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Illiberal Technologies: Linking Tech Companies, Democratic Backsliding, and Authoritarianism

By Jasmin Dall’Agnola


As I am writing this introduction, Trump has not only won all major swing states but also the popular vote. Watching America teeter toward another Trump era—a moment one of my U.S. colleagues has described as an “illiberal turning point”—it is clear that this special issue on digital illiberalism could not be timelier. As the United States approached this consequential election, the impact of technology on electoral integrity raised a series of urgent questions. From disinformation and deepfakes to Russian interference and AI-driven bias, technology’s influence on democratic processes has never been more significant.

This issue on digital illiberalism arrives at a critical moment not only for the United States but for societies worldwide, which are contending with similar illiberal forces. Today’s rapidly advancing technologies—particularly information and communication technologies (ICTs) and artificial intelligence (AI)—have unprecedented potential to transform our lives. Yet they also open new avenues for control, manipulation, and privacy violations. Digital tools now empower both governments and corporations to erode individual freedoms and recalibrate power structures in ways unseen in previous eras. From the state wiretapping exposed by the Snowden leaks to the vast data extraction practices of Western tech giants like Meta, X, and Google, driven by profit motives and intense market competition, digital illiberal practices have led to less privacy and more secretive monitoring,[1] not only in authoritarian states but also across democratic societies.

Jasmin Dall’Agnola, “Illiberal Technologies: Linking Tech Companies, Democratic Backsliding, and Authoritarianism,” Journal of Illiberalism Studies 4 no. 3 (Fall 2024): 1-10, https://doi.org/10.53483/XCQS3577.

Like the twentieth-century factory workers who were separated from the knowledge and control of the end product of their labor by the segmentation of production chains across many factories, people in our era often have insufficient knowledge about how information shared on the Internet and gathered via closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras is being used by IT companies and government agencies.[2] The firewalls and paywalls that IT giants erect between how users experience the digital world and how the companies use the consumer experience online further enhance these illiberal practices. At the same time that people’s data is increasingly compromised, the methods and motives of those collecting and manipulating this data often remain shrouded in secrecy.

In this special issue, we delve into the tools, ideologies, and motivations used by state actors and tech corporations to promote digital illiberalism. We begin by advancing a definition of digital illiberalism—distinguishing it from the concept of digital authoritarianism while recognizing the important connections between them. Whereas digital authoritarianism often implies direct and overt state control, typically in authoritarian regimes, digital illiberalism encompasses subtler encroachments on individual freedoms within both authoritarian and democratic contexts. By examining these differences and similarities, we shed light on how the Internet and other advanced technologies can enable illiberal practices, even in societies that uphold democratic values. Below, we explore the dominant themes from the articles in this issue. Our contributors offer critical insights into the challenges and ethical dilemmas at the intersection of digital illiberalism and digital authoritarianism.

Digital Illiberalism versus Digital Authoritarianism

The Internet was originally envisioned as an empowering instrument that would promote democratic values and strengthen civil society across borders. Indeed, digital technologies played a crucial role in various democratic transitions globally, from the post-Soviet space to the Islamic world and Asia Pacific.[3] They facilitated grassroots mobilization and provided alternative information channels that challenged state-controlled media. Yet one development that could hardly have been predicted in the early days of the Internet is how digital tools would ultimately undermine—rather than support—liberalism and democracy over time. As digital technologies evolved, from ICTs to AI and CCTV cameras, they shifted from empowering individuals and fostering democratic ideals to enabling both digital illiberalism and digital authoritarianism. Although these two concepts may share control-oriented goals,[4] they diverge in several ways, with different impacts on individual freedoms and political systems.

Digital illiberalism centers on practices that restrict individual autonomy, often under the guise of protecting security and public order, without dismantling democratic structures outright. In democratic societies, illiberal digital practices manifest themselves through arbitrary, pervasive, technology-enabled surveillance, data collection, and algorithmic manipulation. Governments and tech corporations justify these actions as necessary for national security, market efficiency, and public safety.[5] However, such digital illiberal practices undermine the core values of a liberal democracy—specifically, individual privacy and personal dignity, as revealed by the Snowden leaks[6] and the 2018 Cambridge Analytica scandal.[7] So, while illiberal practices in the digital realm infringe on individual rights, they do not necessarily challenge democratic institutions directly. Instead, they subtly erode democratic norms, diminishing the quality of democratic participation while leaving the broader democratic framework intact.

Digital authoritarianism, on the other hand, aims to consolidate state power and dismantle accountability mechanisms, transparency, and political pluralism. Digital authoritarian practices extend beyond limiting personal freedoms: They are used to actively suppress opposition, manipulate information, and obstruct collective democratic engagement.[8] These actions undermine democratic processes by silencing dissent, often through direct censorship, media control, and state-sponsored disinformation campaigns. As Glasius and Michaelsen note, authoritarianism’s core feature is sabotaged accountability, which makes it a threat not only to individual rights but to democratic processes broadly. This form of control goes beyond influencing public opinion; it seeks to dominate it by restricting information access, imposing a singular narrative, and suppressing alternative perspectives.

The methods used in illiberal and authoritarian practices further differentiate these approaches. Digital illiberalism tends to operate indirectly, using technology-enabled surveillance, data manipulation, and algorithms that influence behavior and shape public discourse often without people’s knowledge. For instance, Big Tech algorithms designed to maximize engagement on social media can create echo chambers, polarization, and distorted public debates. These algorithms, as Marlene Laruelle[9] and Paul Kanevskiy[10] describe, contribute to the “gamification of the public space” and undermine civic consensus and the common good. Although digital illiberal practices can impair individual freedoms and erode trust in democratic norms, they generally fall short of direct censorship or intimidation. In contrast, digital authoritarianism relies on both covert and overt methods, such as direct censorship, strict control over the media, and extensive monitoring.[11] These forceful measures suppress dissent and prevent democratic organization, as seen in regimes, such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, which employ nationalized digital infrastructures to restrict foreign information access and maintain control over citizens. Overall, while digital illiberal practices work subtly within democratic frameworks, digital authoritarian practices fundamentally oppose democratic engagement and seek to eliminate it.

Digital illiberalism and digital authoritarianism also differ in scope and reach. Digital illiberal practices often target specific groups (e.g., terrorists, minorities) and sectors (e.g., the media) within society that are perceived as threats to public order. These actions may be rationalized as “necessary evils” in democratic societies, creating a paradox in which democratic institutions exist formally but are undermined in practice. Therefore, digital illiberalism is selective, with its effects felt unevenly across society. By contrast, digital authoritarianism applies on a much broader scale, targeting society as a whole to ensure compliance and loyalty to the authorities. Authoritarian regimes use digital technologies—from ICTs to CCTV cameras—to surveil, censor, and control both public and private life, consolidating their power by stifling dissent and reinforcing a singular narrative. China’s Great Firewall exemplifies digital authoritarian control by restricting access to foreign information sources, ensuring that all citizens receive only state-approved narratives.[12] In contrast, the Chinese government’s extensive monitoring of the Uyghur population—targeting a single ethnic group—could be framed as a practice of digital illiberalism.

In terms of impact, illiberal practices in the digital realm erode democratic norms by limiting individual freedoms and reducing the quality of public debate, but they do not fully obstruct democratic engagement. For example, in Poland, an “anti-censorship” law was enacted in 2021 that prevents social media platforms from removing content unless it violates Polish law, thereby transferring significant control of content moderation to the Polish government. Critics argue this law may allow harmful content to persist while restricting meaningful debate, subtly influencing public discourse without outright banning democratic engagement.[13] The latter process can gradually erode public trust and polarize societies, yet it often occurs within democratic structures. By contrast, authoritarian practices in the digital realm directly undermine democratic foundations by preventing opposition, eliminating accountability, and fostering a climate of fear. For example, the Iranian government frequently restricts Internet and social media access during protests,[14] such as after Mahsa Amini’s death in 2022, to prevent mobilization and information-sharing. This digital clampdown severely limits Iranians’ ability to organize, access uncensored news, and express dissent. Therefore, digital authoritarian actions disable public oversight and block freedom of expression, ultimately making democratic engagement nearly impossible.

Nevertheless, the lines between practices of digital illiberalism and digital authoritarianism often blur. Surveillance and data collection practices and technologies originating in democratic contexts are increasingly used by authoritarian regimes to monitor and control citizens, as the recent revelation of the Pegasus spyware scandal highlights.[15] Similarly, state actors have repurposed data-driven techniques from tech giants like Meta. For instance, in the Israel-Palestine conflict, content moderation practices were used to suppress pro-Palestinian narratives and align with government-backed propaganda.[16] This demonstrates how both democratic and authoritarian states leverage commercial platforms for censorship. This convergence complicates the distinction between digital illiberalism and digital authoritarianism, as both forms of control increasingly operate together, signaling a shift in digital technology’s role from a liberating tool to an instrument of control.

About this Special Issue

This special issue of the Journal of Illiberalism Studies aims to shed light on the complex interaction between digital illiberalism and digital authoritarianism, along with the diverse actors engaged in these practices. The idea for this issue emerged during a lunch meeting between Marlene Laruelle and me in Washington, D.C., in March 2023. I had just joined Marlene’s team through a Swiss National Science Foundation Postdoc.Mobility Fellowship to work on my project examining Central Asian autocrats’ use of smart city technologies. While discussing our shared interests in technology, authoritarianism, and illiberalism, we quickly noticed a gap in the literature: There are few studies examining the intersections of digital illiberalism and digital authoritarianism or how digital illiberalism can amplify authoritarian tendencies in both democratic and autocratic societies. This realization led us to draft a call for papers exploring the tools, ideologies, and motivations of actors involved in digital illiberal practices across democratic and authoritarian contexts.

Most of the contributions in this special issue primarily address digital illiberal practices in authoritarian-leaning countries, such as China, North Korea, Russia, and Hungary. Only three of the eight articles examine digital illiberal practices in democratic contexts, all focusing on actors in the United States.

This is unsurprising, since political leaders in China, Russia, Hungary, and, increasingly, the United States have been identified as exhibiting illiberal characteristics, drawing academic attention to these country cases.[17] For instance, Chinese President Xi Jinping is known for advancing digital authoritarianism through initiatives like the Digital Silk Road,[18] while also promoting an illiberal agenda that redefines governance and restricts freedoms that were previously allowed in the post-Mao period of limited liberal legal principles.[19] Vladimir Putin’s use of mass surveillance technologies to suppress democracy and violate human rights is a hallmark of his digital authoritarianism[20]; meanwhile, his alliance with the Russian Orthodox Church projects illiberal values onto state institutions.[21] The contributions in this special issue enrich previous scholarship by focusing on the tool kit used by these political leaders to promote both digital illiberal and authoritarian practices. They also support previous scholars’ findings that illiberalism has other proponents—including the media[22] and tech companies[23]—that can contribute to the spread of digital illiberalism and authoritarianism.

The prominence of U.S.-based tech moguls relative to their peers from other countries explains our issue’s exclusive focus on them. Many of the most influential and controversial global tech leaders, such as Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk, and Jeff Bezos, are based in the United States. Numerous privacy scandals—from Snowden’s revelations to the Cambridge Analytica affair—have revealed how these U.S. tech entrepreneurs drive digital illiberalism by creating infrastructures to collect data, which they then sell or share with government agencies and corporations.[24] The contributions in this special issue deepen previous scholarship on U.S. tech corporations and entrepreneurs’ involvement in digital illiberal practices, by enriching our understanding of their ideologies and methods. They align with Adrienne LaFrance’ observation that U.S. tech moguls, despite historically professing Enlightenment values, have instead fostered “an antidemocratic, illiberal movement”.[25] While this special issue primarily addresses U.S. tech companies and moguls, we should remember that they are not the only actors advancing digital illiberalism in the 21st century. Influential tech entrepreneurs outside the U.S., such as TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew of Singapore and Spotify CEO Daniel Ek of Sweden, also play significant roles in shaping global digital practices. Future research should broaden the focus beyond the United States to explore ideologies and motivations in the tech sector that drive digital illiberal practices on a global scale.

When looking at our current issue, it stands to bear in mind the challenges of researching illiberalism within Western democratic contexts, where scholars may depend on funding from institutions and corporations with specific ideological perspectives.[26] Tech giants like Google and Meta have dramatically increased their charitable contributions to university campuses in recent years, giving them considerable influence over academics studying such critical topics as artificial intelligence, social media, and disinformation.[27] This financial dependence could result in a form of self-censorship, where scholars prioritize topics and perspectives that are likely to be well received by these funders, while potentially neglecting more critical approaches that challenge prevailing views. Ironically, our call for papers may itself have been affected by algorithmic biases introduced by tech moguls on social media, which might have limited its reach to certain academic audiences.

Finally, an important caveat: The recent U.S. presidential election demonstrates that digital tools are not the only forces driving the decline of liberal democracy. Donald Trump’s victory in both the Electoral College and popular vote was not solely due to his alliance with illiberal tech mogul Elon Musk or digital media strategies. Instead, Trump’s unconventional outreach—such as trolling Kamala Harris by serving French fries at a Pennsylvania McDonald’s or holding a news conference in front of a garbage truck while wearing an orange safety vest—played a significant role in gaining support among working-class Black and Hispanic voters, helping to forge a new, cross-racial working-class coalition. Trump’s real-world engagement suggests that, while digital illiberalism shapes the political landscape, deeper socioeconomic issues remain crucial to understanding democratic backsliding and the rise and return of illiberal leaders like Trump.

In this Issue

This special issue opens with Jieun Baek’s study that draws attention to how the North Korean regime’s digital tools reinforce state power through intensive surveillance, ideological programming, and strict content restrictions. Drawing on in-depth interviews with North Korean defectors, Baek shows how North Korea’s digital strategies blend digital authoritarianism with illiberal practices, limiting personal freedoms and enforcing ideological conformity while systematically restricting access to global information. Her work underscores the regime’s dual approach: on the one hand, it leverages authoritarian control to suppress dissent, and, on the other, it employs an illiberal strategy of curtailing access to alternative information and autonomy, mirroring tactics in other contexts. Through this lens, Baek reveals the tension between state control and citizen defiance, as some North Koreans push back through hacking and other forms of quiet resistance.

Building on the theme of digital illiberal practices in authoritarian settings, Anastassiya Mahon and Scott Walker examine how Russia combines digital surveillance with traditional forms of repression, particularly during the Ukraine conflict. Their analysis reveals how digital tools enable the Kremlin to enhance state control, not only by intensifying repression but also by manipulating collective memory and public narratives, a tactic that merges authoritarian and illiberal practices. This dual strategy—employing both coercive measures and digital channels to influence historical memory and shape perceptions—blurs the line between suppressing dissent through overt control and limiting democratic agency through the subtle rewriting of history. Mahon and Walker argue that this strategy reflects an increasingly sophisticated model of state control that extends beyond conventional authoritarian tactics, showcasing a convergence where digital illiberalism supports and deepens the authoritarian regime’s power.

Following this, Kirill et al. focus on the strategic deployment of e-voting during Russia’s 2024 presidential election, examining how the system, ostensibly introduced to boost transparency, has been transformed into a tool of “preventive repression.” Their analysis highlights how e-voting subtly manipulates electoral outcomes by embedding surveillance, allowing the state to shape electoral legitimacy and public perception without visible coercion. While not inherently illiberal, e-voting, in the context of Russia, becomes a means of reinforcing authoritarianism when used to suppress genuine voter intent and disconnect public sentiment from official election results.

Chamila Liyanage then shifts the focus to China, where major Chinese tech firms support state-led bio-surveillance programs targeting ethnic minorities, especially the Uyghurs, through invasive data collection practices. Drawing on expert testimony and witness accounts, Liyanage reveals the Chinese government’s use of AI-managed genetic databases to both control and exploit minority populations, highlighting the alarming implications of state-sponsored bio-data abuse linked to organ harvesting. Her contribution also examines the global export of China’s surveillance technologies, in particular, how the Digital Silk Road facilitates the spread of similar illiberal practices in countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The issue then turns to Hungary, where Eszter Kirs examines how the pro-government media marginalizes youth-led resistance movements. Her discourse analysis reveals that these media outlets portray protesters as anti-national and frivolous, which has the effect of discrediting public dissent and discouraging youth engagement in politics. This framing by the pro-government media reinforces digital illiberalism by delegitimizing protests as democratic expressions, thus entrenching state influence over public discourse and further suppressing democratic engagement among Hungary’s youth.

Shifting from Hungary to the United States, Renée Ridgway expands the discussion on digital illiberalism by examining how geolocation data is used as a tool for state surveillance. Ridgway investigates Google Maps’ geolocation tracking practices and how U.S. law enforcement employs tools like geofence warrants to access citizens’ geolocation data. Her case study of an Arizona man wrongly accused of murder highlights growing concerns about privacy violations, particularly as surveillance technologies enable state actors to bypass traditional legal protections. Her piece underscores how the illiberal nightmare of geolocation tracking, once predicted and thematized in Hollywood films like Enemy of the State (1998), has long become a reality for U.S. citizens.

Steven Livingston and Michael Miller continue this discussion by exploring “digital surrogate organizations” within the U.S., like Qanon, far-right crowdfunding platforms, and influential tech moguls such as Peter Thiel. They argue that these digital entities, enabled by conspiracy-fueled algorithms, weaken traditional democratic boundaries within the Republican Party, amplifying illiberal ideologies and fueling democratic backsliding.

The issue concludes with Arsenio Cuenca and Jaime Caro’s provocative analysis of Elon Musk’s ideology. They argue that Musk’s views align with those of illiberal political leaders, such as Viktor Orbán, as Musk advocates pronatalist policies, amplifies far-right voices and frames wokeness and multiculturalism as societal threats on his social media platform X (formerly Twitter). By examining Musk’s role in shaping public discourse and potentially influencing global policy, Cuenca and Caro underscore the profound impact that influential tech figures can have on democratic norms.

As Trump has tasked Musk with coleading the new “Department of Government Efficiency” together with Vivek Ramaswamy, it is clear that Musk’s actions could have far-reaching consequences. We can only hope that, in the event of an asteroid collision, Musk—unlike his alter ego Peter Isherwell (a billionaire with questionable priorities) from the Netflix film Don’t Look Up (2021)—would prove us wrong by choosing humanity over his own ideological agenda.


[1] David Murakami Wood and Steve Wright, “Editorial: Before and After Snowden,” Surveillance & Society 13, no. 2 (July 2015): 132–138, https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v13i2.5710; Marlies Glasius and Marcus Michaelsen, “Illiberal and Authoritarian Practices in the Digital Sphere — Prologue,” International Journal Of Communication 12, no.19 (2018): 3795–3813, https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/8899; Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2019).

[2] Grégoire Mallard, “Critical Theory in The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: How to Regulate the Production and Use of Personal Information in the Digital Age,” Law & Social Inquiry 47, no. 1 (February 2022): 349–354. https://doi.org/10.1017/lsi.2021.80.

[3] Barrie Axford, “Talk About a Revolution: Social Media and the MENA Uprisings,” Globalisations 8, no.5 (November 2011): 681–686, https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2011.621281; Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People Is Greater Than the People in Power: A Memoir (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012); Olga Onuch, “EuroMaidan Protests in Ukraine: Social Media Versus Social Networks,” Problems of Post-Communism 62, no. 4 (June 2015): 217–235. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2015.1037676.

[4] Julian Waller, “Illiberalism and Authoritarianism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism, ed. Marlene Laruelle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197639108.013.1; Glasius and Michaelsen, “Illiberal and Authoritarian Practices in the Digital Sphere”.

[5] David Murakami Wood, “The Global Turn to Authoritarianism and After,” Surveillance & Society 15, no. 3-4 (August 2017): 357–370, https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v15i3/4.6835; Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism.

[6] Murakami Wood and Wright, “Before and After Snowden”, 134.

[7] Hagar Afriat, Shira Dvir-Gvirsman, Keren Tsuriel, and Lidor Ivan “‘This Is Capitalism. It Is Not Illegal’: Users’ Attitudes toward Institutional Privacy Following the Cambridge Analytica Scandal,”” The Information Society 37, no.2 (March 2021): 115–127. https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1870596.

[8] Steven Feldstein, “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: How Artificial Intelligence is Reshaping Repression,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 1 (January 2019):40–52, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-road-to-digital-unfreedom-how-artificial-intelligence-is-reshaping-repression/; Steven Feldstein, The Rise of Digital Repression. How Technology is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021); Jennifer Earl, Thomas V. Maher, and Jennifer Pan, “The Digital Repression of Social Movements, Protest, and Activism: A Synthetic Review,” Science Advances 8, no. 10 (March 2022): 1–15, https://www.science.org/doi/epdf/10.1126/sciadv.abl8198.

[9] Marlene Laruelle, “Introduction: Illiberalism Studies as a Field” in The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism, ed. Marlene Laruelle (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2023). https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197639108.013.49.

[10] Pavel Kanevskiy, “Digital Illiberalism and the Erosion of the Liberal International Order,” In The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, eds. Julia Berghofer, Andrew Futter, Clemens Häusler, Maximilian Hoell and Juraj Nosál (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023): 3–21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_1.

[11] Ildar Daminov, “When Do Authoritarian Regimes Use Digital Technologies for Covert Repression? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Politico-Economic Conditions,” Swiss Political Science Review (June 2024), https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12607; Bakhytzhan Kurmanov and Colin Knox, “Digital Activism and Authoritarian Legitimation in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” The Information Society (July 2024), https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2024.2374714.

[12] Ronald Deibert, RESET: Reclaiming the Internet for Civil Society (Toronto Canda: House of Anansi Press, 2020).

[13] Tech Against Terrorism, “The Online Regulation Series: Poland,” techagainstterrorism, 16 November 2021, available from: https://techagainstterrorism.org/news/2021/11/16/the-online-regulation-series-poland.

[14] Azadeh Akbari and Rashid Gabdulhakov, “Platform Surveillance and Resistance in Iran and Russia: The Case of Telegram,” Surveillance and Society 17, no. 1/2 (March 2019): 223–231, https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v17i1/2.12928.

[15] Kalin Robinson, “How Israel’s Pegasus Spyware Stoked the Surveillance Debate,” Council on Foreign Relations, 8 March 2022, available from: https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-israels-pegasus-spyware-stoked-surveillance-debate.

[16] Human Rights Watch, ”Meta’s Broken Promises: Systemic Censorship of Palestine Content on Instagram and Facebook,” Human Rights Watch, 21 December 2023, available from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/12/21/metas-broken-promises/systemic-censorship-palestine-content-instagram-and.

[17] Marlene Laruelle, Russia’s ‘Fascism’ or ‘Illiberalism’?’ Is Russia Fascist? Unraveling Propaganda East and West (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021); Joshua Tait, “American Illiberal Thinkers” in The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism, (ed) Marlene Laruelle (Oxford United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197639108.013.33; Eva Pils, “Contending Illiberalisms in the People’s Republic of China” The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism, (ed) Marlene Laruelle (Oxford United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197639108.013.44; Tímea Drinóczi and Agnieszka Bień-Kacała “Illiberal Constitutionalism in Central and Eastern European States” in The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism (ed) Marlene Laruelle (Oxford United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197639108.013.22.

[18] Luis Da Vinha, “Smart for Whom? Africa’s Smart Cities and Digital Authoritarianism,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 37, no. 3 (2024): 941–959, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2284629

[19] Pils, “Contending Illiberalisms in the People’s Republic of China”.

[20] Laura Howells and Laura A. Henry “Varieties of Digital Authoritarianism: Analyzing Russia’s Approach to Internet Governance,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 54, no. 4 (December 2021): 1–27, https://doi.org/10.1525/j.postcomstud.2021.54.4.1

[21] Ivan Grek, “Grassroots Origins of Russia’s Illiberalism” in The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism (ed) Marlene Laruelle (Oxford United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197639108.013.28.

[22] Reece Peck, “The Illiberalism of Fox News: Theorizing Nationalism and Populism Through the Case of Conservative America’s Number One News Source,” in The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism (ed) Marlene Laruelle (Oxford United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197639108.013.17; Václav Štětka and Sabina Mihelj, “Media and Illiberalism” in The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism (ed) Marlene Laruelle (Oxford United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197639108.013.31.

[23] Azadeh Akbari, “Authoritarian Smart City: A Research Agenda,” Surveillance & Society 20, no. 4 (December 2022): 441–449, https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v20i4.15964.

[24] Zuboff Surveillance Capitalism

[25] Adrienne La France, “The Rise of Techno-Authoritarianism” The Atlantic, 30 January 2024, available from: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2024/03/facebook-meta-silicon-valley-politics/677168/.

[26] Marlene Laruelle, “Wrestling with Ethical Issues in Studying Illiberalism: Some Remarks from the U.S. Context”, Journal of Illiberalism Studies 4, no. 1 (Spring 2024): 57–63, https://doi.org/10.53483/XCOW3568.

[27] Joseph Menn and Naomi Nix, “Big Tech Funds the Very People Who are Supposed to Hold it Accountable,” The Washington Post, 7 December 2023, available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/12/06/academic-research-meta-google-university-influence/.

Jasmin Dall'Agnola

Postdoctoral researcher, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland