The Rise of Tech Illiberalism in Russia: E-Voting and New Dimensions of Securitization
By Kirill Petrov, Ilya Fominykh, Matvey Bakshuk, Albert Ahalian, and Arseniy Krasnikov
Abstract
This paper explores the evolution of digital technologies within the Russian state, focusing on the shift from efforts to enhance data transparency and civil e-services to securitization, marked by increasing investment in surveillance, facial recognition, personal data storage, and content censorship. The covid-19 pandemic accelerated these restrictions, with e-voting emerging as a key tool in the government’s illiberal practices, coinciding with a decline in opposition support. Using empirical models, the research examines the impact of technological development and administrative capacity on the adoption of e-voting in the 2024 Russian elections. The findings reveal an association between the introduction of e-voting, low administrative capacity, and high technological development at the regional level. This research contributes to the broader discourse on the decline of liberalism, emphasizing the critical role digital technologies play in reinforcing illiberal practices and policies.

Kirill Petrov et al, “The Rise of Tech Illiberalism in Russia: E-Voting and New Dimensions of Securitization,” Journal of Illiberalism Studies 4 no. 3 (Fall 2024): 51-71, https://doi.org/10.53483/XCQV3580.
Keywords: Russian studies, digital governance, e-vote, electronic voting, technological illiberalism, securitization
Throughout 2023–2024, the Russian societal landscape has been shadowed by pressing questions regarding the manifestations of civil nonviolent protest and the symbolic expressions of dissent against the current state policies embodied by Putin’s regime. The prevailing inertia within Russian society and its apparent inability to drive change have been attributed to a complex interplay of factors. These include psychological adaptation and learned indifference,[1] the rally-’round-the-flag effect,[2] and the extensive repression of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and opposition groups.[3]
Digital transformation and its impact on civil actors also play a crucial role in this dynamic. A striking illustration of the implications for ordinary citizens comes from a temporary forced emigrant who described his brief return to Russia in early 2024, after a two-year absence. He vividly encapsulated the essence of this digital shift to his Telegram audience, stating: “Upon returning from countries with established norms of freedom and privacy, Moscow presents itself as a digital concentration camp. The ubiquity of ‘voice assistants,’ security gates, scanners, and facial recognition cameras, even on buses, signifies a pervasive surveillance infrastructure. The absence of freely available WiFi and the stringent requirement of presenting a passport for purchasing train or even intercity bus tickets further underscore the extent of control and monitoring.”[4]
On one hand, the administrative capacity of the Russian state, capable of suppressing civic activity, rooted in rigid Soviet-era bureaucratic hierarchies,[5] manifests itself most clearly in disciplinary institutions like the police, judiciary, military conscription centers, and government-organized nonprofit organizations, or GONGOs,[6] which support the political regime.[7] These coercive institutions have seen a resurgence, contrasting sharply with the subtler control methods described in works like Spin Dictators.[8] On the other hand, the critical growth of the state’s use of digital tools has become a key to controlling communication and conducting mass surveillance. Initially expanded during the covid-19 pandemic, these practices have gained further relevance amid military conflicts. This dual strategy of combining traditional coercion with advanced digital technologies highlights an evolving governance model that increasingly infringes on human rights and privacy.
Digital tools have significantly enhanced the state’s ability to shape public behavior in alignment with its objectives. The expansion of administrative and technological capacities to more efficiently regulate individuals in accordance with national goals serves as a textbook example of biopolitics.[9] The ongoing advancement of sophisticated digital tools has strengthened the sociotechnical governance model, where securitization now includes the effective digital control of citizens.[10] Information and video surveillance technologies add a new dimension to securitization,[11] enabling the rapid identification of disloyal individuals through digital tools, which can lead to further collection of private information, sanctions such as dismissal, or even criminal prosecution. This domain is expanding through mechanisms such as social media censorship, big data manipulation, arbitrary algorithmic surveillance, and the regulation of e-voting procedures.
Scholars have extensively explored the impact of digital technologies, both through broad analyses such as Feldstein’s examination of the interplay between traditional and digital repression strategies,[12] and through focused studies on specific regime types, both democratic[13] and nondemocratic.[14] In the case of Russia, researchers have shifted their focus towards the role of digital media in facilitating political opposition during Russia’s parliamentary elections, underscoring the evolving landscape of civil engagement under authoritarian rule.[15] While detailed examinations of Russia’s surveillance apparatus have been conducted, they are often framed within the context of investigative journalism, as seen in the early as well as the more recent works by Soldatov and Borogan.[16]
Balayan and Tomin provide a compelling argument that the emergence of digital autocracies was not the result of a deliberate strategy by the ruling class to politicize the internet. Instead, they suggest that it arose from a complex interplay of factors, including the adaptation of political regimes in various countries to external pressures—such as global economic competition and international political conflicts—and internal challenges like political destabilization.[17] Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole conclude that the Chinese model of state policy regarding digital communications is characterized by a more filtering approach, while the Russian model is more restrictive.[18]
At the beginning of 2024, there was a significant increase in initiatives aimed at expanding government authority while reducing citizens’ rights to protect their personal information. Russian federal bodies, including the Ministry of Digital Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Transportation, seemed to compete in proposing the most restrictive, unconventional, and illiberal approaches to data collection on citizens.[19]
One of the most controversial and widely criticized measures of the Russian officials is the recent development of a unified electronic database for individuals subject to conscription, which could severely restrict even basic civil liberties simply based on the presence of a corresponding mark in the database. By the fall of 2024, this database had been launched in three regions.[20] We observe a significant qualitative increase in the state’s digital capabilities for controlling Russian nationals. But how can this impact of growing digital capacity on illiberal practices be effectively measured? Our approach lays the groundwork for deeper analysis, potentially sparking debate on how the extensive use of information and communications technology (ICT) systems impacts civil liberties and the effectiveness of democratic voting in this new digital age, where, as in a “brave new world,” all the clocks may well be striking thirteen. In this context, we propose paying close attention to the procedure of e-voting, which is being actively implemented by both the Russian federal government and regional administrations.
While e-participation is often associated with efforts to enhance legitimacy, as Schlaufer[21] discusses in her analysis of Moscow’s “Active Citizen” online voting platform, we argue that, given the growing digital capabilities, this is part of a broader strategy to exert greater control over society through an established digital illiberal infrastructure. This view is supported by Eichhorn,[22] who examines the digitalization of manipulation tactics in Russian gubernatorial elections, and Kynev,[23] who sees e-voting as an experimental tool to boost pro-government votes in specific regions and subdivisions.
In our research, the primary focus is the controversial use of e-voting in Russia, which has frequently been criticized for its questionable impact on electoral integrity.[24] While electronic voting (e-voting) does not inherently lead to the escalation of illiberal practices, its implementation can facilitate electoral fraud by making it easier for state agents to manipulate results if preliminary outcomes are unfavorable. E-voting generally aligns more closely with illiberal tendencies compared to traditional voting methods, as evidenced by early case studies of e-elections to consultative bodies in Russia during the 2010s.[25]
Here the term “illiberalism” should be explained in more detail, regarding the intrinsic value it holds in explaining such a phenomenon, which is vital for our research. Interestingly, at first this term was used only in conjunction with the notion of democracy as “illiberal democracy”—that is, a democratic government with central values and principles different from or even strongly opposed to Western liberalism, but nonetheless an elected government that is responsive to the voters.[26] In its standalone form, it is an emerging social science concept which, in its “pilot” definition as coined by Laruelle, means a certain thin ideological paradigm, broadly encompassing many kinds of ideological backlash against Western liberal hegemony, from right-wing populism to the likes of Chinese state capitalism.[27]
However, in this work we will look into illiberal practices themselves: herein lies an important distinction between ideological illiberalism itself and its disruptive counterpart provided by the political scientists Kauth and King.[28] While the ideological version combats against liberal values on the grounds of a philosophical discussion masterplan and tries to effectively exclude certain groups of people from democratic processes based on their opposition to traditional values, disruptive illiberalism acts more implicitly, attacking democratic institutions (or what’s left of them) while introducing exclusionary practices from the ground up, invoking not only traditionalism, but rationalism and objective empiricism as well—usually with the extensive use of contemporary state technological capabilities. Waller[29] has aptly captured illiberalism in the Russian context as ideational production by second-tier institutions and figures who use it to demonstrate ideological loyalty to the regime.
This paper examines the evolution of digital competencies within Russian state bodies from 2007 to the present. The first section reviews the development of digital suppression capacities, contextualized by increasing securitization and the tightening of restrictions on citizens’ online and offline activities. We describe how the covid-19 pandemic marked a pivotal moment, accelerating the state’s adoption of digital technologies. Thus, in the post-pandemic period, regions became more reliant on this infrastructure, establishing e-voting as a key illiberal practice. By the March 2024 presidential elections, which were conducted amid a ban on mass gatherings, e-voting had expanded to 29 regions, with the Moscow region fully transitioning to digital elections by the fall of 2024. The second section presents an empirical analysis of these elections. We explore how e-voting was primarily introduced in competitive regions where traditional electoral manipulation tactics,[30] such as the coercive mobilization[31] of government-employed workers, as well as employees of private businesses with connections to the state, were limited. The paper concludes by synthesizing the findings and linking them to the theoretical framework, offering a comprehensive view of the relationship between technological advancement and illiberal governance in Russia’s digital landscape.
Building the State’s Digital Capacity: A Brief History
Since around 2007, there has been a concerted effort by Russian federal executive authorities to develop ICT competencies and accumulate digital capacity.[32] This process has included the parallel development of user-friendly digital services for citizens, most notably through the flagship state portal Gosuslugi (State Services). However, alongside these smart e-governance advancements, the state has systematically built-up resources to create sovereign digital security systems, designed to identify and target disloyal media sources and citizens.[33] These long-term investments, which have dramatically transformed Russia’s digital landscape, were underpinned by a shared funding and human resources base.
The contemporary Russian system of state governance is defined by two pivotal elements: centralization and control, both of which have significantly influenced the state’s ICT capabilities.[34] Federal authorities have progressively assumed responsibilities that were initially shared with regional governments, gradually encroaching on areas of governance that, according to the constitution, fall outside their formal jurisdiction. Digitalization, fueled by strategic investments, has greatly facilitated this centralization process. The State Duma has played a compliant role by passing framework laws that delegate extensive regulatory powers to the executive branch. Consequently, major government information systems and databases have been developed with little to no public oversight.[35]
The digital evolution of the Russian state can be delineated into three consecutive phases, each defined by a distinct approach to integrating and utilizing ICT.
Exploration and Preparation for Broad Implementation (2007–2012)
This initial phase marks Russia’s foray into the development and integration of state digital infrastructure, beginning with several significant milestones:[36]
- In 2007, the development of the “Safe City” state-enforced video surveillance system began, aiming to enhance urban security.
- The creation of the federal agency Roskomnadzor on December 3, 2008, signaled the state’s growing desire to control the digital sphere. Roskomnadzor later became notorious for its stringent regulatory approach and for blocking numerous independent web resources.
- The key public service portal, Gosuslugi, was designed and launched by the state corporation Rostelecom in 2009, demonstrating the state’s commitment to digitizing public services.
- During this period, Yandex N.V., the leading digital company and formerly independent search service on the Runet, transferred its “golden share” to the state-owned Sberbank.
This phase marked the beginning of Russia’s journey into digital governance, with early technological adoption and initial government oversight in the digital and public domains. It concluded with the mass protests during the 2011–2012 general elections, which pressured the Kremlin to resume direct gubernatorial elections.[37] These protests, largely coordinated through online platforms, highlighted the critical role of ICT in political mobilization. In response, the Kremlin discreetly increased its investment in digital technologies, though the true purposes of these investments were largely concealed from the public. A key outcome was the transformation of mobile phone numbers into universal identifiers for state and fintech services, with SMS verification as the primary method for confirming online transactions. Additionally, mobile geolocation became a critical tool for identifying suspects in criminal investigations as part of securitization efforts.
The Securitization of State-Accessible ICT (2013–2019)
This phase was marked by a shift towards the securitization of information technologies, representing the digital extension of a broader process known as “authoritarian learning.”[38] During this period, the state strategically pivoted to leverage ICT not only for administrative efficiency but also as a tool to enhance control over independent information flows, conduct arbitrary surveillance, and enforce state security doctrines.
This period was characterized by the gradual securitization of digital developments, increasingly focused on identifying and preventing threats to the political regime. Information security systems and personal data collection became prominent, with significant investments directed toward these areas. In 2014, the Ministry of Emergency Situations was allocated ₽1.4 billion in federal funding over 10 years to revamp the “Safe City” hardware-software complex, featuring an extensive video surveillance system integrated with facial recognition for compulsory citizen identification—not just limited to criminals. Rostelecom, a state corporation, served as the key contractor,[39] with the system’s capabilities remaining deliberately vague and largely inaccessible to public scrutiny, aside from general financial disclosures.
Especially rapid state ICT development occurred in Moscow, where city authorities felt the competition with the opposition led by Alexey Navalny most acutely. During any rallies, even the most apolitical, such as those accompanying the housing renovation initiative in Moscow, participants were digitized. Before entering a rally in Moscow, citizens coming to express their opinion were not only searched for dangerous objects and weapons but also passed through a frame with a special video camera that collected biometrics. By 2017, a facial recognition system officially began operating within Moscow’s city video surveillance system. In the same year, the Russian government approved the “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation” program, with the budget for 2019–2021 including ₽20.8 billion for purchasing software.[40]
In 2018, the Yarovaya Law was enacted, significantly expanding the powers of the intelligence services under the guise of antiterrorism measures. Starting in July 2018, cell phone operators and internet service providers were mandated to store up to six months of all user internet traffic, including messenger correspondence, social media activity, emails, and audio recordings of calls.[41] For Putin’s regime, this law represented a crucial step in expanding state control over communications and the Internet. From April 2018 to June 2019,[42] Roskomnadzor attempted to block the Telegram messenger, but the effort ultimately proved unsuccessful.[43]
In 2019, a trial version of a regional e-voting system was used for the first time, with flexible legal regulations for remote e-voting applied in the Moscow regional parliamentary elections. The lack of public oversight of e-voting was a crucial factor in its promotion. A similar e-voting model, funded separately by the Central Election Commission headed by Ella Pamfilova, was later used beyond the capital region during the three-day voting period on the 2020 constitutional amendment initiative[44] and the 2021 State Duma elections. In Moscow, a separate digital platform for e-voting appears to have played a decisive role, securing overwhelming victories for single-member constituency candidates loyal to the incumbent mayor Sergey Sobyanin, in contrast to traditional polling station results, where opposition candidates performed better.[45] Russian political analyst Alexander Kynev highlights how e-voting was used experimentally in 2021 to boost pro-government votes in specific regions. He points out two critical aspects of the 2021 e-voting in Moscow: the 12-hour delay in reporting results and the suspiciously decisive role of online votes in securing United Russia’s victory in districts where opposition parties had been leading.[46]
Widespread Restrictive Use of Digital Services (2020–Present)
The current phase is marked by the extensive and increasingly restrictive deployment of digital tools, beginning with covid-19 measures aimed at controlling citizens’ movements. This period highlights the consolidation of ICT as a set of governance tools, with a strong emphasis on restricting information flows, monitoring dissent, and further entrenching the state’s control over the digital sphere.
The covid-19 pandemic accelerated the state’s use of these tools, providing a justification for increased surveillance and control. Systems like “Safe City” and digital platforms for online e-voting were rapidly expanded. Additionally, in 2022, the government effectively blocked major Western social media platforms like Facebook, while preserving access to the WhatsApp messenger, further tightening its grip on digital communications.
The government’s main digital service, Gosuslugi, played a crucial role during the covid-19 lockdowns, particularly in enforcing controls and issuing penalties. Starting in April 2020, Gosuslugi gained the authority to issue QR codes, which became essential for movement within cities and regions. From April 15, 2020 onward, in Moscow, QR codes became mandatory for any transportation use, including personal vehicles. Without a QR code, passengers could not pass through subway turnstiles, and car owners who attempted to drive without one were fined.[47] The strict implementation of this system was made possible by Moscow’s extensive “Safe City” network. The video surveillance system directly covers residential apartment building entrances, typically consisting of two or three cameras per entrance. One camera, mounted near the intercom, monitors those entering, while a second observes the entrance door from inside to reinforce the operation of the first camera; sometimes, a third camera is added inside for redundancy. This setup allows for the automatic monitoring and recording of each person entering an apartment building, which facilitates tasks such as tracking illegal migrants and documenting actual residents. Currently, Moscow’s video surveillance system covers more than 90% of the city’s residential buildings and nearly 75% of public areas.[48]
Public access to detailed information about the operation of the “Safe City” system remains extremely difficult. We can learn generally about the scale of funding, but not about the actual goals, capabilities, and results of work beyond what the authorities themselves want to communicate. By 2020, the Ministry of Emergency Situations reported that 12 Russian regions had implemented the “Safe City” system, but it did not even report which regions these were.[49] In 2021, the “Safe City” complex with hardware and software solutions for video surveillance was transferred from the Ministry of Emergency Situations to the Ministry of Digital Development. The number of cameras connected to the facial recognition system in the country has reached 508,000.[50] Furthermore, while facial recognition systems were in use and tested in about five regions of the Russian Federation in 2021, by 2024 the number of regions implementing sophisticated surveillance systems had increased twelvefold, to 62.[51]
In Moscow, the broad system of video surveillance—with 216,000 monitors—relies on a wide-ranging network of cameras in public places (arbitrary surveillance) with the ability to recognize faces and track the movements of, for example, political activists.[52] It is reflected in the expenses that are allocated from the budget to support the “Safe City” system (see Figure 1). It can be said that the very practice of indiscriminate video surveillance can be considered illiberal at its core. The massive and unlimited use of video surveillance with facial recognition software is becoming one of the cornerstones of maintaining political order within illiberal autocracies, and it is also cropping up as an island of illiberalism within otherwise liberal democratic systems.[53]

Figure 1. Increase in costs for video surveillance and IT facial recognition software in Moscow.
Source: data from Moscow’s open budget website, https://budget.mos.ru.
Reflecting on the milestones of each phase, a retrospective analysis reveals key developments in the trajectory of state information systems in Russia. This evolution underscores the growing importance of ICT in the state’s strategies to maintain authority and manage societal dynamics within the broader context of digital transformation and its implications for governance, security, and civil liberties. Future stages may involve the nationwide implementation of a fully managed e-voting system, the monopolization of social media by the VK social networking portal following the blocking of Facebook and Twitter (now X), and government control of the Russian Internet modeled after China’s Great Firewall. These advancements suggest a continued move towards tighter state control over digital infrastructure, aiming to consolidate governmental oversight and directly regulate every aspect of the digital public sphere.
It is important to note here that we did not mention the start of the conflict with Ukraine as an additional breaking point in different phases of digital developments in Russia. Indeed, the majority of changes in the patterns of digital securitization after February 2022 were changes in the scale and urgency of such policies, but not in the overall strategy of post-2020 digital authoritarianism, as reviewed in the Atlantic Council’s exhaustive Digital Forensics Research Laboratory (DFRLab) report.[54] Moreover, really serious changes in spheres like the development of software and hardware, the behavior of Russian IT companies, and Russia’s growing dependency on China in imports of software and hardware are topics of tremendous importance for understanding Russia’s digital strategies, with our without the conflict in Ukraine.[55]
Post-Pandemic Digital Restrictions and E-Voting
After the pandemic ended, Russia’s funding for the “Safe City” system surged from ₽40 billion to ₽135 billion. The justification for these increased security costs, initially tied to the pandemic, continued to rise post-lockdown, enabling further restrictions on political rights and constitutional freedoms, including peaceful assembly and freedom of speech. The 2021 State Duma elections and the 2024 presidential elections were conducted under a de facto ban on rallies and public events.[56]
Meanwhile, the electoral system underwent significant changes. The three-day voting period, first introduced in 2020, became the standard for all subsequent elections, along with the e-voting systems.[57] However, the Central Election Commission has not yet implemented e-voting in all regions, and the criteria for selecting regions for e-voting have not been officially disclosed. As an emerging digital tool, e-voting has the potential to enhance autocratic control over elections by enabling “emergency” corrections of electronic votes to suppress opposition. It also plays a significant role in developing digital mechanisms for mass surveillance and public opinion prediction, positioning electronic voting in authoritarian settings as a manifestation of a disruptive technology in the service of illiberalism. In addition, e-voting preserves the advantages of coercive mobilization. Technical capabilities provide authorities and managers of enterprises (including in medicine and higher education) with monitoring tools, ensuring that mobilized voters have actually taken part in the elections. Previously, a mobilized person had a chance to cast a vote for an opposition candidate, making the victory of the government-backed candidate uncontrollable. Now, such an individual “сheating strategy” for dependent workers is less effective. The possibilities of real-time monitoring of the desired outcome with e-voting are thereby expanded, and get-out-the-vote programs are implemented in an even more centralized manner. [58]
Coercive mobilization, enabled by e-voting, can enhance patron-client networks that extend beyond elections, such as in organizing pro-government rallies, making it particularly advantageous in regions with higher political competition.[59]
Here we explore the possible reasons for selecting certain regions for e-voting. Our assumption is that the introduction of electronic voting made the most sense in the most competitive regions with few opportunities to apply traditional strategies from the menu of manipulation. Thus, we assume that one of the reasons for holding electronic voting could be the potential shortage of public sector employees, who are commonly used for coercive voter mobilization.[60]
Another possible reason for selecting regions for the implementation of e-voting could be their degree of technological development. First, high levels of technological development can reduce the costs of creating and operating the necessary electoral infrastructure, making economic rationality a factor. Second, technological development is often associated with higher levels of protest activity, as more educated and urbanized populations tend to live in these regions.[61] Digital methods of repression are often preferred in this context because in highly developed regions they are paradoxically cheaper and easier to implement than traditional administrative forms of repression.[62] Therefore, implementing e-voting in technologically advanced regions can lower both economic and political costs for the autocracy. Finally, e-voting may not be convenient for individuals with low technological literacy, who are often more supportive of the autocrat. If a region is dominated by such individuals, there is little incentive to implement e-voting there.
Overall, two described mechanisms allow us to formulate hypotheses as follows:
- H1: The level of technological development of a region is positively associated with the introduction of e-voting.
- H2: The number of civil servants per 1,000 people is negatively associated with the introduction of e-voting.
Empirical Strategy
Design and Research Procedure
To explore the relationship between illiberal voting practices, regional technological development, and administrative capacity, we employ a series of binary logistic regressions and multiple linear regressions, depending on the type of the dependent variable. The models are categorized into two groups, with each group consisting of six different specifications based on the explored relationships.
The first group of models examines the relationship between the innovation potential (a measurement of technological development) of Russian regions and the introduction of e-voting in the 2024 presidential elections. The second group of models employs the number of civil servants per 1,000 people (a measurement of administrative capacity), exploring whether it is associated with the introduction of e-voting in the 2024 presidential elections. Thus, variables of interest differ depending on the group. Both groups utilize logistic regressions to address the hypothesized relationships.
Within each group, model 1 serves as a baseline model that does not include controls, preliminarily exploring the relationship between the variable of interest (either innovation potential index or number of civil servants per 1,000 people) and the dependent variable (introduction of e-voting). Model 2 is an electoral model, exploring whether turnout and voting for Putin during the 2018 presidential elections can determine the introduction of e-voting. This model does not include parameters of interest, as it is used to explore the effect of turnout and voting with no controls. Model 3 is a geographical model, incorporating controls for region size and distance from Moscow. Model 4 is a socio-economic model, accounting for cost of living and life expectancy. Model 5 is a full electoral model which adds a variable of interest to Model 2. Lastly, Model 6 is a full model, encompassing a complete set of controls (geographic, socio-economic, and electoral) with a variable of interest. We use Model 6 in each group to test our hypotheses, while previous specifications are presented to estimate possible suppression and reverse suppression effects.
Data and Measures
We utilize the introduction of e-voting in the 2024 presidential elections as our primary measure of technological illiberalism. While technological illiberalism is a wide term encompassing a range of different practices, e-voting certainly can be interpreted as a manifestation of technological illiberalism in our research design. If a region is officially designated to have an e-voting system,[63] the variable is encoded as 1; otherwise, it is encoded as 0.
To account for the regional level of technological capacity, we used the latest available round of an index compiled by the Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge of the Higher School of Economics (HSE), evaluating regional innovation development on a continuous scale from 0 to 1. This index takes into consideration five different aspects of innovation climate in the regions: socio-economic conditions, scientific and technical potential, innovation activity, export activity, and quality of regional innovation policy,[64] utilizing indicators similar to those used in the European Regional Innovation Scoreboard.[65] As an alternative proxy, we used an index of scientific and technical potential — a component of the first index. This component accounts for research and development spending, scientific personnel, and research productivity.
In order to capture the number of civil servants in the region, we used open data from Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) and took the indicator that shows the number of government civil servants per 1,000 people in the workforce in 2022, since this was the latest data available, which has not changed much from the levels for previous years.[66]
Different characteristics of Russian regions are included in the analysis as controls. Choosing controls, we stopped on the parameters that can affect the decision to introduce electoral voting on a regional level. Indicators are taken from databases created by the International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development (ICSID), with support from the Basic Research Program of the Higher School of Economics.[67] We utilized measures for the regional cost of living, life expectancy, use of internet, the share of the population that was urban, crime rates, distance from Moscow, and area of a region. Such factors, in our view, allow us to control for the socio-economic status of the region as well as for the protest potential.[68] We do not include other substantially similar measurements, as it can cause multicollinearity, considering variables already included in the analysis.
Turnout during previous presidential elections as well as the share of votes for Putin in 2018 are also included, as they, could also drive the decision to introduce e-voting. Data for the 2018 presidential elections is taken from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation[69] to find measurements for these predictors.
Results
table 1. Models of technological capacity
Dependent variable: | ||||||
E-voting present in 2024 | ||||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
Innovation potential | 5.293* (2.785) | 6.390** (3.080) | 5.783** (2.887) | 5.757* (3.088) | 6.256* (3.514) | |
Presidential elections 2018 turnout | -0.116*** (0.044) | -0.109** (0.044) | -0.082 (0.071) | |||
Presidential elections 2018, vote for Putin | 0.135** (0.058) | 0.144** (0.058) | 0.141 (0.114) | |||
Region, crime | 0.00000 (0.00001) | |||||
Region, urban share | 0.044 (0.033) | |||||
Region, use of internet | -0.072 (0.066) | |||||
Region, area | -0.00002 (0.001) | 0.001 (0.001) | ||||
Region, distance from Moscow | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0002) | ||||
Region, cost of living | 0.0001 (0.0001) | 0.0002 (0.0001) | ||||
Region, life expectancy | -0.089 (0.107) | -0.183 (0.166) | ||||
Constant | -2.292** (0.974) | -2.966 (2.851) | -2.647** (1.151) | 3.210 (8.135) | -6.007* (3.429) | 6.216 (13.952) |
Observations Log Likelihood Akaike Information Criterion | 88 -56.293 116.586 | 83 -51.497 108.994 | 84 -50.853 109.706 | 83 -52.262 112.524 | 83 -49.591 107.182 | 79 -42.712 107.425 |
Note: | *p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.01 |
table 2. Models of regional administrative capacity.
Dependent variable: | |||||||
E-Voting Presented 2024 | |||||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | ||
Number of civil servants | -0.050** (0.021) | -0.043* (0.023) | -0.063** (0.025) | -0.044* (0.023) | -0.061** (0.031) | ||
Presidential elections 2018 turnout | -0.116*** (0.044) | -0.102** (0.044) | -0.074 (0.072) | ||||
Presidential elections 2018 vote for Putin | 0.135** (0.058) | 0.103* (0.059) | 0.098 (0.115) | ||||
Region, crime | -0.00001 (0.00002) | ||||||
Region, urban share | 0.051 (0.034) | ||||||
Region, use of internet | -0.092 (0.067) | ||||||
Region, area | -0.0001 (0.001) | 0.0003 (0.001) | |||||
Region, distance from Moscow | -0.00003 (0.0001) | -0.00004 (0.0002) | |||||
Region, cost of living | 0.0001 (0.0001) | 0.0001 (0.0001) | |||||
Region, life expectancy | -0.181 (0.126) | -0.163 (0.172) | |||||
Constant | 1.407* (0.830) | -2.966 (2.851) | 1.120 (0.853) | 14.153 (9.522) | 0.303 (3.401) | 13.342 (14.063) | |
Observations Log likelihood Akaike Information Criterion | 88 -54.706 113.412 | 83 -51.497 108.994 | 84 -51.187 110.374 | 83 -49.743 107.487 | 83 -49.288 106.577 | 79 -41.862 105.724 | |
Note: | *p <0.1; **p <0.05; ***p <0.0 | ||||||
To test our hypotheses, we used several models. The first set of models (Table 1) tackles the link between the technological capacity of the region and the presence of online voting in the 2024 presidential elections. Model 1 in this set is the baseline model, including the sole use of the innovation potential index, without any controls added to the model. This specification argues for a positive link between the technological potential in the region and the manifestations of technological illiberalism. The significance of innovation potential is robust when controlling for the geographical characteristics of the regions (Model 3). Specification with the inclusion of socio-economic characteristics of the region (Model 4) yields analogous results, as controls remain insignificant and innovation potential remains positive and significant.
Electoral specifications include turnout and 2018 presidential elections votes for Putin at the regional level (Model 2, Model 5). Again, the effect of the innovation potential of the region on the introduction of e-voting remains significant. Moreover, according to Model 2 and Model 5, higher voter turnout is linked to lower odds of adopting e-voting, while a higher share of votes for Putin in the 2018 elections is associated with increased odds of e-voting adoption. In the full model controlling for geographic and socio-economic characteristics of the region (Model 6), however, their effect on introduction of e-voting disappears, which can be interpreted as an indication that the observed relationship between these variables and the adoption of e-voting may be driven by underlying regional-level factors rather than voter turnout or support for Putin alone. In the presented full model, the effect of innovation potential, again, remains significant.
The second group of models (Table 2) takes into consideration the possible link between the regional administrative capacity and the adoption of online voting in the 2024 presidential elections. Again, Model 1 is the baseline, including only the key explanatory variable of the number of civil servants per 1,000 people. This specification shows the opposite effect from that of administrative capacity on the dependent variable as compared to that of technological capacity. The inclusion of the geographic (Model 3), socio-economic (Model 4), and electoral (Model 5) features of the regions does not change the effect of the key regressor on the dependent variable, and the significance and the character of the control variables also remain consistent with respect to the results from the first set of models. The full model (Model 6) controls for a complete set of geographic, socio-economic and electoral features. Again, the significance of an effect of the number of civil servants per 1,000 people on the introduction of e-voting argues for secondary hypotheses.
Discussion
Overall, the first set of models gives evidence in favor of the existence of a link between innovation potential and the probability of implementing the e-voting system during the 2024 presidential elections. The results support our initial intuition that e-voting was implemented in the regions with enough technological capacity to maintain such a system. Moreover, we also suggested that electronic voting could be implemented in regions where more expensive, traditional repression would otherwise have to be applied. Our results in a similar way argue in support of this mechanism: e-voting can be understood as a form of preventive repression.[70] Thus, we find evidence to accept the first hypothesis. It is hard, however, given the models, to dive deeper into mechanisms and specify which one of them played a dominant role here. It is likely that several mechanisms contributed to the observed effect.
Results for the second set of models may be interpreted in a way that there is a substitution effect between technological and administrative capacity. In the regions with high administrative capacity, which ensures an efficient system of coercive voter mobilization, there is no need to invest in alternative costly forms of electoral manipulation. The authorities of the remaining regions have to look for different ways of achieving desirable electoral outcomes, particularly through the e-voting system. Thus, we find evidence to accept the second hypothesis.
Previous research has primarily focused on the disruptive impact of e-voting, demonstrating that its introduction can substantially influence electoral outcomes.[71] Our study extends this discussion by uncovering potential underlying mechanisms behind the selection of regions for e-voting implementation. One could argue that the enhanced capabilities afforded by the adoption of e-voting in autocracies like Russia may serve as additional motivation for decision-makers to expand its implementation to even more regions in the future.
The insignificance of lockdowns in predicting the emergence of digital illiberal practices can be explained by the fact that there is a serious difference between the underlying motivations for the implementation of harsh lockdowns and the development of e-voting systems. The first might be interpreted as the practice of the state of emergency, or martial law,[72] an emergency measure the strictness of which depends primarily on the severity of the problem it strives to resolve, not the technological capacities to implement it. In contrast, e-voting is the practice of the state of new normalcy: its aim is more straightforward in relation to illiberal tendencies and its order and magnitude of realization depends precisely on technological capabilities.
Conclusion
This article contributes to the ongoing discourse on illiberalism by examining its interplay with the widespread adoption of digital technologies. It explores the balance between convenience and security offered by the state through the development of its digital capacity, using Russia’s promotion of e-voting as a case study.
The case of Russia’s expanding digital infrastructure demonstrates how the original goals of transparency and user-friendly digital services, when shaped by securitization, can result in coercion. This is achieved through population-wide database maintenance and mass surveillance aimed at facial recognition and matching personal data that aligns with illiberal policies. The covid-19 pandemic further accelerated this process, revealing that digital technologies employed by Russian authorities have become central mechanisms of illiberalism, persisting beyond the crisis which was originally used to justify their implementation. This infrastructure now enables executive authorities to manipulate key democratic processes and institutions, including the freedom of assembly and elections. Therefore, the accumulation of digital tools is a co-element in the broader trend of democratic backsliding.
Russian e-voting procedures during the 2024 presidential elections involved over 8 million voters, significantly affecting the electoral landscape nationwide. Our analysis supports the idea that the regions selected for e-voting implementation were not chosen randomly. Firstly, it underscores the deliberate deployment of e-voting in areas with limited administrative oversight, where it is much harder to utilize the traditional sources for coercive voter mobilization, such as state-employed workers or personnel of firms with close informal ties to the government. Furthermore, our findings suggest an association between the technological advancement of a region and the implementation of e-voting. After finding evidence supporting our hypothesis, we describe the possible mechanisms driving this selection. It is possible that decision-makers are more likely to adopt e-voting in the regions where: (1) e-voting can play a role in preventive repression, potentially decreasing political costs by masking the genuine level of public support, and (2) economic costs of implementation are lower. Overall, we find evidence supporting our hypotheses describing the possible mechanisms driving this selection.
Given the relatively low costs, it is evident that the e-voting system in Russia is likely to expand further in the near future. Its rapid spread and the results it has produced, particularly those favoring Putin as a candidate, clearly demonstrate the benefits it offers to current officials. This system, designed to manipulate electoral outcomes and disconnect election results from genuine voter intent, reflects a broader trend toward centralization through unified data formats and highly centralized federal databases with personalized citizen profiles, thereby expanding the potential for arbitrary surveillance and enhanced digital control via e-voting.
Appendix. The Legal definition of the e-vote procedure in the 2024 Moscow elections.
Ironically, the best way to find the accurate legal definition of electronic voting in Moscow in 2024 was to use a website that explained the terms of an official (that is, Moscow government-sponsored) competition for prizes among citizens who prefer e-vote.[73]
The full official notice of electronic voting in Moscow in 2024 is given below in the original language and in English translation.
English (translation by the authors):
E-voting is voting without using a paper ballot, using the special Remote Electronic Voting (hereinafter referred to as “GIS DEG”) software of the state information system of the City of Moscow. This ensures interaction with the state information system’s Portal of state and municipal services (or functions) of the City of Moscow, which is integrated with the Official Portal of the Mayor and Government of Moscow automated information system. This includes logging in through the personal account subsystem of the state information system’s portal of state and municipal services (or functions) of the City of Moscow from any device providing access to the information and telecommunications network via Internet, compatible with GIS DEG (hereinafter referred to as “DEG in the form of online voting”), or using electronic voting complexes consisting of technical devices that ensure electronic voting in and outside the polling stations—electronic voting terminals, stationary and portable, using GIS DEG (hereinafter referred to as “EG using terminal”), in the elections for deputies of the Moscow City Duma of the eighth convocation and elections for deputies of representative bodies of local self-government in the City of Moscow, held on a single voting day in September 2024, in the manner established by the current legislation of the Russian Federation (the “Elections”).
Russian (original):
Дистанционное электронное голосование — голосование без использования бюллетеня, изготовленного на бумажном носителе, с использованием специального программного обеспечения государственной информационной системы «Дистанционное электронное голосование» (далее — «ГИС ДЭГ»), являющейся государственной информационной системой города Москвы, обеспечивающей взаимодействие с государственной информационной системой «Портал государственных и муниципальных услуг (функций) города Москвы», интегрированной с автоматизированной информационной системой «Официальный портал Мэра и Правительства Москвы», в том числе через подсистему «Личный кабинет» государственной информационной системы «Портал государственных и муниципальных услуг (функций) города Москвы» с любого устройства, обеспечивающего доступ в информационно-телекоммуникационную сеть Интернет, совместимого с ГИС ДЭГ (далее — «ДЭГ в форме онлайн-голосования»), или с применением комплексов электронного голосования, состоящих из технических устройств, обеспечивающих проведение электронного голосования в помещениях для голосования и вне помещения для голосования — терминалов электронного голосования, стационарных и переносных, с использованием ГИС ДЭГ (далее — «ЭГ с использованием терминала»), на выборах депутатов Московской городской Думы восьмого созыва и выборах депутатов представительных органов местного самоуправления в городе Москве, проводимых в единый день голосования в сентябре 2024 года, в порядке, установленном действующим законодательством Российской Федерации (далее — «Выборы»).
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[48] The Moscow Government Portal discloses some information about the city’s video surveillance system, which was created within the framework of the Moscow City State Program “Development of the Digital Environment and Innovations,” approved by Moscow Government Resolution No. 349-PP of August 9, 2011. Data aggregated through the Moscow Government’s official web resources: Moscow City State Program, “Development of the Digital Environment and Innovations,” 2024, https://video.dit.mos.ru. and Open Data Portal of the Moscow Government, 2024, https://data.mos.ru.
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