Arnaud, thank you for joining us. Your book Les Lumières sombres, soon to be out in English with Polity, seeks to describe “neo-reactionary thought.” What led you to take an interest in this movement, and what, in your view, is the purpose of your book?
My interest in neo-reactionary thought originates from my doctoral research, where I studied contemporary discourses of decadence under the supervision of Professor Julie Saada at Sciences Po.
My thesis demonstrated that an imaginary of decadence, expressed through a set of recurring metaphors, emerged within the reactionary tradition of what is often (and somewhat euphemistically) referred to as the “Conservative Revolution,” particularly with thinkers such as Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, and Julius Evola. The central argument of my work was that these metaphors of decadence circulated far beyond this reactionary milieu; they could also be found, somewhat unexpectedly, in French left-wing thought from the 1970s to the 1990s, in authors such as Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Jacques Derrida. In other words, my research traced the circulation of this imaginary of decadence across ideological boundaries.
Metaphors of decadence circulated far beyond [the] reactionary milieu; they could also be found […] in French left-wing thought […], in authors such as Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Jacques Derrida
In the final part of my dissertation, I turned to more contemporary expressions of this imaginary. I initially intended to examine currents that are relatively well studied in political science, such as the French Nouvelle Droite, before focusing instead on a much less explored phenomenon: anglophone neo-reactionary thought. What particularly drew my attention was the intellectual trajectory of Nick Land. His path seemed to invert the dynamic I had previously identified: whereas I had studied the diffusion of reactionary motifs into critical theory, Land moved in the opposite direction—from a Deleuzian background in the 1990s to explicitly pro-capitalist and eventually reactionary positions in the 2000s. Land’s encounter with the writings of Curtis Yarvin, notably in in his essay series The Dark Enlightenment, is what led me to begin studying neo-reactionary texts.
I defended my dissertation at the end of 2024, at a moment when the ideas of the Neo-Reactionary movement (NRx) were beginning to gain wider visibility, notably through their resonance in certain proposals associated with Donald Trump, such as those made by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). I then decided to write this book as an introductory study aimed at providing readers with conceptual tools to understand this emerging intellectual current. More broadly, this ideological phenomenon coincided with what appears to be a striking convergence between the tech world and Trumpism.
The purpose of the book is therefore twofold. First, it seeks to offer a clear and systematic account of the content of neo-reactionary thought. Second, it aims to open up avenues for further research into what I see as a new and striking phenomenon: the digital production and circulation of political ideas.
Do you consider the growing scholarly focus on NRx and its leading figures to be useful or satisfactory? Why do you think earlier research paid them less attention? We can see that Curtis Yarvin is attracting increasing attention today—do you think this is warranted given his influence on neo-reactionary thought, or does such personalization obscure the complexity and heterogeneity of this intellectual current?
From the perspective of academic research, I believe we are still only at the very beginning of the study of neo-reactionary thought. When I first became interested in this current in the early 2020s, the secondary literature was extremely fragmented and limited. Most of the existing sources were journalistic, highly critical, or openly partisan. There was no comprehensive study that seriously addressed both the modes of production of this ideology and its theoretical content.
It is important to emphasize Yarvin’s dependence on other key figures, such as Peter Thiel and Marc Andreessen, who have been the economic promotors of his ideological project since the early 2010s.
The question of the personalization of this current around Curtis Yarvin is therefore an important one. His role in both the foundation and the subsequent visibility of these ideas is undeniable. However, as I try to show in the book, he is far from embodying the full complexity of this constellation on his own. When the movement becomes more and more organized, in the years 2012-2013, Yarvin does not play an active role. For this reason, neo-reaction should never be reduced to a form of “Yarvinism.” The centrality he enjoys today likely stems, in part, from the fact that he has distanced himself from the pseudonymity that characterizes many actors within the neo-reactionary milieu. In this respect, his trajectory differs significantly from that of Nick Land, who, on the contrary, has tended to obscure his own notoriety through the use of pseudonyms.
Moreover, it is important to emphasize Yarvin’s dependence on other key figures, such as Peter Thiel and Marc Andreessen, who have been the economic promotors of his ideological project since the early 2010s.
Regarding the debate over the “philosophical” character of these texts, should they be treated as “classical” political theory, or does one need a specific hermeneutic framework, for instance, to account for practices such as trolling and the use of memes?
This is one of the most interesting aspects of studying the neo-reactionary constellation. These are not conventional texts: they are produced by pseudonymous bloggers who make extensive use of irony and write in a style that blends classical references with elements of geek culture. This originality even extends to the production of doctrine itself. In the book, I emphasize a point that struck me during my investigation: in 2013, following the publication of Nick Land’s series, and within the space of just a few weeks, we witness an explosion of neo-reactionary accounts which— in a completely decentralized manner—work together to define a shared theoretical foundation.
This phenomenon suggests that we are dealing with a new mode of production of political ideas in the age of the internet. It therefore requires us to adapt our methods to the networked and uncoordinated character of ideational production and circulation. This is precisely what I am currently working on: developing the epistemological foundations of a digital history of political ideas. Such an approach must combine a hermeneutics specific to the internet, taking into account practices such as trolling or the use of memes, with network analysis, which in turn requires bringing together methods from digital ethnography and computational tools.
We are dealing with a new mode of production of political ideas in the age of the internet [which] requires us to adapt our methods to the networked and uncoordinated character of ideational production and circulation.
That being said, one may still question the place that should be granted to these ideas within the canon of political philosophy. As a historian of political thought, I believe it is important to avoid two pitfalls when dealing with neo-reactionary authors. The first would be to take them too seriously—that is to treat them only as philosophers. Their normative claims cannot be considered in isolation from the broader economic and political enterprises they support. In this respect, I understand my work as an ideological analysis of a larger phenomenon, which can be interpreted, following Arnaud Orain, as an imperial recomposition of capitalism, or, following Marlène Laruelle, as part of a global illiberal project.
The second pitfall would be not to take them seriously enough, on the grounds that they are merely bloggers. Recent developments in the history of political ideas have shown the importance of studying the role of minores—small, obscure, and public-facing actors—in the production and circulation of concepts. I believe the case of neo-reactionary bloggers demonstrates that we cannot limit ourselves to studying minores only when they promote ideas we find pleasant.
A major issue today is understanding the rightward shift and the spread of illiberalism across liberal democracies. Your book clearly highlights the importance of the libertarian legacy in the thought of neo-reactionary thinkers (with a few exceptions), which leads me to the following question: to what extent does neo-reactionary thought break with conservative fusionism and libertarianism, in your view? At what point, in your opinion, does one move from libertarianism to post-libertarianism?
You are right to emphasize the importance of the libertarian origins of neo-reaction. It seems to me that libertarianism, along with technological accelerationism, is what constitutes its originality within the long history of reaction, and what justifies the use of the prefix “neo.” While one can say that this current emerges in 2007 with the publication of Yarvin’s Formalist Manifesto, it is also the product of an internal evolution within libertarian thought.
More specifically, neo-reaction appears to be rooted in paleolibertarianism. Sébastien Caré has shown how this tendency took shape around Murray Rothbard in the 1990s, in response to the failure of fusionism under Reagan, and with the aim of incorporating cultural conservatism into libertarian doctrine itself. This was accompanied by a defense of anti-democratic secessionism, which culminates in Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Democracy: The God That Failed in 2001. In this work, Hoppe advocates for anarcho-capitalism, but also argues that monarchy is a superior regime to democracy. Although he ultimately remains within a libertarian framework, he clearly prepares the ground for the neo-reactionary turn of the 2000s.
Neo-reaction, in my view, is best understood as part of a post-libertarian framework: while it acknowledges its intellectual inheritance, it also argues that libertarianism must be surpassed through new political forms. Yarvin’s 2010 text, From Mises to Rothbard, is a good illustration of this shift. I should also stress an important point: this current is certainly not liberal, nor neoliberal. The model promoted by Peter Thiel is one of a capitalism of conquest and predation, in contrast to the competitive capitalism he openly disdains. This break is clearly visible in his 2014 book Zero to One.
[The Neo-Reactionary movement] is […] not liberal, nor neoliberal. The model […] is one of a capitalism of conquest and predation.
Finally, in your chapter “A Cartography of the American Right,” you argue that there has been an “ideological recomposition of Trumpism around neo-reactionary thought.” What, in your view, are the manifestations of this recomposition? You also devote significant attention to post-liberal thought in the book—are there not potential tensions or contradictions between the latter and neo-reactionary thought (or at least between some of its thinkers)? I am thinking, in particular, of the fantasy of a “post-political” world, which has been vigorously criticized by Adrian Vermeule.
From my perspective, Trump’s second term is characterized by a composite alliance between three ideological poles: the alt-right (which embodies the national-populist strand that was decisive during the 2016 campaign), post-liberalism (which reflects a radicalization of religious conservatism), and neo-reaction (with which part of the tech elite have aligned themselves). Of course, these categories are heuristic, but they are useful precisely because they allow us to identify potential lines of fracture within the governing coalition.
The lines of fracture in this alliance are quite clear: the opposition between populism and elitism, which became visible during the controversy surrounding the “Epstein list”; the tension between isolationism and imperialism, particularly salient today in light of the interventions in Venezuela and Iran; the divide between bioethical conservatism and transhumanist accelerationism; the issue of immigration, especially concerning highly skilled engineers; and, of course, the question of antisemitism.
In my book, I emphasize the specific nature of neo-reaction in its relationship to politics. Its goal is the complete destruction of politics as an autonomous sphere—understood as a domain of uncertainty and therefore inefficiency. That said, this fantasy of this post-political world is, of course, not shared by all factions within Trumpism.
Arnaud Miranda holds a PhD in political theory from the CEVIPOF (Sciences Po) and is a postdoctoral researcher attached to the Tech-ILL program (Inalco). As a specialist in the history of contemporary political thought, his current research focuses on the digital circulation of neo-reactionary ideas. He has recently published a book entitled Les Lumières sombres (Gallimard, 2026).
