The election of Karol Nawrocki, who was backed by the illiberal and national conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, as President of Poland in June 2025 is likely to hinder the efforts of Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s coalition government to repair democratic institutions. It may also strain Poland’s relations with the European Union. Nawrocki’s electoral victory was secured with support from voters affiliated with PiS, which was responsible for Poland’s democratic backsliding between 2015 and 2023, as well as from voters who supported far-right candidates in the first round of the election in May. While Poland is a parliamentary democracy, the presidency carries important powers, including the ability to veto legislation. Today’s governing coalition does not hold the supermajority in Parliament needed to override a presidential veto, and it is therefore expected that one of Nawrocki’s goals will be to paralyze the work of the Tusk government and pave the way for a PiS victory in the 2027 parliamentary elections.
The Campaign and Electoral Context
For many months leading up to the presidential election, the frontrunner in the polls was Rafał Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw and a vice president of the center-right Civic Platform (PO), led by Prime Minister Tusk. Trzaskowski won the highest vote share in the first round (31%) but narrowly lost in the runoff on June 1 to Karol Nawrocki, who secured 50.89% of the vote. A relatively unknown figure prior to the campaign, Nawrocki ran as a formal independent but was effectively supported by PiS and its leader Jarosław Kaczyński. Previously, Nawrocki headed the state-run Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), tasked with overseeing the state’s official historical policy.
Many voters who had supported the government’s coalition in 2023 expressed frustration over unfulfilled campaign promises and visible internal divisions.
Several key factors contributed to Nawrocki’s victory. First and foremost, dissatisfaction with the Tusk government, which was formed in December 2023 by a four-party “pro-democratic” coalition: Civic Platform, the centrist Poland2050, the conservative agrarian Polish People’s Party (PSL), and the Left. By June 2025, 47% of respondents viewed Tusk’s government unfavorably, a higher disapproval rating than the PiS-led government of Mateusz Morawiecki had in October 2023 before it was defeated at the polls. Importantly, many voters who had supported the government’s coalition in 2023 expressed frustration over unfulfilled campaign promises and visible internal divisions, particularly on contentious issues such as abortion rights, civil partnerships, LGBT protections, housing, and taxation. Judicial reform, a core priority, has also been obstructed by President Andrzej Duda, who referred key legislation on the National Council of the Judiciary and the Constitutional Tribunal to a politically captured Constitutional Tribunal, blocking their implementation. Within 18 months of the coalition taking office, President Duda had vetoed six additional laws.
Second, Trzaskowski’s campaign made strategic missteps. Progressive voters within the coalition’s base were disillusioned by the conservative messaging. For instance, on the issue of Ukrainian refugees. Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Poland had hosted approximately 1.5 million economic migrants from Ukraine. After the war began, millions of refugees arrived in Poland and received extensive public support. Although many have since left, around one million remain registered and have access to healthcare, education, employment, and social benefits. However, public support for hosting refugees declined from 94% in March 2022 to 54% in September 2024. Far-right parties seized on this shift, promoting narratives that Ukrainian refugees are overburdening public services. During the campaign, both PiS and the far-right Confederation party advocated for cutting refugee benefits. Trzaskowski, for his part, supported conditioning the child benefit (800+) to Ukrainian children on whether or not their parents were working and paying taxes in Poland. Moreover, in contrast to the 2023 parliamentary campaign, Trzaskowski’s campaign did little to mobilize young female voters, a key demographic that had previously helped secure the coalition’s victory, particularly on the issue of abortion rights.
Trzaskowski’s campaign made strategic missteps. Progressive voters within the coalition’s base were dis-illusioned by the conservative messaging.
Third, there is growing fatigue among voters regarding the long-standing duopoly of Civic Platform and Law and Justice, two parties that have dominated Polish politics for over two decades. Anti-establishment sentiment has grown, particularly among voters aged 18–29, who gravitated toward far-right candidate Sławomir Mentzen and far-left candidate Adrian Zandberg—both younger, outspoken, and effective on social media. In the runoff, voters who had supported Mentzen or extreme right candidate Grzegorz Braun (of Confederation) overwhelmingly voted for Nawrocki. Focus groups suggest these voters were not necessarily endorsing PiS, but rather voting against Trzaskowski.
A fourth factor was the appeal of the populist “people versus elites” narrative and a desire for a strongman leader amid geopolitical instability. PiS selected a candidate capable of appealing to far-right voters, especially young men. Trzaskowski, a cosmopolitan polyglot from an artistic family in Warsaw, has long supported pro-EU policies and progressive reforms, including on LGBT rights and abortion. Nawrocki, by contrast, campaigned as a socially conservative Catholic nationalist, skeptical of the EU and committed to a hardline immigration stance. His working-class background and amateur boxing career resonated with key segments of the electorate despite scandals uncovered by the media. Nawrocki also received a boost from a photo-op with Donald Trump during a U.S. visit. Shortly before the election, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem publicly endorsed him at a CPAC event in Rzeszów, saying that he “needs to be the next president of Poland.”
The election results reflect broad public dissatisfaction with Tusk’s government and may signal the decline of both Civic Platform and Law and Justice as dominant political forces.
Thus, the election results reflect broad public dissatisfaction with Tusk’s government and may signal the decline of both Civic Platform and Law and Justice as dominant political forces. There is also a growing generational desire for political renewal. Although most Poles are enthusiastic about the EU, after over 20 years of EU membership, eurosceptical views have gained more traction. PiS and the far-right are openly criticizing EU migration and climate policies. In this respect, the Polish far-right narrative mirrors that of the far right in Western Europe’s EU member states (for example, the Alternative for Germany in Germany, or the National Rally in France).
Nawrocki’s Role as President
Karol Nawrocki will be sworn in on August 6, 2025, for a five-year term. Though Poland is a parliamentary democracy, the presidency holds significant symbolic and constitutional authority. The outcome of the presidential election has weakened Prime Minister Tusk’s position and deepened divisions within the governing coalition.
As commander-in-chief and a key player in national security policy, Nawrocki will assert influence in a country that is a NATO frontline state on the EU’s eastern border. In 2025, Poland allocated 4.7% of its GDP to defense, more than double NATO’s target. Defense spending enjoys broad cross-party consensus, and Poland remains a staunch U.S. ally. Nawrocki will likely use this platform to consolidate his political base and position PiS as a security-oriented alternative to the current government.
The president can veto legislation and refer laws to the Constitutional Tribunal, which has been politically captured by PiS since 2016. Like President Duda, Nawrocki is expected to block key elements of Tusk’s judicial reform agenda. The current coalition lacks the supermajority needed to override a veto, meaning it may be unable to pass foundational reforms. Tusk’s government has marginalized the Constitutional Tribunal and wants to reform it before electing new justices. However, by the end of 2025, there will be six vacant seats on the Tribunal, and two more in 2026. By September 2026, the current governing majority can appoint 8 of the 15 judges on the Constitutional Tribunal. Another priority is addressing flawed judicial appointments, especially to the Supreme Court. Although the Tusk government proposed a legislative fix before the presidential election, Nawrocki is expected to defend PiS-era judicial changes and refuse to sign any law questioning the legitimacy of judges appointed through politicized processes. However, the coalition will gain control of the National Council of the Judiciary in 2026, a key body for judicial appointments.
Like President Duda, Nawrocki is expected to block key elements of Tusk’s judicial reform agenda and to veto any liberal-ization of abortion laws or measures expanding LGBT rights.
Nawrocki is also likely to veto any liberalization of abortion laws or measures expanding LGBT rights. Poland does not recognize same-sex partnerships or marriages and lacks criminal code protections against homophobic hate speech. The Tusk government prepared a bill on civil partnerships that Nawrocki will likely veto. His predecessor, Duda, previously blocked a law reforming hate speech by referring it to the Constitutional Tribunal.
The president also holds the right to grant clemency, which Nawrocki could use to pardon PiS politicians or other figures facing legal scrutiny for abuses of power during 2015–2023. For example, at the end of his term, Duda controversially pardoned far-right nationalist leader Robert Bąkiewicz, convicted in 2023 for assaulting a female protester during 2020 demonstrations against abortion restriction.
As head of state in foreign relations, the president can block ambassadorial appointments proposed by the government and delay filling key EU posts, including Poland’s currently vacant seat on the EU’s top court, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This power has been emboldened by a 2023 law (passed by the Law and Justice government) that expanded presidential powers over key EU nominations.
Nawrocki has already announced a “legislative offensive,” including proposals to raise pensions and introduce tax breaks.
Nawrocki can also initiate legislation, which he may use to expose the Tusk government’s perceived inefficacy, especially in costly areas such as pensions or tax cuts. Nawrocki has already announced a “legislative offensive,” including proposals to raise pensions and introduce tax breaks. Poland’s recent years have seen surging social spending and defense investments, with plans underway for large infrastructure projects such as a new airport and nuclear power plants. Nawrocki will likely propose his own bills, with even higher expenditure, on those investments.
Although foreign policy is led by the Council of Ministers, the president plays a prominent role. Nawrocki will likely prioritize U.S.-Polish relations. While the Tusk government also highly values transatlantic ties, it simultaneously seeks to strengthen bonds with European allies.
Following PiS and far-right narratives, Nawrocki is expected to adopt a confrontational stance toward Germany, emphasizing historical grievances and migration issues. In 2022, the PiS government officially demanded World War II reparations from Germany, which Germany declined. Far-right parties such as Confederation accuse Germany of sending irregular migrants back to Poland. These are migrants who initially crossed from Belarus into the EU. Though the numbers involved are relatively small (in the hundreds), these claims have fueled anti-German sentiment, and migration in general remains a dominant political issue.
During the campaign, Nawrocki appealed to anti-Ukrainian sentiments by calling for reduced social benefits for Ukrainian refugees and adopting a hardline stance on contentious issues in Polish-Ukrainian historical memory. On July 10, the anniversary of the 1943–44 Volhynia massacres—considered genocide by Poland—Nawrocki demanded full-scale exhumations from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. While Ukraine allowed some exhumations to resume, the topic remains highly sensitive, especially since the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Poles during the massacre, is honored in Ukraine as a symbol of resistance to foreign occupation.
Outlook for Liberal Democracy in Poland
President Nawrocki’s election will significantly limit the Tusk government’s ability to fully enact democratic and rule-of-law reforms. The governing coalition, which had hoped for a Trzaskowski presidency, must now reassess its strategy regarding the Constitutional Tribunal and judicial appointments. This task was entrusted to the new Minister of Justice, Waldemar Żurek, a former judge who had defended the standards of the rule of law during the PiS government and was unlawfully persecuted for it. In a July government reshuffle, Żurek replaced Minister Adam Bodnar, who had been responsible for the first phase of the rule of law repair in Poland. Progress on abortion rights and LGBT protections is now unlikely.
This cohabitation will be turbulent, especially as Poland enters a new parliamentary campaign.
This cohabitation will be turbulent, especially as Poland enters a new parliamentary campaign. PiS and Confederation, emboldened by Nawrocki’s win, are confident of good electoral results in 2027. Both parties promote illiberal values: prioritizing executive power, national sovereignty over supranational cooperation, traditional gender roles, resistance to LGBT rights, and nationalist identity politics. The coming years will test whether the governing coalition can present a compelling and mobilizing alternative to the narrative offered by Law and Justice, Confederation, and other illiberal forces.
The coalition won in 2023 due to public fatigue with PiS, exacerbated by high inflation and tensions with the EU. Voters expected Tusk’s government to deliver. But for many months it was paralyzed by internal disputes, contributing to Civic Platform’s loss in the presidential race. Still, nothing is inevitable. The coalition is likely to persist until 2027, and two years is a long time in politics. It remains to be seen whether the Tusk government will be a mere interlude or the beginning of a sustained democratic renewal in Poland. Paradoxically, Nawrocki’s hardline presidency may galvanize voters who fear Viktor Orbán-style illiberalism in Poland, and this alone may revitalize the current coalition and offer opportunities for a genuine renewal. Time will tell if these opportunities present themselves and if the current coalition will be able to seize upon them.
It remains to be seen whether the Tusk government will be a mere interlude or the beginning of a sustained democratic renewal in Poland.
Dr. Anna Wójcik is an assistant professor at Kozminski University (Warsaw, Poland), and the Principle Investigator in the National Science-Centre-funded project on the EU media regulation and the rule of law. She co-founded the rule of law in Poland monitoring projects, The Wiktor Osiatyński Archive and the Rule of Law in Poland.
Image made using “001 Jarosław Kaczyński in 2023,” by Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland licensed under CC Attribution 3.0 Poland; “Donald Tusk presents EU summit conclusions for last time (48942190253),” by European Parliament licensed under CC Attribution 2.0 Generic; “01 Karol Nawrocki,” by Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland licensed under CC Attribution 3.0 Poland; “Rafal Trzaskowski 2020 Bytom,” by Adrian Tync licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International. All other images are in the public domain.
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