The Right reaffirmed its political dominance in Ecuador with the victory of Daniel Noboa, candidate for the National Democratic Action party (ADN), in the April 13 presidential elections. Noboa did so categorically by winning 55.63 percent of the vote—11 points more (1.3 million votes) than his rival, Luisa Gonzalez, the candidate of the Citizen Revolution Movement (RC5). A triumph of such magnitude was not anticipated after the virtual tie in the first electoral round (4.53 million votes for Noboa against 4.51 million for Gonzalez). With a close election anticipated in the runoff and a chance of any of the two candidates to emerge as a winner with narrow margins, Noboa’s impressive victory came as a surprise.
The surprising result was the consequence of the wide mobilization of the right wing after the tie in the first round. The entire political structure of President Noboa and his movement (ADN), the institutional network of the executive’s power, and multiple formal and informal networks of conservative-oriented society were activated in anticipation of a potential return to power for the RC5, whose top figure remains former President Rafael Correa, now exiled in Belgium after being sentenced to 8 years in prison on corruption charges. This broad mobilization was also aided by the mistakes of the González’s campaign: she never hid her sympathies for the autocratic regime of Nicolás Maduro, with which she maintains close political ties; she promised to return to a model of social protection without questioning the excesses of the state and the populist model of political management, with its concentration of power, authoritarian drifts, and long shadow of corruption; and she was unable to embody the image of a ruler who would act autonomously in the event of a presidential triumph. For most voters, González represented a political chip managed by the exiled Correa without a political personality of her own, who was aggressive in her attacks on President Noboa, whom RC5 and some of its allies accuse of being a neo-fascist.
Two Decades of Polarization and Coming Challenges
Noboa’s wide victory could potentially break the ideological polarization that Ecuador has been immersed in since 2007, when Correa came to power. The leftist president imposed populist antagonism as a logic of political action; that is, he constituted himself as a charismatic leader who mobilizes the popular will—the people—against the elites and the political parties. This was done in order to lead the country toward a post-neoliberal model with elements of the so-called socialism of the 21st century. Correa maintained enormous popularity during his 10 years as president, but his movement split between two irreconcilable camps in 2017. Since then, the movement has been defeated by right-wing candidates in three consecutive elections, two by narrow margins (2021 and 2024) and in 2025 by a very wide margin.
Noboa’s wide victory could potentially break the ideological polarization that Ecuador has been immersed in since 2007.
Former president Correa’s logic, and that of his opponents, configured an irreconcilable cleavage between two forces—correístas and anti-correístas—which broke any space for communication and civic coexistence.
To respond to this left-wing populism and its re-foundational policies, a right wing emerged that used anti-populism as its main strategy to reconstitute itself as a political actor. Both Correa’s logic and that of his opponents configured an irreconcilable cleavage between two forces—correístas and anti-correístas—which broke any space for communication and civic coexistence. The two forces see their opponents as a threat to their own existence and believe that Ecuador would be better off if the other disappeared. In this polarizing logic, both forces moved away from a pluralistic and tolerant sense in which a democratic horizon could operate. Mistrust, mutual boycott, closed disputes, a lack of respect for rules, and the capture of political institutions, especially their justice and control functions, were imposed in the political game. Polarization has persistently deteriorated democratic coexistence and citizens’ trust and confidence in institutions.
While RC5 appears as a defeated movement today with deep internal disagreements, a movement unable to mobilize its social base in support of its accusations of fraud in the last elections, and one forced to reinvent itself (if possible) without the leadership of Rafael Correa, Noboa too faces enormous challenges even from his victorious position. Perhaps the most challenging (and at the same time, promising) task for President Noboa will be the consolidation of ADN as a party that unites all the forces of the right wing. This process already took place in part during the last election. In the first electoral round of February 9, ADN captured all the votes of Ecuador’s scattered and fragmented right-wing parties (Christian Social Party, Creating Opportunities, and Actuemos) and united them around Noboa’s leadership.
The mobilization in the runoff allowed him to increase his vote share in the second round by 1.3 million votes compared to the increase of 170,000 for his rival, Gonzalez. ADN was able to win in several provinces where González had triumphed in the first round. Its victory in 19 of the 24 provinces of the country, with a particularly notable strength in those of the highlands—the Andean region—where it obtained between 61 and 78 percent of the votes, shows its political strength. The number of assembly members of the party increased from 16 to 66 between 2024 and 2025. Only 36 years old, Noboa emerges as the only strong leader on the right. He has managed to overcome what had been impossible in the last four decades: a successful change of leadership that leaves behind the permanent confrontation between the multiple figures that emerged to represent it.
Party Construction in Ecuador or More Caudillismo?
Consolidating a strong political party, with cadres and organizational structure, would imply overcoming the caudillista inclination of political leaders in Ecuador, who end up seeing themselves as irreplaceable. Noboa comes from the upper class of Guayaquil, from where all the strong right-wing leaders of the last 40 years have emerged. His family amassed an immense fortune from banana exports through his grandfather, Luis Noboa Naranjo, a highly respected figure among the Guayaquil elite. His father, Alvaro Noboa, was a presidential candidate five times, each time rivaling the other leaders of the establishment. He acted alone, confident in his immense business power. He lost all five times. The political vocation of Guayaquil’s business groups has an oligarchic nature: they form a class that concentrates economic wealth and social status, rife with rivalries and intrigues among themselves; they exercise their authority in a hierarchical and tutelary way over the poor social sectors; they understand the elites as a natural group of domination, and tend to project their influence and will over the institutions and legal frameworks of society without subjecting themselves to general rules.
Consolidating a strong political party, with cadres and organizational structure, would imply overcoming the caudillista inclination of political leaders in Ecuador.
In light of this, it is not surprising, for example, that Noboa offered a message to the country after the results of the runoff election were announced from his home on the beach, together with his mother, who will be an assembly member, and his wife. This image is far removed from that of a party leader who brings together the organization’s leaders to show a structure prepared and ready to govern. In these almost 15 months as president, Noboa showed signs of managing the state from a patrimonialist logic, without differentiating between the bureaucratic or public and the private. Many of his cabinet officials have been loaned to the public service by companies belonging to the Noboa group, the majority are trusted friends without party affiliation, or public officials with a modest history of public service. In many ways, he has improvised public management, failing to show a clear vision of where he wants to lead the state.
With a clearer popular mandate and the greater social force accumulated at the ballot box, Noboa’s challenge is to inaugurate a political project for Ecuador that goes beyond the anti-populist strategy of the last decade.
These shortcomings could be attributed to his unexpected triumph in the 2024 election, to his youth, and to the fact that he was appointed president for a period of only 15 months after the early elections called by his predecessor, the conservative banker Guillermo Lasso. With a clearer popular mandate and the greater social force accumulated at the ballot box, Noboa’s challenge is to inaugurate a political project for Ecuador that goes beyond the anti-populist strategy of the last decade. Until now, that position has consisted of demonizing Correa as a corrupt and authoritarian caudillo, demobilizing the popular sectors, and vindicating the role of elites in the social and political life of the country. The strategy has served to contain correísmo in the elections, but not to govern or to set Ecuador on a clear path towards a desired horizon. A crucial issue for the government will be to dynamize the economy’s growth through private capital investment and job creation. Between 2017 and 2024, governments elected on an anti-Correa line have emphasized fiscal adjustment to correct the imbalances caused by the expansionary policies of the previous period (from 2007 to 2017). The argument has been to put the house in order as a condition for healthy and sustained economic growth. But the promise to replace public investment with private investment has not been fulfilled, and the economy shows signs of stagnation. Last year, GDP declined by 2.0%.
Ecuador’s right wing has questioned the post-neoliberal model inaugurated by the Citizen Revolution Movement between 2007 and 2017, but has not proposed anything substantive beyond calls to replace it.
The return to structural adjustment policies was accompanied by a critique of state activism and the left’s redistributive policies. Ecuador’s right wing has questioned the post-neoliberal model inaugurated by the Citizen Revolution Movement between 2007 and 2017, but has not proposed anything substantive beyond calls to replace it. In practice, their position generates a vacuum of state capacity that affects the government’s ability to manage such sensitive issues as security, energy provision, maintenance of public infrastructure, and the quality of social services. Nor does their discourse indicate a convincing political concern about poverty and inequality, aggravated since 2017. One of the legacies of the RC5 was the establishment of the idea that democracy implies a distribution of social power to close the gaps between classes and social groups. Post-correístas governments, on the other hand, associate democracy with the overcoming of populism, the reestablishment of political freedoms, and the independent functioning of the institutional powers of the political regime. But this proposal has been overwhelmed by the confrontation between correístas and anti-correístas to control political institutions, attack their rivals, and safeguard their positions within the political system.
Managing Violence, Insecurity, and Rule of Law in Ecuador
The picture is made more confusing by the violence associated with organized crime, and drug trafficking as its main expression. Since 2020, Ecuador has experienced a dizzying, unstoppable increase in intentional homicides. The rate rose from 7.8 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 2020 to 46.2 in 2023. In January 2024, President Noboa’s government declared a state of “internal armed conflict” and intensified the fight against 21 designated terrorist groups, all linked to drug trafficking. Although the initiative reduced violent deaths to 38.8 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2024, in the first quarter of 2025 there was a new surge. In the span of just five years, many cities in Ecuador have become among the most unsafe in Latin America. Violence has led to horrific massacres in prisons, filled city streets with murders, and sowed distrust and fear among citizens. The violence has led to authoritarian policies to reestablish public order, which raises questions about the rule of law. From 2019 to 2023, 39 state of emergency decrees were issued. The most violent provinces, many of them located on the Ecuadorian coast, have lived under an almost permanent state of emergency since 2024.
In the span of just five years, many cities in Ecuador have become among the most unsafe in Latin America. The violence has led to authoritarian policies to re-establish public order.
Against this backdrop, the Constitutional Court criticized President Noboa’s argument that an “internal armed conflict” was the reason for declaring continuous states of emergency. Military and police operations tend to be concentrated in poor, marginal areas of the most dangerous cities, with warrantless raids on homes. There are reports of operations involving up to 500 police and army personnel, with dozens of young people detained in each of them. Drug violence erodes confidence in governmental efficacy, increases institutional corruption, and generates an environment of impunity with a cornered justice system. Furthermore, it becomes a political weapon. In the last electoral campaign, drug trafficking was used by both candidates to destroy the image of their opponents.
It is up to the newly dominant right wing to show its political capacity and implement a state project that provides reasonable, balanced, equanimous, centrist answers to the multiple complex problems that plague the country.
The clear predominance of the right wing after the last elections marks, undoubtedly, a deep turn in the Ecuadorian political scene. The triumph clearly demonstrates how weary most Ecuadorians are of the leadership structure and worn-out project of Correísmo, the great loser of the electoral process. It is up to the newly dominant right wing to show its political capacity and implement a state project that provides reasonable, balanced, equanimous, centrist answers to the multiple complex problems that plague the country in a climate of democratic respect.
Felipe Burbano de Lara is a research professor in the Department of Sociology and Gender Studies at FLACSO-Ecuador. He has directed several master’s and doctoral programs there and served as its director from 2020 to 2024. His areas of research include populism, state transformations, and democratization in Latin America. He has collaborated with various media outlets as a political analyst. He is currently working on a project on anti-populism in Latin America.
Image made by the Illiberalism Studies Program using “CONTINUACIÓN DE LA SESIÓN NO. 767 DEL PLENO DE LA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL. ECUADOR, 14 DE ABRIL DE 2022 (52004972820),” by Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic; “Rafael Correa,” by The Left licensed under CC Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic. Any other images used are in the public domain or otherwise free to use and remix.
