”? More broadly, do you think “illiberalism” is a useful term? Do populist discourses overlap more with illiberal ones than they do with nationalist ones?
The concept of “illiberalism” could be useful when it is used to help us acknowledge that populism may indicate a political project that pays more attention to the democratic component of liberal democracy (popular sovereignty, majority rule) rather than to the liberal one (for example, rights). From this point of view, when scholars like Cas Mudde and Takis Pappas discuss populism as “illiberal democracy” or “democratic illiberalism,” I think they capture something worthy of attention. However, vis-à-vis populism, I don’t think that we should confuse this illiberalism with an outright anti-pluralist or authoritarian stance. In most cases, populists are not against rights and the rule of law. They are certainly not against pluralism; on the contrary, they can be seen as agents of pluralization. Their projects are largely targeting the “liberalism” that has acted as an ideological veil for the post-democratic or even anti-democratic (oligarchic) avalanche that has dominated the global political sphere in recent decades, facilitating the establishment of market societies regulated by market sovereignty and resulting in what Peter Mair called “the hollowing of western democracy.” And here the global system you describe becomes relevant. At any rate, the sequence of events is rather clear and it has prepared the ground for the outright authoritarian trend we are currently experiencing globally.
[In most cases, populists] can be seen as agents of pluralization. Their projects are largely targeting the “liberalism” that has acted as an ideological veil for the […] anti-democratic avalanche that has dominated the global political sphere in recent decades.
In most cases, populist mobilizations constitute a crying call to return to the basics of liberal democracy, to repair a representative system that has been hijacked on the way. From this point of view, employing a critique of such projects premised on a conceptualization of “illiberalism” may act as a corrective when minority rights, for example, are threatened by the pernicious polarization that can ensue in the hegemonic struggles between “liberalism” and “populism” when these are constructed as completely antithetical political and cultural camps. Obviously, both these political orientations are important and modern democracy has flourished on the basis of the agonistic choreography between the two, when the latter permitted further democratization.
In order to restore such a dynamic equilibrium—if this is still possible, which is debatable—we need to move beyond the essentialization and idealization of both sides and the ensuing demonization of the adversary. That would also mean moving beyond any idealization of liberalism, resisting the exclusive identification of democracy with liberalism, and stopping to ignore the legitimate grievances and demands of excluded sectors in our increasingly techno-feudalist conjuncture. If the concept of “illiberalism” can be used within such a framework, indicating, for example, that parts of the liberal apparatus are still important to safeguard pluralism, then it could be useful. If not, if it is utilized as an ideological weapon in political and academic life, stigmatizing legitimate criticisms of the economic and political excesses of supposedly liberal hegemonies, then many reservations arise.
This also raises questions about the link between populism and liberalism. You write that the populist demand for “popular sovereignty” emerges from—but is also limited by—the discourses of liberal democracy: at its core, populism is “a call to honour promises given in the past.” Could you explain this in more detail? With liberalism in crisis globally, is populism radical enough or is it too constrained by its idealization of liberal democracy? As people lose faith in the very possibility of liberal democracy’s “legitimizing notions,” is there a risk that the democratic optimism of inclusive populism becomes less attractive?
Both the promise and the limitations of populism may stem from its parasitic status vis-à-vis modern (liberal, constitutional, representative) democracy. If the promise of “popular sovereignty” was given in order to stabilize the social contract following a series of struggles in the last few centuries, we need perhaps to acknowledge that populist-style movements speaking “in the name of the people” have been instrumental in “humanizing” capitalism and “democratizing” liberalism, so to speak—at least to some extent. From this point of view, populism is, arguably, an ally of liberal democracy. Without such pressures, liberalism could degenerate back into its oligarchic past. This opens the door to authoritarianism. Then, not only will the liberal democratic agonistic consensus suffer, but eventually liberalism itself, at least in its more progressive forms.
During the last few decades, many liberals thought that it was possible to have a vibrant liberal democracy without the people, which—directly or indirectly—legitimized authoritarian trends through the implicit development of a “hatred of democracy,” in Rancière’s words. Having idealized liberalism at the expense of democracy, ignoring the many inequalities, injustices and even global atrocities produced by perceiving liberalism in quasi-religious, end-of-history terms—thus unleashing a multitude of neo-colonial/Eurocentric tendencies as well as brutal marketization and plutocratic forces (the association here is to the operation of capitalism as religion, highlighted by Walter Benjamin)—some liberals seem now to externalize all threats to liberal democracy, projecting them onto the “populist scandal” seen as a wholly irrational anomaly, which attacks liberal democracy from the outside.
Having idealized liberalism at the expense of democracy, ignoring the many inequalities, injustices and even global atrocities produced by perceiving liberalism, […] some liberals seem now to externalize all threats to liberal democracy, projecting them onto the “populist scandal” seen as a wholly irrational anomaly, which attacks liberal democracy from the outside.
In addition, with populism delegitimized by its liberal demonization and with many liberal forces accepting the mainstreaming of a potentially authoritarian modus operandi in economics and in politics or both (for example, ordoliberalism), now authoritarianism—having co-opted populist tendencies, left free-floating by the liberal attacks, in order to turn them against democracy and egalitarianism—is also attacking liberalism, which enters a deep crisis. This is part of our current predicament, and it is hard to imagine how democratization will manage to survive and radicalize itself.
It is not unlikely, however, that in the long run, discrepancies and contradictions will emerge in the authoritarian techno-feudalist co-optation of populism and eventually a new political cycle may emerge if democratic populism manages to inspire collective action against the autocratic, individualizing and cynical tendencies currently hegemonic. Will then liberals realize that populism constitutes a potential ally, will they be able to move beyond their dislocated self-idealizations into a popular-fronts strategic coalition? I am afraid that past experience is rather indicating that they may largely opt for a suicidal quietism benefitting autocracy, allowing a further consolidation of what Max Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School had described as the “racket society” model. Obviously, resisting this trend and the incorporation into emerging racketeering-style hierarchies of domination (and the fascist passions they often promote) is, today, a challenge for everyone, for all social and political sectors and groupings, domestically and internationally.
You write that populism does not just happen in parties, but can be expressed anywhere, including in cultural spheres; for example, in another paper, you discuss populist messages in Greek rap music. The link between cultural practices and political movements is a big interest for the Illiberalism Studies Program, so I want to go a bit deeper here. Do you see a difference in the content of specifically populist art and other, still political, types? What role does such cultural production play in building and sustaining a populist moment? Can far-right movements, with their only partial populisms, every truly command this force?
Obviously politics does not constitute a secluded terrain isolated from social and cultural dynamics. There is a continuous back and forth movement mutually constituting these fields. If political messages and especially mobilization calls are to become appealing, they need to incorporate the energy and the signifying materials originating from other spheres. Gramsci already knew that and today there is a booming bibliography on political and democratic art.
This is also the case with populism. Populist projects often incorporate culturally mediated grievances initially surfacing through the performativity of popular songs and other forms of artistic and broader cultural practices. In that sense, cultural representations of “high”/“low” antagonisms (Ostiguy) often constitute pre-populist or proto-populist instantiations that could potentially acquire stricto sensu political meanings as well.
In the recent paper you mention, we examined how rap music performances in Greece have articulated such affectively invested (oppositional) meaning structures during the period around the pandemic. Against the background of anti-populist governance and with a fragmented opposition unable to put forward dynamic forms of political contestation, rap performances were perhaps the only public socio-cultural practices articulating a quasi-populist political message doubting the status quo and earning significant salience on this basis. It remains to be seen whether this will have implications for the political terrain itself, which is currently in a state of flux.
Needless to say, such practices are also open to reactionary political forces because there is no way to limit the scope of socio-cultural dynamics in advance, to restrict the various displacements that could occur in this field, as well as their antithetical political implications. Such contingent re-significations constitute an ever-present danger both in politics and in the choreographies of cultural hegemony and contestation; but they also constitute perhaps our only hope during this era of failing certainties and escalating fears.
Yannis Stavrakakis is Professor of Political Discourse Analysis at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, where he is currently directing the Laboratory for the Study of Democracy (DemLab) and the Postgraduate Programme in Political Theory (both at the School of Political Sciences). In the last period, he edited the Routledge Handbook of Psychoanalytic Political Theory (New York: Routledge, 2020) and co-edited the Research Handbook on Populism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2024). His most recent monograph is Populist Discourse: Recasting Populism Research (New York: Routledge, 2024).
