Illiberalism’s Quest for Security: A Cross-National Analysis of Illiberal Ideological Components

Illiberalism’s Quest for Security: A Cross-National Analysis of Illiberal Ideological Components

Francesco Melito

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Keywords: illiberalism, liberalism, ontological insecurity, nationalism, hegemony, discourse theory

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For over a decade, scholars have noted an illiberal turn in the West, eroding the foundations of liberal democracy. While Central-Eastern Europe has been at the forefront of this illiberal backlash,[1] the contestation of the post-1989 liberal-democratic system has spread across several countries.[2] Initially, anti-establishment mobilization prompted many observers to frame this challenge in terms of populism. As the “populist moment” has transitioned from rupture to normalization, many so-called populist parties have become integrated into national political systems, and have developed institutionalized structures.[3] This evolution suggests that populism is a variable component of these parties, perhaps better understood as a discursive logic of articulation that pits the people against the elite,[4] rather than an ideology.[5] Instead, we observe certain enduring common features that, opposing the core principles of liberalism, can be more aptly described as part of an ideological framework here defined as illiberalism.

While the adjective “illiberal” has been used since the late 1990s to characterize certain democratic regimes,[6] only recently has illiberalism emerged as a specific concept attracting considerable scholarly attention.[7] Although a consensus on its definition is yet to be reached, illiberalism denotes an ideological alternative to liberalism, promising to arrest the fatalism depicted by what Spain’s Vox party leader, Santiago Abascal, has called the “progressive dictatorship.”[8] In this context, this article applies the concept of hegemony as a crucial lens for viewing the dynamics of the illiberal challenge. As the antithesis of liberalism,[9] illiberalism is primarily a counter-hegemonic project that contests the post-1989 order,[10] insofar as it became marked by “the victory of liberalism … in the realm of ideas or consciousness.”[11] Its negative dimension entails a rejection of the core principles of liberalism, accompanied by a positive discursive construction, offering an essentialist worldview to cope with the challenges of a globalized and fluid world.

This article has a twofold purpose. First, it examines the illiberal discourse of four European political leaders from Italy, Spain, Hungary, and Poland, aiming to advance our understanding of illiberalism through empirical analysis. Using insights from poststructuralist discourse theory (PDT), the qualitative analysis identifies the core ideological components shared by these leaders across different contexts. Second, it seeks to enhance the conceptual framework of illiberalism by exploring it as a reaction to the ontological insecurity triggered by progressive liberalism.

The article is structured as follows: first, it discusses recent literature on illiberalism, highlighting growing insecurity as a trigger for its rise; second, it outlines the methodological framework for the empirical analysis based on PDT; third, it presents the selected case studies; fourth, it discusses the main findings of the illiberal discourse of the analyzed leaders, focusing on both its negative (performance of crisis) and positive (ideological construction) dimensions. Finally, it concludes by suggesting that illiberalism can be considered an umbrella ideology, including specific subcategories (e.g., traditionalism, nationalism), yet discursively articulated as the opposing equivalent to a general liberal worldview.

The Missing Piece of Illiberalism: Insecurity

The distinction between illiberal democracy and illiberalism is pivotal, as the former indicates a political regime while the latter refers to an ideology. Kauth and King highlight this distinction by differentiating between “disruptive illiberalism” (opposition to liberal-democratic procedures) and “ideological illiberalism.”[12] However, they characterize the latter as “practices that emerge from the politics of exclusion,” failing to clearly distinguish between practices and ideology, and risking a conflation of illiberalism with other concepts, such as nativism.[13] Instead, rather than merely describing a regime, illiberalism should be seen as an ideological counterrevolution aimed at overturning the hegemonic liberal worldview.[14]

Based on this crucial assumption, I define the concept of illiberalism as a discourse[15] that opposes liberalism across various domains, adopting the framework provided by Marlene Laruelle while supplementing it with additional features. According to Laruelle:

illiberalism is a new ideological universe [which] represents a backlash against today’s liberalism in all its varied scripts—political, economic, cultural, geopolitical, civilizational, … proposes solutions that are majoritarian, nation-centric or sovereigntist, favouring traditional hierarchies and cultural homogeneity; and it calls for a shift from politics to culture and is post-post-modern in its claims of rootedness in an age of globalization.[16]

An essential aspect of this definition places illiberalism in a relational position vis-à-visliberalism. Illiberalism is characterized ex negativo, defined primarily through its opposition to the main principles of liberalism. At the same time, Laruelle is careful to note that not everything non-liberal belongs to the illiberal family. Rather, illiberalism emerges specifically as a reaction in those regions that have experienced liberalism. In other words, it can be described as post-liberalism.[17] This perspective partially aligns with Zielonka’s idea of a post-1989 illiberal counterrevolution, wherein illiberal actors aim to reverse the post-Cold War political system in the West.[18] This interpretation, which frames contemporary liberalism as the hegemonic worldview, accounts for illiberalism’s novelty, distinguishing it from other ideologies like conservativism. However, while Laruelle effectively captures the visible surface of illiberalism, it can be argued that this definition addresses its symbolized aspects, leaving its deeper, real dimension unexamined.[19] Why, for example, should the emphasis on national sovereignty necessarily be categorized as illiberal rather than simply nationalist?

Defining illiberalism in contrast to an already vast and diverse ideology such as liberalism presents challenges. Liberalism is indeed a multifaceted and evolving ideology, notoriously difficult to pin down, having developed over centuries.[20] To avoid this potential pitfall and the avalanche of exceptions that would hit the use of the concept after empirical analysis, it is crucial to explain the post-post-modern character of illiberalism.[21] Rather than reacting to all of liberalism’s various and diverse manifestations, illiberalism fundamentally opposes the consequences and core principles of the liberal worldview in its thin version. In its early stages, liberalism was closely tied to the idea of liberation from authority: freedom from noble and ecclesiastical privileges, economic restrictions, and oppressive rule. As Alisa Carse explains, the liberal individual is “the locus of moral judgment and choice” and “the final adjudicator of morality,”[22] implying that, in liberal theory, only the individual possesses the authority to decide what is morally demanded and morally good. Historically, this radical individualism was tempered by other moral authorities—vestiges of the past—that imposed limits on self-determination. However, the rise of postmodern values, in particular following the cultural revolution of the 1960s, disrupted the old heteronomous pillars of traditional values, prompting a backlash against the liberalization of values.[23] The subsequent growing relevance of postmaterialist values accelerated over the following decades, simultaneously creating more and more space for reactionary illiberal discourses, and fueling a “noisy counter-revolution … against post-industrial liberal democracy and its universalistic, inclusive, and non-authoritarian cultural underpinnings.”[24]

Thus, illiberalism is not merely a blanket rejection of the vast and complex ideological landscape of liberalism—indeed, certain forms of liberalism, such as economic liberalism, are embraced by some illiberal actors. Rather, at least in its cultural guise,[25] it opposes the self-styled progressive form of liberalism, which foregrounds individual emancipation at the expense of a broader system of norms, whether these stem from the nation, traditions, or religion. As argued by the Polish conservative philosopher Ryszard Legutko, the member of a liberal-democratic society “rejects a vast share of loyalties and commitments that until not long ago shackled him, in particular those that were imposed on him through the tutelage of religion, social morality, and tradition.”[26] Using an expression by Erich Fromm, the “negative freedom” (that is, freedom from something, as opposed to “positive freedom,” being the freedom to do or to be something)[27] championed by liberalism disempowers these heteronomous moral authorities, emancipating the individual from external beliefs, even though “simultaneously he is freed from those ties which used to give him security and a feeling of belonging.”[28]

In practical terms, liberalism elevates individual rights above national or communitarian interests, individual choice over collective morality, individual emancipation over community values, and secularism over religion. In essence, it prioritizes autonomous freedom of choice over heteronomous principles. However, as argued by Zygmunt Bauman, the displacement of religion, national belonging, and family in favor of individual emancipation within a globalized world has become a significant source of Unsicherheit (insecurity).[29] While traditional structures, however oppressive, once provided stability and meaning, fluid identities now demand continuous individual effort to reshape and affirm one’s sense of self. At the heart of illiberalism lies the need to address this lack of ontological security caused by axiological individualism and promoted by the progressive and postmodern version of liberalism. Accordingly, the emphasis illiberal actors place on national sovereignty, traditions, and cultural homogeneity does not simply mirror liberalism negatively. Illiberalism offers a promise to resolve this existential uncertainty by providing a collective safe haven larger than the individual, liberating people from the burden of free choice imposed by postmodern liberalism.[30]

Methodological Remarks

This study employs insights from PDT[31] to scrutinize the counter-hegemonic strategy of illiberal actors. PDT, concerned with the emergence and sedimentation of discourses and practices,[32] provides a framework for analyzing how illiberal discourse is constructed and how it challenges the liberal hegemony. The qualitative analysis focuses on the discursive connections between various illiberal elements and their antagonistic stance toward liberalism.

Crucially, the focus on discourse implies that the political leaders under scrutiny are not the primary objects of analysis. From a PDT perspective, illiberalism is viewed as a discourse that precedes and transcends illiberal actors, who act primarily as vehicles for articulating illiberal demands.[33] This aligns with Maarten Hajer’s concept of “discourse coalition,” defined as “a group of actors that, in the context of an identifiable set of practices, shares the usage of a particular set of story lines over a particular period of time.”[34] Accordingly, the selected four leaders are not treated as expressions of a monolithic and coherent illiberal worldview. As Hajer notes, members of a discourse coalition might even contradict themselves.[35] However, the leaders were selected as they are considered representative mouthpieces of illiberalism because their speeches articulate key illiberal demands, among other themes. Thus, it is not relevant whether they share or not political ties or whether, at times, express liberal ideas. The focus of the research is on illiberalism itself.

To analyze the discursive construction of illiberalism, the research focuses on its political logic, which indicates “the ways in which dislocation is discursively articulated or symbolized.”[36] This counter-hegemonic discursive strategy can be divided into two main phases, which cover the negative andpositive sides of dislocation.[37] The first step for articulating a new discourse is by performing a crisis. The failures of liberalism are elevated to crises, performed to disrupt the previous hegemonic order. Drawing on the model proposed by Benjamin Moffitt, three moments were identified for the current analysis: (1) identification of a failure signaling that which is lacking within a discourse (the “lack” in the Lacanian sense), which is then (2) mediated and performed in a series of empirical crises, and (3) identification of the enemies responsible for the crisis.[38]

Regarding the positive construction of discourse, PDT offers comprehensive analytical tools to critically explain the political logic sustaining hegemonizing discursive practices.[39] According to Martin Nonhoff, three essential stratagems must be deployed to launch an offensive counter-hegemonic strategy, aiming at overcoming the “lack” in discourse: equivalence, antagonism, and representation.[40] (1) A relation of equivalence is established between two different elements, yet equivalent in relation to a third element. Notwithstanding their differential nature, political demands—as Laclau would name them[41]—can be articulated in a chain of equivalence as they are equivalent in relation to the same thing which is lacking. The latter lies beneath the surface of representation, requiring a further move involving (2) the creation of an antagonistic division of the discursive space. Sharing the same “lack,” the chain of equivalence is constructed through relations of contrariety with opposite elements. In a hegemonic confrontation, this results in two competing chains of equivalence.[42] (3) Finally, certain discursive elements are elevated as nodal points to represent the chain of equivalence. These nodal points, as “empty signifiers,” fill the void within discourse. As Laclau put it:

In a situation of radical disorder “order” is present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of this absence. In this sense, various political forces can compete in their efforts to present their particular objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack. To hegemonize something is exactly to carry out this filling function.[43]

As part of a chain of equivalence, empty signifiers do not merely represent and structure a discourse, but gain meaning through their articulation with other elements. For instance, the meaning of democracy changes significantly depending on whether it is articulated with the rule of law or with majoritarianism (as we will see in the empirical part, the same applies to the meaning of freedom). Since articulation is a “practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice,”[44] this is extremely relevant as PDT analysis goes beyond description to reveal how meanings shift through articulatory hegemonic practices.

Case Selection

The analysis covers six emblematic speeches delivered by political leaders in Spain (Santiago Abascal, leader of the Vox party), Italy (Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, leader of the Brothers of Italy party, Fratelli d’Italia: FdI), Poland (former Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of the Law and Justice party, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: PiS) and Hungary (Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, leader of the Fidesz party). Initially, four speeches per leader from 2019 were selected. To enhance the research’s validity, an additional speech by Kaczyński in 2019 and another by Meloni in 2021 were included, as discussed below.

Speeches were selected based on the significance of their political impact and incorporation of key illiberal themes. Abascal’s was the closing speech in Vox’s electoral campaign, summarizing the party’s key political positions ahead of the April 2019 Spanish general election, when the party gained parliamentary representation for the first time.[45] Meloni’s 2019 speech—famously known in Italy as the “I am Giorgia” (“Io sono Giorgia”) speech—captured public attention and, arguably, marked a pivotal moment in the push toward her electoral victory in 2022.[46] Due to its relevance in the Italian political debate, its selection was a natural choice. However, as delivered during an antigovernment rally in Rome, part of the speech covered many themes targeting specific politicians, which were therefore irrelevant for this research. For this reason, a second speech by Meloni was included in the text corpus.[47] Delivered in Madrid at a Vox rally and highlighting the ideological affinity between the two parties, it was partially a translation of the “I am Giorgia” speech while also exploring illiberal themes in greater depth. Kaczyński’s speeches took place in Lublin and Kraków as part of the PiS 2019 Polish general election campaign. The Lublin speech was selected as it was presented at the party’s program convention, the main event of the PiS electoral campaign.[48] While placing great emphasis on traditional values, presented at the beginning of the speech as the cornerstone of the party’s platform, Kaczyński, due to the nature of the event, also addressed the full PiS agenda, dedicating considerable attention to other policy areas. Thus, as for Meloni, a second speech from the same electoral campaign was added to the corpus as it provided a more focused discussion on specific issues relevant to this research.[49] Finally, Orbán’s selected speech was delivered at the 2019 Tusnádfürdő/Băile Tuşnad meeting, where he annually articulates his political vision.[50] Significantly, Orbán’s famous speech on illiberal democracy was held at the same meeting in 2014.[51] Four speeches were analyzed in the original language. Meloni’s Madrid speech, which was delivered in Spanish, was analyzed using the Italian translation from Meloni’s official website, while the analysis of Orbán’s speech relied on the English version provided by the Hungarian Cabinet Office’s official webpage.

As elaborated above, the object of analysis is the illiberal discourse contained in the speeches. The selected actors were not chosen for their being inherently illiberal or for necessarily sharing the same political views. Rather, they represent diverse cultural and political origins, reflecting significant differences among them. In this respect, it should not be surprising if they shift their stances over time or, occasionally, espouse liberal positions on certain matters. The goal, indeed, is not to classify these actors as necessarily illiberal. However, discourse still requires mouthpieces to circulate and cannot exist outside the collective action of agents.[52] Based on a preliminary analysis and prior research, these leaders were identified and selected because they could potentially express illiberal ideas; therefore, they can be considered as the “organic intellectuals” of a cross-national illiberal discourse coalition.[53] In other words, these actors advocate similar illiberal demands and construct antagonism against the liberal hegemony.

Since the goal of this research is to investigate the shared illiberal core beyond local variations, the analysis included leaders from different countries. Yet their selection was not arbitrary. First, the sample comprises both incumbent (Fidesz and, at the time of the speeches, PiS) and opposition parties (Vox and, at the time of the speeches, FdI). Second, while leaders from Italy and Spain may express illiberal ideas, the term illiberalism is never used in their contexts. In Romance languages, the term literally implies the denial of freedom (for example, in the context of this study, libertà in Italian; libertad in Spanish), making it politically taboo, at least in a liberal democratic context such as in the European Union or where liberalism is not highly politicized as an ideology. Third, in Central-Eastern Europe, illiberalism is often framed as part of an anticolonial narrative, denouncing liberalism as a Western imposition.[54] For historical reasons, this anticolonial framing is absent in European countries that did not experience Soviet influence and the subsequent return to the West. Despite these contextual differences, the following analysis seeks to demonstrate how illiberalism emerges as a coherent discourse capable of transcending national boundaries.

The Performed Crises of Liberalism

As noted by several authors,[55] the failures of liberalism have given rise to alternative discourses seeking to replace the liberal hegemony. The so-called populist moment[56] can be considered the initial phase of liberalism’s contestation, when, as Gramsci would put it, “a great variety of morbid symptoms appear[ed].”[57] After a few years, illiberalism emerged and sedimented as the most promising counter-hegemonic challenger, achieving significant victories in terms of political and intellectual power.[58] While liberalism remains the dominant paradigm in the West, illiberalism has managed to seriously challenge its supremacy by performing crises that undermine liberalism’s legitimacy.In this light, understanding illiberalism requires more than analyzing its positive components. PDT’s “ontology of lack” assumes that the construction of hegemony involves attempting to fill a void.[59] As Laclau and Mouffe argue, “ ‘hegemony’ will allude to an absent totality, and to the diverse attempts at recomposition and rearticulation … ‘Hegemony’ will be not the majestic unfolding of an identity but the response to a crisis.”[60] When the contingency of discourses emerges, this absence surfaces, calling for new signifiers and discourses “to fill the void made visible by a dislocatory event.”[61] At the same time, crises themselves are contingent, requiring three distinct moments (as listed above) to fully emerge.

The failure

As previously indicated, illiberal discourse centers around the lack of Sicherheit (that is, the state of Unsicherheit). Physical security is undoubtedly a significant element, reflected in the law-and-order profile of the populist radical right,[62] and it frequently appears in the analyzed speeches. However, in terms of ideological content, illiberalism primarily critiques the uncertainty generated by liberalism’s axiological individualism. In the empirical analysis, it was observed that the crises being performed (e.g., multiculturalism, globalization; see below) consistently pointed to an underlying lack of certainty, stability, security, predictability, or identity. While progressive liberalism advocates for free choice and fluid identities, illiberal leaders emphasize the need to affirm stable, essential categories that cannot be altered at will. As Meloni argued at the Vox rally in Madrid:

The subject of identity constitutes the core of our common commitment and the baseline of conflict in our time. Preserving your identity makes you an enemy of the globalist mainstream, and all of us who take a stand for it are the targets of the implacable advocates of progressivism. Everything we stand for, our very identity, is under attack.[63]

Identity, in its literal sense of something that remains the same, is perceived as lacking in a world where moral relativism allows for continuous resignification. Similar (if not identical) grievances are voiced by Orbán, who, more explicitly, blames liberalism:

According to the liberal notion of freedom, you can only be free if you discard everything that involves you in belonging somewhere: borders, the past, language, religion, culture and tradition. If you can free yourself from all this, if you can leave it all behind, then you’re a free person. As tends to happen, the antithesis of this has also come into being, and this is what I call “illiberalism.”[64]

In both cases, the negative freedom pursued by liberals (or progressives) is rejected in favor of stable categories that offer a sense of belonging, and eternal values that provide individuals with a deep sense of identity and purpose.[65] More generally, the perceived failures of liberalism hinge on its inability to provide the stability—and, by extension, security—that essential categories are thought to ensure.

The crisis

The second step, according to Moffitt,[66] involves elevating the initial failure to a series of equivalent crises. The lack of ontological security is mediated and performed through practical disrupting events. In this context, the “lack” is transformed into and narrated as crises of multiculturalism, gender identity, de-Christianization, abortion, and more. Certainly, the mobilizing power of crisis, such as “the politics of fear,”[67] is often employed as an effective rhetorical tool. However, while crises are sometimes performed as calculated political strategies to polarize the electorate and win votes, my focus is not on this tactical use. Instead, this analysis examines the discursive connection between failure and crisis, exploring how performed crises (e.g., crisis linked to LGBT activism) reflect a deeper lack of security (e.g., lack of stable, essential categories). In other words, performances of crises link the ideological dimension of illiberalism to its visible political and politicized effects.

Crises are performed by constructing a perceived sense of threat emanating from the liberal/progressive/globalist ideology. As Meloni asserts, family, spirituality, borders, sexual identity, history are “under attack”[68] because “for them, everything that defines us is an enemy.”[69] A similar narrative is employed by Kaczyński, who warns that the “family [of a man and woman] is under attack, and so are the natural differences between people, between men and women.”[70] These crises are framed as equivalent, with all perceived threats treated as part of the same overarching problem, making the texts under analysis remarkably similar. The attack on identity is framed as an assault on the family, the nation, and the Christian religion—key signifiers depicted as intertwined and under siege by the same liberal-democratic enemy.[71] The following Orbán quote clearly shows the equivalence of these crises:

Liberal democracy changed radically when it began to break the bonds that bind people to real life: when it questioned the identity of a person’s sex, devalued people’s religious identity, and deemed people’s national affiliation superfluous.[72]

The displacement of family, religion, and nation is presented as the root cause of crisis, the source of the “lack.” As these foundational pillars are attacked, displacing phenomena emerge, threatening the stability of contemporary society. In this way, the universal lack of Sicherheit is transformed into a series of performatively narrated crises that demand a counter-reaction. Table 1 illustrates how the displacement of key signifiers—nation, family, religion (tradition)—is consistently performed as crises, which disrupt pre-existing categories. Although specific references vary depending on the context,[73] these elements are present in all speeches. Other crises (e.g., drugs, abortion) are not listed here, as they are not always explicitly mentioned in the analyzed speeches but can be seen as resulting from the same underlying sense that something is lacking caused by moral individualism.

Crises serve the political function of delegitimizing and denouncing the antagonist discourse, framing destabilizing events as a threat. However, the crucial feature of these crises lies in their equivalence. For example, as Meloni suggests, the crisis caused by Islam is a consequence of secularism and the de-Christianization of Europe: “The secularism of the state is being used as a club against Christian symbols, while pretending not to see that in Europe, entire neighborhoods are now under Islamic law.”[74]

table 1. Links between dislocation and crisis

Displaced signifier	Performed crisis	Disrupted institution
Nation	Supranational organizations	National sovereignty
Nation	Cultural globalization	National identity
Nation/Religion	Multiculturalism	National (Christian) tradition
Religion	De-Christianization; Islamization	Christianity/Catholic Church
Family	Relativist models of family and gender identity	Traditional social roles
Family	Progressivism, relativism, and nihilism	Traditional values

The enemy

The third step in the performance of crisis involves identifying and blaming those responsible for it.[75] While the “lack” within the illiberal discourse is consistent among all the actors under analysis, the discursive construction of the enemy proves more context-dependent. Nevertheless, this variability can be approached from two distinct perspectives, making these differences less evident. First, the enemy is typically identified as those actors that undermine the nation, family, and identity. This results in a wide array of culprits, such as the globalist bureaucrats in Brussels (Meloni, Abascal), the Catalan separatists and feminazis (Abascal), George Soros (Orbán), migrants (Meloni, Abascal, Orbán), the post-Communist elite aligned with Western European cultural models (Kaczyński), and so forth.  In these cases, the antagonists are specific actors or issues, usually connected to the local political environment. Crises are framed as resulting from the actions of these enemies, portrayed as responsible for the “lack,” adhering to a classic crisis narrative in which blame is assigned to a specific Other.[76] This construction of the enemy helps perpetuate a sense of crisis, thereby mobilizing people against a perceived threat.

Yet there is another type of antagonistic division of the discursive space. Rather than attributing responsibility to specific actors, the blame for the crisis is sometimes assigned to the progressive/liberal ideology that advocates for a world without nations, traditions, or stable identities. This division between “us and them” signals a clash of worldviews. In this case, the issue of naming their discourse as illiberal vis-à-visliberalism arises, particularly as Abascal and Meloni differ from the Hungarian and Polish leaders. In Romance languages, the adjective “liberal” shares the same etymology as the word for freedom (libertà in Italian; libertad in Spanish), making it awkward to use the word “liberalism” in a negative fashion for those operating within a liberal democratic context and, conversely, to ascribe positive connotations to illiberalism.[77] Interestingly, Meloni and Abascal denounce the threat posed by the “soft progressive dictatorships”[78] and “globalist mainstream,”[79] but they avoid explicitly mentioning “liberals.” It is worth mentioning that in some interviews conducted by the author with FdI members (not included in the present analysis), a few of them self-defined as liberals, all the while advocating for illiberalism as defined in this work. Opposing liberals, and even liberal democracy, does not represent a taboo for Orbán and Kaczyński.[80] In some cases, the latter refers to the hegemonic attempt of post-Communist liberalism to reshape Polish society co-opting the local elite.[81] According to Kaczyński, the post-Communist ruling elite, in fact, has been …

supplemented by a very peculiar ideology, very simplified, we could say a vulgar version of liberalism, of permissiveness: an attack on values, an attack on the Church, an attack on the national tradition, on everything that contributed to national dignity.[82]

By blaming the post-Communist liberal elite, a second difference emerges. In their performance of crisis, Meloni and Abascal largely employ a populist discursive articulation, pitting a distant elite against the common sense of the people. For instance, Abascal repeatedly compares the irrational behavior of the foolish progressives (insensatos), with the normal people who possess common sense (sentido común). Populist discursive articulations are also present in the rhetoric of Orbán and Kaczyński. However, they go further by denouncing what Laruelle terms “liberal colonialism.”[83] For these Hungarian and Polish leaders, liberalism is not merely a betrayal by the elite, as in Meloni’s and Abascal’s readings of the situation. Rather, they portray the shift to progressive values as an imposition their countries endured after regaining independence in 1989. In this context, it has been observed that illiberalism in Central-Eastern Europe follows a neo-traditionalist political strategy, which differs somewhat from the approach of illiberal actors in Western Europe.[84]

Building Illiberalism

Nation, family, traditions

A key aspect of illiberalism is its ambition to reverse the existing liberal system of meanings. In other words, illiberalism represents a counter-hegemonic project that challenges liberal values and promises to resolve the performed crises by furnishing alternative meanings[85]—an illustrative example being the resignification of the signifier “freedom,” as discussed below. As a response to the narrated failures of liberalism, illiberalism provides its adherents with stable categories that address the former’s lack of ontological security. Instead of fluid identities, illiberalism offers immutable values and fixed roles that remove the burden of individual choice, giving individuals a clear and stable sense of who they are. Discursively, this approach necessitates the construction of a chain of equivalent demands, and the division of the discursive space into two antagonistic camps. This operation is evident in the following example from a famous Meloni quote:

[T]he family is an enemy, national identity is an enemy, gender binaries are an enemy. For them, everything that defines us is an enemy. It’s the game of the uniform narrative [pensiero unico]: they want to take away everything we are, because once we lose our identity and our roots, we will be unaware and incapable of defending our rights. That’s their game. They want us to be Parent 1, Parent 2, LGBT gender, Citizen X, just codes. But we are not codes, we are people, and we will defend our identity. I am Giorgia, I am a woman, I am a mother, I am Italian, I am Christian. You won’t take that away from me![86]

This example clearly shows the dynamics of equivalence and antagonism. On one side, they seek to eliminate stable identities, leaving instead an atomized understanding of the self. On the other side, gender roles (“I am a woman”), social roles (“I am a mother”), nationality (“I am Italian”), and religion (“I am Christian”) are articulated as equivalent, all functioning as elements that offer pre-existing group identities, as opposed to a relativist “principle of ‘self-id.’ ”[87]

A similar construction of equivalence is performed by Abascal, who defends eternal values against the modernity and relativism of the progressives:

Because the love of family as the basic unit of society, the love of the homeland, the respect for the faith of our forefathers: these are things that are always there, that have always been there, and that will not cease to exist.[88]

Family, homeland, and tradition are articulated as equivalent nodal points of the same essentialist worldview that, unlike the postmodernity of progressives, remains constant and unchanging. Thus, even in this case, the boundary between liberalism and illiberalism is constructed around the same sense that something is lacking: the space between a world in flux and those essential identities that provide a stable sense of self. This chain of equivalence can be found also in the speeches of Orbán and Kaczyński, who similarly treat family, nation and Christianity as the cornerstones of the same illiberal project. Crucially, the equivalence of these nodal points suggests that, while retaining their particular qualities, the nation, family, and traditions are different facets of the same illiberal discourse, unified by the same lack of security. In this light, illiberalism emerges as a discourse that incorporates and integrates various strands of contestation against liberalism (for example, nationalism and traditionalism) to create a single counter-hegemonic front.

While each leader may prioritize certain elements depending on context or the salience of particular issues (e.g., in Spain, the unity of the nation), the three equivalent nodal points—nation, family, and traditions—constitute the nodal points of illiberalism, defining its ideological core. By focusing on these discursive elements and their articulation, the “nation-family-traditions” chain of equivalence and the antagonism towards the opposite chain reveal the wider scope of illiberalism, as represented in Figure 1. Illiberalism prioritizes the sovereign nation in a globalized world, placing it at the locus where both political power and national culture are expressed. In this respect, all leaders express a position that highlights the centrality of the nation in the international arena—both in political and cultural terms—with Kaczyński describing it “as the basis of human existence and activity in our civilization.”[89] Conversely, they denounce “a kind of liberal internationalism, from which a liberal empire must emerge,”[90] embodied by the “Brussels globalist bureaucrats,” who threaten Western civilization with their multiculturalism.[91] Family, described as “a social unit of fundamental importance for the continuity of generations, for the transmission of culture and civilization, and for the permanence of larger communities,”[92] occupies a special place in opposing liberal moral individualism. While liberalism provides the individual with free choice regarding one’s identity and values system, the family represents the community of shared values.

Finally, the last component of illiberalism is tradition. Although this is often characterized by references to Christianity, I prefer to refer to traditions, as the role of Christian values in this context seems more related to cultural heritage and traditional practices than to spiritual beliefs. Moreover, references to traditions prove more generalizable, as they can be found also in those illiberal narratives outside Europe (e.g., in India). Importantly, traditions imply an essentialist understanding of morality, one that opposes the relativism of “anything goes.” As Kaczyński argues, outside of the Church, “there is only nihilism, and we reject that nihilism because it builds nothing—it destroys everything.”[93] In brief, the illiberal “nation-family-traditions” chain of equivalence stands in contrast with that of “globalization-individualism-relativism.”

figure 1. Illiberal construction of equivalence and antagonism

Resignifying freedom

The analysis of the articulation of nodal points serves more than just a descriptive purpose. Through articulation, the meaning of other discursive elements is affected. In this sense, illiberalism deploys a counter-hegemonic strategy aimed at resignifying existing meanings and offering a different cultural paradigm. A clear example is provided by the signifier “freedom.” As discussed above, freedom is a key signifier in the liberal discourse, particularly in its progressive form, which foregrounds negative freedom. Against this backdrop, it would be reductive to consider il-liberalism simply as the absence of liberty. On the contrary, all leaders in the analysis placed a strong emphasis on the signifier “freedom.” However, when articulated within the illiberal chain of equivalence, its meaning shifts, illustrating the discursive hegemonic struggle between the two camps.

In the illiberal context, freedom does not mean emancipation. Emancipatory freedom is exactly what illiberal leaders reject, viewing it instead as another form of enslavement, whereby new identities are imposed by the ideology of the elite—by the colonizers, according to the neo-traditionalist version of Central-Eastern European illiberalism. The picture is thus inverted, as Abascal vividly illustrates when he invites his audience to choose between “the progressive dictatorship or the freedom of the Spanish people” and between “the anti-Spain or the living Spain”.[94] Similarly, he argues that freedom is tied to duty to one’s homeland, rather than individual rights and desires:

We tell the fools that we want a better society, one filled with values, not just a society filled with comforts—because we have rights, but we also have obligations. For too long, only rights have been discussed, and we all know that for a society to survive and move forward, we must all commit to it. Just as we have duties to this flag and to our country [patria].[95]

The distinction between liberal and illiberal freedom is made explicit by Orbán, whose reasoning reflects the core theoretical premise of illiberalism as a reaction to moral individualism: “In a liberal system the rule is that one has the freedom to do anything, provided it doesn’t violate the freedom of others. This is the compass of individual action.”[96] Instead, he argues, illiberalism offers a different conception of freedom:

The individual’s appeal to freedom must not override the interests of the community. There is a majority, and it must be respected, because that is the essence of democracy. The state must not be indifferent to culture, the state must not be indifferent to the family, and the state must not be indifferent to the question of what kinds of people—or who—are within the borders of your country. In other words, today it is the illiberal person who defends their borders, defends their national culture and rejects external interference and attempts at empire building.[97]

This passage is particularly relevant for delving beneath the surface of illiberalism. Indeed, it encapsulates all the key elements mentioned by Laruelle in her definition, including national sovereignty, a majoritarian understanding of democracy, cultural homogeneity, and the traditional family.[98] Crucially, these illiberal principles are justified through a redefinition of freedom, one that places the community above the “individual’s appeal to freedom,” as Orbán puts it.

In summary, illiberal freedom derives its meaning from its articulation with the nodal points of illiberalism: nation, family, and tradition. Freedom becomes a communitarian freedom, existing only if traditional values are upheld, national sovereignty is preserved, and families reflect national and traditional culture. This concept of freedom does not necessarily deny individual choice. Instead, illiberalism encourages its adherents to choose from among socially pre-established answers, shielding them from the uncertainty that comes with complete emancipation and unfettered free will.

Conclusions

In examining the illiberal rhetoric of four European leaders, this article has contributed to both the empirical exploration and the theoretical understanding of illiberalism. Firstly, in terms of its ideological components, while a few context-dependent differences exist, these are more formal than substantial. The analysis revealed a shared ideological framework based on the rejection of liberalism’s axiological individualism. In this light, illiberalism emerges as a counter-hegemonic response to the perceived failures of liberalism, particularly its emphasis on moral relativism and the dislocation of traditional values. The article, therefore, identifies a common thread beneath the illiberal ideology, namely the lack of security. Centered on immutable nodal points (nation, family, and traditions), illiberalism opposes the fluidity and moral relativism of postmodern liberalism, offering instead a stable and essentialist worldview that promises to restore ontological security in an increasingly globalized and mutable world. As a counter-hegemonic project, illiberalism seeks not only to challenge liberalism but to replace it, offering a different kind of freedom: one that is grounded in tradition, authority, and the collective will.

Secondly, the article sought to refine the conceptual framework of illiberalism. In this case, the use of PDT categories in the empirical analysis illuminates how illiberalism operates as a distinct ideological framework. As it is opposed to a vast and multifaceted ideology like liberalism, using the concept of illiberalism risks falling into the same trap of treating it as a monolithic concept. This oversimplification may obscure the complexity of the ideological illiberal landscape, where multiple currents and nuances coexist. Moreover, the many faces of illiberalism may suggest that an overarching concept is of little help when we might simply use more specific concepts. The various strands of illiberalism, defined by the illiberal nodal points, could be seen as part of distinct ideologies, such as nationalism, sovereigntism, traditionalism, or nativism. However, while these –isms are present and define the political agenda of illiberal actors, their equivalence marks the coherence of the illiberal discourse, as the equivalent nodal points share the same roots and the same opposition to liberal principles. In other words, the equivalence of nationalist and traditionalist elements, and the antagonistic division between the two worldviews, suggest that we are facing a specific variant of these discourses, namely they are articulated to form a single, unified illiberal discourse. In this respect, the concept of illiberalism functions as an umbrella ideology that brings together various specific elements that share a least common denominator in addressing the postmodern lack of security.

Instead of serving a purely descriptive function, this conceptualization of illiberalism offers a deeper understanding of the concept, interpreting the contestation of liberalism as a broad counter-hegemonic struggle linking different strands, rather than a series of isolated ideological critiques. This perspective opens two key avenues for future research. First, empirical studies could further examine how the positive content of illiberalism, as defined in this study, operates across different contexts, particularly in cases where it coexists with strong neoliberal policies, potentially giving rise to contradictions. Second, the contingency of discourses means that the negative side of liberalism does not necessarily need to be replaced by right-wing illiberalism. On a more normative level, future research could explore whether and how alternative discourses, possibly coming from the left, can address the ontological insecurity and fill in the “lack” created by progressive liberalism, offering solutions that do not rely on reactionary narratives.

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[1] Petra Guasti and Lenka Bustikova, “Varieties of Illiberal Backlash in Central Europe,” Problems of Post-Communism 70, no. 2 (2023) 130–142, https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2022.2156889; Jacques Rupnik, “ ‘Move Forward to the Back’: The Illiberal Turn in East-Central Europe,” in Update Liberalism: Liberal Answers to the Challenges of Our Time, eds. Ralf Fücks and Rainald Manthe (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2023): 51-58.

[2] Jan Zielonka, Counter-Revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[3] Stijn van Kessel and Daniele Albertazzi, “Right-Wing Populist Party Organisation across Europe: The Survival of the Mass-Party? Conclusion to the Thematic Issue,” Politics and Governance 9, no. 4 (2021): 365–370, https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i4.5003.

[4] Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005).

[5] Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 4 (2004): 542–563, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x.

[6] Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (November–December 1997): 22–43.

[7] Raphaël Demias-Morisset, “The Paradoxical Sources of Illiberalism: A Synoptic Approach to the Genealogies of Illiberalism,” Journal of Illiberalism Studies 4, no. 2 (Summer 2024): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.53483/XCPS3572; Zsolt Enyedi, “Concept and Varieties of Illiberalism,” Politics and Governance [online], 12 (September 11, 2024), https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.852; Marlene Laruelle, “Illiberalism: A Conceptual Introduction,” East European Politics 38, no. 2 (June 2022), 303–327, https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2037079; András Sajó, Renáta Uitz, and Stephen Holmes, eds., Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism (New York: Routledge, 2021); Julian G. Waller, “Distinctions with a Difference: Illiberalism and Authoritarianism in Scholarly Study,” Political Studies Review 22, no. 2 (2024): 365–386, https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299231159253.

[8] Santiago Abascal, “Discurso de Santiago Abascal en el cierre de campaña en Colón,” in Madrid, Spain, VOX España YouTube channel, April 26, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i6Fwxu8zSjk&t=446s.

[9] Viktor Orbán, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 30th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp,” AboutHungary.hu, July 27, 2019, https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-speech-at-the-30th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp.

[10] Zielonka, Counter-Revolution.

[11] Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (1989), 4.

[12] Jasper Theodor Kauth and Desmond King, “Illiberalism,” European Journal of Sociology 61, no. 3 (December 2020), 367, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975620000181.

[13] Kauth and Knight, “Illiberalism,” 378.

[14] Waller, “Distinctions with a Difference”; Zielonka, Counter-Revolution.

[15] Instead of ideology, I use the term “discourse” to be coherent with the methodological framework inspired by PDT.

[16] Laruelle, “Illiberalism,” 304.

[17] Laruelle, “Illiberalism.”

[18] Zielonka, Counter-Revolution.

[19] SeeYannis Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).

[20] Michael Freeden, Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[21] Laruelle, “Illiberalism.”

[22] Alisa L. Carse, “The Liberal Individual: A Metaphysical or Moral Embarrassment?” Noûs 28, no. 2 (1994), 186.

[23] Piero Ignazi, “The Silent Counter-Revolution. Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe,” European Journal for Political Research 22, no. 1 (July 1992): 3­­­–34, https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1992.tb00303.x.

[24] Lars Rensmann, “The Noisy Counter-Revolution: Understanding the Cultural Conditions and Dynamics of Populist Politics in Europe in the Digital Age,” Politics and Governance 5, no. 4 (2017): 128, https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i4.1123; see also Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

[25] Arguably, economic illiberalism might take a different shape, denouncing the economic insecurity generated by laissez-faireeconomics.

[26] Ryszard Legutko, The Demon in Democracy: Totalitarian Temptations in Free Societies, trans. Teresa Adelson (New York: Encounter Books, 2016), 8.

[27] Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1965), 48.

[28] Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 80. Significantly, the idea of “negative freedom” is often mentioned and criticized by the leader of the Polish party Law and Justice, Jarosław Kaczyński.

[29] Zygmunt Bauman, In Search of Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). The German word Unsicherheit, used by Bauman, captures three aspects that in English are translated as uncertainty, insecurity, unsafety.

[30] Francesco Melito, “Anti-Colonial Neo-Traditionalism in Central-Eastern Europe: A Theoretical Examination,” New Perspectives 30, no. 4 (2022): 349–366, https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X221135127.

[31] Benjamin De Cleen and Yannis Stavrakakis, “Distinctions and Articulations: A Discourse Theoretical Framework for the Study of Populism and Nationalism,” Javnost—The Public 24, no. 4 (2017): 301–319, https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2017.1330083; Jason Glynos and David Howarth, Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory (London: Routledge, 2007); Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985).

[32] Glynos and Howarth, Logics.

[33] See Steiner Kvale, “Postmodern Psychology: A Contradiction in Terms?” in Psychology and Postmodernism, ed. Steiner Kvale (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1992): 31–57.

[34] Maarten Hajer, “Coalitions, Practices, and Meaning in Environmental Politics: From Acid Rain to BSE,” in Discourse Theory in European Politics, eds. David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2005), 302, emphasis in the original.

[35] Hajer, “Coalitions, Practices, and Meaning in Environmental Politics,” 303.

[36] Glynos and Howarth, Logics, 143.

[37] Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso, 1990).

[38] Benjamin Moffitt, “How to Perform Crisis: A Model for Understanding the Key Role of Crisis in Contemporary Populism,” Government and Opposition 50, no. 2 (2015), 198, https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2014.13.

[39] Glynos and Howarth, Logics.

[40] Martin Nonhoff, “Hegemony Analysis: Theory, Methodology and Research Practice,” in Discourse, Culture and Organization: Inquiries into Relational Structures of Power, ed. Tomas Marttila (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019): 63–104.

[41] Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005).

[42] Francesco Melito, “Finding the Roots of Neo-Traditionalist Populism in Poland: ‘Cultural Displacement’ and European Integration,” New Perspectives 29, no. 1 (2021): 23–44, https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X20954756.

[43] Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996), 44.

[44] Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 105.

[45] Abascal, speech in Madrid.

[46] Giorgia Meloni, “Il discorso integrale di Giorgia Meloni in piazza San Giovanni a Roma,” (speech in Rome, October 19, 2019, https://www.giorgiameloni.it/2019/10/19/il-discorso-integrale-di-giorgia-meloni-in-piazza-san-giovanni-a-roma/, Giorgia Meloni’s personal website, accessed February 28, 2024.

[47] Giorgia Meloni, “Giorgia Meloni infiamma il popolo di VOX a Madrid: Il testo integrale dell’intervento del presidente di FdI e dei Conservatori europei a ‘VIVA21. La Spagna in piedi,” (speech in Madrid, October 12, 2021), Giorgia Meloni’s personal website, https://www.giorgiameloni.it/2021/10/12/giorgia-meloni-infiamma-il-popolo-di-vox-a-madrid-il-testo-integrale-dellintervento-del-presidente-di-fdi-e-dei-conservatori-europei-a-viva21-la-spagna-in-piedi-video, accessed March 19, 2024.

[48] Jarosław Kaczyński, “Jarosław Kaczyński—Wystąpienie Prezesa PiS na Konwencji w Lublinie,” (speech in Lublin, Poland, September 7, 2019), Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) party YouTube channel, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5UtpCfY_C04.

[49] Jarosław Kaczyński, “Jarosław Kaczyński—Wystąpienie Prezesa PiS na Konwencji w Krakowie,” (speech in Krakow, Poland, September 22, 2019), Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) party YouTube channel, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rxnceQU9xkQ.

[50] Orbán, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the 30th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp.”

[51] Viktor Orbán, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp,” 2015-2019.kormany.hu, 26 July 2014, https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp.

[52] Nico Carpentier, The Discursive-Material Knot: Cyprus in Conflict and Community Media Participation (New York: Peter Lang, 2017).

[53] See Francesco Melito, “Hegemonic Struggles and the Role of Contemporary ‘Organic Intellectuals’: A Different Perspective for the Analysis of Discourses,” Politics 45, no. 3 (August 2024), https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957241259118.

[54] Ewa Korolczuk and Agnieszka Graff, “Gender as ‘Ebola from Brussels’: The Anticolonial Frame and the Rise of Illiberal Populism,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 43, no. 4 (2018): 797–821, http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/696691; Melito, “Anti-Colonial Neo-Traditionalism in Central-Eastern Europe.”

[55] Nancy Fraser, “From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump—and beyond,” American Affairs 4 (Winter 2017): 46–64; Zielonka, Counter-Revolution.

[56] Chantal Mouffe, “The Populist Moment,” Simbiótica: Revista Eletrônica 6, no. 1 (2019): 6–11, https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=575961686004.

[57] Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 276.

[58] Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks.

[59] Glynos and Howarth, Logics.

[60] Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 7.

[61] Glynos and Howarth, Logics, 129.

[62] Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[63] Meloni, speech in Madrid.

[64] Orbán, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 30th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp.”

[65] Abascal, speech in Madrid.

[66] Moffitt, “How to Perform Crisis.”

[67] Ruth Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2015).

[68] Meloni, speech in Madrid.

[69] Meloni, speech in Rome, emphasis added.

[70] Kaczyński, speech in Lublin.

[71] Abascal, speech in Madrid.

[72] Orbán, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 30th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp.”

[73] For instance, references to Christianity in the speeches of Meloni and Abascal rather refer to Christian civilization, while Kaczyński deems the Catholic Church to be a part of Polish identity.

[74] Meloni, speech, Madrid.

[75] Moffitt, “How to Perform Crisis.”

[76] Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993).

[77] Interview of the author with a member of FdI.

[78] Abascal, speech in Madrid.

[79] Meloni, speech in Madrid.

[80] Nevertheless, Orbán is aware that the word illiberalism may stir controversy as he proposes to avoid “the essentially negative-sounding word ‘illiberal,’ arguing that illiberal politics can be better defined as ‘Christian liberty.’ ” Orbán, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 30th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp.”

[81] Kaczyński, speech in Lublin.

[82] Kaczyński, speech in Krakow.

[83] Laruelle, “Illiberalism,” 313.

[84] Zdzisław Mach, “Right-Wing Populism, Euroscepticism, and Neo-Traditionalism in Central and Eastern Europe,” in The Right-Wing Critique of Europe: Nationalist, Sovereignist and Right-Wing Populist Attitudes to the EU, ed. Joanna Sondel-Cedarmas and Francesco Berti (Abingdon: Routledge, 2022), 22–31; Melito, “Anti-Colonial Neo-Traditionalism.”

[85] Aron Buzogány and Mihai Varga, “The Ideational Foundations of the Illiberal Backlash in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary,” Review of International Political Economy 25, no. 6 (2018): 811–828, https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2018.1543718; Melito, “Finding the Roots of Neo-Traditionalist Populism.”

[86] Meloni, speech in Rome.

[87] Meloni, speech in Madrid.

[88] Abascal, speech in Madrid.

[89] Kaczyński, speech in Lublin.

[90] Orbán, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 30th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp.”

[91] Abascal, speech in Madrid.

[92] Kaczyński, speech in Lublin.

[93] Kaczyński.

[94] Abascal, speech in Madrid.  

[95] Abascal.

[96] Orbán, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 30th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp.”

[97] Orbán.

[98] Laruelle, “Illiberalism,” 304.