The recent two-round presidential elections held in Romania brought a resounding victory to the liberal democratic camp and to pro-European forces. Independent candidate Nicușor Dan, supported by most Western-oriented parties in Bucharest’s Parliament, defeated far-right candidate George Simion, president of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). However, this victory for maintaining the country’s pro-European trajectory was hard-fought for, especially since these elections were organized following the annulment of the December 2024 presidential elections. In those elections, independent candidate Călin Georgescu, the winner of the first round, was accused of having benefited from Russian interference and of failing to declare the financial resources used by his campaign online. As a result, he was banned from running in the new elections pending a criminal investigation into both him and his entourage.
Although Dan’s victory, by a margin of nearly 830,000 votes (or 7.2%) over Simion, should no longer raise questions about the legality of the May 18 elections, the narrative promoted by the sovereigntist camp is that the elections were stolen. This narrative has normalized numerous conspiracy theories, such as claims that so-called “Soros networks,” including the presidents of France and Moldova Emmanuel Macron and Maia Sandu, conspired to help Dan win the election. Other theories allege electoral tourism, suggesting that Romanians living in Moldova overturned the outcome of the vote. In response, Simion called on Romanians with dual citizenship (Romanian and Moldovan) to mobilize for Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections in order to politically defeat Sandu. These developments in recent months have kept the nationalist current alive, despite Simion’s electoral loss. Yet, this entire electoral cycle has deeper implications not only for Romania’s foreign policy, especially in relation to the Republic of Moldova, but also for the broader illiberal drift in the region. This drift will likely shape the outcome of Moldova’s parliamentary elections on September 28—and not only those.
Crises and Choices: Populist-nationalism or Technocratic Continuity
The presidential race took place in a year with multiple crises in Romania: an economic one, tied to running the highest budget deficits in the European Union (over 9%); a representative one, tied to the lack of trust in the authorities following the annulment of the previous presidential elections; and an informational one, tied to foreign and domestic information manipulation. And yet, the election results showed that in the face of a common danger, namely isolationism, society resisted and united around the pro-European interest.
Romania’s election results showed that in the face of a common danger, namely isolationism, society resisted and united around the pro-European interest.
Nicușor Dan, the former mayor of the capital, Bucharest, and a mathematician by profession, managed to unite around him the majority of pro-Western parties, civil society, and even business interests with a strong discourse concerning the fight against corruption and the defense of the rule of law. His campaign advocated for continued European integration and maintaining the European and Atlantic course, military support for Ukraine and the condemnation of the Russian Federation, and substantial economic support for Moldova. By contrast, the populist discourse of his opponent, George Simion, advocated for collaboration primarily with the United States, displaying some contact with the new Trump administration, but also with conservative politicians in the European Union, such as the Polish presidential candidate (now President) Karol Nawrocki and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. Additionally, Simion supported taking a much more radical stance towards the Republic of Moldova, calling it a captured state whose independence no longer needs to be financially supported by Bucharest. The goal of this policy is the ultimate unification of the Republic of Moldova with Romania, achieved once Chisinau is no longer able to manage itself economically.
Simion opted for an anti-system platform that appealed to national values, traditions, and religion, but with somewhat more moderate language than his predecessor Georgescu.
Overall, as the candidate of the sovereigntist bloc in Bucharest, Simion opted for an anti-system platform that appealed to national values, traditions, and religion, but with somewhat more moderate language than his predecessor Georgescu, who is a convinced ultra-nationalist but nevertheless backed Simion. Even if the latter has lost the chance to become president of Romania, he is not giving up and is instead trying to keep the sovereigntist wave going. This is in no small part because he obtained 46.4% of the vote in these elections, whereas his party (which is the second largest force in parliament in terms of number of seats) only obtained 18% of the votes in the parliamentary elections held on December 1, 2024.
Thus, the sovereigntist current has lost the presidential elections but remains relevant in the polls, especially amid the budget deficit and the unpopular measures to be taken by the new coalition government led by Ilie Bolojan. Among these measures are new taxes, a VAT increase, and cuts to bonuses, in addition to a cap on wage and pension increases. This creates fertile ground for populist movements in the country, which will not hesitate to penalize the pro-European ruling parties such as the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the National Liberal Party (PNL), the Save Romania Union (USR) and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) at the next parliamentary elections. The likely result will be far fewer seats for these parties in the next parliament.
The sovereigntist current has lost the presidential elections but remains relevant in the polls, especially amid the budget deficit and the unpopular measures to be taken by the new coalition government.
According to the latest opinion polls, 40% of voters support AUR and the party is likely to gain even more traction during the upcoming austerity period. Within this sovereigntist bloc in Bucharest, there are other parties with similar ideologies, including some with a pronounced pro-Russian bias such as the controversial S.O.S. Romania party, led by Diana Șoșoacă (which captured over 7% of votes in the last elections for parliament), and the Party of Young People (POT), led by Georgescu’s close associate Ana-Maria Gavrilă (which captured over 6% of votes).
Despite growing domestic pressure from sovereigntist and populist forces and illiberal rhetoric gaining ground domestically, Romania’s foreign policy remains anchored in its strategic partnerships, where Romania’s pro-Western government, together with the presidential administration, continues to play a central role in regional stability and European integration efforts, especially in the relationship with the Republic of Moldova.
Moldova in the Crosshairs of Nationalist Ambitions
Domestically, the Moldovan president Maia Sandu, together with the pro-European government in Chisinau, are committed to advancing reforms and have opened accession negotiations with the European Union from their position as EU candidate state (obtained in 2022). However, the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine pushed Romania into an important role vis-à-vis helping to achieve these goals from the outside. Crucially, the Sandu administration and the government led by the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) depend on the EU’s, and Bucharest’s, constant support in budget efforts, energy independence, and infrastructure—all potential crisis points that have been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic, the economic crisis, high inflation, and the economic effects of the war in Ukraine.
Thus, Romania plays a key role in the European path of the Republic of Moldova, being the main advocate of Chisinau within the European Union. Nicușor Dan’s victory guaranteed the continuity of this strategic support. In a regional context marked by instability, populism, and attempts at external influence, a victory for Simion and the sovereigntist camp would have called into question Bucharest’s firmly pro-European stance. Such a shift would have created a diplomatic rift and would have significantly weakened Moldova’s ability to move forward in the EU accession process. The outcome of the Romanian elections was therefore not only about the country’s direction, but also about the European future of its eastern neighbors, including Moldova.
The outcome of the Romanian elections was not only about the country’s direction, but also about the European future of its eastern neighbors, including Moldova.
Contra this continuity, Simion strongly stated that he hates “this artificial state called the Republic of Moldova,” and AUR has contributed to the destabilization of the partnership between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, invoking the topic of unification of the two states instead of substantial support from Bucharest. In other words, reviving the idea of unification in populist and coercive terms which are reminiscent of revisionism, especially since he mentions the Ukrainian territories which were once part of Greater Romania, too. This rhetoric aligns worryingly well with the narratives put forward by the Russian Federation, which does nothing other than challenge the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova. Added to all this is the fact that Simion has a 5-year ban on entering Moldova, as he is considered a risk factor for conducting “systematic anti-Ukrainian activities.” Unsurprisingly, he is banned from entering Ukraine for three years, as well.
The foreign policy implications of Romania’s internal illiberalism are nowhere more visible than in Moldova-Romania relations.
Following Romania’s presidential elections, Simion leveled charges of fraud due to the high turnout of Moldovans with dual citizenship (more than 158,000 Moldovans with Romanian citizenship voted in the elections). Moreover, Simion says that he needs “100,000 votes” for Maia Sandu to be defeated, indirectly suggesting that his supporters in the Republic of Moldova should vote for pro-Russian parties in Chisinau, as he says that “all Soros’ agents and so-called pro-Europeans in Chisinau” should pay the electoral price. Such language runs the risk of eroding Moldova’s sovereignty by subsuming it into Romania’s nationalist discourse. Therefore, the foreign policy implications of Romania’s internal illiberalism are nowhere more visible than in Moldova-Romania relations.
Although there is evidence of a rise of sovereigntist and populist forces in Romania, Bucharest continues to act as a strategic ally for Moldova’s European integration efforts. However, with Moldova’s parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2025, the political scene in Chisinau—including but not limited to actors in the ruling PAS, pro-Russian parties such as the Bloc of Communists and Socialists (BCS), and proxy parties led by Ilan Shor in exile—is being reshaped by personalities who, like George Simion in Romania, combine nationalist messages with populist appeal and ambiguous geopolitical positioning. One such figure is Ion Ceban, the mayor of Chisinau and one of the leaders of the political bloc “Alternativa,” which, although publicly adopting a pro-European discourse, maintains links and channels of communication that raise questions in both Brussels and Bucharest.
The political scene in Moldova s being reshaped by personalities who, like George Simion in Romania, combine nationalist messages with populist appeal and ambiguous geopolitical positioning.
Romania’s recent decision to ban Ceban from entering its territory and the Schengen Area for five years shows Bucharest’s growing desire to draw red lines with actors it considers to be exploiting the European integration narrative for electoral purposes while flirting with illiberal or pro-Russian currents. This stance is opposite to the former Ciolacu government, which, through its PSD party, offered Ceban resources, important visits, and contacts in several major Romanian cities. This development increases the pressure ahead of the elections in Moldova, where the stakes involve not only the competition between parties but also the future direction of foreign policy and even the country’s democratic resilience.
Continuity Today, Political Volatility Tomorrow?
Nicușor Dan’s victory in the presidential elections demonstrates the continuity of Romania’s pro-European foreign policy. His mandate has only just begun, but we are already seeing initiatives beneficial to European security. For the first time, we saw a trilateral format meeting in Odessa, where the Presidents of the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania discussed security, regional interconnectivity, and resilience to external threats from the Russian Federation, an important signal of good cooperation.
Dan’s administration is expected to continue its European and Atlantic path, its support for Ukraine’s war of defense, and maintain other key pillars of Romania’s foreign policy, such as support for Moldova’s European trajectory and its energy security. But the political polarization revealed by these elections, in particular the normalization of anti-EU and anti-NATO discourse, poses long-term problems.
The Romanian presidential elections highlight both the resilience and fragility of liberalism in Eastern Europe.
The Romanian presidential elections thus highlight both the resilience and fragility of liberalism in Eastern Europe. While European values are still preferred by the majority of citizens, the growing popularity of nationalist populism, the politicization of the Moldovan issue, and the systemic weakening of trust in state institutions only reveal the extent of the risks of democratic regression. While countries such as Slovakia and Hungary continue to move towards institutional illiberalism, Romania remains on the brink as a potential anchor for democratic resilience in the region, at least for the next four to five years, if political stability is achieved.
Therefore, the timing of the presidential elections in Romania crystallizes not only resistance to illiberal currents in the region but also the reaffirmation of a foreign policy based on European values. For example, Romania, with its strategic and symbolic weight in Moldova’s European path, seems, through its new administration, ready to use political capital, financial aid, and even border access as conditional commitment instruments, especially in the volatile run-up to the parliamentary elections in Moldova, precisely to support Chisinau’s European path.
Laurențiu Pleșca is Program Coordinator at the Black Sea Trust of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He is also a PhD candidate at the Doctoral School of Political Science, University of Bucharest, and a researcher at the Romanian Centre for Russian Studies at the University of Bucharest. His main areas of expertise are Russia’s geopolitics in the Black Sea region, the Eastern Partnership, and EU foreign and security policy.
Image made using “Great Romania Graffiti Moldova,” by Julian Nyča licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported. Other images used are in the public domain.
