When considering the intersection of right-wing politics and environment, two dominant narratives usually come to mind. The first—and most widely recognized—is “anti-environmentalism,” which rejects or downplays the need for progressive and stringent environmental policies. Today, this stance is most often linked to climate skepticism and obstructionism, with far-right parties and figures serving as its primary political advocates. The examples of such skepticism are widely known and highly erratic, including U.S. President Donald Trump’s dismissal of climate change as a “hoax invented by the Chinese to harm American industry” or Nigel Farage’s indicating that climate change has become a “new religion for many.”
The second, less explored but increasingly visible, is a pro-environmental agenda from the (far) right. Seemingly unexpected, this agenda has a long historical record and derives from the 19th-century beginnings of an environmental thought tied to a romantic appreciation of nature. These disarrayed sentiments are often labeled as right-wing ecology, far-right ecologism, green conservatism, ecofascism, or green nationalism, with significant variations across the meanings of these terms. Irrespective of the terminological debates, there is an intrinsic appreciation of nature at work here, though such environmentalism is framed through traditionalist, nationalist, or potentially exclusionary narratives.
There is an intrinsic appreciation of nature at work in right-wing ecology, though such environmentalism is framed through traditionalist, nationalist, or potentially exclusionary narratives.
From Marine Le Pen’s calls for “patriotic ecology” in France to Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) framing sustainability as a “duty to protect the homeland,” such positions challenge the assumption that ecological concerns belong exclusively to the political left. Yet, environmentalism remains largely associated with the left, and as a result, right-wing audiences often dismiss the entire cause of environmental protection. This rejection is reinforced through emblematic and derisive portrayals of environmentalists as naïve or insincere “watermelons” and “soy latte eco-warriors.”
Varieties of Right Environmentalism
In reality, the categories of “skepticism” and “pro-environmentalism” only scratch the surface of how right-wing actors engage with ecological issues. In actual fact, the spectrum of right-wing ecologies is broad, ranging from populist attacks on “elitist environmentalists” to eco-localism, which emphasizes tangible, domestic environmental issues over global concerns like climate change. Some radical right-wing groups even embrace mystical ecofascism, invoking ideas of sentient ecologies—the belief that landscapes and ecosystems possess agency, shaping the character of those who inhabit them.
Given the virtually non-negotiable presence of neoliberal capitalism in environmental policy circles at the highest level, the dominant ecology of today seems to be right-wing.
Regardless of the number of these right-wing variations, which of these actually matter in environmental politics? In other words, what falls within the ecology of the right—and more specifically, what is the “mainstream” right’s ecology? Given the virtually non-negotiable presence of neoliberal capitalism in environmental policy circles at the highest level, the dominant ecology of today seems to be right-wing. But is right-wing ecology the dominant ecology of today? After all, it does not seem that right-wing parties, including the center right, are particularly active in promoting environmental policies, lacking ambition to develop them. It may be argued that this lack of ambition is a consequence of the relatively uninterested electorate, since right-leaning voters are in principle less supportive of advanced environmental policies, although this seems to be the case predominantly in the Global North. Again, most of these statistical models are ultimately dependent on how the “right wing” is defined and “center” parsed out from the “far right,” especially in studies in which the ideology variable is evaluated through single-item self-assessments.
In spite of the cases in which right-wing and especially Christian-democratic parties have an elaborate environmental agenda, environmental politics of the right amount to little more than the background clatter in contemporary (environmental) politics. This is warranted by a popular, albeit warranted impression that right environmentalism is often considered as insincere, a “yes, but” form of conditional environmentalism, throwing a wrench in the works of a progressive environmental policy.
The relatively reactive behavior of the right in the environmental domain is a case in point, as the environment is usually rendered as a second-order topic electorally for conservatives and nationalists, as research on electoral manifestos has shown. Simultaneously, the center right and Christian democrats are not the only contenders for a representative, mainstream “right-wing” ecology, as far-right parties (and non-party actors) around the globe are developing their own environmental agenda in an attempt to stay up to date with the current political trends and the topics their support base is increasingly interested in.
Not all of these ideas wield equal influence within right-wing discourse, nor do they all aspire to mainstream acceptance. Some are defined precisely by their radicalism, for which absorption into the mainstream would entail an abdication of their raison d’être. Yet the mainstream itself is an ever-shifting construct—particularly in right-wing politics, where the far right is increasingly enmeshed within its contours. This fluidity obscures the precise extent to which right-wing actors shape environmental politics and renders uncertain the trajectory of mainstream ecological discourse in the years to come.
Center-right Environmentalism: Five Challenges
While the mainstream is invariably context-dependent, it remains spatially anchored in the “center.” The center-right, as the most electorally prevalent party family, possesses the greatest potential to articulate a distinctively conservative environmental politics. Yet the very breadth of these parties—their oft-cited “catch-all” character—risks diluting their ecological commitments into an amorphous pragmatism. In this sense, the future of center-right environmentalism hinges on its ability to navigate these tensions, lest it cede the discursive space to ideological competitors better suited to shape the terms of ecological debate. But this project faces considerable challenges.
The very breadth of center-right parties—their oft-cited “catch-all” character—risks diluting their ecological commitments into an amorphous pragmatism.
The first challenge is associated with what both the “center” and the “right” stand for today. Without the need to delve into complex debates on the ideological terminology, the mainstreaming of the far right has altered our understanding of mainstream politics. Consequently, the concepts of inequality and order, the traditional markers of right-wing politics appear to be unsettled by the presence of salad-bar ideologies which usually inform radical and extremist politics, characteristic of the far right and especially ecofascism. Ideologies indeed travel across time and space, making it no longer surprising that the far right in Europe is protesting in the name of civil liberties.
The radicalism of far-right ecologism, which is in itself a conglomerate of (right-wing) positions, is also questionable. There is nothing particularly radical about calling obstructing environmental policies nor about the energy autarky and other forms of self-dependent, “ego-ecology.” If the center is perceived to be “anti-radical” and in favor of social stability, then we may have an explanation as to why center-right ecology has been unable to galvanize an environmental profile that would be appealing to “green” voters. Rather than a priority topic, the environment remains an issue through which younger party members and newcomers can demonstrate their organizational talent and climb higher in the ranks.
The second challenge relates to the paucity of foundational literature, effectively making it difficult to identify the sources that a center-right ecology should build on. Indeed, there have been some attempts by right-wing intellectuals to offer a coherent ecology of the right. An emblematic figure is Roger Scruton, whose writings on green conservatism, epitomized in the sentiment of oikophilia—the love of home (and a more subtly nativist variant of “loving our own”)—have impacted environmental thought on the right. While Scruton’s writings are among the first associations to a “non (overtly) fascist ecology,” they have simultaneously made very limited inroads into mainstream politics of the environment. True, there were other role models among intellectuals and politicians offering a blueprint for a right-wing ecology, but their influence is predominantly limited to their respective contexts: Michael Oakeshott’s takes on aesthetics and organicism, Herbert Gruhl’s authoritarian Malthusianism in Germany, or Brice Lalonde in France. This list could even expand to non-Western European contexts and pioneers of conservationism, such as Jan Gwalbert-Pawlikowski in Poland or even Jovan Cvijić in Serbia/Yugoslavia.
Speaking of the influential figures, the third challenge relates to the role of religious organizations globally: in the case of European right, the role of the Catholic church. While individuals who identify with the political right evaluate Pope Francis more negatively, his Laudato si’ has allowed the religious institutions to engage more substantively with contemporary environmental politics. At the same time, right-wing commentators have used Laudato si’ to advance a greener conservative agenda which has yet to materialize substantively in right-wing politics. With that in mind, the idea of anthropocentric stewardship that appears to be central to right ecologies has to evolve in a way that is encompassing other interpretations of, including the more-than-human perspectives. The fourth challenge is the post-political moment that retains its relevance in environmental politics. If the center and the far right are, after all, the sides of the same coin, the emancipatory potential of the conservative right in light of the climate crisis appears to be depleted. Distinguishing environmental policy positions based on ideological leanings is becoming increasingly challenging, giving way to expertocratic-authoritarian policy that fosters ever more exclusion. This, in turn, amplifies the “background clatter” sentiment of indistinctiveness, now commonly associated with right-wing ecology.
To avoid tapping into, on the one hand, far-right scapegoating and on the other, ecopopulist quick-fix policies, right-wing ecology will need to steer itself away from an elitist aura and become more attuned to the eclectic environmental movements of today, including those associated with the left.
To avoid tapping into, on the one hand, far-right scapegoating and on the other, eco-populist quick-fix policies, evident in the uncritical appropriation of concepts believed to be innovative (such as “prosumer energy”), right-wing ecology will need to steer itself away from an elitist aura and become more attuned to the eclectic environmental movements of today, including those associated with the left. This may include exploring degrowth narratives, thinking about new political alliances, or openly embracing green politics and values.
With this in mind, the fifth challenge pertains to issue ownership and the peculiarities of both domestic and international contexts. In the realm of politics, it is generally assumed that the dominant party controls the narrative, shaping the discourse around the issues it claims as its own. A party of smallholders assuming control over the ministry of sports, for instance, inevitably raises suspicions of political corruption. This concern explains why the right remains reticent to engage substantively with environmental issues, fearing that such involvement could alienate potential voters.
Too Broken to Fix?
Beyond the perceived (though not inherently necessary) ideological incompatibility, the challenges are also context-specific: in a country like Poland, where an openly anti-carbon right-wing party is a political non-starter, such an approach would likely result in swift political suicide. As a result, the center-right is often ensnared in path dependency, constrained by its status as a long-established party family that leaves little room for experimentation, particularly when it comes to adopting bold environmental stances.
It is exactly the center right’s path dependency that can both make right-wing ecology irrelevant and possibly successful.
It is exactly this path dependency that can both make right-wing ecology irrelevant and possibly successful. If the mainstream environmentalism of the right continues to be heavily technocratic, it stands the chance to be a major force in the discourse of adaptation, vulnerability and coming to terms with an unavoidable ecological disaster. Yet, if it persists along this path, it is likely to attract the ire of radicals—and rightly so. It is true that right-wing politics and especially the mainstream right holds a lot of the blame for the contemporary state of the climate crisis and the associated environmental issues. Consequently, it may make little sense to fix something that is already broken, instead prioritizing the project of developing other, more socially progressive political options. However, despite the formidable challenges that shape its trajectory, right-wing politics of nature are unlikely to fade into obsolescence.
Balša Lubarda is a Marie Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University – University Pompeu Fabra Public Policy Center. He is also the author of “Far-Right Ecologism: Environmental Politics and the Far Right in Hungary and Poland” (Routledge 2023). Previously, he headed the Ideology Research Unit at the Far-Right Analysis Network and was a visiting lecturer (Fulbright) at UC Berkeley.
