Mitigating Illiberalism through Political Representation: Intermediary Bodies as Pillars of Pluralism

Mitigating Illiberalism through Political Representation: Intermediary Bodies as Pillars of Pluralism

By Antonio Campati

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Keywords: illiberalism, political representation, liberal democracy, intermediary bodies, pluralism

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Several decades ago, Giovanni Sartori saw a dangerous gulf between democracy and liberalism. He wrote that after a long and happy convergence, they were once again diverging. He saw the greatest danger of such a divorce in the fact that it might inadvertently begin to work towards an illiberal democracy, feeding the illusion that by eroding parts of liberalism, direct forms of democracy could be strengthened.[1] Such an illusion can still be felt today—albeit in a profoundly changed context, mainly due to the use in the political arena of sophisticated algorithms that govern the “bubble democracies” in which we live—an ideal type that emphasizes the importance of virtual bubbles in which the audience is fragmented due to the process of disintermediation that characterizes democracies.[2]

As is well known, the link between democracy and liberalism is quite recent: for some scholars, the works of Alexis de Tocqueville, written during the first half of the 19th century, represent a clear caesura because they mark the beginning of the combination of democracy and liberalism, even with the intention of contrasting this new union with the perspectives evoked by socialist thought. Other perspectives place the beginning of the union a few decades earlier, while still others put it later, at the end of the 19th century.[3] Regardless of the periodization, there is no doubt that the histories of democracy and liberalism are distinct and that each has its own peculiar identity. But, at least from a certain point onward, they find themselves converging in a way that will prove decisive in constituting Western democracies, at least from the middle of the 20th century onward.[4]

Can we therefore argue that democracy and liberalism have diverged again today? In one sense, the answer is yes, if we look at the emergence of so-called illiberal democracies, since the leaders behind these regimes are proposing to maintain democratic methods in their countries but abandoning liberal principles. On the other hand, there are not a few democracies that, although going through various crises, still have a high level of resilience because of the functioning of institutions that are the result of the age-old combination of democratic and liberal principles.[5] The debate is ongoing. Despite the different interpretations of an illiberal virus in contemporary democracies, it would be superficial to overlook the signs that point to a breakdown of the relationship between rights, duties, and freedoms—that is, of the different combinations of democratic and liberal principles that until a few years ago seemed inviolable.[6]

The aim of this paper is to underline how political representation is a crucial element capable of acting as a check on illiberalism because it aims to prevent the concentration of power by guaranteeing pluralism.[7] In fact, it provides a very important democratic balance, according to which sovereignty belongs to the people but, at the same time, is deliberately limited by the introduction of certain basic safeguards and protections (for example, those for racial minorities). To this end, we first emphasize the link between democratic representation and liberalism; then, we focus on the role of intermediary bodies as actors capable of guaranteeing the resilience of representative democracy.

Thus, I describe the new divergence between liberalism and democracy with the emergence of illiberal democracies. The question with which we begin is therefore the most provocative because it goes to the root of the problem: can illiberal democracy exist or is it just a rhetorical device used by some populist leaders?[8] In order to answer this question, the preferred methodological option is to leave out the elements that define liberal democracy and focus on the elements that define liberalism. In this way, the link between liberal principles and democratic principles is emphasized. Next, I focus on political representation as a point of intersection between liberalism and democracy by recalling the vertical and horizontal theories of democracy.

Finally, on this basis, I analyze the importance of intermediary bodies: first, from a theoretical point of view as necessary elements to ensure real political pluralism; then, thanks to some empirical research data on young Italians, I will show how the awareness of the importance of political mediation is growing, even in a phase like the current one, where disintermediation processes are pervasive.

The Response to a New Conceptual Split

For Sartori, illiberal democracy is a form of authoritarianism. In fact, by breaking down the two elements that make up liberal democracy, he emphasizes the importance of their connection: the liberal component is liberating—that is, it liberates the demos (people) from oppression, servitude, and despotism, and the democratic component is empowering, in the sense that it empowers the demos. So liberal democracy is firstly demoprotection, the protection of the people from tyranny, and secondly demopower, the allocation of increasing shares of power to the people. The crucial point is not so much to find out which of the two elements is more important, but to put them in the right order. Therefore, if there is no freedom from for the former, there will be no freedom of the latter—if there is no demoprotection first, then there can be no demopower.[9]

Sartori’s lesson is useful in understanding the inherently problematic nature of the division proposed by today’s illiberal leaders. As Jan-Werner Müller notes,[10] Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán voluntarily performs a conceptual split when he uses the term “illiberal democracy” to describe his political project.[11] In fact, the Hungarian leader cleverly presents himself as a true democrat who supports elections but rejects the liberal tradition, which he presents, quite superficially, as the philosophy that animates the technocratic elites in Brussels. In other words, Orbán separates democracy from liberalism: he keeps the former and abandons the latter. In this way, liberal democracy is no longer understood as a core that holds together demoprotection and demopower.

A new war of words has broken out[12] among scholars of politics, law, philosophy, and international relations when analyzing the notion of illiberal democracy.[13] For example, those who study political regimes use it to refer to a particular regime characterized by a set of qualitative and quantitative indicators;[14] organizations that monitor democracies, such as V-Dem and Freedom House, often use it to refer to flawed democracies; political leaders such as Orbán use it to refer to their own political project; some scholars consider it to be closely related to populism;[15] and still others think the term “illiberal democracy”  is outdated because it is based on a misunderstanding.[16] Norberto Bobbio is the progenitor of the view that liberal democracy is the only form of effective democracy, while all others are merely forms of apparent democracy.[17]

Thus, in response to the conceptual shift promoted by contemporary illiberal leaders, the perspective that suggests a shift in focus from adjective to noun—from illiberal to illiberalism[18]—is supportable and encourages a reflection on the field of political theory, allowing us to rediscover the roots of the marriage of democracy and liberalism by reasoning backwards from illiberal theories. Some analyses of illiberal trends do not fully consider the complex trajectory of liberal democracy, which is necessary to understand how current deviations often result in an intentionally misplaced consideration of the history of democracy.

Moreover, focusing on illiberalism in noun form underscores the fact that democracy is based on and stands for certain political doctrines, worldviews, and perspectives on the future that are promoted and supported by the political classes and approved by citizens through elections—and beyond. In fact, liberal democracy is not only a set of formal procedures, but also the result of ideal conflicts that shape its functioning and logic: this point was partly obscured by the belief that, after 1989, democracy had won its battle against authoritarianism and had therefore become a sign of destiny for many peoples. The history of the 20th century—and its sometimes tragic events—has reminded us that democracy is a political method like many others, insofar as it is founded, develops, and dies: if democracy is considered a better method than others, it must be protected.[19]

In short, shifting the topic from adjective to noun is a useful way to avoid misreading the illiberal trend and to remember that liberal democracy rests on a series of sometimes precarious balances, the most general being that between democratic and liberal principles. Of course, illiberalism has its own characteristics, which sometimes refer to old political, social, and economic traditions that are difficult to reconcile with contemporary societies.[20] It is therefore necessary to distinguish between an old and a new illiberalism, the latter having its own characteristics that denote a new ideological universe of reference.[21]

The Point of Intersection between Democracy and Liberalism

One of the main tenets of contemporary illiberalism is the idea that liberalism is an obstacle to democracy.[22] In fact, as Yves Mény notes, the paradox that has plagued democracies since their revival in the modern era is the affirmation of the sovereignty of the people and, at the same time, the deliberate limitation of that sovereignty.[23] This paradox has been largely resolved by the complex marriage of democracy and liberalism, based on institutions and mechanisms of representation, delegation, and mediation that have tempered the idea that democracy should be understood as authorizing the unlimited power of the sovereign people.

One of the most insidious threats to contemporary democracies is the alteration of this balance between democracy and liberalism by those who present illiberalism as a form of direct democracy, responsive to the immediate needs of citizens. In fact, direct democracy should not be subject to the mediation of political representation, which is inevitably a synthesis of different options. In many ways, this last conception is strongly influenced by the ideology of immediacy, which sees the system of political representation as a falsification of the true will of the people.[24]

On closer inspection, this debate takes us back to the first lines of this article, when we recalled the old tendency to erode parts of liberalism with the intention of increasing the level of democracy. Illiberal projects go in this direction when they promise the immediacy of decisions, but at the cost of eroding the system of political representation. At first glance, this may seem like a minor problem: it is right to bring citizens closer to the decision-making process and to guarantee them permanent contact with leaders and political power. But in the face of this fascinating prospect, we cannot overlook how liberal representative democracy was structured: we must rediscover the geometric dimension of democracies, their structuring around horizontal and vertical axes, which is the child of an ancient tradition of political thought.[25]

In fact, on the long and bumpy road by which liberalism and democracy have coexisted, political representation has been a point of intersection between the values of the former and the principles of the latter. In other words, if liberalism focuses on the individual, democracy focuses on society. According to Sartori, liberalism has developed the vertical dimension and promotes freedom, while democracy has developed the horizontal dimension and promotes equality. Public opinion, electoral democracy, participatory democracy, referendum—all represent a horizontal implementation and diffusion of democracy, “the foundations of the edifice,” but “foundations, essential as they are, are something that support a superadded construction”; then, it is important to look to democracy as a system of government and, more generally, to the vertical structuring of democracy—vertical democracy, for short.[26]

Thus, liberalism and democracy are two lines that intersect at right angles, where the point of intersection defines the zone of convergence, while the lines remain divergent and divided. The system of political representation is in the zone of convergence because it allows the direct participation of citizens in the decision-making process and, at the same time, organizes consensus, limits excesses of power, and mediates interests.

At this point, it becomes clearer how the idea of liberal democracy is structurally defined by the relationship between democratic and liberal principles: that is, by horizontal and vertical dimensions that define a space within which, on the one hand, citizens can control power through a network of mediations and, on the other hand, rulers can exert their influence, albeit in a manner controlled by citizens and institutions. Incidentally, it should not be forgotten that this geometric view of democracy is also one of the main differences between what we call the “democracy of the ancients” and the “democracy of the moderns.”[27]

Political Representation as a Restraint on Illiberalism

In such a complex framework, it is important to rediscover the contribution that political representation has made to mitigate the illiberal forms of the “pure” democratic system. A long history—starting at least with the French Revolution of 1789—shows us that a political system that develops without institutions and mediation is not able to guarantee “true” representation. The elitist nature of liberalism—in that it is the few who represent and the many who are represented—was the key to breaking the impasse that, from the late 19th century onward, pitted those who feared the entry of the people into the political arena against the masses who pressed to enter it. In those decades, a form of representation was structured that would form the basis of the system that, not surprisingly, would come to be called liberal representative democracy. At this point, Sartori’s concern, mentioned in the first lines of this article—that it is an illusion to think that democracy could be made more democratic by eroding liberalism—certainly appears clearer. The result would be an imbalance of political representation.

In fact, political representation in contemporary democratic systems is perhaps the most successful product of the convergence of democracy and liberalism, because it has managed to strike a balance between direct and indirect forms of citizen participation in public life and, above all, to make concrete the idea that citizens are able to exercise power through the representatives they elect, albeit without binding them with an imperative mandate. However, it is well known that political representation is at the center of a project of rethinking, and in the same case, classical theoretical-conceptual tools are no longer useful for studying today’s dynamics.[28] For example, there is no doubt that the Internet (as well as artificial intelligence) has fostered a process of immediacy that has shortened the distance between the representative and the represented, but at the cost of no longer respecting the balance that underlies representative responsibility and accountability. The extreme changes that are taking place in this regard are beyond the scope of this article. It is important to note that illiberal trends are attempting to undo the mediating space in which political representation is formed. In other words, illiberalism threatens political pluralism, which is an indispensable element of representative democracy.[29]

Therefore, to curb the illiberal trend, it is important to endorse the role of intermediary bodies as actors that guarantee social and political pluralism.[30] At the theoretical level, this can be done by rediscovering the dimensions of democracy—vertical and horizontal—recalled above. It may be useful to dwell on the concept of democratic distance, which separates representatives from the represented and within which intermediary bodies operate.[31] If this distance is reduced too much, there is a risk of reducing the space in which intermediary bodies, associations, and civil society can exert their influence, debate political issues, and build new social identities.

The Intermediary Bodies in Italian Democracy

A particularly interesting case for the analysis of the role of intermediary bodies in a democratic context is Italy. Before proceeding with an in-depth study, clarification must first be made. What is an intermediary body?

A Brief History and Definition of Intermediary Bodies

Defining an intermediary body is not easy for at least two reasons. Firstly, this is because the term “intermediary body” is used synonymously with social formation, infrastructure of mediation, and intermediate community; they are often synonyms but sometimes have nuances of meaning that may be relevant. Second, it is because their history is ancient and therefore intertwined with very different political systems; in ancient Rome, there were collegia and corpora opificum, the first professional associations. In the Middle Ages, guilds became the typical structures of the social and political-institutional order; they were organized by a statute that regulated their internal activities and the relations among their members and were led by one or more masters chosen through various electoral procedures. Over time, they became increasingly central to social life, but they suffered a setback during the French Revolution, when guilds were abolished. Only after several decades (between the 19th and 20th centuries) did intermediary bodies gain full legitimacy; from then on, we witnessed their karst development. In some historical stages, they have appeared essential to good social order, and at others, as obstacles.[32]

Intermediary bodies are characterized by three aspects in particular: (1) the purpose that holds these groupings together (their shared values and interests), (2) their organizational profiles, and (3) the ways in which they represent themselves in relation to other intermediary bodies and in relation to the state.[33] Based on this definition, we can consider professional organizations, foundations, and civil society associations to be intermediary bodies, especially in view of their role as a bridge between the state and civil society.[34] However, their aims are not exactly the same as those of political parties and can sometimes be quite different. But as far as the political sphere is concerned, and rightly so, all studies on democracies consider the presence of parties to be an indispensable index for considering a country as fully democratic. It is well known that parties are necessary for holding elections, selecting the political class, synthesizing the interests of society, controlling the government, and maintaining contact with citizens beyond just during the electoral cycle.[35]

The Italian Case: Reflections Starting from a Recent Survey

In the history of Italian democracy, from 1946 to the present, political parties have played an essential role, since the early years of the republic, in structuring the democratic system through education in democratic practices such as voting, and through the representation of various political, social, and economic interests. It is with good reason that Italian democracy has been called “the Republic of Parties.”[36] But over the decades, trust in political parties has gradually declined: in 2024, the overall level of trust dropped again, from 32.5% in 2023 to 29.8% this year.[37]

However, a recent survey conducted by Ipsos-Istituto Toniolo among Italians aged 18–34 showed some interesting data that partially bucks the trend seen in the older age groups. While trust in political parties among this age group is at one of its lowest points (31.6%), it is nonetheless on the rise—in fact, it is still the highest that it has been since 2012 (see Figure 1). This figure indicates a trend reversal that must be monitored in the coming years. It shows that something may be changing, because young people interviewed did not live through the first phase of Italian democracy—the “Republic of Parties”—but instead live in the era of “liquid parties,” when their function is supposed to be less incisive.[38]

Figure 1. Trust in Italian political parties among those aged 18–34.[39]

There is another response to this survey that is very interesting, and it concerns the importance that young Italians attach to political parties for the smooth functioning of democracy. In response to the statement that there is no real democracy without political parties, 6.3% disagree, while 8.7% strongly agree. On as scale from 1 to 10, with 1 meaning “I do not agree at all” and 10 meaning “I completely agree,” intermediate values of 5, 6, and 7 (see Figure 2) received the highest responses.[40]

Figure 2. “Without parties, there is no true democracy; their role is essential to protecting everyone’s interests.” (1: Do not agree at all; 10: Completely agree).

The results in the two tables are related, but they show us two different aspects of the phenomenon. In Figure 1, we see that young Italians’ trust in the parties is low, although it has increased in the last decade; it is important to report this growth, but the survey was conducted from April 22 to May 10, 2024, during the European election campaign, which may have influenced the responses. Therefore, there is long-term and short-term data, both of which should be kept in mind.

Figure 2 gives us the opportunity to make some more general observations about the role of parties as intermediaries. It is problematic that some young people (those reporting scores of 1 to 4 out of 10) do not believe that parties are important for democracy and, therefore, do not even recognize their fundamental role in organizing elections. Those who support this view are in the minority, but it is a fact that should not be overlooked and that also calls for educational intervention.[41] Most of the young respondents believe that parties are important for a well-functioning democracy. This finding, together with that in Figure 1, shows us how the idea that there should be political mediation in the relationship between representatives and the represented is shared and partially disproves the assumption that disintermediation is the future of democracy.

Conclusions

The bottom line of this paper is that identifying political representation as a means by which to analyze the problem of illiberalism is a way to rediscover the function of political mediation and to consider democracy as a complex system rather than simply a set of rules and procedures.[42]

The renewal of mediation as a means of understanding the link between democracy and liberalism must reckon with the process of disintermediation that is taking place in Western societies and with the veritable revolt against intermediaries that is now a hallmark of all political discourse.[43] However, the trend towards disintermediation is coming to a halt: even empirical data tells us that intermediaries are coming back to the fore.[44] This is a positive sign. After the inebriation of disintermediation, there is now a greater awareness of the risks and, above all, the illusions that such a prospect has generated for several decades. But there is no doubt that any discourse on disintermediation cannot overlook the fascination it exerts—especially among the younger generation, as we have seen, for whom mediation in most cases is synonymous with slowness and constraint on immediate decisions.

Regarding the future of liberal democracy, there is one aspect that deserves special attention more than any other, and that is the role of civil society and its organization through associations and intermediary bodies. In 1990, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Ralph Dahrendorf recalled that it took six months to create new political institutions and to write a constitution and new electoral laws for the former East Germany.[45] He went on to say that it can take six years to create an economy that is able to hold itself together; but above all, he predicted that it might take 60 years to create a civil society.[46]

This provocative claim should give us pause today, especially when we think of some Eastern European countries, such as Hungary, which are considered the main models of illiberal democracy. Dahrendorf’s reflection reminds us that to “create” a democracy, it is not enough to have rules, laws, and a set of procedures; doing so also requires an ideal kit, a set of values, and the belief of the citizens that this political system is best for the country. To forget this condition, to think that the sentiments of freedom, equality, and justice are given once and for all, has created a sense of weariness in societies that has gradually weakened the institutions that these values are supposed to protect: the processes of deconsolidation of democracies[47] are the result of a disaffection with the democratic ideal. The historically established relationship between democracy and liberalism is therefore crucial because it laid the foundations for the flowering of those values, methods, and practices that must be defended if liberal representative democracy is to be defended. Constitutional guarantees—that is, the ability to express oneself freely—must coexist with constitutional methods. In some democracies, moreover, constitutional guarantees also protect the welfare state—that is, the social aspects of democracy that are bound up with the course of economic cycles and the working of supranational institutions such as the European Union.[48]

For a new step in the history of democracy,[49] it is necessary to start from the role that such intermediary bodies play in animating and structuring society,[50] even in countries that have only recently embraced democracy, with the hope that we may see results before the 60 years predicted by Dahrendorf have passed.

In this sense, Adrian Pabst argues that a new corporatism—quite different from the fascist and socialist versions—needs to be reinvented to allow citizens to feel free and protected from the state, economic, and financial constraints that affect modern democracies.[51] This perspective intersects with the analysis proposed here because it emphasizes the importance of the infrastructure of mediation for a well-functioning democracy.[52] The importance of political mediation, especially as a mode of checking power and fostering political representation, is a legacy of liberalism that, when eroded in contemporary democracies, results in illiberal distortion. The old and important fiction of the people as the holders of sovereignty has been widely accepted because it is built around a system of political representation that relies on the presence of intermediary bodies and institutional relations that always keep the governed in touch with the rulers, while ensuring the “principle of distinction”[53] between the governed and the rulers.

There is, however, a fundamental theoretical question that lies at the heart of this framework: is liberal democracy still the best political model, and therefore should it be emulated in countries where it does not already exist? According to some authoritative scholars,[54] the answer is no, it is no longer a model to be emulated. There may be many reasons for this: the poor quality of the political class, the low level of responsiveness of political elites to citizens’ demands, or the failure of liberal democracy to live up to the promises made at the time of its inception (such as equality, protection of rights, smooth functioning of institutions, etc.).[55] In addition, there is the appeal of political regimes such as that of China, which is seen as decisive and meritocratic—forgetting, however, that it does not correspond to the system of guarantees and freedoms that we would never want to abandon.[56]

The question, then, is a radical one: is liberalism still a doctrine that can be useful for our democracies? For some scholars,[57] it is necessary to start again from the connection between adjective and noun: that is, from what it means to be a liberal democrat, a liberal socialist, a liberal nationalist, and so on. Others, meanwhile, have proclaimed the end of liberalism[58] and imagined a post-liberal future.[59] There is no single answer—and that is good for free debate. There is no shortage of proposals, and they will increase in the coming years.[60]

This article has tried to highlight how liberal democracy is a set of trade-offs, including one that strikes a balance between governing under the assertion of popular sovereignty and its deliberate limitation. From this point of view, the works of Alexis de Tocqueville are still instructive.[61] So are those of several liberal thinkers who focused their intellectual energies on defining the principles of representation, delegation, and mediation, which then formed the contours around which contemporary liberal representative democracy has developed.

Recalling that the marriage of democracy and liberalism is the foundation of contemporary democracies is neither a rhetorical nor an exercise in nostalgia for something that has lost its driving force today. On the contrary, it is a realistic awareness of what the laboratory of history has produced and what is being challenged today by the illiberal trend. We do not have before us an alternative model to liberal democracy that is coherent enough to worry us for the foreseeable future; but we cannot rule out the possibility that in the future unprecedented combinations of democratic and illiberal forms will emerge capable of seducing a growing number of citizens. That is why it is important to check up on our democracies to see if the balances on which they have been based are still holding, and to see what adjustments can be made. At the same time, it is equally important that scholars make the intellectual effort to show that the nature of the system of political representation and mediation is the primary element of liberal democracy, since this element is the guarantor of true pluralism.

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[1] Giovanni Sartori, “How Far Can Free Government Travel?” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 3 (July 1995): 101–111; Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, vol. II (London: Chatham House Publishers, 1987).

[2] Damiano Palano, Towards a Bubble Democracy? Notes for a Theoretical Framework (Milan: Educatt-Polidemos, 2022), 55-79; see also: Damiano Palano, Bubble Democracy: La fine del pubblico e la nuova polarizzazione (Brescia: Scholé, 2020).

[3] See, for example, Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society: An Historical Argument (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992); Michael Freeden, Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); John Gray, Liberalism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986).

[4] See Norberto Bobbio, Liberalismo e democrazia (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1995); Massimo L. Salvadori, Democrazia: Storia di un’idea tra mito e realtà (Rome: Donzelli, 2016); Massimo L. Salvadori, Democrazie senza democrazia (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2009).

[5] Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[6] Yascha Mounk, The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018).

[7] Alessandro Pizzorno, “La sfera pubblica e il concetto di mandante immaginario,” Sociologica, no. 3 (November–December 2008): 1–23, https://doi.org/10.2383/28764.

[8] Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017); Nadia Urbinati, Me the People: How Populism Transforms Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2019).

[9] Sartori, “How Far Can Free Government Travel?” 102.

[10] Müller, What is Populism? 27-43.

[11] Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp, Budapest Beacon (news site) July 26, 2014, https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/; Zoltán Kovács, “PM Orbán in Rome: Liberalism is over; it’s time for Christian Democracy,” February 6, 2020 https://abouthungary.hu/blog/pm-orban-in-rome-liberalism-is-over-its-time-for-christian-democracy.

[12] Antonio Campati, “A New War of Words: Democracy, Illiberalism, and the Forgotten Lessons of Liberalism,” in Illiberal Trends: Democracies under Pressure, ed. Antonio Campati (Milan: Polidemos-Educatt, 2024): 11–42.

[13] Marlene Laruelle, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024); András Sajó, Renáta Uitz, and Stephen Holmes, eds., Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism (New York: Routledge, 2022).

[14] Leonardo Morlino, Changes for Democracy: Actors, Structures, Processes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[15] Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Populism and (Liberal) Democracy: A Framework for Analysis,” in Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds., Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 1–26.

[16] Andrew Arato and Jean L. Cohen, Populism and Civil Society: The Challenge to Constitutional Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).

[17] Norberto Bobbio, “Valori politici,” in Norberto Bobbio, Teoria generale della politica, ed. by Michelangelo Bovero (Turin: Einaudi, 1999), 233. For an interesting analysis about the distinction between illiberalism and authoritarianism, see Julian G. Waller, “Distinctions with a Difference: Illiberalism and Authoritarianism in Scholarly Study,” Political Studies Review, vol. 22, no. 2 (May 2024): 365–386, https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299231159253.

[18] Marlene Laruelle, “Illiberalism: A Conceptual Introduction,” East European Politics, vol. 38, no. 2 (March 2022): 303–327, https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2037079.

[19] Alfio Mastropaolo, Is Democracy a Lost Cause? Paradoxes of the Imperfect Invention (Colchester: European Consortium of Political Research, 2012); Alfio Mastropaolo, Fare la guerra con altri mezzi: Sociologia storica del governo democratico (Bologna: il Mulino, 2023).

[20] Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Pierre Rosanvallon, La Démocratie inachevée: Histoire de la souveraineté du peuple en France (Paris: Gallimard, 2000).

[21] Marlene Laruelle, “Illiberalism: A Conceptual Introduction,” East European Politics, vol. 38, no. 2 (June 2022): 303–327,

[22] Yves Mény, Popolo ma non troppo: Il malinteso democratico (Bologna: il Mulino, 2019).

[23] Mény, Popolo ma non troppo, 144.

[24] Daniel Innerarity, Politics in the Times of Indignation: The Crisis of Representative Democracy (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), 161.

[25] Stefano Bartolini, The Political (Colchester: European Consortium of Political Research, 2018).

[26] Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, vol. II (London: Chatham House Publishers, 1987): 131–132.

[27] John Dunn, Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2005).

[28] Dario Castiglione, eds., Creating Political Presence: The New Politics of Representation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018); Hanna F. Pitkin, “Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance,” Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 27, no. 3 (August 2004): 335–342, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2004.00109.x; Michael Saward, “Representation and Democracy: Revisions and Possibilities,” Sociology Compass vol. 2, no. 3 (April 2008): 1000–1013, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00102.x.

[29] Ulrich Wagrandl, “A Theory of Illiberal Democracy,” in András Sajó, Renáta Uitz, Stephen Holmes, eds., Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism (New York: Routledge, 2022): 94–117.

[30] Antonio Campati, “Representative Democracy and the Ideology of Immediacy: The Distance between Elites and Citizens,” in Antonio Campati and Damiano Palano, eds., Democracy and Disintermediation: A Dangerous Relationship (Milan: Polidemos-Educatt, 2022): 85–103.

[31] Antonio Campati, La distanza democratica: Corpi intermedi e rappresentanza politica (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2022).

[32] Antonio Campati, La distanza democratica: Corpi intermedi e rappresentanza politica (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2022): 35–63.

[33] Campati, La distanza democratica, 39.

[34] Sabino Cassese, Il popolo e i suoi rappresentanti (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2019), 32–37; Bernard Caillaud, and Jean Tirole, “Parties as Political Intermediaries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 117, no. 4 (November 2002): 1453–89, https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935070.

[35] Anthony King, “Political Parties in Western Democracies: Some Sceptical Reflections,” Polity, vol. 2, no. 2 (Winter 1969): 111–141, https://doi.org/10.2307/3234095.

[36] Pietro Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti: Evoluzione e crisi di un sistema politico 1945–1996 (Bologna: il Mulino, 2021).

[37] Eurispes, “36° Rapporto Italia: L’Italia al bivio,” L’Istituto di Ricerca degli Italiani, May 24, 2024, https://eurispes.eu/news/risultati-del-rapporto-italia-2024/.

[38] Damiano Palano, La democrazia senza partiti (Bologna: il Mulino 2015): 106.

[39] Osservatorio Giovani, “Giovani, democrazia e partecipazione politica,” eds. Alessandro Rosina, Andrea Bonanomi, Antonio Campati, Fabio Introini, Cristina Pasqualini, and Veronica Riniolo, Istituto Toniolo, p. 8, https://www.rapportogiovani.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Osservatorio-Osservatorio-Giovani-nota-sui-giovani.pdf.

[40] Osservatorio Giovani, “Giovani, democrazia e partecipazione politica,” p. 9.

[41] This data can also be analyzed in relation to that on the importance of living in a democracy. For several years now, researchers have been telling us that the importance of living in a democracy is no longer considered an essential condition: 71% of those born in the 1970s considered it important to live in a democracy; the figure drops to 29% for those born in the 1980s. Mounk, The People vs. Democracy, 105.

[42] Daniel Innerarity, Una teoría de la democracia compleja: Gobernar en el siglo XXI (Barcelona: Batiscafo Libros, 2023).

[43] Nadia Urbinati, “A Revolt against Intermediary Bodies,” Constellations vol. 44, no. 4 (October 2015): 477–486, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12188.

[44] Benjamin Labonnélie, ed., Le retour des corps intermédiaires (Paris: Fauves, 2020).

[45] Ralph Dahrendorf, “Has the East Joined the West?” New Perspective Quarterly, no. 7 (Spring 1990), 42.

[46] Dahrendorf, “Has the East Joined the West?” 42.

[47] Hans Keman, Democracies in Peril? Waves of Backsliding (New York: Routledge, 2024).

[48] Maurizio Ferrera, “Mass Democracy, Welfare State and European Integration: A Neo-Weberian Analysis,” European Journal of Social Theory, no. 23 (May 2020): 165–183, https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431018779176.

[49] For more information about the models of democracy, see the classic work by David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006).

[50] As he argued several decades ago: William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: The Free Press, 1959), 76–90.

[51] Adrian Pabst, Postliberal Politics: The Coming Era of Renewal (London: Polity, 2021), 99–106.

[52] Jan-Werner Müller, Democracy Rules (London: Allen Lane, 2021), 90–138.

[53] Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[54] Ivan Krastev, Stephen Holmes, The Light that Failed: A Reckoning (London: Penguin, 2019).

[55] Norberto Bobbio, The Future of Democracy (London: Polity, 1987).

[56] Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).

[57] Michael Walzer, The Struggle for a Decent Politics: On “Liberal” as an Adjective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023).

[58] Patrick Deneen, Why Liberalism Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018).

[59] Patrick Deneen, Regime Change: Toward a Postliberal Future (New York: Sentinel, 2023).

[60] Hannah Dawson and Annelien De Dijn, eds., Rethinking Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

[61] Ewa Atanassow, “Illiberal Democracy? A Tocquevillean Perpective,” in The Emergence of Illiberalism: Understanding a Global Phenomenon, eds. Boris Vormann, Michael D. Weinman (New York: Routledge, 2021): 58–70; Ewa Atanassow and Richard Boyd, eds., Tocqueville and the Frontiers of Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013).