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Reviewed: Enda O’Doherty, The Dark Side of France: A History of the French Far Right from the 1890s to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton, 2026).

The far right has long been a “dark matter” for researchers.

Whether historians, political scientists, or sociologists, scholars of the right often face suspicions about their object of study. Do they harbor fascination with evil regimes, villainous leaders, or arcane but malign ideas? Is the far right a fit object for serious study, or does such research result in undue legitimization? Fortunately for our scholarly understanding, as the far right has grown in political stature, these academic prejudices have changed, and there is more widespread recognition that it is important to understand such a potent force, even if we disagree vehemently with it. But studying the far right is still a fraught, complicated, dark-matter affair.

As the far right has grown in political stature…there is more widespread recognition that it is important to understand such a potent force, even if we disagree vehemently with it.

Jean-Yves Camus, for example, a historian of the far right, has recently been challenged by former colleagues who lament his leniency towards the right. They have accused him of normalizing Marine Le Pen’s National Rally when he declared that the populist successor party to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front is no longer a far-right party.

At other times, the far right has seemed a “dark-matter subject,” as scholars who study it are accused of being unable or unwilling to set aside their own politics and think with nuance and impartiality. On this reading, studying the far right is merely militancy disguised as research, a means of waging a vindictive campaign against it. In a recent op-ed published by the conservative newspaper Le Figaro, Paul-François Paoli makes that argument. The article, titled “Those Activist Historians Who Exploit Their Discipline to Fight an Imaginary Fascism,” accused the three leading French historians, Johann Chapoutot, a specialist in the history of Nazism, Nicolas Offenstadt, a historian of memory of the Great War, and Gérard Noiriel, a pioneer in the history of immigration in France, of “having a Manichean view of the world—or rather, one seen in shades of [Nazi] brown and [communist] red.” These historians had, Paoli argued, imposed a tired and singular framework onto a far more complicated public debate: “the present is portrayed as a return to the 1930s.”

The debate here is hardly without dark consequences. In the early days of the second Trump administration, the American historian of antifascism Mark Bray fled the United States after Trump issued an executive order designating Antifa a “terrorist” organization, and Bray in turn was subjected to death threats from conservatives on social media. A vivid example, it seems, of what can happen when far-right politics is normalized.

The dark character of far right studies is, finally, traceable to its nebulous definition, which is always hard to grasp or delimit, and so often acts as a negative category. This lack of clarity is the main problem with The Dark Side of France: A History of the French Far Right From the 1890s to the Present, written by Irish journalist Enda O’Doherty. In his preface, O’Doherty declares: “I have not attempted a definition of ‘far right’ since, over the 130 years of history that this study covers, it has encompassed many strands and has also changed over time.” This can only frustrate, as readers are asked to content themselves with this introductory explanation while an already fraught area of inquiry is muddied rather than elucidated.

Defining “Far Right”

Far from dismissing the question of what defines the far right on the pretext that it is too vague, it is necessary to question and confront the very flexibility of the term.

Far from dismissing the question of what defines the far right on the pretext that it is too vague, it is necessary to question and confront the very flexibility of the term. All the more so since the National Rally, on whom O’Doherty dwells, rejected the designation, denouncing it as early as 1996 as a stigma aimed at disparaging the party. Not only is “far-right” a descriptive term, it seems it is also a polemical one.

So, what is the far right? An ideology, a set of ideologies, a political style? What could monarchist counterrevolutionaries, the populist National Rally, and small identitarian groups staging high-impact actions to defend white European ethnicity possibly have in common with one another?

When justifying his use of the term “far right,” O’Doherty acknowledges that “there are other terms in common use, for example ‘hard right,’ ‘ultra right,’ whose precise significance seems to vary depending on who is using them.” While the semantic ambiguity cannot be denied—Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde has identified about 27 definitions of far right—certain nuances can be outlined: according to the political scientist Stephane François, in France, the term “hard right” (“droite dure”) tends to refer to extra-parliamentary splinter groups, neo-fascist in nature, that aspire to overthrow the Republic through overt violence. By contrast, the “far right” (“extrême droite”) still tends to play the parliamentary game even while criticizing it. The hard right and far right are not to be perceived as two entirely separate blocks: Their interactions are ambivalent, constantly oscillating between moments of closeness and those of estrangement. It is, in fact, these “porous borders” that justify what the political scientist Andrea Pirro calls the significance of the umbrella category of “the far right.”

A major recent work, Nouvelle Histoire de l’extrême droite (A New History of the Far Right) edited by historian Baptiste Roger-Lacan, has tackled this difficult question of definition. He too recognizes that “If the far right has endured through the centuries by constantly reinventing itself, it is because a heterogeneous milieu, fueled by diffuse loyalties, has carried its slogans across generations and historical turning points.” Even so, he shows that since the late eighteenth century, the far right can be characterized by a penchant for conspiracy theories and by a radical and uncompromising view of society based on an immutable natural order. In other words, in the far-right worldview, everyone must remain in their proper place within a social body that is perceived as a living, albeit fragile, organism that, as dictated by the laws of biology, is mortal. Thus conceived, society must be on guard and protected from any threat—internal or external.

In the far-right worldview, everyone must remain in their proper place within a social body that is perceived as a living, albeit fragile, organism…

Limiting Choices and Missing Threads

In his treatment of right-wing French history, O’Doherty chooses to start with the Dreyfus Affair, a scandal involving fraudulent allegations against a Jewish military officer that bitterly divided French society for over a decade at the turn of the century. The Dreyfus Affair, of course, embodied a turning point in the history of France and marked the birth of the modern far right by uniting several different royalist factions around an antisemitic nationalism.

Yet, as convenient as Dreyfus may be for identifying beginnings, we can also trace the rise of the French far right back more than a century earlier to the French Revolution and the reaction against the Enlightenment and its philosophes—a struggle that gave rise to a robust counter-modernity. It’s through the writings of Louis de Bonald and Joseph de Maistre that ideas of nostalgia and decadence, and the threat of modernity, gained influence and spread from France throughout Europe (and even into aspects of American conservative thought). O’Doherty only addresses Maistre’s impact in the eighteenth century and beyond in retrospect, reaching back from his chapter on the nineteenth-century Franco-Prussian War.

The failure to define and delineate the far right at the outset leads O’Doherty to make confusing shifts back and forth in time, sometimes giving the narrative a disjointed structure. But it also leads him to focus more on the history of French politics than on his core subject…

The failure to define and delineate the far right at the outset leads O’Doherty to make confusing shifts back and forth in time, sometimes giving the narrative a disjointed structure. But it also leads him to focus more on the history of French politics than on his core subject—admittedly, because he is adapting to his readers’ lack of familiarity with French history. The chapter “Out of Africa,” for instance, dwells at length on the 1958 crisis that brought de Gaulle back to power and gave birth to the Fifth Republic, but devotes far less space to the OAS, the pro-colonial terrorist group, and its links to the French far right.

O’Doherty has undeniable talent as a storyteller: many of the political figures he covers are brought to life through vivid, novelistic images and a sometimes-sharp tone. But he does not draw out the deeper implications of the events he recounts for the far right. He struggles, for example, to convey how the collapse of the French Empire and the drawn-out defeat in Algeria enabled the far right in crucial ways. These events helped them, for instance, shed the guilt associated with their involvement in the Nazi collaborationist Vichy regime and refocus on defending the empire and the colonial order. As historian Pauline Picco explains, France’s struggle with anti-colonial forces provided right-wingers an opportunity to immerse themselves in a mythical, racially charged armed conflict in defense of a victimized West. This vision lives on in fears that migrants from former colonies will “submerge” France and the rest of Europe, allowing the French far right to conceive of itself as defending not only the nation, but the entirety of white Europe. O’Doherty’s book does not engage with these arguments, and it is worse off for it.

O’Doherty ends by discussing the National Rally, its rehabilitation, and the possible transfer of power from Marine Le Pen, daughter of Jean-Marie, to Jordan Bardella, the party’s media-savvy and strikingly young president, whose polished image has been dented by Mediapart’s recent revelations of his antisemitic writings.

Put another way, he concludes his history of the far right with the so-called “institutional” far right of recent decades. Yet, as Baptiste Roger-Lacan points out, rather than an established institutional presence, the far right is more of a fluid counterculture that draws inspiration from various trends, reinvents its worldviews and imaginaries, and merges with new networks. It is always evolving and adapting. Confining it, as O’Doherty tries to do, to a National Rally desperate for credibility and power ahead of the 2027 presidential elections, appears too limiting. What is more, as critics might contend, doesn’t this approach risk playing, however unwittingly, into the hands of normalization and minimization?

It is similarly surprising that The Dark Side of France makes no mention of the influence of identity-based networks on the parliamentary far right.

It is similarly surprising that The Dark Side of France makes no mention of the influence of identity-based networks on the parliamentary far right. As the historian Marion Jacquet-Vaillant has shown, the “identitarians,” a set of hard right organizations founded in 2002 to advocate for ethnopluralism (the idea that each territory must be ethnically and culturally homogeneous within its own borders, but that differences must be accepted between territories), have gradually won considerable influence on the National Rally—and, before 2018, on the National Front, as it was then called. They have done so by renewing the party’s ideological vocabulary and political orientation: anti-communism has given way to anti-cosmopolitanism, and the Cold War East-West confrontation has given way to a North-South anti-immigrant divide (as, once again, Baptiste Roger-Lacan has shown).

The Identitarians’ most pronounced influence has followed the creation of Éric Zemmour’s far-right party Reconquête (Reconquest). Zemmour and his nationalist party have played a major role in injecting radical ideas into the public discourse —particularly the idea of the “Great Replacement,” an important concept invented by French author Renaud Camus (which is never mentioned in the book) that posits the replacement of white populations by non-white ones, and thereby justifies the proposal for a “Ministry of Remigration.”

Reactionary International

Not only is the far-right hybrid in time, swirling and shifting and reforming over the decades, but it also moves through geographical space. As early as the eighteenth century, the counter-revolution and rejection of the Enlightenment had crossed languages and borders.

Today, the heightened visibility and communication that social media allows for facilitates interactions among far-right groups in disparate countries, for instance through memes, the parodic images that spread quickly across the internet. Take the case of Pepe the Frog, an originally apolitical comic character that became a cherished symbol of the far right, and was alternately depicted as Donald Trump, Hitler, or Marine Le Pen. This far-right convergence has reached a point at which it may fairly be defined as a “reactionary international.” There is now a web of illiberal intellectuals and political figures, galvanized by Trump’s victory, who intermingle with one another both personally and institutionally, exchange ideas, and create synergies to defend a Europe rooted in its ethnic, linguistic, and cultural origins and forge a “civilizational” alliance of nationalist organizations.

One might think of MCC Brussels, an ultraconservative think tank founded in 2022 and affiliated with the private Hungarian Mathias Corvinus Collegium, which had close ties to the Orbán government and to the MAGA movement. Hungary’s new pro-European prime minister, Péter Magyar, has cut the Mathias Corvinus Collegium off from state support. But previously, the organization’s Brussels branch opposed immigration, LGBTQ rights, and environmental policy, weighing in on the supposedly corrupted European debate from the inside. MCC Brussels regularly invited MEPs from the Patriots for Europe group, which includes several far-right parties such as France’s National Rally, Hungary’s Fidesz, Italy’s Lega, the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, and the Freedom Party of Austria. French attendees of MCC Brussels events include three elected officials from the National Rally slate.

These exchanges help carry out the process of “dédiabolisation” (de-demonization) for the French far right—the “don’t-mention-the-war” strategy that O’Doherty, evoking the British sitcom Fawlty Towers, discusses at the end of his book. This reputation-laundering process is real and important, but O’Doherty frustratingly explains too little as to how, or through what channels, it is implemented.

In the age of social media, humor is, for instance, an essential vehicle for this softening of the far right’s image: think of the high success of those TikTok videos showing Jordan Bardella munching on Haribo candy like an eternal, friendly and gluttonous teenager, leading the New York Times to call him a “TikTok star.”

Meanwhile, think tanks like MCC work toward de-demonization through pseudo-academic conferences and analysis that lend a semblance of respectability to a nauseating language of exclusion and stereotype. The ultimate goal is to win the “metapolitical struggle,” a critical concept of the New Right, popularized by Alain de Benoist. This is a current that O’Doherty only skims over. Metapolitics holds that power is acquired on the fringes of politics, primarily by shaping cultural narratives and changing mindsets so that they accept extreme ideas. If you move the Overton window, you change what can be imagined and, therefore, legislated. 

The Dark Side of France fails to capture the many shades and shadows cast by the French far right. O’Doherty leads us over to France’s dark side…but he ultimately leaves us fumbling for more light.

That was the aim of the Remigration Summit, organized by far-right theorist Jean-Yves Le Gallou for October 31 in Paris. Eventually banned after the racist terrorist attack in Trappes that killed one man, the aborted goal was to push the term “remigration” onto the 2027 agenda, with scheduled guests including Restore Britain spokesman Charlie Downes and the US group FAIR (Federation for American Immigration Reform). The Austrian far-right activist Martin Sellner, the leading promoter of remigration who is banned from entering the UK, was also expected to attend but was eventually deported from France.

In addition to his refusal to draw clear definitional boundaries and his over-emphasis on parliamentary politics, O’Doherty all but ignores these international dynamics. And so, The Dark Side of France fails to capture the many shades and shadows cast by the French far right. O’Doherty leads us over to France’s dark side…but he ultimately leaves us fumbling for more light.


Juliette Heinzlef is a French journalist based in Paris. She holds a degree in Literature from the ENS de Lyon (where she researched how the far right engages with fiction), and a degree in journalism from La Sorbonne. She has written for Le Monde, Politis, Elle, Le Grand Continent, and AOC on the intellectual expressions of the far right.