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On June 2, Mexico is poised to elect its first female president. The leading candidate, Claudia Sheinbaum of the ruling Morena party, enjoys a substantial (though not insurmountable) lead over her closest rival, Xochitl Gálvez, running in a coalition of opposition parties. The only male candidate in the race occupies a distant third place. Unquestionably, this event carries important symbolic implications. Whoever she is, the next Mexican president will be the first woman elected to the chief executive in any North American country. Feminists hope that she will be more sensitive to women’s demands than the current president has been. A successful female commander-in-chief could alleviate fears that women cannot command the loyalty of troops or manage tough security challenges. Yet it still matters which candidate gets elected.

The good news for the United States is that in many respects the two candidates intend to pursue similar policies. We are not facing a stark contrast between a very pro-U.S., pro-trade candidate, and one who wants to withdraw from the North American community. Neither candidate is proposing to withdraw from the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Both candidates have promised to address weaknesses in infrastructure as well as the alarming security situation in order to provide more guarantees for nearshoring investment. While neither talks much about migration (it is not a top concern of Mexicans in the campaign) it seems likely that both would be willing to cooperate with U.S. initiatives to assist in controlling migration, provided that some incentives were offered. Both are promising to continue popular social programs such as the pension for the elderly and scholarships for unemployed youth. So, what is at stake in this election?

The Candidates: Real Differences

Despite some congruence, there are some important differences between the candidates that deserve attention, both in terms of their policy proposals and in terms of their likely political coalitions.

Security is one such area; convergence on the goal of addressing the security crisis masks important differences in approach. For most Mexicans, crime and security are the number one concern—this is understandable in a country that hosts five of the ten most violent cities in the world, one of the highest homicide rates in the hemisphere, and an alarming number of disappearances (the official count now surpasses 100,000, which dwarfs the total number of disappeared during Argentina’s Dirty War in the 1970s). Gálvez has highlighted the security crisis as one of the key failures of the current Morena administration and accused both the president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (often known simply as AMLO), and his hand-picked successor Sheinbaum of involvement with the cartels. The accusations are based largely on the New York Times reporting that López Obrador’s administration had taken illicit cartel money as far back as 2006 (claims that López Obrador denies as categorically false), and on the president’s self-proclaimed strategy of “hugs, not bullets” to deal with criminal violence. The very first point in Gálvez’ campaign platform is “Neither concessions nor courtesy toward organized crime. Hugs for delinquents are finished.” While she does not propose to withdraw the military from the war against the cartels, she does want to double the size of the civilian police forces, educate them at a new national police academy and pay them well enough to discourage corruption. She also proposes building a new high-security prison to house the most dangerous criminals and building out the court system.

Gálvez has highlighted the security crisis as one of the key failures of the current Morena administration and accused both the president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (often known simply as AMLO), and his hand-picked successor Sheinbaum of involvement with the cartels.

Sheinbaum, on the other hand, does not mention the security situation until promise number 91 out of 100, and what she commits to doing is essentially more of the same: “attending the causes” of crime (for example, through social programs directed at youth), consolidating the National Guard (under military control) and presumably continuing to rely on the military for the wide array of civilian and security tasks delegated to it by the current president. She is not, at any rate, proposing to change this, as Gálvez does. Sheinbaum has also proposed a constitutional reform to require the popular election of judges at all levels of the court system, a measure that some see as jeopardizing the independence of the judiciary. Morena, as the largest party, could expect to place many of its adherents into judicial positions while career lawyers might suffer.

In the case of energy policy, while both candidates indicate their desire to advance toward clean energy and recognize the need to fortify Mexico’s state-owned oil company Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), they have different approaches toward accomplishing these goals. A self-made entrepreneur, Xochitl Gálvez proposes a greater emphasis on attracting private investment to the energy sector “within the framework of our laws,” as she says in her platform, i.e., without proposing the full privatization of either Mexico’s oil company (PEMEX) or the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE). Gálvez also promises to “democratize access to energy” by promoting the deployment of 2 million solar panels (presumably in rural areas not otherwise covered by electricity service) in order to allow greater access to energy for all.  Sheinbaum, in contrast, is putting her efforts into PEMEX and CFE, which she says should have command at least 54% of the national energy market., This includes efforts to strengthen CFE’s capacity for generation as well as distribution of energy.

In all, the official platform of Sheinbaum makes 100 specific promises; Gálvez makes 369. Both are politically astute enough to promise the moon during the campaign. But would either of them be able to implement even the majority of these promises? There are several obstacles that either candidate, should they be elected, would face.

The Next President’s Uphill Battle

The first task for an incoming president will be to address Mexico’s budget. Oddly, the “leftist” Sheinbaum is the candidate promising no new taxes, just more efficient enforcement, while the “conservative” Gálvez plans to tax the rich. Both strategies face difficulties.

The first task for an incoming president will be to address Mexico’s budget. Mexico has been running a fairly significant fiscal deficit, projected by the IMF at about 3.9% of GDP in 2023. The current government has promised to erase this deficit in the next year, but experts think that such a large shift would trigger a shock to markets, so it is unclear whether the shift will be immediate or spaced out over the next two or three years. Either way, Mexico cannot continue to run deficits of this size indefinitely and oil revenue alone cannot come to the rescue: PEMEX is significantly indebted. Under these circumstances, neither Gálvez nor Sheinbaum is likely to be able to fund all of the generous social programs they promise without additional revenue. Oddly, the “leftist” Sheinbaum is the candidate promising no new taxes, just more efficient enforcement, while the “conservative” Gálvez plans to tax the rich. Both strategies face difficulties. Enforcement of the tax code does seem to have improved under López Obrador, but clearly not enough to pay for all of his programs despite his much-vaunted strategy of “republican austerity”—budget-cutting by lowering government salaries and eliminating or reducing the funding for various agencies. And raising the taxes on the rich always carries political challenges, but perhaps especially for Gálvez, whose political coalition includes the conservative parties who have been the biggest promoters of business interests.

A second challenge stems from that fact that it is not clear that either candidate will have the legislative backing to pass their more ambitious proposals. This is particularly true for Gálvez. While she has served as a senator for the conservative National Action Party (PAN), Gálvez consistently stresses her independence from parties in the campaign. She is running as the candidate of a coalition that spans the traditional Mexican ruling party, the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI), the PAN, and the pre-Morena leftist party, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). These three parties were historically bitter rivals, united today only in their detestation of López Obrador and Morena. They prefer different policy positions. And even if Gálvez pulls off a major upset and wins the presidential election, it is not clear that she will have enough electoral coattails to pull with her sufficient local congressional candidates to secure a legislative majority, or that such a majority would be coherent enough to work together.

Sheinbaum’s position is relatively better. Morena itself is polling around 46% of the legislative vote. Due to limited over-representation and support from two smaller parties—the Workers Party (PT) and the Ecological Green Party (PVEM)—that are running in coalition with Morena, she is likely to have a majority of the legislature, assuming she wins. This will give her the votes to pass most ordinary legislation, but likely not the super-majority she wants in order to approve constitutional reforms without the consent of the opposition. Some of her more ambitious proposals, such as the proposal to elect judges, would thus run into serious roadblocks.

Gálvez faces another problem: How to get the military back into the barracks, as she has said she wants to do. Under President López Obrador, the military has been charged with numerous tasks that were once carried out by civilian government agencies, including the construction and running of the Tren Maya, the land-port system, vaccinations, filling potholes, and even running the airline Mexicana de Aviación. Profits from some of these enterprises are earmarked for military pensions. It is unclear whether the military would resist withdrawal from these tasks or be delighted not to have to run businesses.

For Sheinbaum, the problem is slightly different: How to get Andrés Manuel López Obrador into successful retirement. Although López Obrador has promised to leave politics and write books, there is widespread skepticism about his ability to resist telling Sheinbaum what to do, or failing that, using his considerable prestige within Morena to tell its legislators whether to support or oppose the president. Sheinbaum’s main electoral advantage at the moment is the fact that she has been publicly backed by a very popular president. This advantage could turn into a disadvantage if she attempts to steer an independent course as president.

For Sheinbaum, the problem is slightly different: How to get Andrés Manuel López Obrador into successful retirement. Although López Obrador has promised to leave politics and write books, there is widespread skepticism about his ability to resist telling Sheinbaum what to do.

Mexico After AMLO

Many popular presidents have tried to pick their successors with the notion of continuing to exercise power behind the scenes. Most of them have failed. Should Sheinbaum be elected president, she would have tools at her disposal to create incentives for legislative cooperation, as most Mexican presidents have been able to do.

Yet more is at stake than the continuation of López Obrador’s favorite social policies. The future of democracy in Mexico may be riding on this election. If Sheinbaum were to win and get a supermajority of the legislature, she might continue to engage in the slow erosion of checks and balances that have made AMLO the most powerful president in a quarter century. A more optimistic scenario—and the most likely one in my view—is a Sheinbaum presidency with only a legislative majority. Preventing the more alarming proposals of constitutional reform promoted by the current president (and blocked by the opposition and the courts) is a key goal of democrats in the country.

More is at stake than the continuation of López Obrador’s favorite social policies. The future of democracy in Mexico may be riding on this election. If Sheinbaum were to win and get a supermajority of the legislature, she might continue to engage in the slow erosion of checks and balances that have made AMLO the most powerful president in a quarter century.

A Gálvez victory poses problems of a different type. Observers of AMLO point out that in the six elections he has participated in as a candidate, he accepted the results of only two of them: the ones that he won. A Gálvez victory, especially if it goes against the trends in most of the publicly available polls, would likely be disputed, creating a difficult situation in which AMLO could resist leaving power. The outcome of such a situation, and the role that might be played by the military, would put Mexican democracy in its greatest danger since the transition.

Even if this scenario is avoided, we must be realistic about the serious challenges Mexico faces. To date, 30 candidates have been murdered, principally candidates for mayor in areas where cartels contest power with the government. This already ties Mexico for its most violent elections ever, with a month still to go before the elections occur. No strategy, by either candidate, can reverse this situation quickly, or alone. Greater cooperation with the United States will likely be required, cooperation that is in the best interests of both countries. Territorial control by drug trafficking organizations—who increasingly also smuggle migrants—jeopardizes Mexico’s growing integration with the United States.


Kathleen Bruhn is a Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She has published extensively on Mexican elections, campaigns, the effects of party primaries, and the Mexican Left. She is currently working on a project about the health of democratic institutions in Mexico, and a second project on populist governments in Latin America.
Her latest book is Politics and the Pink Tide: A Comparative Analysis of Protest in Latin America.

Image by John Chrobak, made using “Xóchitl Gálvez Ruiz,” by EneasMx licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0; “Claudia Sheinbaum (49503536727),” by Secretaría de Cultura Ciudad de México licensed under CC BY 2.0; “Votación Elecciones federales de México de 2018 – 3,” by ProtoplasmaKid licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0; and “Lona en apoyo a la precandidatura de Claudia Sheinbaum,” by ProtoplasmaKid licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0.

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