The far right has been on the rise since the 1990s, so its increasing prevalence in public discourse and politics is not a new phenomenon. However, the scope of the influence of the far right has reached new heights; most importantly, perhaps, in terms of its impact on parties that form part of the traditional mainstream in European countries, and the center-right in particular. The general pattern is that these parties have moved closer to the ideological territory of the far right, helping to normalize its politics. Of equal importance is the influence the far right has had on the mainstream media, and how the media responds to the far right’s increasing grip on the political debate.
In this context, we argue that the mainstream (parties and media) are absolutely key in terms of how political events are framed (how they are talked about), and how they are situated in relation to liberal democracy. Given their crucial role in safeguarding democracy, we argue, first, that mainstream parties and media need to be explicit in identifying and calling out far-right rhetoric and actions, especially when far-right actors incite or engage in violence. Second, they need to perform an educational role regarding the meaning and boundaries of liberal democracy, and also act in line with liberal democratic principles.
We use recent events in the Netherlands to illustrate our argument. This is a case where the far right has become a dominant electoral force—in the most recent national election of November 2023 Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) gained more votes than any other party and entered a short-lived coalition government, and several other far-right parties are part of the Dutch political landscape. The PVV is still leading the polls ahead of the early national election of October 29th this year.
Violent far-right protests in the Netherlands
Rioters shouted racist and antisemitic slogans, made Nazi salutes, and displayed symbols that were clearly associated with the extreme right
On Saturday, September 20th, anti-immigration protests in The Hague got out of hand, and extreme right-wing rioters went on a rampage through the city. Rioters shouted racist and antisemitic slogans, made Nazi salutes, and displayed symbols that were clearly associated with the extreme right (such as the orange-white-blue flag that was adopted by the Dutch fascists during the Second World War). They attacked or harassed police officers and journalists, set two police cars ablaze, attempted to invade the site of the Dutch Houses of Parliament, and broke some windows of the D66 (Dutch liberal democratic party) office.
There were some parallels between these anti-immigrant protests and the anti-immigration protests in London just one week before. The demonstration in the Netherlands was initiated by a far-right activist: a 26-year-old woman nicknaming herself “Els Rechts” (Els Right-wing). The event lacked the high profile and well-known speakers that drew in larger crowds in the UK (a few thousand showed up in The Hague), but the protest turned out to be much more violent. Over a thousand (male) attendants never seemed that interested in peaceful protesting.
“Els Rechts” declared her dismay with the violent turn of events, and the initial reporting by the Dutch public broadcaster NOS confirmed her interpretation of what happened, emphasizing the difference between, on the one hand, peaceful protesters voicing their legitimate concerns about immigration and, on the other, violent rioters who were responsible for mayhem. Later, it was emphasized that the violence was caused by “hooligans” allied to a variety of football clubs who had put their rivalry on hold to, in their words, “save the Netherlands.”
While this interpretation of the events was not altogether inaccurate, there was surprisingly little explicit mentioning of the ideological nature of the protest. In fact, one Liberal party (VVD) cabinet minister even commented that these events where not political and they should not be politicized by other politicians in the name of depolarization. A few days later his fellow party member and cabinet colleague responsible for justice and security initially showed considerable hesitation to qualify the documented Nazi-salutes as acts of Nazism, and to explicitly label the events as “right-wing extremist” (against the advice of the government’s anti-terrorism agency). After receiving considerable criticism in parliament, he eventually dropped his reluctance. By this time, much of the media reporting and commentary—including that of the NOS—placed clear emphasis on the “extreme right-wing” nature of the violent protests.
While this interpretation of the events was not altogether inaccurate, there was surprisingly little explicit mentioning of the ideological nature of the protest.
This brings us to an important and pressing question: how should we talk about controversial and hot topics, allowing for a difference of opinion, and still defending liberal democracy?
Addressing the far right and safeguarding liberal democracy
In the academic literature, a distinction is typically made between the often violent and undemocratic extreme right and the democratic, yet xenophobic and exclusionary, radical right (the latter of which enjoys considerable electoral success in Europe and beyond). Both these subcategories of the broader far right came together during the protest in The Hague. It is worthwhile to note the lines between extreme and radical can sometimes be blurry. While distancing herself from the violence, Els Rechts had previously declared her readiness on social media platform X to participate in a civil war should left-wing parties win elections. And, as became apparent on the day, some of the peaceful protesters distanced themselves from the rioters but nevertheless showed a degree of understanding for how the national situation drove other participants to violent actions.
In its initial reporting, the public broadcaster seemed particularly keen to avoid the appropriate labels (far- and extreme-right) to describe the nature of what was happening—the fact that the far right often accuses the NOS of biased (left-wing) reporting may play a role here. Several (center-right) politicians and cabinet ministers showed a similar reluctance. Accurate categorization of political actors and their ideologies is not merely of academic interest. It is obvious that far-right politicians have contributed to fanning the flames of anti-immigrant sentiment, blowing the, arguably “genuine,” problems related to immigration and asylum out of proportion, and declaring that citizens need to “fight back” against the criminal actions of non-natives—a phrase PVV leader Geert Wilders used in a parliamentary debate days before the riots. Shying away from using the appropriate labels in media reporting makes it easier for far-right parties to deny responsibility for stimulating far-right violent events, or even to blame their opponents for sowing division, when these refer to the far-right’s inflammatory discourse (Wilders did both these things).
Yet, and here we come to our second point, safeguarding liberal democracy is not simply a matter of criticizing the far right, or refusing to cooperate with it in office. In the current context it is in fact also necessary to separate political opinions from liberal democracy. Part of the problem arises, in the above-mentioned case, over the right to protest. The anti-immigration protests in the Netherlands and elsewhere are part and parcel of a liberal democracy. Ideological content should not determine whether a protest should or should not be allowed to happen. The key is whether the protests take place within the bounds of liberal democracy. Thus, it is clear that the Els Rechts demonstration and the protests could have abided by the rules of liberal democracy, were it not for the extreme right violence that accompanied it.
Safeguarding liberal democracy is not simply a matter of criticizing the far right, or refusing to cooperate with it in office. In the current context it is in fact also necessary to separate political opinions from liberal democracy.
Referring to another relevant case: one day before the anti-immigration protests, the Dutch parliament supported a motion to treat Antifa—a broad and fragmented social movement with its stance against fascism as its common denominator—as a “terrorist organization.” No doubt inspired by similar actions taken by U.S. President Donald Trump, the motion was proposed by one of the far-right parties in Dutch parliament (Forum for Democracy), and was supported, among others, by the governing VVD. Such a move has strong potential to stifle free assembly protests and has the appearance of mainly targeting the ideology of politically driven action, which in this case does not even pose a genuine security threat.
Depolarizing politics does not imply depoliticization. However, it does entail refraining from instrumentalizing liberal democracy for one’s own political gain.
It is more important than ever for political parties, and the media, to highlight what a liberal democracy is, and what it is not. Thus, protests, whether they are on the left or the right (e.g. anti-immigrant protests or protests in support of Palestine), are an essential part of a liberal democracy so long as they are within the confines of a liberal democracy. In this regard, banning movements such as Antifa that are clearly not terrorist organizations does not help the cause—which is not to say that one should condone violent protests by sympathizers of such movements if they do take place. As such depolarizing politics does not imply depoliticization. However, it does entail refraining from instrumentalizing liberal democracy for one’s own political gain.
Stijn van Kessel is Professor of Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London.His main research interests are populism and the politics of European integration, with a particular emphasis on radical right parties and Euroscepticism. His latest co-authored book is Populist Radical Right Parties in Action: The Survival of the Mass Party (Oxford University Press, 2025).
Andrej Zaslove is Associate Professor at Radboud University, in Nijmegen. He conducts research into populism and political parties. He measures populist attitudes among voters and examines the links between populism and democracy, foreign policy and gender. He also examines the impact of populism on party systems.
Image: “Riots 3” by Bryan Tong Minh licensed under CC BY 2.5.
