Giorgia Meloni, an Italian Trump?

Giorgia Meloni, an Italian Trump?

Marc Lazar

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Keywords: Populism, Fascism, Neo-Fascism, Post-Fascism, National conservatism, Illiberalism, Illiberal Democracy, Far Right, Radical Right Wing Populist party, Brothers of Italy

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Time magazine honored her by putting her on the cover of its July 24, 2025 issue with a striking headline: “Where Giorgia Meloni is Leading Europe.” A month earlier, in France, Le Figaro Magazine had presented her as a “Catholic, right-wing, liberal” who had invented “a winning method.”[1] A veritable “Melonimania” is spreading, promoted by the American and European right and many media outlets. Italian Prime Ministers Giorgia Meloni, established as a strong leader within the European Union, is often presented as close to US President Donald Trump.[2] She is said to be part of “a new reactionary international,” according to the expression used by French President Emmanuel Macron for the first time on January 6 2025.[3] The phrase caught on almost immediately, particularly on the left. There is  now a tendency to associate a series of European and non-European leaders and personalities with it, lumping them together into a monolithic group—Meloni, Trump and his vice president J.D. Vance, multi-billionaire and Trump’s former Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) administrator Elon Musk, former Trump advisor Steve Bannon, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, French National Rally party leaders Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella, French Reconquest party leader Éric Zemmour, Argentinean President Javier Milei, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to name but a few, are said to share the same ideas, act in concert, and work to bring down representative and liberal democracy in order to establish illiberal democracies. An International dominated by the American president, who would directly influence the various heads of government close to him and the leaders of various parties aspiring to take power, all fascinated by what is happening in Washington, even tempted to imitate his behavior and way of doing politics. In truth, from a scientific point of view, the classification of these actors and their parties is far from obvious. Should they be considered new fascists, representatives of the far right or radical right, national populists, national conservatives, illiberals, or even techno-populists? What is certain is that their backgrounds, statements, practices, and successes raise questions about their conception of democracy. Furthermore, in the eyes of some observers, as well as for the liberal political opponents of these actors, the latter pose a considerable challenge to our democracies—a challenge that revives memories of earlier periods, such as the 1920s and 1930s in Europe, when democracies collapsed. In this regard, Italy, the subject of our article, provides a particularly interesting case study.

To avoid any misunderstanding, and to contribute to the debate on the current political situation, we will begin by clarifying three concepts that are sometimes mistakenly considered equivalent and interchangeable in the public sphere: populism, fascism, and illiberalism. We will do this by taking into account the very particular case of Italy, which experienced more than 20 years of Fascist Party rule (a past that is difficult to completely recover from), and where the political career of Giorgia Meloni, who joined the youth movement of the former neo-fascist MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano) party at a very young age, has raised and continues to raise questions about her relationship to her own past. In this article, we will focus on this woman. Indeed, in the general context of presidentialization, personalization, and mediatization,[4] she dominates and controls not only her party, which has become a personalistic party, but also the governing coalition currently in power.[5] We will then analyze what Meloni and her party are and what they have been doing to Italian democracy since they came to power. Finally, we will examine the relationship forged between Meloni and the highest dignitaries of Trumpism, highlighting their ideological similarities but also their differences, and even their political divergences, particularly with regard to Europe and some international issues, such as the war with Iran. Indeed, the relationship between the American president and the Italian head of government is not simply a bilateral one, since the European Union, a third key player, is also involved.

Populism, Fascism and Illiberalism: What Are We Talking about?

Populism, fascism, and illiberalism are some of the words most often used in the media to describe Giorgia Meloni, which can be confusing. It is therefore essential to provide a useful and enlightening definition of the concepts used.

The word populism is a catch-all term and a concept that has long presented, and still sometimes presents, “an essential impalpability, an awkward conceptual slipperiness.”[6] Proof of this “impalpability” is the constant oscillation between populism in general and its many varied forms, which means that we must consider both its uniqueness and the multiplicity of its variants. This makes it imperative to find the right balance between an overly broad definition, which would prove ineffective—everything or almost everything would be populist—and an overly restrictive approach, which would obscure the extreme complexity of the phenomenon, which has a long history dating back to the late 19th century that we cannot discuss in this text. Populism has set off an avalanche of books and academic articles in various disciplines, primarily political science, but also in sociology, philosophy, anthropology, and history. Here we focus on three major approaches in political science, without claiming to be exhaustive, but which prove to be the most relevant for characterizing Meloni.[7]

The first approach, which is known as the ideational approach, is now dominant in political science.[8] Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser conceive of populism as a thin-centered ideology, which differs from thick ideologies, to use Michael Freeden’s distinctions.[9] This thin ideology “considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”[10] This antagonism is often moral in nature, the two authors point out. We might add that populism is in the overwhelming majority of cases nationalist, sovereigntist, and even nativist, and that at the same time it rarely presents itself as clearly and purely as this definition suggests. For populism, pragmatic, changeable, and practical, takes on a “chameleon-like” aspect, as Paul Taggart mentions.[11] It can therefore be combined with established ideologies, or what remains of them today (Marxism, Communism, socialism, conservatism, libertarianism) or be the direct emanation or derivative of pre-existing ideologies such as fascism. This is why there are right-wing populisms, left-wing populisms, and populisms that defy classification. These various populisms have similarities and differences, for example in their conception of the nation or the people, or in terms of the sociology of their supporters and voters. However, populism can attempt to transform itself from a thin ideology into a thick ideology. This is what Orbán is attempting to do with right-wing populism, and, in a completely different vein, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe with left-wing populism.[12]

The second definition of populism sees it primarily as a strategy deployed by leaders and political parties to win power and, if successful, to manage it. This understanding of populism places greater emphasis on the actions of populists than on their rhetoric, on doing rather than saying. As Kurt Weyland explains, populism is “a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalised support from large numbers of mostly unorganised followers.”[13] This approach tends to focus on the role of the leader. Through his own volition and also through the way his supporters, opponents, the media, and social networks talk about him, he builds and showcases his personality and charisma. He must attach the utmost importance to his language and communication, using the tools available at the time (print media, radio, television and, today, social media), the way they address the public, their ability to appear close to the people, their skill in making people believe that they have a personal relationship with their supporters, their talent for playing on a range of emotions (fear, anger, rage, hope), and their ability to invent and develop a narrative capable of mobilizing the masses. Weyland rightly points out that the leader feels invested or leads people to believe that he is invested in a “heroic mission such as re-founding the country and combating dangerous adversaries.”[14] Populist leaders thus give meaning to the political struggle, on the one hand by infusing it with an almost religious dimension and, on the other, by constantly identifying enemies against whom they call for general mobilization. Once in power, this can have significant consequences for the functioning of institutions and public policy. Populism as a strategy involves a particular style that contrasts with that of political rivals. Leaders, regardless of their social background and level of education, most often resort to direct, simple, effective rhetoric—crude and vulgar if necessary—adopt body language that is supposed to “connect with the people,” engage in provocative behavior to ensure that people are constantly talking about them, engage in spectacle, and develop a whole range of symbols that clearly and obviously evoke, with a heavy emotional charge, the people and the nation, their past, their present, and their future.[15]

Finally, the third aspect of populism is socio-cultural, an interpretation already put forward by Margaret Canova.[16] Pierre Ostiguy is its main proponent today. According to him, populism is based on the antagonism between the “low,” towards which it expresses empathy, and the “high,” which it vilifies. Furthermore, it develops a “flaunting of the low,” the author’s favorite expression, which is extremely transgressive.[17] In an ostentatious and provocative manner, populism values lowbrow culture, which is refused recognition and denigrated by those belonging to the highbrow culture. In this way, it exalts a kind of revolt of the low,  which gives it a form of moral superiority and constitutes its identity. In a similar vein, Italian historian Giovanni Orsina sees populism as a “rebellion of the concrete against abstraction.”[18] (The risk in this analysis is that it oversimplifies the dichotomy between popular culture and high culture, since the former is not only autonomous but also completely impervious to the culture of the elites, even though it has long been demonstrated that there are dense interactions between the two). On the other hand, this approach to populism suggests that it constitutes a kind of socio-cultural insurrection of the “little people” against the “big people,” according to Pierre Birnbaum’s formula for the French case:[19] it is the weak against the powerful, the humble against the arrogant, the dominated against the dominant, encouraged by political entrepreneurs sometimes supported by intellectuals deliberately fanning the flames smoldering among the lower classes. These entrepreneurs transform a growing or already pronounced social and cultural divide into a political resource.

Each of these definitions of populism has raised objections and controversy. This is because populism has many facets and is polymorphous and fluid. Contrary to the tendency to rigidify positions and choose one definition to the exclusion of another, I believe that populism is a combination of more or less coherent and structured fragments of ideology, a strategy of rupture associated with a disruptive style to win elections and govern a country, and a call for cultural revolt by sections of the people against the elites, or a section of them, whom they distrust. It cannot be easily classified within a traditional category of political taxonomy. This is particularly true for Giorgia Meloni. Therefore, we must use an empirical method to identify and classify her. Indeed, after her political socialization in the youth movement of the neo-fascist MSI party, she followed its transformation in 1994 into the post-fascist part National Alliance. She then contributed to the founding of a new party in 2012, Fratelli d’Italia, or Brothers of Italy, of which she became president two years later and which, according to most researchers specializing in this party, is a radical right-wing populist party. Her own political trajectory therefore requires us to examine the possible links between her populism and fascism, if she can be classified at least partially in these categories. But before embarking on this task, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by fascism and to determine whether it itself has any connection with populism.[20] In other words, was fascism the initiator of a certain strain of Italian populism that may have continued to this day?

Fascism continues to haunt Italy. The more than 20 years of Fascist Party rule left a deep mark on the country. On the one hand, a minority of Italians are nostalgic for it, claim to be fascists, and pay homage to Il Duce, as Benito Mussolini liked to be called, as evidenced by the nearly 70,000 people who gather each year at his tomb in the village of Predappio in Emilia-Romagna. On the other hand, anti-fascism remains strong, and not just on the left. It has had a checkered history, with periods of low intensity and sudden resurgence, as has been the case since Giorgia Meloni took office as prime minister.[21] More generally today, the emergence of populist leaders, parties, and movements that either have a direct connection with fascism or display traits reminiscent of fascism, however remotely, triggers comparisons with fascism and raises the debate about its possible return. This essentially political debate, which is taking place from Europe to Donald Trump’s United States, often has an impact on academic research. Indeed, anti-fascism has often taken on such proportions that it tends to label the right wing, or even anything that is not left wing, as fascist. Furthermore, some intellectuals tend to give a very broad definition of fascism. One of the most famous of these is Umberto Eco. On April 25, 1995, on the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Italy (and at a time when Silvio Berlusconi had already been in office as prime minister for a few months in 1994), Eco gave a lecture at Columbia University in which he listed 14 points constituting what he called “eternal fascism.”[22] The publication of this text was hugely successful and continues to be reprinted. But the debate also pits historians who, like Emilio Gentile, consider fascism to be a specific historical experience, against those who subscribe to the “generic fascism” school represented by Roger Griffin, George Mosse, Robert Paxton, Roger Eatwell, and Stanley Payne. We cannot analyze in detail this historiographical controversy, which is reflected in the use of the word fascism, either in the singular or plural.[23] I share Emilio Gentile’s point of view. Let us therefore content ourselves with attempting to clarify the reality of fascism.

The historical Italian fascism lasted from 1919 to 1945, with its three phases: fascism as a movement before the seizure of power on October 30, 1922, then fascism as a regime, which really began in 1925, and which ended with the Republic of Salò from September 1943 to May 1945 and which provoked an apocalyptic outbreak of violence. Gentile points out three new features of this original fascism: on the one hand, the emergence of a revolutionary nationalist movement organized as a militia party practicing violence, destroying democracy, and establishing a new state and a regenerated nation; secondly, the sacralization of politics, which took the form of a secular religion; and finally, the beginnings and then the establishment of totalitarianism. Therefore, if a comparison must be made, it can only be based on this form of fascism which, beyond the different phases it has gone through, has an organizational dimension, a quasi-anthropological cultural dimension, and an institutional dimension.[24]

Do fascism and populism share features in common? In part, yes: through the rhetoric and behavior of its founder, Benito Mussolini, certain traits of which were already apparent when he was a socialist. Mussolini’s strategy was to seize power through a combination of participation in elections and the spreading of terror by his militant squadrons. He denounced liberal democracy, stigmatized the elites, exalted the nation, and appealed to the masses. His language and style were vehement, violent, brutal, rebellious, and vulgar. He was a virtuoso in the art of demagoguery, an ingredient undeniably common to both populism and fascism.[25] Once in power, he constantly reminded people of his humble origins, practiced demagoguery more than ever and constantly displayed his closeness to the people through effective radio and film propaganda. For example, during the “battle of the wheat,” launched in 1925 to 1926, he was seen shirtless, participating in a harvest alongside peasants and later working with laborers who were opening the Via dei Fori Imperali in Rome.[26] Fascism and populism have similarities in terms of style and language.[27] But while Italian fascism has a populist component, it is not limited to populism alone. As for populism, it may bear certain similarities to fascism, but it is not automatically synonymous with fascism. Some authors highlight its ideological similarities with populism.[28] According to Griffin, “fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism.”[29] This formula, repeated ad nauseam by all proponents of generic fascism, allows the label of “fascist” to be extended almost without limit to many other case studies. According to them, and rightly so, populism and fascism cultivate the mystique of the people, the nation, the leader, and authority.[30]

Other authors point out their differences. Italian fascism was anti-democratic, anti-liberal, anti-Communist, anti-left, and anti-Enlightenment (antagonisms that, adapted to the present, can be found among right-wing populists), but it was also anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois, and carried the Promethean ambition to transform humanity, which differentiates it from populism. Furthermore, “populism is a form of democracy, albeit not liberal democracy,” while fascism is neither liberal nor democratic.[31] This leads us to consider the question of illiberalism.

According to Marlene Laruelle, illiberalism is an ideology that is inseparable from liberalism, as it is, in a sense, its opposite. This ideology is based on a few precepts: a cultural “backlash against today’s liberalism … often in the name of democratic principles,” with primacy given to unlimited popular sovereignty, with mistrust or even hostility towards pluralism, with the valorization of the nation, sovereigntism, nativism, the praise of traditional values and cultural homogeneity, and the denigration of minority rights.[32]Illiberalism differs from populism but can also overlap with it to form “populist illiberalism.”[33] When in power, illiberal actors can establish illiberal democracies. In an illiberal democracy, voting remains in place after a biased competition, but those in power attack the independence of the judiciary, muzzle the media, deploy one-way communication, limit or even reduce individual and minority rights (e.g. sexual rights), intimidate their opponents, seek to stifle them and destroy academic freedoms.[34] In a consolidated liberal democracy, illiberalism consists of “disruptive illiberalism,” which means “an opposition to procedural democratic norms—as disruptive illiberalism—or constitutes part of an ideological struggle termed ideological illiberalism.”[35] Illiberal democracy, as a regime, is not established overnight. It is the result of a dynamic developed by a party and a leader who initiate the transition from a liberal and representative democracy to something else, which is not yet a firmly established and consolidated authoritarian regime and may never become one. It is “a gradual erosion of liberal values and institutions that goes unnoticed long enough to achieve illiberalism’s ultimate goal: the substitution of liberal rights and freedoms with illiberal values.”[36] Illiberal democracy can therefore mean an intermediate, hybrid regime, accepted by part of the population, or even desired by them, while another section opposes it and a large section remains indifferent.

Having clarified as much as possible what is meant by populism, fascism, and illiberalism, we must now study Meloni and her Brothers of Italy party, attempting to characterize them in relation to these concepts and determine their relationship to liberal democracy.

Who Is Giorgia Meloni and What Does She Do?

In political science literature, the category of radical right-wing populist party has become widely used to describe the rise of new parties that no longer fall strictly within the classical far right. These parties are characterized by populism, nativism, authoritarianism, Euroskepticism, and their reference to “ethnic and cultural identity.”[37] Fratelli d’Italia is therefore generally described as a radical right-wing populist party. Studies devoted to it explain the reasons for its electoral success in 2022 and highlight the elements of continuity with its previous history, linked to fascism, neo-fascism and post-fascism, and the current shifts, or even changes that have taken place, particularly with national conservatism.[38] But as Murat Aktas writes about populist radical-right parties, their definitions “are flexible and ambiguous, others are contradictory.”[39] This is particularly true for Brothers of Italy and its leader.

Meloni is populist because she meets all three definitions of populism. Ideologically, she often appeals to the people against the traditional ruling class and European and global elites. She values common sense and popular wisdom. At the same time, because of her history, she condemns fascism as a regime in the name of morality and not on the basis of in-depth political analysis; but she proclaims her loyalty to neo-fascism and, to a lesser extent, to post-fascism. For instance, on December 29, 2020, during her first press conference as head of government, she said, “I believe that the MSI has had a role in the history of the Republic, the role of guiding to democracy millions of Italians who have been defeated by the war, a party of the republican right who participated in the election of all the presidents of the Republic, and who played an important role against the terrorist violence.”[40] On May 2024, she explained again that the tricolor flame who is in the logo of Brothers of Italy and was yet the symbol of the MSI demonstrates the “continuity … with the MSI and AN.”[41] She also adopts a national-conservative stance, well summarized in her triptych, “God, family, homeland” which she repeats all the time, explaining it is not a slogan but “the most beautiful proof of love.”[42] Nationalism, nativism, the cult of traditional values, the defense of Italian identity and the denunciation of wokeism and gender theory, as well as constant criticism of minority rights, demonstrate her propensity for illiberalism.[43] Strategically, she constantly denounces her enemies, the left, and the judges; when addressing Italians, she resorts to aggressive rhetoric and delivers fiery speeches in a stentorian voice. She feels she is vested with a mission, to use Weyland’s phrase, to restore Italy’s greatness. However, even before taking office, and even more so now as the chief executive, without renouncing or abandoning her populism, her radical right-wing identity, her propensity for illiberalism, or her national conservatism, she tends, depending on her strategic priorities, to show relative moderation in Italy, Europe, and the world. In other words, she is evolving without us knowing how and where this will end.

This raises the question: since Giorgia Meloni came into office, have she, her party and her allies in the coalition she leads (Forza Italia and the Lega, or League party), been behaving in an illiberal manner and engaging in what could be called the checklist that tips a liberal and representative democracy towards becoming an illiberal one?

Having come into office with a coalition that demonstrates real and fairly unprecedented stability, Meloni has set out a number of priorities .[44] Firstly, there is what she has called “the mother of reforms,” namely institutional reform to strengthen the executive branch, which is not the preserve of illiberals .[45] She quickly abandoned the MSI, then National Alliance and Fratelli d’Italia’s plan to elect the president by universal suffrage, based on the model of the French Fifth Republic. On the other hand, she advocates the direct election of the prime minister, whose power would be strengthened in relation to that of the president, who is appointed by the parliament. This measure has been condemned by the opposition and the majority of constitutional scholars, who fear the emergence of a strongman or strongwoman, reflecting the lingering memory of fascism. However, opposition figures and some other constitutional scholars of various political persuasions do not reject the principle of such a reform, as there has been consensus for decades on the need to strengthen the executive branch.[46] The discussion therefore focuses on the modalities of its implementation and the voting system for appointing the president of the Council of Ministers. In any case, this reform has still not been implemented, as the League wants to obtain at the same moment a in reform on regional autonomy aimed at strengthening the power of the regions. It will not be put to a referendum before the end of the current legislative term, in 2027, as the Constitution stipulates that such a consultation must be organized if the vote in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate does not reach the required two-thirds majority of their total membership, which is the case with the current legislature. Therefore, there is no reason to speak of an illiberal attitude of the government, which respects the rules for reforming. On the other hand, another cause for concern is the government’s practice of ruling by decree, thereby reducing the legislative activity of Parliament to a bare minimum. However, this is in line with the practice of previous executives.[47]

The other major reform, which was adopted by Parliament in October 2025, concerns the justice system and has sparked heated controversy.[48] This controversy is not new. In fact, in the mid-1990s, it first erupted following investigations by Milanese judges during Operation Clean Hands, which revealed the extent of corruption among the ruling parties and led to the collapse of the party system as it had existed until the 1990s, and even more so with the clashes between former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and the magistrates investigating a number of cases involving him. These controversies, especially between the right-wing parties and certain judges, have always centered on the role and place of the judiciary in relation to political power and society. The reform initiated by the Minister of Justice, Carlo Nordio, aims, among other things, to separate judicial and prosecutorial careers and to change the representation of these two categories of magistrates with the creation of two new councils of magistrates. There is heated debate between its supporters (the governing parties, some law professors, and commentators) and its opponents (mainly judges, lawyers, jurists, the Democratic Party, the Five Star Movement, and left-wing newspapers). The latter fear the loss of independence of the judiciary and are alarmed by the composition and method of appointment, in this case by lottery, of the two newly proposed judicial councils, one for judges and the other for prosecutors. The European Commission has also expressed concern.[49] In addition, a High Disciplinary Court has been established, responsible for imposing sanctions on magistrates. This type of mechanism has been put in place in Poland and Hungary and usually considered as a way to limit the autonomy of the judges.[50] Nevertheless, opponents of the government, classified as reformist and liberal center-left, approve of the separation of careers and have called for a yes vote in the referendum. The government, led by the president of the Council, Giorgia Meloni; and the minister of justice, Carlo Nordio, regularly castigates and threatens judges accused of overstepping their authority, prosecuting them and seeking to destabilize them. Just as frequently, some magistrates accuse the political authorities of wanting to tame them and denounce an illiberal threat. As this proposed reform, which would have amended Title IV of the Constitution, failed to obtain the required supermajority of 75% of the members of the Parliament, it was put to a referendum held on March 22 and 23, 2026, which, following a rather virulent campaign, turned into an indirect form of referendum on Meloni’s leadership. A clear majority of 53.7% of the voters rejected the reform, inflicting a serious political defeat on Giorgia Meloni.

A law was also passed in June 2025 providing for tougher penalties for prison riots, occupations of public or university spaces, road blockades, etc.[51] This is part of a broader law-and-order policy championed by Meloni and typical of radical right-wing populist parties, as well as the right wing in general. On April 27, the first decree law triggered significant opposition from 237 lawyers and constitutional experts, who signed an open letter in the newspaper La Stampa denouncing the measure as unconstitutional, restrictive of freedoms, and an attack on democracy.[52] In February 2026, the government promoted another very severe decree law on public security.[53] The Constitutional Court will be called upon to rule on the text of the decree.

Illiberal democracies develop “illiberal immigration policies”, and this is the case in Meloni’s Italy.[54] When it was in the opposition, denouncing immigration was one of the main causes championed by Brothers of Italy and the League. Meloni’s party has referred to the so-called great replacement theory, and its leader has not hesitated to announce a naval blockade, condemning the inaction of Italian and European governments and lambasting NGOs coming to the aid of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. As part of the Mattei Plan, her government has concluded agreements with countries such as Tunisia and Egypt to set up migrant detention centers. It has made it more difficult for NGOs to carry out rescue operations, restricted reception and asylum application conditions, and launched the Albania project to outsource certain reception centers, which has cost €70 million and so far has only affected a small number of migrants, several of whom had to come back to Italy by decision of Roman magistrates. The government has strongly criticized these judges, who acted in accordance with European law, and the European Court of Human Rights, which denounced the conditions in which migrants are held in detention centers. “Detention camps for migrants are a strong manifestation of ideological illiberalism,” write Kauth and King.[55]  Similarly, the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union onstating that the decision to return migrants transferred to Albania must be subject to judicial review and that the list of countries considered safe for the reception of deportees must comply with European standards, drew the ire of the president of the Council, Giorgia Meloni; and the government, who claimed that it hindered their efforts to combat illegal immigration and defend national borders.[56] On this issue, Meloni has received the support of the Danish Social Democratic government and seven other heads of government, who accuse the Court of preventing the political authorities from combating illegal immigration, thereby undermining national sovereignty.[57] In fact, Meloni’s migration policy has been taken up by a number of European countries, by the elected representatives of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament, and by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the Labour Party, while the European Commission has approved the Albanian project. The situation remains unresolved for the moment.

In 2022 and 2023, Meloni wanted to impose a policy of full Italian sovereignty in line with Matteo Salvini’s actions when he was Minister of the Interior from 2018 to 2019. She clashed with France, Germany, and the European Commission. Since 2023, she has changed her perspective, making her policy a policy shared by other European governments. At the same time, she agreed to allow 420,000 immigrant workers to enter the country between 2023 and 2025, and on June 30, 2025, the government issued a decree law accepting nearly 497,550 new immigrants for the period from 2025 through 2028.[58] Due to Italy’s aging population and falling birth rate, employers need this labor force, particularly in sectors such as textiles, metallurgy, and agriculture. Meloni therefore has a double discourse and a double standard of action: very firm against illegal immigration, yet very pragmatic about legal immigration.[59]

Criticism of the power of Italian and European judges, characteristic of illiberal populism and now of a large section of the European right, has spread to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Italian government is led by one of the few European executives, along with those of Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Latvia, to have refused to sign the declaration signed by 79 ICC member states opposing the sanctions taken against it by the Trump Administration.

The government has taken almost full control of the public television and radio broadcaster RAI by appointing figures close to its political agenda to positions of responsibility.[60] While public broadcasting in Italy has always been subject to political influence, this control now appears to be increasing. In addition, the government can also count on the Mediaset private channels—which represent the other half of the Italian broadcasting landscape—owned by the Berlusconi family, which has close ties to the Forza Italia party. Furthermore, according to the Media Freedom Report 2025, the government sometimes intimidates journalists who are critical of its actions by filing complaints against them.[61]

Giorgia Meloni and her supporters intend to break what they call the cultural hegemony of the left by striving to deploy a new national narrative based on traditional values. The challenge, according to them, is to defend the West, its culture, and its civilization. To this end, the fight against progressivism and in favor of conservatism is underway. This has resulted in various initiatives. Alessandro Giuli, the current minister of Culture (who happens to be the second person to serve in this position since Meloni took office in 2022), has appointed a large number of figures who are ideologically close to him to head public cultural institutions. Nevertheless, some of these institutions still demonstrate real autonomy. The ministry has been reorganized with a strong emphasis on centralization. It is involved in film production and distribution, particularly at the Cinecittà studios in Rome, where it is reorganizing its governance, which Minister Giulli had criticized as comparable to that of the USSR, in order to encourage “the production of stories linked to our tradition,” which has implications for film financing.[62] A similar intervention is taking place in public theaters. The ministry supports the organization of exhibitions that have sparked heated controversy due to their bias, such as one on the late British philologist and fantasy author J. R. R. Tolkien, one of the favorite authors of the international far right and Giorgia Meloni in particular;[63] or one in Rome on futurism, which barely mentioned the link between this artistic and cultural movement and fascism but which extolled the virtues of being “made in Italy,”  a phrase repeated ad nauseam by Giorgia Meloni.[64]

Nationalism is one of Meloni’s core values. It is also one of the foundations of the education minister’s school reform, which, alongside various measures to modernize teaching, promotes a change in history curriculum and therefore textbooks, with an increased focus on the history of the Italian nation. Similarly, Meloni, as promised, has not abolished the already highly restrictive abortion law; however, she has allowed pro-life organizations to be present in consultation rooms in an attempt to dissuade women from terminating their pregnancies. She has signed a bill into law on November 4, 2024, stipulating that resorting to surrogacy abroad, which is prohibited in Italy, constitutes a universal offense and is therefore subject to prosecution.[65] Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court has restored the legal status of both mothers over their children for lesbian couples, overturning a circular issued two years earlier by the minister of the interior that excluded one of the two mothers. As proof of their conservatism, in the European Parliament, the elected representatives of Fratelli d’Italia and the League oppose sanctions against Poland’s Law and Justice party and Hungary, rights for LGBTQ+ minorities, and the inclusion of the right to abortion in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.[66] The fight over values is essential for Meloni and her supporters. This is why she continues to vilify the left with rare virulence, blaming it for every possible and imaginable evil and accusing it of being violent, sectarian, irresponsible and anti-national.

Meloni has not, for the moment, transformed Italy into an illiberal democracy, but as a radical right-wing populist she demonstrates an ideological propensity for illiberalism in her speeches, practices, and behavior. This propensity is limited by the resilience of the rule of law; the vigilance of the president, Sergio Mattarella, a watchful guardian of the Constitution and a staunch supporter of the European Union; and the existence of an opposition that, although divided, has almost as many voters as the right.

Meloni, Trump, and the EU: Convergences and Divergences

Giorgia Meloni, a radical right-wing populist with a certain propensity for illiberalism tinged with national conservatism but limited by the vigor of Italian republican democracy, has maintained excellent relations with Donald Trump since his first term in office. This was evidenced by her presence at President Trump’s second inauguration ceremony on January 20, 2025, in Washington. She also has contacts with various people close to Trump, regardless of their political leanings. In 2018, for example, while she was in the opposition and organizing the Atreju meetings in Rome, she welcomed Steve Bannon, who had led the US president’s 2016 campaign.[67] He presented his ideas and plans, with which she largely agreed and which were particularly applauded by the Italian audience. She also had her party join The Movement, an organization based in Brussels and launched by Bannon, which aimed to bring together all European nationalist groups ahead of the 2019 European Parliament elections. According to her, it was “interesting that different parties had relationships to exchange ideas on the defence of European borders, European identity and the family.”[68] The venture was short-lived. Bannon’s marginalization by Trump led Meloni to distance herself from him. She also has a very good relationship with Elon Musk, who was also invited to Atreju in December 2023 in the presence of the President of the Council, Meloni, who had a one-on-one meeting with him on topics including artificial intelligence, birth rates (a subject of great concern to them both) and Starlink, the satellite system of SpaceX, the company owned by the richest man in the world.[69] In September 2024, when she received the Atlantic Council Global Citizen Award, she chose him to deliver the award ceremony speech. This provided an opportunity for an exchange of mutual praise, with Musk hailing her as “a person who is even more beautiful on the inside than on the outside,” and “honest, genuine, authentic, a rare quality for a politician,” while Meloni thanked this “precious genius for the times we live in.”[70] She was nevertheless embarrassed when the billionaire began to intervene directly in Italian politics. In November 2024, he wrote a tweet attacking the Italian judiciary for obstructing Operation Albania in the name of the law: “These judges need to go.” President Mattarella responded sharply, asking him to respect his country’s democracy. However, this did not prevent the President of the Council of Ministers, Meloni, in January 2025, in an interview with the newspaper Corriere della Sera’smagazine, Sette, which was picked up by the entire Italian press, from referring to him as “a great personality of our time, an extraordinary innovator who always has his eye on the future. I find it natural to be able to dialogue with him. Of course, there are things on which our view is more similar, others on which we are more distant, but that does not prevent us from engaging with each other.”[71] Since his distancing from the President Trump beginning in mid-2025, Musk seems to have become persona non grata to Meloni and her party as well.

Furthermore, Meloni has ties to various conservative circles. In 2019, she was the only Italian politician invited to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) near Washington, DC   and she participated in 2022 and again in February 2025.[72] On each occasion, she demonstrated her commitment to the ideals of the conference. On February 3, 2020, she gave the opening speech at the National Conservatism Conference held in Rome. This conference was created the previous year by Israeli philosopher Yoram Nazony, his Edmund Burke Foundation, and the Conservative Partnership Institute. She began with a heartfelt tribute to the organizer and his book, The Virtue of Nationalism, which, “in a few words … clearly sums up the fact that our worldview is the exact opposite to what they would like to force on us. Dear Yoram, your book will scandalise Italy, and I will gladly make my contribution to this effect, because I intend to quote it frequently.”[73] She then developed her ideas on the nation; sovereignty; a Europe of nations, peoples, and identities; and traditional values, naming her major figures of reference: the late US President Ronald Reagan, Pope John Paul II, the British conservative philosopher Roger Scrutton, and J. R. R. Tolkien. On February 14, 2025, vice-president J. D. Vance’s gave an important speech to the Munich Security Conference claiming that there were problems with democracy in Europe due to the stifling of freedoms and the failure to take into account the expectations of the people.[74] Eight days later, on February 22, she addressed CPAC via video link from Rome. While skillfully attempting to avoid US tariffs and reject the prospect of the new administration abandoning Europe, she rejected the criticism leveled at Vance’s speech and, on the contrary, vigorously defended his arguments in the name of freedom, democracy, the people, and common sense. She explained that if conservatives—a word she used repeatedly—are winning more and more elections, it is because “we defend freedom, we love our nations, we want to make our borders secure, we protect workers and citizens from the left’s crazy environmentalism, we defend the family and life, we fight against wokeism, we protect our sacred right to faith and freedom of expression. We are fighting for common sense.” And she placed her fight alongside those of Trump, Milei, and Modi (Orbán was conspicuous absent from this list).[75] On March 28, she reiterated her agreement with Vance in an interview with the Financial Times, explaining that she had been saying the same thing for a long time: “Europe has lost a bit of itself. Trump’s criticism of Europe was not aimed at its people, but at its ‘ruling class’ … and the idea that instead of reading reality and finding ways to respond to the people, you can impose ideology on people.”[76] These statements perfectly illustrate Meloni’s blend of political and ideological conservatism and the enduring nature of her populism as head of government, with her reference to common sense and the contrast she draws between the elites and the people she claims to defend and embody.  On April 18, 2025, she warmly welcomed the Catholic vice President of the United States during his visit to Rome, who explained that, walking through the streets with his wife and three children, he felt that the Eternal City “is a place that has been built by people who loved humans and loved God.”[77] In the aftermath of the American right-wing political activist and social media personality Charlie Kirk’s assassination on September 10, 2025, she immediately elevated him, who had been hitherto completely unknown on the Italian Peninsula, to the status of a martyr for freedom, and she vehemently accused the left in both the United States and Italy of always being responsible for violence.[78] She identified with Bannon’s aggressive nationalism, Musk’s technopopulism and Vance’s national conservatism. For a decade now, the latter has tended to become one of her major ideological reference points. She shares with Trump a belief in sovereignty, nationalism, the need to show authority (albeit with less intensity), the fight against immigration, criticism of policies put in place to combat global climate warming (although she is less openly denialist about the problem), hostility to Islam, the fight in the name of freedom against the dictatorship of wokeism, gender theory and what she describes as the hegemony of the left over culture, the desire to defend the right to life rather than the right to abortion (although here, too, not in the same way in Italy as in the United States), and the defense of the traditional family and the Christian religion. Her ambition is not only to Make Italy Great Again, as we have seen, but also to Make the West Great Again, as she told Trump during her meeting with him at the White House on April 17, 2025: “when I speak of the West, I am not referring to a geographical area: I am referring to civilization. I want to make this civilization stronger.”[79]

This political and ideological affinity reinforces a historical characteristic of Italian diplomacy. Indeed, Meloni is continuing within the broad outlines of the foreign policy pursued by Italy since 1945, which has been both pro-American and pro-European.[80] Italy’s Atlanticism stems from the need for post-1945 reconstruction and from the Cold War, due to the Peninsula’s strategic position in the center of the Mediterranean and the presence in the country throughout those years of the most powerful Communist Party in Western Europe. Even today, Italy has a duty to remain close to America and to be among its most reliable and zealous allies. Meloni had also forged a very good relationship with US President Joe Biden over the war in Ukraine during his administration. This ironclad alliance with the United States is proving more necessary than ever against possible incursions by Russian ships into the Mediterranean. Italy is keen to keep NATO bases on its territory.

Finally, successive Italian governments, regardless of their political leanings, have not wanted to sever ties with the Italian-American community in the United States. Meloni is therefore relying on the two pillars of the policy of all previous Italian governments: Atlanticism and Europeanism. She too faces moments of tension that occasionally arise between these two orientations. She adds to this a powerful ideological factor that is at odds with most previous executives. This factor stems from her partial adherence to the cultural revolution initiated by Trump.

Meloni and Trump are in partial harmony. Certain nuances and even differences stem from the political, sociological, and historical characteristics of their two countries. In addition, both of these leaders intend to defend what they consider to be their respective national interests. This opens up areas of friction between them, presenting Meloni with a serious dilemma. On the one hand, she must assert the consistency of her ideological position and demonstrate that it is not specific to Italy, but part of a vast and conquering movement reacting against liberal-progressive domination. On the other hand, various major political issues are forcing her into delicate contortions.

This tension is evident on a number of serious geopolitical issues. Let us take the examples of Ukraine, the European Union, customs duties, Gaza and Iran. Indeed, from the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Giorgia Meloni, who was the in opposition, supported the decisions of Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s government to condemn Russian President Vladimir Putin, impose European sanctions on Russia, and send weapons to the Ukrainian people. Once Meloni became prime minister, she continued this policy against her coalition partner in the League, the Five Star Movement, the ambiguities of the Democratic Party, and, above all, a very pacifist public opinion. As a result, following Trump’s missteps in verbally attacking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, threatening to stop supplying him with weapons, and seeking an agreement with the Kremlin before changing his position again, she warned that “Every division in the West makes us weaker.”[81] Thus, on the eve of the August 15, 2025 meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska, Meloni signed a communiqué with French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb, calling on the American president to “put pressure” on the Russian Federation.[82] On August 18, together with other European leaders, she stood alongside President Zelensky opposite President Trump. However, she never criticized the American president, advocating instead for maintaining dialog with him at all costs and opposing President Macron’s firm stance. She did not support the plan to form volunteer troops in Ukraine after the war put forward by Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, and London, considering it too risky and arguing that sending troops could only be envisaged as part of a United Nations mission. Regarding the European rearmament sought by France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Poland, she is careful not to use this term because of the wide Italian pacifist sensibility and defends the idea of an army that would form a branch of NATO.

The bottom line is, she cannot support the American project aimed at undermining   European Union cohesion. Her country needs it, particularly the Next Generation EU fund, which is an important allocation of recovery funds dedicated to supporting economic recovery after the covid-19 pandemic (Italy received €191.5 billion in loans and grants from 2021 to this 226 year).[83] She also wants to act as a go-between for Washington and Brussels on customs duties. She believed she could avoid these duties, and when they were set, she minimized their impact and called Brussels to support Italy. But by setting herself up as the head of government closest to Trump and being regarded as such by him, who is full of praise for her, she hopes to ensure the success of her policies. On immigration, first of all, she does not import Trump’s violent approach, but she still takes decisive action against illegal immigration, as the United States does. On climate change, she intends to undo the Green Deal, which she describes as suicidal for the EU.[84] On Gaza, until 2025 she has not clearly condemned the actions of the Israeli government led by her close friend Benjamin Netanyahu, whose Likud party has close relations with the Conservative and Reformist Group in the EU Parliament. She then changed her position under pressure from Italian public opinion, which was moved and outraged by the suffering of the Palestinians, made visible by all the media, and by the position of Pope Leo XIV.[85] She coordinated with other European leaders to criticize the Israeli government and on August 21, 2025, issued a statement condemning Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the authorization of new settlements in the West Bank.[86] Always worried to maintain a good relationship with Trump, Meloni explained in March 2026 that “Italy is not at war in Iran and does not want to participate in it,” but refused to say whether she supports or condemns the American and Israeli military operation.[87] The same day of her declaration, Trump explained to the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera that she was “a great leader and my friend” and somebody who “is always trying to help.”[88] But when President Trump attacked Pope Leo XIV as too liberal and “weak on crime,” after almost a whole day of silence, she declared his words unacceptable.[89] The next day, the American president criticized her for refusing to get involved in the war with Iran.[90] She did not answer, but some days later she traveled to Paris for a meeting with Macron, Starmer, and Merz to discuss the possibility of sending a multilateral nonbelligerent mission to secure shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.[91] Meloni’s presence at this meeting was a symbolic and political message to demonstrate to Trump that she was certainly an Atlanticist, but also European. It was an inflection point in her foreign policy, but not at all a break in it.

Indeed, despite this incident, Meloni seeks to maintain and deepen her political and ideological collusion with Trump, both in the name of the traditional Italian-American bilateral relationship and because she considers it essential to preserve the unity of the West, which is based on the values claimed by both her and Trump. At the same time, she is forced to demonstrate her concern for preserving Italy’s interests. She must take into consideration her voters and Italian public opinion more generally. However, the latter overwhelmingly rejects Trump: in 2025, 52% of Italians said they saw him as “an enemy,” and in 2026, 79% of them consider Trump’s statements about the pope inappropriate, while only 11% (or 12% in the case of Brothers of Italy voters) have confidence in the American president.[92] This leads her to constantly vacillate. On the one hand, she distances herself from Trump, but without publicly acknowledging or explaining this, in order to avoid a break with the United States. This is especially true given that her Brothers of Italy party is wary of competition on its right from Matteo Salvini’s Lega party and the new far-right leader of the National Future party, retired Army General Roberto Vannacci, which are fully aligned with both Trump’s and Putin’s policies. On the other hand, her party makes statements in favor of the occupant of the White House and makes decisions that mirror his own, which is greatly appreciated in the Oval Office. Thus, in the name of national sovereignty, Italy has rejected the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Global Pandemic Treaty, which provides for the establishment of a preventive security network in preparation for a possible new pandemic.[93] Nevertheless, unlike the United States, Italy has not left the WHO, UNESCO, or the Paris Climate Agreement.

Meloni’s balancing act has two foundations. In her view, the tensions that may arise between the United States and Italy or the European Union are merely normal disagreements between countries and can be resolved through negotiation. Under no circumstance does this mark the beginning of a new historical era characterized by a lasting rift between the United States and the European Union, nor should it do so in the foreseeable future. For if that were the case, it would mean that the Union would have to significantly increase its integration and establish solid foundations for European sovereignty. This is something it cannot accept, as it would imply a complete reversal of its paradigm and its own conception of Europe, which remains that of peoples and nations, a kind of confederation of national sovereignties. This is why it defends the principle of unanimous voting on the European Council, which means requiring the agreement of all member states in order to make a decision. On the other hand, just as Trump signals the strong comeback of right-wing politics, Meloni believes that the battle of ideas and values is essential—in Italy, in the European Union, and in the world. She is realistic and pragmatic politically and economically, but she remains a leader who attaches importance to ideology, even if it is evolving. In a way, she hesitates to choose between realism and idealism. However, the constraints are there, and her dilemma is therefore clear: just as Trump says “America first,” should she say “Italy first” or “EU first”?

However, while Trump is setting in motion a process in the United States that could lead his country towards illiberal democracy, the situation in Italy is very different, as we have seen. In other words, the idea of international reactionaries as used in the public sphere is more of a political weapon than a socially scientific concept. Italy is not an illiberal democracy. Giorgia Meloni herself is a work in progress. She was politically socialized in a neo-Fascist party, to which she remains openly loyal, and eventually became post-Fascist; today, within her Brothers of Italy party, she is at once populist, radically right-wing, and increasingly leaning towards national conservatism. She oscillates between extremist illiberal attitudes and the assimilation of the rules of liberal and representative democracy.

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[1] Jean-Marc Gonin, “Catholique, de droite et libérale: La méthode gagnante de Giorgia Meloni en Italie,” Le Figaro, June 13, 2022, https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/catholique-de-droite-et-liberale-la-methode-gagnante-de-giorgia-meloni-en-italie-20250613.

[2] “Giorgia Meloni: La femme forte de l’Europe,” L’Express, August 18–24, 2024.

[3] Le Figaro and Agence France Presse, “Elon Musk soutient ‘une nouvelle internationale réactionnaire,’ dénonce Emmanuel Macron,” Le Figaro, January 6, 2025, https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/elon-musk-soutient-une-nouvelle-internationale-reactionnaire-denonce-emmanuel-macron-20250106.

[4] Thomas Poguntke, Paul D. Webb, eds., The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[5] Mauro Calise, Il partito personale: I due corpi del leader (Bari: Laterza, 2010); Mauro Calise, “The Personal Party: An Analytical Framework,” Italian Political Science Review / Rivista italiana di scienza politica 45, no. 3 (2015): 301–315, https://doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2015.18; Francesco Melito and Mattia Zulianello, “The Organization of Brothers of Italy: An Activist and Centralized Party Led by a ‘Mother in the Family,’ ” South European Society and Politics, vol. 29, no. 1 (September 2024): 1–26, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13608746.2025.2463909; Salvatore Vassallo and Rinaldo Vignati, Fratelli di Giorgia: Il Partito della Destra Nazional-Conservatrice (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2023); Sofia Ventura, Giorgia Meloni e Fratelli d’Italia: Un partito personalizzato tra estrema destra e destra radicale (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2022).

[6] Paul Taggart, Populism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000).

[7] Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa-Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Populism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[8] Margaret Canovan, Populism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981); Kirk A. Hawkins, Ryan E. Carlin, Leven Littvay, and Cristóbal Rovira Kalwasser, The Ideational Approach to Populism, Extremism and Democracy series (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018); Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Ben Stanley, “The Thin Ideology of Populism,” Journal of Political Ideologies 13, no.1 (2008) 95–111, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310701822289.

[9] Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

[10] Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism, 6, italics in original.

[11] Taggart, Populism, 10; Paul Taggart, “Populism in Western Europe,” in Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser,  Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa-Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Populism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 248–263, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.12.

[12] Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005); Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism (London: Verso, 2018); Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the XXV Bálványos Free Summer University and Youth Camp, July 26, 2014, https://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2014/07/31/viktor-orbans-speech-at-the-xxv-balvanyos-free-summer-university-and-youth-camp-july-26-2014-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo/comment-page-1/.

[13] Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept: ‘Populism’ in the Study of Latin American Politics,” Comparative Politics 34, no.1 (2001), 14, https://doi.org/10.2307/422412; Kurt Weyland, “Populism: A Political Strategy,” in Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa-Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Populism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 48–72, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.2.

[14] Weyland, “Populism,” 58.

[15] Théo Aiolfi,  “Populism as a Transgressive Style,” Global Studies Quarterly 2, no. 1 (January 2022): 1–12, https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/2/1/ksac006/6546411; Théo Aiolfi, “The Stylistic Approach to Populism: From Early Definition to Interdisciplinary Hybridisation,” in Performing Left Populism: Performance, Politics and the People, eds. Goran Petrović Lotina and Théo Aiolfi (London: Bloomsbury, 2023): 27–49; Jan Jaggers and  Stefan Walgrave, “Populism as Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties’ Discourses in Belgium,” European Journal of Political Research 46, no. 3 (2007): 319–345, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00690.x; Benjamin Moffit, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press 2016); Paul-André Taguieff, “Le populisme comme style politique,” in Le retour du populisme: Un défi pour les démocraties européennes, ed. Paul-André Taguieff (Boulogne-Billancourt: Encyclopedia Universalis, 2004): 17–23.

[16] Canovan, Populism.

[17] Pierre Ostiguy, “Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach,” in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, eds. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa-Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 73–98,  https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.2.

[18] Giovanni Orsina, “L’ascesa dei movimenti anti-europei e i populismi,” in Europa tra presente e futuro, eds. Giulano Amato and Nicola Verola (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, 2023), 272.

[19] Pierre Birnbaum, Le Peuple et les gros (Paris: Grasset, 1996); Pierre Birnbaum, Genèse du populisme: Le peuple et les gros (Paris: Pluriel, 2012).

[20] Roger Eatwell, “Populism and Fascism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, eds. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa-Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017): 363–383, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.14.

[21] Andrea Rapini, Antifascismo: Una tradizione generativa (1945–2025) (Rome: Donzelli, 2025).

[22] Umberto Eco, “Ur-Fascism,” New York Review of Books, June 22, 1995.

[23] Mabel Berezin, “Fascism and Populism: Are They Useful Categories for Comparative Sociological Analysis?” Annual Review of Sociology vol. 45 (July 2019): 345–361, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-073018-022351; António Costa Pinto, ed., Rethinking the Nature of Fascism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); António Costa Pinto, The Nature of Fascism Revisited, (Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs, 2012); Giovanni De Luna, “Ieri e oggi: Per non gridare ‘al lupo,’ ” in Fascismo e storia d’Italia: A un secolo dalla marcia su Roma—Temi, narrazioni, fonti, ed. Giovanni De Luna (Milan: Annali Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, Anno Cinquantaseiesimo, 2002): ix–xxiii; Olivier Forlin, Le fascisme: Historiographie et enjeux mémoriels, (Paris: La Découverte, 2013): 137–177; Federico Finchelstein, From Fascism to Populism in History, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019): 31–97; Emilio Gentile, Qu’est-ce que le fascisme? Histoire et interprétation (Paris: Folio Histoire, 2004): 93–122.

[24] Gentile, Qu’est-ce que le fascisme?

[25] Ivan T. Berend, A Century of Populist Demagogues: Eighteen European Portraits 1918–2018, (Budapest: CEU Press, 2020).

[26] Pierre Milza, “Mussolini entre fascisme et populisme,” in Les populismes, ed.Jean-Pierre Rioux (Paris: Tempus, 2007): 195–204.

[27] Eatwell, “Populism and Fascism.”

[28] Michele Battini, “Sull’ambiguo: Brevi note sui nazional-populisti del XXI secolo,” in L’età dei populismi, eds. Antonio Masala and Lorenzo Viviani (Rome: Carocci, 2020): 141–150; Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, (London: Routledge, 1993).

[29] Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, 2.

[30] John Abromeit, “Transformation of Producerist Populism in Western Europe,” in Transformation of Populism in Europe and the Americas: History of Recent Tendencies, eds. John Abromeit, York Norman, Gary Marotta, Bridget Maria Chesterton (London: Bloomsbury, 2016): 231–264; Federico Finchelstein, From Fascism to Populism in History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019).

[31]  Eatwell, “Populism and Fascism.”

[32] Marlene Laruelle, “Illiberalism: A Conceptual Introduction,” East European Politics 38, no. 2 (June 2022): 309, https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2037079; Marlene Laruelle, “Introduction: Illiberalism Studies as a Field,” in The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism, ed. Marlene Laruelle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).

[33] Zsolt Enyedi, “Concept and Varieties of Illiberalism,” Politics and Governance vol. 12 (2024): 1–15, https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8521.

[34] Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan Mac Donnell eds., Populists in Power, (London: Routledge, 2015); Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022; Marlene Laruelle, “Introduction Illiberalism Studies as a Field”; Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2019); András Sajó, Renáta Uitz and Stephen Holmes, eds., Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism (London: Routledge, 2021); Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).

[35] Jasper T. Kauth and Desmond King, “Illiberalism,” European Journal of Sociology/ Archives Européennes de Sociologie 61, no. 3 (2020), 367, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975620000181.

[36] Ruzha Smilova, “The Ideational Core of Democratic Illiberalism,” in Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism, eds. András Sajó, Renáta Uitz, and Stephen Holmes (London: Routledge, 2021): 177–202; Ruzha Smilova, “Conceptual Space for Illiberal Democracy,” Politics and Governance, 13 (2025): 4: https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.9734.

[37] Murat Aktas, “The Rise of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe,” International Sociology 39, no. 6, (2024): 591–605; Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter, Reactionary Democracy: How Racism and the Populist Far Right Became Mainstream (London: Verso,  2020); Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Cas Mudde, The Far Right Today (Medford, Mass.: Polity Press, 2019).

[38] Gianfranco Baldini, Filippo Tronconi, Davide Angelucci, “Yet Another Populist Party? Understanding the Rise of Brothers of Italy,” South European Society and Politics 27, no. 3 (2022): 385–405, https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2022.2159625; Alessia Donà, “The Rise of the Radical Right in Italy: The Case of Fratelli d’Italia,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 27, no. 5 (2022): 775–794, https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2022.2113216; Antonello Canzano Giansante, “Trasformazioni sociopolitiche a Destra: L’evoluzione da Allenza Nazionale a Fratelli d’Italia—primi risultati di una ricerca empirica,” Società Mutamento Politica 13 no. 25, (2022): 213–222, https://digital.casalini.it/5474865; Piero Ignazi, Il polo escluso: La fiamma che non si spegne—da Almirante a Meloni, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2023); Carmen Innerarity and Antonello Canzano Giansante, “National Populism and Religion: The Case of Fratelli d’Italia and Vox,” Religions 16, no. 2 (2025), https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/16/2/200; Leonardo Puleo and Gianluca Piccolino, “Back to the Post-Fascist Past or Landing in the Populist Radical Right? The Brothers of Italy between Continuity and Change,” South European Society and Politics 27, no. 3 (2022): 359–383, https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2022.2126247; Marco Tarchi, “Fratelli d’Italia: Neofascist Heritage, Populism and Conservatism,” Fondation pour l’Innovation Politique, https://www.fondapol.org/app/uploads/2024/03/238-tarchi-gb-2024-03-18-w.pdf; Marco Tarchi, “Le tre età della fiamma: La Destra in Italia—Giorgio Almirante a Giorgia Meloni,” Intervista da Antonio Carioti, (Milan: Solferino Editore, 2024; Filippo Tronconi, Davide Angelucci and Gianfranco Baldini, “Exploring the Political Culture of Fratelli d’Italia with a Novel Middle-Level Elite Survey,” Political Research Exchange 7, no. 1 (2025): 2569981, https://doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2025.2569981; Davide Vampa, Brothers of Italy: A New Populist Wave in an Unstable Party System (Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2023);  Amadeo Varriale, “Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI): Conservative, Populist, or Extreme Right?” ECPS Party Profiles, European Centre for Populism Studies (ECPS), July 27, 2025, https://doi.org/10.55271/op0011; Salvatore Vassallo and Rinaldo Vignati Fratelli di Giorgia: Il Partito della Destra Nazional-Conservatrice (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2023).

[39] Aktas, “The Rise of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe,” 595.

[40] “Cosa ha detto Meloni nella conferenza di fine anno: presidenzialismo, MSI, covid e guerra in Ucraina,” Il Riformista, December 29, 2022; https://www.ilriformista.it/cosa-ha-detto-meloni-nella-conferenza-di-fine-anno-presidenzialismo-msi-covid-e-guerra-in-ucraina-336773/.

[41] “Meloni: ‘La Fiamma nel simbolo di FdI segna la continuità con MSI e AN,” La Stampa, May 31, 2024: https://www.lastampa.it/politica/2024/05/31/news/meloni_fdi_simbolo_fiamma-14350539/.

[42] Paola Di Caro, “Noi conservatori, una famiglia della UE: Che ci attaca dannegia tutta l’Italia,” Corriere della sera, August 3, 2022.

[43] Puleo and Piccolino, “Back to the Post-Fascist Past or Landing in the Populist Radical Right?”

[44] Martin Bull and Laura Polverari, “The Meloni Government: Consolidation and a Return to Politics,” Contemporary Italian Politics 17, no. 2 (2025): 130–144, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23248823.2025.2492523.

[45] Bull and Polverari, “The Meloni Government”; Press conference of Italy’s Council of Ministers no. 57 (2023), https://www.governo.it/it/media/conferenza-stampa-del-consiglio-dei-ministri-n-57/24161; Monica Guerzoni, “Meloni: Ecco il premierato, madre di tutte le riforme,” Corriere della sera, November 3, 2023, https://www.corriere.it/politica/23_novembre_03/meloni-ecco-premierato-madre-tutte-riforme-77472f66-7a91-11ee-b53e-9ce47cd2f4d8.shtml; Nicola Lupo,  “The Constitutional Reform Providing for Direct Election of the Prime Minister: The So-Called ‘Premierato,’ ” Contemporary Italian Politics 17, no. 2  (2025): 1–15: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23248823.2025.2472575.

[46] This is the case of Stefano Ceccanti, an influential center-left constitutional scholar. Stefano Ceccanti, “Premierato sì, ma non così,” Giustizia insieme, May 21, 2024: https://www.giustiziainsieme.it/it/costituzione-e-carta-dei-diritti-fondamentali/3147-premierato-si-ma-non-cosi-stefano-ceccanti.

[47] Carlo Canepa, “Il governo Meloni non è stato di parola sull’abuso dei decreti-legge,” Pagella politica, June 19, 2025. 

[48] Carlo Guarnieri, “Riformare la giustizia: il progetto Nordio,” Il Mulino 3 (2024): 75–82; Senato della Repubblica (2025), Testo legge costituzionale, https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2025/10/30/25A05968/SG.

[49] European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document,“2024 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Italy,” European Commission website, 2024, 6, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/60d79a4f-49cd-4061-a18f-d3a4495d6485_en?filename=29_1_58066.

[50]  Patrice Spinosi, Menace sur l’État de droit (Paris: Allary Éditions, 2025), 76.

[51] Testo coordinato del decreto-legge, April 11, 2025, n. 48: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2025/06/09/25A03312/SG.

[52] La Stampa, “L’appello di 237 giuristi: Il decreto-legge sicurezza un attacco alla democrazia—fermiamolo,” La Stampa, April 27, 2025, https://www.lastampa.it/politica/2025/04/27/news/l_appello_di_237_giuristi_il_ddl_sicurezza_un_attacco_alla_democrazia_fermiamolo-15121568/.

[53] Council of Ministers of Italy, “Sicurezza pubblica e immigrazione: Pubblicato in Gazzetta Ufficiale il decreto-legge,” Dipartimento per il Programma di Governo, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, February 26, 2026,  https://www.programmagoverno.gov.it/it/notizie/sicurezza-pubblica-e-immigrazione-pubblicato-in-gazzetta-ufficiale-il-decreto-legge/.

[54] Kauth and King, “Illiberalism,” 368.

[55] Kauth and King, 393.

[56] AgenPress, “Meloni: ‘La decisione della Corte di Giustizia UE indebolisce le politiche di contrasto all’immigrazione illegale di massa e di difesa dei confine nazionale,” AgenPress, August 1, 2025,  https://www.agenpress.it/2025/08/01/meloni-la-decisione-della-corte-di-giustizia-ue-indebolisce-le-politiche-di-contrasto-allimmigrazione-illegale-di-massa-e-di-difesa-dei-confini-nazionali/.

[57] Jean-Baptiste Chastand, Allan Kaval, and Anne-Françoise Hivert, “Cour européenne des droits de l’homme: Les dessous de l’offensive de neuf pays européens,” Le Monde, sec. International, Union Européenne, June 12, 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2025/06/12/les-dessous-de-l-offensive-de-neuf-pays-europeens-contre-la-cedh_6612493_3210.html.

[58] Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, “Flussi 2026–2028: Appunto in esame preliminare il DPCM da 500 mila ingressi,” https://www.lavoro.gov.it/priorita/pagine/flussi-2026-2028-approvato-in-esame-preliminare-il-dpcm-da-500-mila-ingressi.

[59] Maurizio Ambrosini, “The Populist Far Right Paradox: The Identification of the Enemy and Its Exceptions in the Immigration Policies of the Meloni Government in Italy,” Comparative Migration Policies 13, no. 17 (April 2025), https://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40878-025-00438-y.

[60] Allan Kaval, “Giorgia Meloni à l’offensive sur l’audiovisuel public,” Le Monde,July 23, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/m-le-mag/article/2024/07/23/giorgia-meloni-s-offensive-against-public-broadcasting_6695023_117.html.

[61] Media Freedom, “Monitoring Report 2025,” 39–32, https://www.mappingmediafreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/MFRR-Monitoring-Report-2025.pdf.

[62]  “Cinema, la rivendicazione di Gulli: Cinecittà prima di noi era come l’URSS,” Il Tempo, July 8, 2025, https://www.iltempo.it/politica/2025/07/05/news/alessandro-giuli-cinecitta-cinema-come-unione-sovietica-burocrazia-fondi-governo-43267387/; Michela Tamburrino, “Cinecittàgate,” La Stampa, July 6, 2025.

[63] Agenzia Italia News, “Giorgia Meloni cita Tolkien: ‘Più forte di quell’anello c’è una compagnia che ti accompagna,’ ” YouTube, December 18, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mTHmnrbzdv8.

[64] Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci, “Futurisme, où est le fascisme,” L’Histoire, January 23, 2025, https://www.lhistoire.fr/exposition/futurisme-o%C3%B9-est-le-fascisme%C2%A0.

[65] Alice Stillone, “Approvata al Senato la legge che rende la gestazione per altri (GPA) un ‘reato universale,’ ” Opiniojuris, October 29, 2024: https://www.opiniojuris.it/opinio/approvata-al-senato-la-legge-che-rende-la-gestazione-per-altri-gpa-un-reato-universale/.

[66] Edoardo Bressanelli and Margherita de Candia, “Italy, Allies or Competitors? Far-Right Parties between Rome and Brussels,” in The Far-Right in the EU Coalition Politics, ed. Salvatore Vassalo (forthcoming).

[67] The meetings of Atreju were founded in 1998 in Rome by Giorgia Meloni, leader of the youth movement of the National Alliance. They are now an annual meeting for debates of Brothers of Italy. The name Atreju comes from the name of the protagonist in German fantasy author Michael Ende’s book, The Neverending Story.

[68] Laure Mandeville, “Steve Bannon se pose en gourou des populistes européens,” Le Figaro, October 8, 2018, https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2018/10/07/01003-20181007ARTFIG00129-populismes-l-inquietante-campagne-europeenne-de-steve-bannon.php?msockid=10623120d84f69c60a7b2094d937684d.

[69] “Musk col figlio in braccio dal palco di Atreju: ‘La natalità cala, fate bambini.’ Le opposizioni: ‘Ipocriti’ ”: La Stama, December 16, 2023, https://www.lastampa.it/politica/2023/12/16/news/atreju_meloni_musk_colloquio_figlio_polemica-13937085/.

[70] Quentin Raverdy, “Entre Giorgia Meloni et Elen Musk c’est (très) sérieux,” Le Point, September 25, 2024, https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/giorgia-meloni-et-elon-musk-derriere-la-romance-des-interets-communs-25-09-2024-2571203_24.php#11.

[71] Il Tempo, “Meloni contro i detrattori di Musk: ‘Primo un genio e oggi un mostro,’ ” Il Tempo, January 3, 2025, https://www.iltempo.it/politica/2025/01/03/news/giorgia-meloni-elon-musk-prima-esaltavano-genio-oggi-mostro-41263686/.

[72] Maria Scopece, “Cos’è la Cpac e perché la Premier Meloni è invitata,” PolicyMaker, February 21, 2025, https://www.policymakermag.it/dal-mondo/cose-la-cpac-e-perche-la-premier-meloni-e-invitata/.

[73] Giorgia Meloni, “God, Homeland, Family: NatCon Rome 2020,” National Conservatism website, February 3–4, 2020, https://nationalconservatism.org/natcon-rome-2020/presenters/giorgia-meloni/.

[74] J. D. Vance, Address to the 61st Meeting of the Munich Security Conference, American Rhetoric: Online Speech Bank, February 14, 2025, https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/JDVance2025vancemunichsecurityconference.htm.

[75] “Meloni al CPAC: ‘Noi conservatori facciamo quello che diciamo, combattiamo per quello in cui crediamo,’ ” La Voce del Patriota, February 23, 2025, https://www.lavocedelpatriota.it/meloni-al-cpac-noi-conservatori-facciamo-quello-che-diciamo-combattiamo-per-quello-in-cui-crediamo-2/.

[76] Roula Khalaf, Amy Kazmin, and Ben Hall, “Italy’s Giorgia Meloni Rejects ‘Childish’ Choice between Trump and Europe,” Financial Times, March 28, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/96d02345-1079-47d0-b208-1e80bcedf684.

[77] Alessandra Ziniti, “Vaticano e tour nella storia, Vance scopre la capitale: ‘Costruita da chi ama Dio,’ ” La Repubblica, April 19, 2025: https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2025/04/19/news/james_david_vance_visita_castel_sant_angelo_ministro_giuli-424137145/.

[78] Francesco Maselli, “En Italie, Charlie Kirk, nouvelle icone de de la droite de Giorgia Meloni,” L’Opinion, September 23, 2025, https://www.lopinion.fr/international/en-italie-charlie-kirk-nouvelle-icone-de-la-droite-de-giorgia-meloni.

[79] Pagella Politica Editorial Board, “Com’è andato l’incontro tra Meloni e Trump,” Pagella Politica, April 18, 2025, https://pagellapolitica.it/articoli/incontro-meloni-trump-stati-uniti.

[80] Pierangelo Isierna and Francesca Longo, “The Italian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Continuities,” Italian Political Science Review / Rivistia Italiana di Scienza Politica 47, no. 2, special issue, “Italian Foreign Policy: To Take Arms against a Sea of Troubles?” (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, July 2017); Giampiero Giacomello and Bertjan Verbeek, eds., Italy’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: The New Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle Power (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2011).

[81] Sky TG24, “Scontro Trump-Zelensky, Meloni: ‘Ogni divisione dell’Occidente ci rende più deboli,” TG24.sky.it, February 28, 2025, https://tg24.sky.it/mondo/2025/02/28/scontro-trump-zelensky-macron.

[82] Le Monde, “Guerre en Ukraine: Les Européens demandent d’exercer ‘une pression’ sur Moscou, avant le sommet Trump-Poutine,” Le Monde, August 10, 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/international/live/2025/08/10/en-direct-guerre-en-ukraine-les-europeens-demandent-d-exercer-une-pression-sur-moscou-avant-le-sommet-trump-poutine_6626390_3210.html.

[83] Government of Italy, Piano nazionale di ripresa e resilinza: Italia domani, https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/PNRR.pdf.

[84] Green Economy Agency, “Green Deal, Meloni: Approccio ideologico con effetti disastrosi, è suicidio,” greeneconomyagency.it, October 23, 2024, https://geagency.it/breaking-news/green-deal-meloni-approccio-ideologico-con-effetti-disastrosi-e-suicidio/.

[85] Pope Leo XIV, @Pontifex, Twitter/X, September 17, 2025, https://x.com/Pontifex/status/1968283807704076535.

[86] Government of Italy, “Dichiarazione del Presidente del Consiglio, Giorgia Meloni, sulla situazione nella Striscia di Gaza e in Cisgiordania,” Office of the President of the Council of Ministers website, August 21, 205, https://www.governo.it/it/articolo/dichiarazione-del-presidente-del-consiglio-giorgia-meloni-sulla-situazione-nella-striscia.

[87] Alessia Guerrieri, “Meloni: ‘L’Italia non è in guerra in Iran e non intende entrarci,” L’Avennire, March 9, 2026, https://www.avvenire.it/politica/meloni-litalia-in-iran-non-e-in-guerra-e-non-intende-entrarci_105563.

[88] Viviana Mazza, “Trump in esclusiva al Corriere sulla crisi in Medio Oriente e Meloni: ‘L’Italia cerca sempre di offrire un aiuto,’ ” Corriere della Sera, March 8, 2026, https://www.corriere.it/esteri/26_marzo_08/trump-iran-meloni-italia-starmer-096fbf9e-940a-47a6-b8ab-741fde2f9xlk.shtml.

[89] Katie Roger, “Trump Attacks Pope Leo as Too Liberal and ‘Weak on Crime,’ New York Times, April 12, 2026: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/12/us/politics/trump-attacks-pope-leo.html; “Meloni: Inaccettabili le parole di Trump nei confronti del Papa,” Il Sole 24 ore, April 13, 2026, https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/presidente-vescovi-americani-trump-parole-denigratorie-il-papa-AImy4OTC.

[90] Margherita Stancati, “Trump Criticizes Italy’s Meloni, Breaking with Key Ally,” Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2026, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-us-cease-fire-talks-stalled-2026/card/trump-criticizes-italy-s-meloni-breaking-with-key-ally-10wG0AtxsroZGmF7Mmlehttps://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-us-cease-fire-talks-stalled-2026/card/trump-criticizes-italy-s-meloni-breaking-with-key-ally-10wG0AtxsroZGmF7Mmle.

[91] Sophia Khatsenkova, « European Leaders Press ahead with Defensive Mission after Iran Reopening Hormuz,” Euronews, April 17, 2026,  https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/17/european-leaders-press-ahead-with-defensive-mission-after-iran-reopens-hormuz.

[92] Jean-Yves Dormagen, “Face à la guerre et Trump, mesurer l’opinion publique européenne: 10 points sure notre sondage exclusive Eurobazooka,” Le Grand Continent, March 20, 2025, https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2025/03/20/les-europeens-face-a-la-guerre-et-trump-10-points-sur-un-sondage-exclusif/. For 2026, the first survey was done by OnlyNumber on April 16: see https://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/GestioneSondaggio.aspx, The second one, by Istituto Piepoli, was published on April 21. See: https://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/GestioneSondaggio.aspx.

[93] Barbara Gobbi, “Piano pandemico dell’OMS, ecco perché l’Italia si è astenuta (insieme ad altri dieci Paesi),” Il Sole 24 ore, May 21, 2025, https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/piano-pandemico-dell-oms-ecco-perche-l-italia-si-e-astenuta-insieme-ad-altri-dieci-paesi-AHeTv0r?refresh_ce=1.