Meloni’s Mark: The Revival of the Traditional Family in Italian Law and Politics 

Meloni’s Mark: The Revival of the Traditional Family in Italian Law and Politics 

By Nausica Palazzo

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Keywords: illiberalism, traditional family, LGBTQ parents, LGBTQ rights, Italian politics.

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Traditionally, gender issues have not played a central role in the political agenda of Giorgia Meloni’s party, Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia; FdI). Although previous research did not specifically address LGBTQ issues, recent studies indicate that women’s issues were relatively marginal within the party before it ascended to power in 2022,[1] with a slight increase in focus from 2018 to 2021.[2]

However, Meloni has recently embraced the illiberal wave, contributing to a conservative surge on gender issues across Europe. It became clear from the election program in 2022 that the family would have played a crucial discursive role during Meloni’s campaign and term of office. The family indeed was made item number one in the FdI’s election program.[3] Aligning with Orban’s Hungary, Poland’s former ruling party Law and Justice, and other self-declared illiberal actors in Europe, her government offered its distinctive contribution to restoring a “shared vision of the sexual order within Europe.”[4] This vision is realized through an increasingly established illiberal script against gender and family equality.[5] According to this view, traditional values and societal structures, particularly the traditional family, are under siege by feminism and gender ideology, as well as by their promoters such as the European Union. Meloni openly identifies progressive forces like feminism as “an ideological tool against right‐wing politics rather than a pro‐women discourse.”[6]

It is now recognized that gender norms play a central role in illiberal political projects.[7] However, the specific and distinctive role of family norms has often been overlooked in the research.^[8] Yet the importance of the family can hardly be overstated. Illiberal discourse increasingly blames the erosion of national identity on the decline of traditional gender norms, which are seen as embodied above all by the traditional family.^[9] The protection of the traditional family is a leitmotif across various illiberal contexts, although discursively this objective is pursued in different forms.[10]

For this reason, the conceptual significance of the ideological use of the traditional family is receiving increasing scholarly attention.[11] This article argues that to fully understand the illiberal momentum, along with its impact on human rights, it is essential to focus on the discursive role of the family within illiberal political agendas. Examining how the concept of the family is framed and used in similar sociopolitical contexts offers valuable insights into broader issues of legal and political theory. It is particularly relevant for understanding the interplay between illiberal ideologies and contemporary human rights frameworks, highlighting the tensions between them.

The aim of examining how the concept of the family is mobilized in illiberal contexts was central to previous research on the relationship between illiberalism and the family in Hungary and Poland, which explored the conflicts that such a relationship has generated with the European Union.[12] The Brothers of Italy, underexplored in the academic literature on illiberalism, is another important site for investigation and deserves critical attention.[13] The party, it will be seen, makes a distinctive contribution to the conservative backlash against progressive family norms and the populations that find themselves promoting such norms, especially – but not only – LGBTQ persons.[14]

This paper will hence examine the attacks on LGBTQ family rights by the current government coalition led by Giorgia Meloni, particularly the continuum between the government and the parliamentary majority, which includes the Brothers of Italy, as well as the League. The Brothers of Italy does not have a monolithic stance on gender and family equality, encompassing both extreme and more moderate positions, as does the broader government coalition.[15] Consequently, this section will focus on two emblematic reforms promoted by Meloni without attempting to provide an exhaustive analysis of the current political landscape. Notably, the paper will explore two recent reforms: the termination of family status for same-sex parents and the expansion of the territorial (and personal) scope of the crime of surrogacy.

These reforms have had a clear and significant negative impact on family equality in Italy, restricting access to parenthood, reproduction and family life for LGBTQ families under the guise of protecting the traditional family. Interestingly, these reforms seek to exploit some interpretive gaps or just foot-dragging of international and national courts in providing protection for LGBTQ family rights.

The Defense of the Traditional Family

In Italy, the legal integration of nontraditional families has become an issue at the heart of the ongoing culture wars. The current Italian government, joining the ranks of illiberal actors across Europe, has articulated a concept of “the people” rooted in nativist foundations, with a conservative stance on family, gender identity, and sexual orientation.[16] The people are not simply seen as a group of individuals united by linguistic, cultural, or customary homogeneity – traits central to the modern nation-state – but as an inherently exclusionary entity. The people are conceived as a homogeneous, organic group anchored in the traditional family, which in turn is construed to exclude those who do not conform to the norms underpinning it. In this sense, the concept of “the people” as put forth by leaders of illiberal parties is strongly and fundamentally anti-pluralist.[17]

The coalition’s leading parties, the Brothers of Italy and the League, have defended a conservative view of gender and the family, with their political agenda and communication style somewhat overlapping.[18] Both parties assert that women justify their station in life through motherhood and that the (heterosexual and nuclear) family is an essential and foundational element of the nation.^[19] This vision subordinates women, relegating them to the private sphere of home and child-rearing. Several recent reforms have actively moved in this direction. For instance, the previous Italian government, acting on an initiative from the League, abolished a subsidy of 600 euros per month for babysitting or childcare costs for mothers who chose not to take parental leave due to work. Simultaneously, it increased what the promoters called “natality benefits” by 2%, starting with the second child.^[20] This reflects the League’s commitment to traditional gender roles and the idea of women’s primary responsibility being as caregivers.[21]

Meloni and FdI have also successfully advocated for measures that make access to legal abortion more difficult, under the guise of promoting what could be framed as “the right not to have an abortion.”[22] Meloni gave a personal touch to this fight in her biography, by referencing her own experience as a single mother who considered terminating her pregnancy.[23] While she stops short of advocating for a repeal of the current abortion law, the program of FdI refers to the need to safeguard life from its inception.[24] The abovementioned “right not to have an abortion” is implemented by allowing pro-life organizations to set up spaces in hospitals (stanze dell’ascolto) where women can be counseled on deciding not to terminate a pregnancy.^[25]

In the area of LGBTQ rights, the current government has expressed a desire to combat what Meloni refers to as the “LGBT lobby” and the increasing influence of “gender ideology.”[26] She frames these efforts as protecting Western civilization from attacks on its core values.[27] In 2022, for example, while campaigning in favor of the Spanish populist party Vox, Meloni stated: “Yes to the natural family! No to the LGBT lobby!”[28] Tellingly, Meloni was elevated to the status of a true icon and defender of the traditional family when a parody-remix of her statement ‘‘I am Giorgia, I am a woman, I am a mother, I am Christian’’ went viral.[29]

Meloni’s election program foregrounded restoring the centrality of the (traditional) family as a core issue.[30] Climbing to the first item of her program, “sustaining fertility and family” preceded other pressing issues, such as how to make more efficient use of the National Recovery and Resiliency Plan (number two on the list).[31] It also preceded some traditional workhorses of the party, such as stopping illegal immigration (coming in at number 21) and the introduction of a presidential executive (24). The incipit of her program, in restoring the centrality of the family, starts off by quoting Pope John Paul II:

The family is the foundational element of society and what makes “a Nation truly sovereign and spiritually strong” (John Paul II). This is why it is necessary to reaffirm the central, educational and social role it continues to play.

Interestingly, the League’s program also quotes John Paul II, setting the stage for a competition over the Catholic constituency.[32]

Item number 12 of Meloni’s program, titled “Defending Everyone’s Freedom and Dignity,” then reaffirms the duplicitous approach that seeks to preserve the legal protection of same-sex adult relationships while curtailing any possibility of recognizing vertical bonds between same-sex families and their children. The program states that FdI will oppose discrimination based on people’s “sexual and affective choices” (sic!), failing to refer to the more accurate notion of sexual orientation.[33] While the relevant passages reaffirm the party’s commitment to uphold the law on civil unions, the program reiterated the need to preserve a ban on adoption by same-sex parents and promote the “fight against all forms of surrogacy, in the best interest of the child.”[34]

Having provided an overview of the fragile status of LGBTQ family rights in Italy, the paper will outline the two controversial reforms that have moved in the direction of curtailing access to legal parenthood by same-sex couples.

A Snapshot of LGBTQ Family Rights in Italy

LGBTQ family rights in Italy remain particularly precarious. Same-sex couples only have access to civil unions, which makes Italy the only country in the western European Union – apart from a few microstates – that does not recognize same-sex marriage.[35] Additionally, same-sex couples have almost no access to parental rights.

Regarding horizontal adult relationships, Italy introduced civil unions only in 2016, upon a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights recognizing that the lack of recognition of same-sex couples amounted to a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.[36] The ruling, while confirmed in subsequent cases against other European states,[37] was at the time narrowly tailored to the peculiar situation of Italy.[38] In particular, it was based on statistics showing that the majority of the Italian population supported the legal recognition of same-sex couples. It was also justified by the scattered protection that same-sex couples enjoyed in the Italian legal system, which was scarce, uncertain, and variable depending on the court or public administration handling the benefit the couple was seeking to obtain.[39] Ultimately, it was based on the existence of several court rulings by the Italian Constitutional Court and Supreme Court urging Parliament to introduce legal protections for LGB families.[40]

At present, therefore, there is an established right under the Convention to grant at least registered partnerships to same-sex couples, with no room for withholding or repealing similar protections.[41] By contrast, there is no obligation under the Convention or the Constitution to introduce same-sex marriage. [42] Thus, FdI’s political agenda does not advocate for the repeal of the 2016 law introducing civil unions,[43] while it pushes for defining marriage exclusively as the union of a man and a woman.[44] This represents a partial shift from their earlier stance, which supported recognizing family rights only within heterosexual marriage, as was the goal of a 2014 bill seeking to amend the Constitution.[45] Nevertheless, Meloni has repeatedly reaffirmed her belief that marriage should be between a man and a woman, and that marital families deserve more support than other family forms.[46] For example, her party has opposed any corporate initiatives to support same-sex families, such as IKEA’s recent initiative to provide a 500-euro voucher to gay and lesbian couples entering into a civil union.[47] Because the Convention does not contain the right to same-sex marriage, the Meloni government can advocate the definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman.

With same-sex marriage not on the horizon in Italian politics, and registered partnerships being “untouchable,” the primary battleground for the backlash against LGBTQ+ rights lies in parental rights and the ability of same-sex families to have children and establish legal ties with them. There are no plans to introduce parental rights for same-sex couples through the political process, making the reforms listed below more about stifling progress than reacting to changes underway.

The so-called Cirinnà law, which introduced civil unions in Italy, equates such unions with marriage, with some exceptions, particularly regarding adoption provisions.[48] Under Paragraph 20 of Article 1 of the law, it is not possible for same-sex couples in a civil union to adopt under the same conditions as opposite-sex married couples. Attempts to introduce stepchild adoption were unsuccessful due to a lack of support in Parliament.[49] As a result, the law only refers to the existing legal framework on adoption, which is far from favorable to same-sex couples, despite judicial attempts to expand its scope.

For same-sex couples, the only potential avenue is an expansive judicial interpretation of a special and traditionally residual procedure called “adoption in special cases.”[50] However, this type of adoption does not create “full” legal parenthood. It fails to sever ties with the child’s original family and does not confer inheritance rights vis-à-vis the adopting parent.[51] Furthermore, this type of adoption is granted only following a complicated and lengthy court procedure before the Juvenile Court, requiring the biological parent’s consent and alignment with the child’s legal best interests.[52] The first requirement places the non-biological parent in a vulnerable position, as consent could be denied in the event of a couple’s crisis.[53] However, recently the Constitutional Court has remedied one of the most discriminatory aspects of the legal framework, allowing adoption in special cases to create legal ties with relatives of the adopters (potential siblings, uncles, and grandparents).[54]

Overall, this type of adoption cannot be considered a fully satisfactory solution; it only confers a second-class parental status, as even the Constitutional Court has acknowledged.[55] While the Constitutional Court recognized the shortcomings of the existing legal framework for adoption, it urged Parliament to intervene as an issue better left to political processes. However, Parliament has so far refused to act.

Additionally, Law 40/2004 introduced rules to strictly regulate access to assisted reproductive technology (ART). The law frames ART as narrowly exceptional for cases of infertility. It, furthermore, excludes both gay and lesbian couples and singles from the possibility of using ART to achieve reproduction. In the aftermath of its introduction, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the prohibition regarding donor’s fertilization.[56] However, surrogacy remains illegal,[57] and same-sex couples continue to be considered ineligible to access ART in Italy.

As a consequence, given the lack of access to full adoption, ART, and surrogacy, same-sex parents are left with the unsatisfactory option of special adoption that relegates them to second-class status as parents, only after a lengthy and cumbersome court proceeding that takes years to wind through.[58] Consequently, same-sex couples often resort to ART abroad and seek legal recognition of parenthood upon returning to Italy. However, until recently, the case law on the recognition of foreign birth certificates was inconsistent and unsettled, making this the primary battleground for the backlash against same-sex couples.

There is, to date, a difference in treatment between gay and lesbian couples conceiving a child abroad. On the one hand, Italian case law seems to recognize the social or “intended” parent in a lesbian couple.[59] The Constitutional Court confirmed this stance in March 2025. Children born to two lesbian mothers through assisted reproduction abroad may now be recognized from birth as the children of both parents.[60] The Constitutional Court held that Article 8 of Law 40/2004 is unconstitutional insofar as it fails to provide that a child born in Italy, conceived abroad through medically assisted reproduction, can be legally recognized by the so-called “intended mother,” the parent who did not give birth but consented to the use of heterologous fertilization. As a result, her parental status must be recorded immediately in the civil registry, without the need to resort to stepchild adoption, which had been the only option until now.

On the other hand, this is not the case for a gay partner who is a non-biological parent, since the use of surrogacy is implied in the latter case.[61] Where dual parenthood derives not from surrogacy but from an adoption proceeding completed abroad (and recourse to surrogacy can be excluded), the case law seems to lean toward recognition.[62] Furthermore, even resorting to surrogacy cannot amount to a blanket refusal to recognize parenthood: in considering the use of surrogacy as an obstacle to the transcription of the birth certificate (contrary to international public policy), the Constitutional Court has emphasized the importance of protecting the best interests of the child in concrete cases where a family has already been formed.[63] In conclusion, the legal framework is at best inconsistent and unsatisfactory, with the Constitutional Court hesitating to step in to expand access to ART or surrogacy to all same-sex couples.

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights does not go out of its way to recognize the right to found a (new) family in favor of single persons and same-sex couples. It has held on several occasions that it is up to states to decide whether to grant the right to prospectively establish a family, for example, through adoption or ART.[64] At the same time, the cautious approach of the Court creates fertile ground for the backlash against LGBTQ family rights.

The existing legal framework – national as well as international – provided the space in which Meloni could act and a gender backlash could spark and spread. The next two sections explore two emblematic reforms aimed at further curtailing access to parenthood for same-sex families by the Meloni government. The goal of these legislative initiatives is to prevent the possibility of same-sex couples to establish legal ties with children conceived abroad in countries where they have access to IVF or surrogacy.

Surrogacy as a ‘Universal Crime’: A Clumsy Move to Curb Access to Surrogacy Abroad

The Italian Parliament recently introduced criminal prohibition of surrogacy abroad.[65] Surrogacy is already prohibited on Italian territory.[66] The aim of the new law is therefore to extend criminal sanctions to Italian families who resort to surrogacy abroad and then seek recognition of their children in Italy, with same-sex families being the declared target of the law. The legislative reform, first presented by Meloni, is now being spearheaded by FdI MP Carolina Varchi, an opponent of LGBTQ rights who has vocally opposed Pride marches and LGBTQ people’s requests to access family rights.[67] During a Pride march in Sicily, Varchi stated:

Pride is now an ideological manifestation of the left. To the members of the center-right coalition and the organizers who will participate, I guarantee that none of the Pride demands will ever become law, as we promised our voters when we stood for election. On the contrary, we are working on measures that go against the LGBT ideology, such as the institution of the universal crime of surrogacy.[68]

On July 2, 2024, the bill was approved by an internal commission in the Senate,[69] by the Senate in plenary session, after the Chamber of Deputies had voted in favor of the bill a year earlier, on July 26, 2023.[70] The current, nationwide ban prohibits a variety of behaviors and imposes criminal penalties on anyone who “performs, organizes, or publicizes surrogacy in any form.”[71] The new law extends the criminal prohibition to surrogacy arrangements entered into by an “Italian citizen abroad,” punishable both by fines of up to a million euros and by imprisonment of up to two years. Citizens of other countries seeking recognition of parenthood for surrogacy carried out abroad would not incur criminal sanctions.

Their conduct was covered by the original version of the law, which sought to prohibit the performance, organization, or advertising of surrogacy abroad by anyone, regardless of nationality.[72] The initial, broader personal scope of the law gave rise to a debate on making surrogacy a “universal crime,” punishable on Italian soil regardless of where it is contracted. According to this view, surrogacy would have joined the ranks of crimes that, in light of their particular gravity, trigger extraterritorial (universal) jurisdiction under Italian or international law, such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and human trafficking.

The preamble of the bill explicitly compares the seriousness of the crime to the compelling objective of combating child trafficking.[73] A similar position was expressed by a consultative body of the European Union, the European Economic and Social Committee, in the context of Directive 2011/36/EU on trafficking in human beings. On that occasion, the Committee urged, without success, the Council to consider gestational surrogacy as a new form of human trafficking, along with forced marriages and “illegal adoptions.”[74] The significance of the criminal ban also lies in the fact that opposition to surrogacy has become embedded in the constitutional identity of the country – regardless of the severity of the sanction, which, as noted, is not among the harshest.[75] Ultimately, the stated purpose of the ban is to prevent the commercialization of women’s bodies and of children, who are portrayed as being treated like commodities,[76] as if taken from a supermarket shelf.[77]

The article describes the bill as clumsy because it raises serious doubts regarding its compatibility with binding international obligations like the European Convention on Human Rights and its practical applicability, especially in light of the cooperation it requires from other jurisdictions. International law scholar Carmelo Danisi rightly notes its incompatibility with the delicate balance achieved by the European Court of Human Rights in the field of surrogacy.[78] While the Court leaves ample leeway for states to legalize the practice, it has urged them to put in place what it calls an “appropriate” legal framework that properly balances the two competing interests of pursuing the best interests of the child and the collective interests at the heart of the implementation of the ban on surrogacy.[79] A blanket criminal prohibition for citizens who engage in surrogacy abroad seems to deny, in nuce and from the outset, any balancing exercise by focusing more prominently on the abstract interest in avoiding the practice to the detriment of children born through surrogacy,[80] as well as the expectation of their biological and/or intended parents to recognize family ties.[81] It therefore seems to run counter to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights with regard to surrogacy.[82]

Similarly, the concrete operationalization of the law risks being hampered by the lack of cooperation in criminal matters by other jurisdictions. In particular, in the European Union, surrogacy is not included in the list of crimes that the Parliament and the Council can introduce to allow Member States to prosecute crimes committed by their citizens in another jurisdiction.[83] While Italy could establish its jurisdiction under the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision,[84] other states may refuse to cooperate if the conduct does not constitute a crime in their own country,[85] or if there is a lack of reciprocity for conduct committed abroad – that is, if the other member states do not punish their citizens for surrogacy practices committed abroad.[86] As Italy’s attempt to prohibit the conduct is unique in the European context – with no other state criminalizing the practice engaged in abroad – serious doubts can be raised about the existence of a duty to cooperate under EU law in Europe.[87] Outside of Europe, it is also unlikely that any state where the practice is legal will cooperate, given the general applicability of the so-called dual criminality requirement in the issuing and executing states.

The attempted reform also appears clumsy in that it exemplifies what is called “penal populism” – the ideological use of criminal law to target behaviors associated with political rivals.[88] True legal and linguistic “nonsense,”[89] the notion of “universal crimes” is invoked here instead of the proper concept of “universal jurisdiction” over international crimes. Its use serves less as a legal principle than as a vehicle to express moral repulsion toward surrogacy and to advance political propaganda.

Hostility toward same-sex couples is the hidden objective of the law. As Meloni herself stated, “It is undeniable that to give birth to a child we need a man and a woman.”[90] The move to ban surrogacy is one part of a multifaceted effort to restore the centrality of the traditional family, to the detriment of those who fall outside of this model. Interestingly, not only LGBTQ couples but also single persons who aspire to become parents were historically legally invisible, which is why the LGBTQ community in Italy has taken on the goal of opening up pathways to parenthood for single persons.[91] Singles in Italy do not have access to medically assisted reproduction,[92] and – in what is a true exception in Europe (note that recently Hungary made itself another outlier) – they lack access to full adoption.[93] In its judgment no. 33 of March 21, 2025, the Italian Constitutional Court struck down the ban preventing single persons from applying for international adoption. Until this ruling, Italian law barred them from adopting foreign minors – a restriction the Court found inconsistent with constitutional principles and the protection of the child’s best interests.[94]

The Termination of Parental Rights of LGBTQ Couples

The most troubling and discussed development is the government’s attempt to strip same-sex couples of their existing parental rights. The Ministry of the Interior of Meloni’s government directed local authorities, such as city mayors, to refrain from recognizing the intended or social parent in same-sex couples.^[95] The guidance (circolare) issued by the Ministry of the Interior referred to a Supreme Court decision regarding the birth certificate of a child born through surrogacy to a gay couple. [96] The Court held that children conceived via surrogacy abroad should not be automatically recognized in Italy through the transcription of their foreign birth certificates. At the same time, it emphasized that recognition of the non-biological parent remains possible through the only available mechanism under Italian law: the special adoption procedure granted by the courts (adozione in casi particolari). In doing so, the Court established a duty to refuse the transcription of foreign birth certificates in comparable cases in Italy.[97]

However, as mentioned above, special adoption is not full adoption because it does not terminate the legal ties with the child’s original family, and problematically it subordinates the completion of the adoption procedure to the consent of the biological parent and to a cumbersome and unpredictable judicial process.[98] The guidance’s reference to the need to resort to the special adoption procedure is aimed at frustrating same-sex couples’ attempts at achieving parenthood through other means, without going through the gauntlet of this special judicial procedure.

After the government move, the Prefecture of Milan argued that the rationale of the guidance applied beyond cases of surrogacy, to cover cases of artificial insemination by a donor as well.[99] As a consequence, local authorities had no choice but to deny same-sex couples the opportunity to list the intended parent on foreign birth certificates, listing only the biological parent.

In one municipality, Padua, the guidance was taken one step further. The Prosecutor’s Office of Padua challenged in court the birth certificates of 37 children of lesbian couples, that is, all those registered from 2017 under the instructions of a progressive mayor. ^[100] The children were conceived abroad through heterologous fertilization (an ART that involves using sperm or eggs from an external donor) and then recognized in Italy as children of both mothers. Unlike other cities, here the termination of parental rights occurred retroactively. Overnight, same-sex intended parents were stripped of all parental rights and responsibilities, waking up as legal strangers to their children.

These developments attracted criticism from the European Union. In a recent resolution, the European Parliament explicitly condemned “the instructions given by the Italian government to the municipality of Milan to no longer register the children of same-sex couples.”[101] They also caused widespread consternation and outrage abroad,[102] with foreign media referring to “ghost parents”[103] and children “orphaned by decree”[104] – echoing a statement by Italian LGBTQ activist and parliamentarian Alessandro Zan.

With a decision issued February 1, 2024, the Padua court remedied the damage caused to LGBTQ parents by the guidance. It declared inadmissible the appeal of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to modify the birth certificates and delete the surname of the non-biological mother. The inadmissibility decision rested on procedural grounds: The Prosecutor could not demand to change the legal status of the parents through a “correction procedure” (procedimento di rettificazione),[105] which is only supposed to “eliminate a discrepancy between a factual situation and that reproduced in the act”[106] in cases where the underlying legal status of the persons involved is not disputed or contested.[107] Different and ad hoc procedures with additional safeguards must be followed not only to correct an act, such as a birth certificate, but also to change the legal status of a person – in this case, a legal parent.

By declaring the case inadmissible, the Court de facto restored the previous situation in which both biological and intended parents were named as parents on the birth certificate. As a result, it secured the parental rights of the same-sex couples in question.

Conclusion

The current Italian government under Giorgia Meloni represents an important case in the study of illiberalism and its impact on human rights. Meloni’s approach underscores the growing centrality of the traditional family in conservative political agendas globally, both as a rallying cry and as an issue around which to legislate and regulate. The Italian case offers insights into how illiberal governments mobilize family norms to consolidate power and reshape society in line with their ideological vision, while also operating with some (in this case, doctrinal) constraints.

There is a sense that some legal protections cannot be rolled back because they have been internalized by society and locked in by international organizations, especially the European Court of Human Rights. This is why the current government has preserved the protection of adult relationships as long as they take place outside of marriage. Meloni has sought only to stifle progress in areas where LGBTQ families are legally unprotected: LGBTQ parenthood and marriage as the union of one man and one woman. Meloni exemplifies pragmatic conservatism, rolling back the rights of LGBTQ families while acknowledging the external constraints imposed by international human rights law, the Constitution, and social pressures. While the protection of same-sex partners through at least civil unions is now a reality in Italian society and European human rights law, the same cannot be said for same-sex parenthood, where the government has found room to halt progress – due to some discretion left by the European Court of Human Rights and the reluctance of the Italian Constitutional Court to intervene.

The reforms introduced under Meloni’s leadership, particularly the curtailment of same-sex parental rights and the expansion of the ban on surrogacy, reflect a broader trend within illiberal politics: the instrumentalization of the traditional family to assert cultural identity and resist progressive changes. Ultimately, these policies are not just political choices but are part of the ideological struggle over the future of national identity and sovereignty within Europe.[108]

The outcomes of Italy’s experience with illiberalism will not only shape the lives of Italian LGBTQ individuals and families but also influence the broader trajectory of human rights and democratic values in Europe. Understanding the Italian case is critical for scholars, policymakers, and advocates working to protect human rights in an increasingly polarized and contested European landscape marked by the culture wars. That judicial inaction has created fertile ground for the illiberal erosion of human rights is the central finding of this paper.

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[1] Elisabetta De Giorgi, Alice Cavalieri, and Francesca Feo, “From Opposition Leader to Prime Minister: Giorgia Meloni and Women’s Issues in the Italian Radical Right”, Politics and Governance 11, no. 1 (February 2023): p. 112, https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i1.6042.

[2] De Giorgi, Cavalieri, and Feo, “Giorgia Meloni and Women’s Issues”, p. 112.

[3] See section “The Defense of the Traditional Family” below.

[4] Maria Elena Indelicato and Maíra Magalhães Lopes, “Understanding Populist Far-Right Anti-Immigration and Anti-Gender Stances Beyond the Paradigm of Gender as ‘A Symbolic Glue’: Giorgia Meloni’s Modern Motherhood, Neo-Catholicism, and Reproductive Racism”, European Journal of Women’s Studies 31, no. 1 (February 2024): p. 7, https://doi.org/10.1177/13505068241230819.

[5] Nausica Palazzo, “The EU Family: Surviving Ideological Familism in Times of Illiberalism”, in Family in EU Law, ed. Marja-Liisa Öberg and Alina Tryfonidou (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press 2024) p. 231-234; Andrea Krizsan and Conny Roggeband, “Towards a conceptual framework for struggles over democrac in backsliding states: Gender equality policy in Central Eastern Europe”, Politics and

Governance 6 (2018): p. 90.

[6] Elia Arfini, Rossella Ghigi, and Sveva Magaraggia, “Can Feminism Be Right? A Content Analysis of Discourses About Women by Female Italian Right-Wing Politicians”, Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia 60, no. 4 (October–December 2019): p. 702, https://dx.doi.org/10.1423/96112.

[7] Andrea Pető, “Gender and Illiberalism”, in Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism, ed. András Sajó, Renáta Uitz, and Stephen Holmes (New York: Routledge 2021), 313–325; Susanna Mancini and Nausica Palazzo, “The Body of the Nation: Illiberalism and Gender”, in Sajó, Uitz, and Holmes, Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism, 403–422.

[8] Sajó, Uitz, and Holmes, Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism. Within its 61 chapters, this multi contribution work includes two chapters on ‘gender’ and illiberalism, while the family is not the object of a separate chapter.

[9] See e.g., Nira Yuval‐Davis, “Gender and Nation”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 16, no. 4 (1993): 621–632, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1993.9993800.

[10] Rogers Brubaker, “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 40, no. 8 (March 2017): 1191–1226, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700. While figures such as Putin and Orbán openly oppose gender equality and LGBTQ rights, a distinct Northern European “gender talk” emerges, that strategically supports such equality to advance illiberal goals. Rogers Brubaker illustrates how this rhetoric in Northern Europe mainly serves to marginalize Muslims or immigrants by claiming their lack of support for women’s or LGBTQ rights.

[11] See Katinka Linnamäki, “Not in Front of the Child: Illiberal Familism and the Hungarian Anti‐LGBTQ+ ‘Child Protective Law’”, Politics and Governance 10, no. 4 (October 2022): 16–25, https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i4.5521; Lídia Balogh, András László Pap and Emese Pásztor, “Hungary: The Concept of Family Within the Framework of ‘Illiberal Democracy’”, in Normativity and Diversity in Family Law: Lessons from Comparative Law, ed. Nadjma Yassari and Marie-Claire Foblets, Ius Comparatum – Global Studies in Comparative Law 57 (Cham: Springer 2022), 195–225.

[12] Palazzo, “The EU Family”.

[13] Among the most recent reflections see Leonardo Puleo and Gianluca Piccolino, “Brothers of Italy is not a post or neo-fascist party, but it might pose an illiberal challenge,” The Loop (blog), 27 April, 2023, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/brothers-of-italy-is-not-a-post-or-neo-fascist-party-but-it-might-pose-an-illiberal-challenge/; Gianfranco Baldini, Filippo Tronconi, and Davide Angelucci, “Yet Another Populist Party? Understanding the Rise of Brothers of Italy”, South European Society and Politics 27, no. 3 (2022): 385–405, https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2022.2159625; Gianfranco Baldini, “From ‘Anomaly’ to ‘Laboratory’? Fratelli d’Italia, Illiberalism and the Study of Right-Wing Parties in Western Europe”, Political Studies Review 22, no. 2 (2024): 402–11, https://doi.org/10.1177/147892992412317.

[14] See 88 below which will refer to the joining of forces between the cause of single persons and LGBTQ parents in Italy as an example of a broader segment of the population that defies the model of the traditional family beyond LGBTQ families. Migrant religious families that do not comply with the dyadic model of family could be another example in this regard (See John Witte Jr., and Joel A. Nichols, “Faith-Based Family Laws in Western Democracies?”, Fides et Libertas: The Journal of the International Religious Liberty Association, (April 2011) 119-132, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1805304; Pancrazio Timpano, “Italy Polygamous Marriage and Family Visa in Italy”, CTM Avvocati, H.G.org (n.d.), https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/polygamous-marriage-and-family-visa-in-italy-36966; Lavinia Parsi et al., “Polygamous Marriage under Italian Law”, University of Milan, Department of Public Italian and Supranational Law, n.d., https://constitutions.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/university%20of%20milan%202.pdf.)

[15] See Donatella Campus, “Female Populist Leaders and Communication: Does Gender Make a Difference?”, in Perspectives on Populism and the Media, ed. Benjamin Krämer and Christina Holtz-Bacha, International Studies on Populism 7 (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2020), 235–252, https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845297392; Francesca Feo and Anna Lavizzari, Case Study Italy, Triumph of The Women? The Female Face of Right-wing Populism and Extremism 06 (Berlin: FES – Forum Politik und Gesellschaft 2021), https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/dialog/17877.pdf; Gaweda et al., “What’s in A Name? Gender Equality and The European Conservatives and Reformists’ Group in The European Parliament”, Party Politics 29, no. 5 (July 2022): 829–839, https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688221116247.

[16] Giorgia Serughetti, “Genere, Razza, Sessualità: Il Populismo di Destra come Politica dell’Identità”, GenIUS, online first ed. (February 2023), https://hdl.handle.net/10281/408441.

[17] Serughetti, “Genere, Razza, Sessualità”, p. 1; See also Maria Clara Sottomayor, “Vulnerabilidade e Discriminação”, Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa 62, no. 1, vol.2 (2021): 705–732.

[18] Indelicato and Lopes, “Understanding Far-Right Stances”, p. 9.

^[19] Nausica Palazzo, “The Religion of Illiberals and the Anti-Gender Backlash”, Law & Ethics of Human Rights 18, no. 2 (November 2024): 107–137, https://doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2024-2008.

[20] Julia Hall, “Gender, Feminism, and Family Values”, in Countering the Illiberal Drift in Europe, ed. Harriet Sanders and Samantha Schrantz, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies (Seattle WA: University of Washington 2023), p. 58.

[21] Cristiana Ottaviano, “Motherhood and Care: (Still) Women’s Destiny?”, AG: About Gender International Journal of Gender Studies 4, no. 8 (November 2025), 240–261, https://doi.org/10.15167/2279-5057/ag.2015.4.8.279; Ottaviano describes Meloni’s insistence on an understanding of “maternity as destiny.”

[22] Feo and Lavizzari, Case Study of Italy.

[23] Giorgia Meloni, Io Sono Giorgia, (Rome: Rizzoli Libri 2021).

[24] Fratelli d’Italia, “Il Programma: Pronti a Risollevare l’Italia”, Elezioni Politiche 25 Settembre 2022, ASTRID, https://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/protected/broc/brochure_programma_fdi_qr_def.pdf.

[25] Camilla Prato, “Aborto, la Stanza dell’Ascolto Resta: Il Tar Boccia il Ricorso. Pro Vita: ‘Aiuto per le Donne’”, Luce!, January 14, 2024, La Nazione, accessed February 14, 2024, https://luce.lanazione.it/attualita/aborto-la-stanza-dellascolto-resta-il-tar-boccia-il-ricorso-pro-vita-aiuto-per-le-donne-sueqxxdl.

[26] Francesca Feo, “Legislative Reforms to Fight Discrimination and Violence Against LGBTQ+: The Failure Of The Zan Bill in Italy”, European Journal of Politics and Gender 5, no. 1 (2022): 149–151, https://doi.org/10.1332/251510821X16377638483577.

[27] Augusta Cesari, “Meloni: “L’Ideologia Gender Mira Alla Scomparsa Delle Madri. Noi Difenderemo L’Identità Femminile”, Il Secolo d’Italia, April 29, 2022, https://www.secoloditalia.it/2022/04/meloni-lideologia-gender-mira-alla-scomparsa-delle-madri-noi-difenderemo-lidentita-femminile/.

[28] “Meloni in Andalusia per Sostenere Vox, Dal Palco Arringa la Folla in Spagnolo”, Corriere Tv, June 13, 2022, https://video.corriere.it/politica/meloni-andalusia-sostenere-vox-palco-arringa-folla-spagnolo/8ce5509e-eb15-11ec-b89b-6b199698064a.

[29] “MEM & J – Io Sono Giorgia (Giorgia Meloni Remix)”, MEM & J, Youtube, October 27, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fhwUMDX4K8o .

[30] Fratelli d’Italia, “Il Programma: Pronti a Risollevare l’Italia”.

[31] Interestingly, Meloni’s objection to non-traditional families is incompatible with the declared objective of combatting the staggering demographic decline of the country. As an ongoing demographic project demonstrates, non-traditional families can also contribute to the objective of countering demographic in Italy: Umberto Damiani, Nausica Palazzo, and Graziella Romeo, “Policy Brief: Expanding Family Rights in Italy with More Inclusive Laws for Non-Traditional Families”, Progetto ALFA, Fondazione Cariplo, Rif. 2021-1321 (2024).

[32] Lega, “Programma di Governo: Programma Elettorale”, Elezioni Politiche 25 Settembre 2022, ASTRID, https://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/protected/prog/programma_lega_2022.pdf.

[33] Fratelli d’Italia, “Il Programma: Pronti a Risollevare l’Italia”, p. 21.

[34] Fratelli d’Italia, “Il Programma: Pronti a Risollevare l’Italia, p. 21.

[35] These microstates are Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Monaco.

[36] Oliari and Others v. Italy [GC], ECtHR nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11 (July 21, 2015), at paras. 176 and 185; Nausica Palazzo, “Fedotova and Others v. Russia: Dawn of a New Era for European LGBTQ Families?”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 30, no. 2 (April 2023): p. 217, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4612696.

[37] See e.g., Fedotova and Others v. Russia [CG], ECtHR nos. 40792/10, 30538/14 and 43439/14 (January 17, 2023).

[38] Oliari, ECtHR nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, at paras. 164 and 185–186.

[39] Oliari, ECtHR nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, at para. 172.

[40] Oliari, ECtHR nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, at para. 127 and 180.

[41] Palazzo, “Fedatova: Dawn of a New Era”.

[42] Schalk and Kopf v. Austria [S1], ECtHR no. 30141/04 (June 24, 2010); Chapin and Charpentier v. France [GC], ECtHR no. 40183/07 (June 9, 2016); See Geoffrey Willelms, “Same-Sex Marriage as a Human Right: How the Strasbourg Court Could Draw Inspiration from the US Supreme Court and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to Affirm Marriage Equality”, Oñati Socio-Legal Series 14, no. 1 (2024): p. 179, https://doi.org/10.35295/osls.iisl/0000-0000-0000-1347.

[43] Fratelli d’Italia, “Il Programma: Pronti a Risollevare l’Italia”, 21.

[44] Law no. 76 of May 20, 2016, “Regolamentazione delle Unioni Civili Tra Persone dello Stesso Sesso e Disciplina delle Convivenze” (“Regulation of Civil Partnerships Between Same-Sex People and Regulation of Living Together”), Official Journal no. 118 (May 21, 2016).

[45] See Bill no. C. 2593 of July 31, 2014, “Modifica degli Articoli 29 e 30 e Abrogazione dell’Articolo 31 della Costituzione in Materia di Famiglia e di Rapporti Tra i Genitori e i Figli, Anche Adottivi” (“Amendment of Articles 29 and 30 and Repeal of Article 31 of the Constitution Concerning the Family and the Relationship Between Parents and Children, Including Adopted Children”), Camera Dei Deputati, https://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/stampati/pdf/17PDL0025660.pdf

[46] See e.g., “Nozze Gay, Meloni: Sentenza è Lezione per Sindaci di Sinistra Che Firmano Atti Illegali”, Fratelli d’Italia, October 27, 2015, https://www.fratelli-italia.it/nozze-gay-meloni-sentenza-e-lezione-per-sindaci-di-sinistra-che-firmano-atti-illegali/.

[47] “Promo Nozze Gay IKEA e Comune di Bari, Gemmato: Presto Interrogazione Parlamentare su Iniziativa Discriminatoria Nei Confronti di Coppie Eterosessuali in Difficoltà”, Fratelli d’Italia, May 17, 2018, https://www.fratelli-italia.it/promo-nozze-gay-ikea-e-comune-di-bari-gemmato-presto-interrogazione-parlamentare-su-iniziativa-discriminatoria-nei-confronti-di-coppie-eterosessuali-in-difficolta/.

[48] Federico Azzarri, “Le Unioni Civili: Luci e Ombre”, in Diritto e persone LGBTQI+, ed. Marco Pelissero and Antonio Vercellone (Torino: Giappichelli 2022); Ingrid Pistolesi, “La Legge N. 76 Del 2016 Sulle Unioni Civili e Sulle Convivenze: Qualche Breve Osservazione”, Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Ecclesiastica, no. 3 (December 2017): 891, https://doi.org/10.1440/89018.

[49] Angelo Schillaci, “Famiglie e Dignità delle Relazioni: Una Lettura Costituzionale”, Questione Giustizia, no. 2 (2019), https://www.questionegiustizia.it/rivista/articolo/famiglie-e-dignita-delle-relazioni-una-lettura-costituzionale_648.php.

[50] Law no. 184/83 of May 4, 1983, “Diritto del Minore ad una Famiglia” (“Right of the Minor to a Family”), Official Journal no. 133 (May 17, 1983), art. 44, no. 1, b).

[51] ​​Fabio Trolli, “L’Adozione dei Minori di Età in Casi Particolari”, in Trattato di Diritto di Famiglia, ed. Giovanni Bonilini, 2nd ed. (Milan: UTET Giuridica, 2022), vol. 3, 591ff.

[52] Guilia Barbato, “Genitorialità Intenzionale e Status Filiationis”, GenIUS, online first ed. (April 2024).

[53] Barbato, “Genitorialità Intenzionale e Status Filiationis”, p. 10, note 36.

[54] Corte Costituzionale Sentenza 79/2022, ECLI:IT:COST:2022:79 (February 23, 2023), Official Journal no. 13 (March 30, 2023).

[55] Corte Costituzionale Sentenza 33/2021, ECLI:IT:COST:2021:33 (January 28, 2021), Official Journal no. 10 (March 10, 2021), at para. 5.7.

[56] Corte Costituzionale Sentenza 162/2014, ECLI:IT:COST:2014:162 (April 9, 2014), Official Journal no. 26 (June 18, 2021).

[57] See following section on surrogacy.

[58] The court scrutiny will ascertain whether adoption is in the best interest of the child and the consent of the biological parent is present. On the insufficiency of this legal path to guarantee the rights of same-sex parents see the Italian Constitutional Court: Corte Cost. Sent. 33/2021, ECLI:IT:COST:2021:33, at para. 5.7.

[59] Susanna Lollini, “Il Riconoscimento della Genitorialità Omosessuale: Un Percorso Lungo e Tortuoso”, in Pelissero and Vercellone, Diritto e persone LGBTQI+.

[60] Corte Costituzionale Sentenza 68/2025, ECLI:IT:COST:2025:68 (March 10, 2025), Official Journal no. 22 (May 28, 2025).

[61] Corte di Cassazione Sentenza 12193/19, Sez. Un. Civ. (May 8, 2019), La Corta Supremo di Cassazione, https://www.biodiritto.org/ocmultibinary/download/3846/45513/3/e360ad88957d6339e2d6806342b50ead/file/s.u._12193_2019.pdf; Corte di Cassazione Sentenza 8029/2020, I Sez. Civ. (April 22, 2020), La Corte Suprema Di Cassazione, https://www.articolo29.it/corte-cassazione-sezione-sentenza-n-8029-del-22-04-2020/.

[62] Corte di Cassazione Sentenza 9006/2021, I Sez. Civ. (March 31, 2021), in Luca Tormen, “Via Libera Alla Trascrizione dell’Adozione per le Coppie Omoaffettive”, La Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile Commentata (2021): 797ff.

[63] Corte Cost. Sent. 33/2021, ECLI:IT:COST:2021:33, at para. 5.7.

[64] Alina Tryfonidou, “The Parenting Rights of Same-Sex Couples Under European Law”, in Marriage, Families and Spirituality 25, no. 2 (2020): p. 180.

[65] Law no. 169/2024 of November 8, 2024, “Modifica all’articolo 12 della legge 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40, in materia di perseguibilità del reato di surrogazione di maternità commesso all’estero da cittadino italiano.”

[66] Law no. 40/2004 of February 19, 2004, “Norme in Materia di Procreazione Medicalmente Assistita” (“Standards in the Matter of Medically Assisted Procreation”), art. 12, para. 6.

[67] Federico Boni, “Carolina Varchi (FDI) Attacca i Pride e Getta la Maschera Sulla GPA: ‘È Ideologia LGBT, Mai Legge le Loro Rivendicazioni’”, Gay.it, June 24, 2024, accessed August 4, 2024, https://www.gay.it/carolina-varchi-fdi-pride-gpa-ideologia-lgbt-legge.

[68] Boni, “Varchi Attaca I Pride” (author’s own translation).

[69] Bill no. S. 824, introduced by Deputies Varchi et al., “Modifica all’Articolo 12 della Legge 19 Febbraio 2004, N. 40, in Materia di Perseguibilità del Reato di Surrogazione di Maternità Commesso all’Estero da Cittadino Italiano”, approved July 2, 2024. Additional information is available on the website of the Senate (accessed Aug. 4, 2024): https://www.senato.it/leg/19/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/57364.htm.

[70] Bill no. C.887, introduced by Deputies Varchi et al., “Modifica all’Articolo 12 della Legge 19 Febbraio 2004, N. 40, in Materia di Perseguibilità del Reato di Surrogazione si Maternità Commesso All’Estero Da Cittadino Italiano”, approved July 26, 2023, https://www.senato.it/leg/19/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/57364.htm.

[71] Law no. 40/2004 of February 19, 2004, art. 12, para. 6.

[72] Carmelo Danisi, “Maternità Surrogata come Reato ‘Universale’: Considerazioni di Diritto Internazionale e dell’Unione Europea”, GenIUS, online ed. (February 2024).

[73] Bill no. C.342 introduced by Deputies Varchi et al. and replaced by Bill no. C.887, p. 2: “This bill, in order to hinder any practice that could be construed as commercial trafficking of children, introduces an explicit prohibition for Italians to have access to the practice of surrogacy also in foreign countries.”

[74] Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 2011/36/EU on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting Its Victims, doc. 10350/23 (June 9, 2023), “Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, no. 9061/23” (May 5, 2023), para. 3.3.

[75] Justice Commission of the Senate: Hearing of Prof. Silvia Nicolai (April 10, 2024), min 10:44-11:00, https://webtv.senato.it/webtv/commissioni/contrasto-alla-surrogazione-di-maternita-1 (point stressed by FdI’s MP Sergio Rastrelli).

[76] “Maternità Surrogata: Reato Universale Contro Business Esecrabile”, Fratelli d’Italia (July 3, 2024), https://www.fratelli-italia.it/maternita-surrogata-reato-universale-contro-business-esecrabile/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CCon%20il%20via%20libera%20della,corpo%20femminile%20e%20di%20bambini.

[77] Ugo Milano, “L’Attacco di Meloni alla Maternità Surrogata: ‘Una Pratica Vergognosa, Non È Un Atto d’Amore’ – Il video”, Open (April 28, 2024) https://www.open.online/2024/04/28/giorgia-meloni-gpa-reato-universale-pescara-video/.

[78] Danisi, “Maternità Surrogata come Reato ‘Universale’, s. 4.2.

[79] C. v. Italy [S1], ECtHR no. 47196/21 (August 31, 2023), at paras. 59 and 68. The decision, which was delivered in French, refers to a legal framework that is “adéquat et suffisant”, appropriate and sufficient to ensure the implementation of the positive obligations stemming from Article 8 of the Convention. A similar position was expressed by the Italian Constitutional Court in the context of a recent decision upholding the prohibition of surrogacy due to its incompatibility with the dignity of the woman: see, Corte Cost. Sent. 33/2021, ECLI:IT:COST:2021:33, at para. 5.1.

[80] Mennesson. v. France [S5], ECtHR appeal no. 65192/11 (June 6, 2014); Labassee v. France [S5], ECtHR no. 65941/11 (June 26, 2014); D. v. France [S5], ECtHR appeal no. 11288/18 (July 16, 2020); D.B and Others v. Switzerland [S3], appeals nos. 58817/15 and 58252/15 (November 11, 2022); see also Danisi, “Maternità Surrogata come Reato ‘Universale’, 18; Fabrizio Filice, “La Nuova Incriminazione della Gestazione per Altri: Problematiche Definitorie e Interpretative”, GenIUS, online first ed. (January 2024): p. 6.

[81] See, generally, Danisi, “Maternità Surrogata come Reato ‘Universale’.

[82] Dafni Lima, “Italy’s ban on international surrogacy is part of a drive towards an ultra-conservative idea of family”, Durham University website (November 20, 2024).

[83] The relevant enabling provision is Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (December 13, 2007), Official Journal C 326 p. 1–390 (October 26, 2012), art. 82, para. 2 and art. 83.

[84] Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, Official Journal L 190 p. 1–20 (July 18, 2002).

[85] Framework Decision, art. 2, para. 4.

[86] Framework Decision, art. 2, para. 7, b).

[87] Danisi, “Maternità Surrogata come Reato ‘Universale’.

[88] Filice, “La Nuova Incriminazione della Gestazione per Altri”, p. 3.

[89] Filice, “La Nuova Incriminazione della Gestazione per Altri”.

[90] Milano, “L’attacco di Meloni alla Maternità Surrogata”.

[91] The main NGO devoted to the promotion of LGBTQ parents, Famiglie Arcobaleno (Rainbow Families), presented in conjunction with legal advocacy group Rete Lenford a legislative proposal aimed at introducing inter alia access to adoption and to MAP for both same-sex couples and single persons, regardless of gender identity and sexual orientation: “Disposizioni in Materia di Vita Familiare delle Coppie Formate da Persone dello Stesso Sesso e di Stato Giuridico dei Figli, Nonché di Accesso all’Adozione e alla Procreazione Medicalmente Assistita per le Persone di Stato Libero” (“Legal Provisions on the Family Life for Same-Sex Couples and the Legal Status of Children, as Well as Access to Adoption and Medically Assisted Procreation for Single People”), proposed by Famiglie Arcobaleno and Rete Lenford, https://www.famigliearcobaleno.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/TESTO-PDL-FA-e-RL.pdf.

[92] The constitutional compatibility of the ban for single women has been recently confirmed by the Corte Costituzionale Sentenza 69/2025, ECLI:IT:COST:2025:69 (March 11 2025), Official Journal no. 22 (March 28, 2025).

[93] Law 184/83 of May 4, 1983, amended by Law 149/2001 of March 28, 2001, art. 6.

[94] Corte Costituzionale Sentenza 33/2025, ECLI:IT:COST:2025:33 (March 21 2025), Official Journal no. 22 (March 26, 2025).

[95] Circolare del Ministero dell’Interno no. 3/2022, Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali (January 19, 2023), https://associazionelucacoscioni.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/circ-dait-003-servdemo-19-01-2023.pdf.

[96] Corte di Cassazione Sentenza 38162/2022, Sez. Un. Civ. (December 30, 2022), La Corte Suprema di Cassazione, https://www.formazionegiuridica.org/images/Sentenze/Sez_Unite_38162-2022.pdf.

[97] Corte di Cassazione Sentenza38162/2022, Sez. Un. Civ.

[98] Barbato, “Genitorialità Intenzionale e Status Filiationis”, p. 7.

[99] “LGBTQ+ Parents Are Being Removed from Their Children’s Birth Certificates in Italy – Here’s What’s Behind This Disturbing Trend”, The Conversation (June 28, 2023), https://theconversation.com/lgbtq-parents-are-being-removed-from-their-childrens-birth-certificates-in-italy-heres-whats-behind-this-disturbing-trend-208241.

^[100] Alvise Armellini and Francesca Piscioneri, “Italy’s Crackdown on Same-Sex Parenting Leaves Children Bemused”, Reuters (April 6, 2023), accessed on January 14, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-crackdown-same-sex-parenting-leaves-children-bemused-2023-04-06/.

[101] European Parliament Resolution on the Rule of Law 2022 (March 30, 2023), para. 10.

[102] “#InPictures: Lesbian Lawyers Protest at Italian Embassy in Dublin”, Irish Legal News (August 3, 2023), https://www.irishlegal.com/articles/inpictures-lesbian-lawyers-protest-at-italian-embassy-in-dublin.

[103] Lara Bullens, “‘Ghost Parents’: Same-Sex Couples in Italy Are Losing Their Rights”, France 24 (September 9, 2023), https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230914-italian-pm-giorgia-meloni-wears-down-parental-rights-of-same-sex-couples.

[104] Ashifa Kassam, “‘Orphaned by Decree’: Italy’s Same-Sex Parents React to Losing Their Rights”, The Guardian, (August 21, 2023), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/21/orphaned-by-decree-italy-same-sex-parents-react-losing-rights#:~:text=This%20year%20the%20Italian%20government,little%20choice%20but%20to%20comply.

[105] Presidential Decree no. 396/2000 (November 3, 2000), art. 95.

[106] Corte di Cassazione Sentenza 951/1993, Sez. Un. Civ. (n.d., ca 1993).

[107] Corte di Cassazione Sentenza 38162/2022, Sez. Un. Civ.: “Consequently, it can be concluded that the remedy under Article 95 of the Presidential Decree cited above can be used in cases where the object of dispute is the act of registration without the status that it documents being disputed; otherwise, whenever there is a dispute over the fact that the act that must document (in this case, since we are dealing with legal status, on the status of the person), one must resort to the different status actions under the Civil Code”.

[108] The culture war scenario opposing the European Union and national illiberal actors is becoming increasingly visible after the EU Commission’s decision to mobilize Art. 2 TUE, enshrining the founding values of the EU, against Hungary. Action brought on 19 December 2022, Case C-769/22, Commission v Hungary OJ 2023/C 54/19. See Matteo Bonelli and Monica Claes, “Crossing the Rubicon? The Commission’s use of Article 2 TEU in the infringement action on LGBTIQ+ rights in Hungary”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 30 (2023); Luke Dimitrios Spieker, “Berlaymont is back: The Commission invokes Article 2 TEU as self-standing plea infringement proceedings over Hungarian LGBTIQ rights violations”, EU Law Live (February 22, 2023); Palazzo, “The EU Family”, s. 5.