This article was first published on November 11, 2026, as a chapter in Marlène Laruelle, ed., The Illiberal Age: The Politics of Entrenchment.
The 2026 midterm elections in the United States signified a historic defeat for Donald Trump and the Republican Party, and a massive victory for Democrats across the country. For nearly a decade now, many Americans have been hoping that the fever of Trumpism would somehow break: that some new scandal—from the “grab-em” audio tape in 2016, through Russiagate and the two impeachments, down to the unprecedented corruption of today—would cause the other shoe to drop. That moment has finally come. On Tuesday, November 3, 2026, voters all across America came together to say enough is enough.
The sweep was unprecedented and exceeded the expectations of even the most bullish Democratic prognosticators. Most everyone expected Democrats to regain control of the House of Representatives, while knowing that, when it comes to holding the Trump administration accountable, the real prize would be the Senate. I recall talking to friends two years ago about the odds of the Democratic Party retaking the Senate in 2026, and the consensus view was that the map looked very bad. There simply were not going to be enough vulnerable seats in play. By election time, the terrain had improved, to be sure, but nothing was guaranteed. In the event, Democrats flipped at least seven Senate seats, growing their caucus from 47 to (at least) 54 members, enough for a decisive majority. As of this writing, two Senate races—in Alaska and Mississippi—remain to be called, but Democrats look poised to win those, too, meaning their caucus could grow to 56.[1]
In the House, their numbers grew from 215 members to at least 254 (with 19 races yet to be called as of this writing).[2] Down ballot, in races for governorships, state legislatures, county clerks, commissioners of all kinds, and the like, Democrats fared just as well. The scale and significance of this victory is hard to overstate, especially when one considers where Democrats won: in deep-red strongholds like Texas, South Carolina, and Mississippi, and in states that had been turning increasingly Republican for a decade-plus, like Ohio, Kansas, and others. It was a bloodbath for Republicans, who were, as Joshua Tait put it, “utterly shellacked,” and it marks a sea change in American politics.
As was the case in the 2026 election in Hungary, this repudiation of Trump was so decisive that it seemed to have stymied—at least for now—large-scale efforts at election denial. As several commentators have said, referring to one of Trump’s staple lines about 2024, the results were “too big to rig.”
There are so many stories coming out of the election that are worth noting: How the new multiracial coalition that voted for Trump in 2024 collapsed entirely, with Latinos in some counties swinging as much as 20 points away from where they were two years ago; how Black voters defied newly gerrymandered districts in the South; how young men also swung away from Trump; how Texas went blue. And of course, there are so many stories about individual candidates who are newly part of the national conversation—like Abdul El Sayed, Gina Hinajosa, James Talarico, Adam Hamilton, and Annie Andrews—or of others who, like Vivek Ramaswamy, Ken Paxton, and Susan Collins, have been shown the door.
Two big questions emerged in the immediate aftermath of these midterms: Is this the end of the MAGA movement? And how will Democrats interpret their big win?
My own view is that, while the election marks a repudiation of Trump, the future of the broader MAGA movement is still uncertain, and this means that the Republican Party as a whole is in a profound bind: There is simply no consensus around Trump, but MAGA now shapes the party to the extent that there is no clear path away from him, either—nor away from any of his signature policies.
In this, the Vice President’s response to the election was highly instructive. The day after the election, JD Vance immediately put some distance between himself and the president, with a long post on X explaining that the single greatest cause of the Republicans’ loss was the war with Iran. He cited a pollster who said that “economic messaging wasn’t sharp enough down the stretch,” and another who suggested that Trump voters were angry about the war, cost of living, and America’s relationship to Israel. But in the end, he wrote, “the real reason we lost is obvious to almost everyone,” and then later, “The reason we lost is the war.” He also claimed that “anyone pushing amnesty is lying to you”—that is, anyone suggesting that legislation reforming immigration could present a solution to the GOP’s woes.
It is, let us say, highly quixotic for a Vice President to call out the administration to which he belongs, which bears responsibility for a failure of this scale. In fairness, it is clear that Vance was ambivalent about the war, but still, the more coherent move would be to resign. The Vice President likely knows that a flip-flop like that would mark the end of his career, given that he already had to flip-flop very publicly to join Trump and the MAGA movement, and this has left him with very little room to maneuver. So, his gambit was to pin the loss on the Iran war, and to defend other parts of the MAGA agenda. The argument, in effect, is that real MAGA has never been tried.
Some part of this analysis is doubtless correct. The war in Iran contributed to the election results. The war is unpopular with Americans, on its own terms and insofar as it clearly contributed to soaring energy costs and overall economic precarity. For some MAGA supporters, it signifies nothing less than the betrayal of Trump’s most important promise: no more forever wars. It thus caused a rift between Trump and “America First” stalwarts, like Representatives Marjorie Taylor Greene and Thomas Massie and former Director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center Joe Kent, as well as with influential commentators like Tucker Carlson.
But other parts of the MAGA agenda were tried: like DOGE, tariffs, mass deportations, and other parts of an “America First” approach to foreign policy. The trouble with Vance’s analysis is that it overstates the popularity of the rest of the MAGA agenda, and obscures some of the additional problems faced by the movement. That makes the analysis deeply misguided or misleading.
In a word, the midterm result was about much more than war with Iran. It was also about other foreign policy choices, from ongoing support for Israel to the threats to invade Greenland and Canada. It was about mass deportations, about the failure to fully release the Epstein files, about rising antisemitism among far-right influencers (from Nick Fuentes to Candace Owens to Tucker Carlson).
Perhaps above all else, it was about the tariffs and the economy, the outsized role of Silicon Valley billionaires in Washington, and the incredible corruption now taking place in the White House. Americans are startled by the crypto schemes, the gifts, and the nepotistic self-dealing. In the days leading up to the election, polls showed that 69% of registered voters and 50% of Trump 2024 voters “were ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ concerned about ‘corruption, self-dealing or conflicts of interest’ in the Trump administration.” During the first Trump administration, there was a lot of talk about Trump’s tax returns, and people were eager to see them released because they suspected that they would prove he was not nearly as wealthy as he claimed. No one talks like that anymore.
So, MAGA looks to be at once broken and enduring: it is now entrenched in the Republican Party’s institutions, personnel, culture, policy preferences, geopolitical orientation, and its relationship to Big Tech. It has reshaped the party to the degree that there is no possibility of a “return” to a more mainstream conservatism. And yet, at the same time, it has just been strongly repudiated, including by Republican voters themselves.
The overall situation, then, is quite volatile. Trump may respond by accommodating the Democrats in some ways (he suggested this might be his approach in a spontaneous interview with a Politico reporter on election night, and later in a 60 Minutes interview with Ross Douthat), or he may aggressively double down on his policies. His decision to promote Stephen Miller into the role of chief of staff points in the latter’s direction. Miller’s are a form of hard-right anti-immigration politics, and he is a ruthless political operator who enjoys antagonizing his opponents. Whereas previous chiefs of staff have moderated the president, Miller will be a radicalizer: there will be more conspiracism, more fringe hires in political positions, and more trolling. The only thing that is clear at this point is that the situation is volatile and none of it will be easy.
Of course, the next two years also depend a good deal on Democrats.
Before the election, I worried that the Democrats would treat any victory as an excuse to sit back on their heels and default to a defensive “back to normal” mindset. That latter attitude shaped the Biden administration, and in the end proved perilously naive. They could not imagine Trump winning again, so they did nothing to guard against the excesses of a potential second Trump administration, failing even to try to pass legislation and reforms that could have protected against some of Trump’s most destructive policies (or the implementation of the Insurrection Act). And there was very little indication during the Biden years that the establishment had any sense of the deeper frustrations motivating political radicalization, or of the need for new political imaginaries (as Marlène Laruelle has described), or of what I have taken in recent months to calling the “meaning gap” in liberal politics.
Somewhat paradoxically, the magnitude and character of the Democratic victory this time around has tempered some of these concerns. My sense is that Democrats are newly awake to the dangers that Trump poses, as well as to the seriousness of some of the issues that the Trump era has exposed. I admit to harboring a hope that the 2026 victory was so definitive that it will animate a new sense of resolve and ambition among Democrats, rather than a return to complacency. There will be, most definitively, bold oversight action on the part of the new Congress and clear efforts to protect the basic institutions of democracy. But we are also seeing new talent emerging—including the first Muslim to become a U.S. Senator, and two other Senator-elects who are United Methodist megachurch pastors and Presbyterian seminarians, respectively. We are also seeing Texas’s first Latina governor, who self-describes as an economic populist.
Whether that energy will be channeled into serious support for more ambitious forms of political renewal is of course entirely unclear. But if MAGA has taught us anything over the course of the last decade, it is that dramatic shifts are possible, and nothing can be taken for granted. Maybe establishment types, at long last, are hearing that message loud and clear.
Laura K. Field is Scholar in Residence at the Niskanen Center in Washington, DC. In addition to her academic work she has written for The New Republic, Politico, The Bulwark, Le Monde, The New York Times and The Atlantic. Her award-winning book Furious Minds: The Making of the MAGA New Right was published by Princeton University Press in November, 2025.
[1] This article was first published on November 11, 2026, as a chapter in The Illiberal Age: The Politics of Entrenchment. Since then, Mississippi has been called for the Democratic candidate. Alaska remains uncalled as of this writing.
[2] The Democratic caucus has since grown to 256 members, and 8 races remain uncalled.





