The October 2025 general election in Czechia delivered a clear victory for the populist ANO (literally, “Yes”) party led by Andrej Babiš and was a decisive defeat for Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s governing coalition. The outcome was hardly a shock. Opinion polls had shown stable support for ANO and other populist forces for months, suggesting that much of the electorate had shifted toward the opposition. Alongside ANO, the populist radical right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party and the new protest party Motorists for Themselves (AUTO) entered parliament, sealing what can rightly be described as a populist triumph.
What did surprise many observers was the scale of that triumph. Together, the three populist parties won 108 of the 200 seats in the Chamber of Deputies—nearly reaching the three-fifths constitutional majority. Ironically, this mirrors the 2021 election, when the anti-populist camp had secured the same comfortable majority. The pendulum has now swung back, raising questions about the sustainability of anti-populist mobilization and its limits as a political strategy. The results of the 2025 Czech elections suggest that the 2021 defeat of populism may have been the exception rather than the rule—and that Czechia’s experience offers lessons well beyond its borders.
The results of the 2025 Czech elections suggest that the 2021 defeat of populism may have been the exception rather than the rule.
2021’s Anti-Populist Moment
The 2021 election was, at the time, a genuine surprise. After eight years of populist government (either as a junior or leading member of the coalition), the anti-populist opposition captured a majority of seats and unseated Babiš’ ANO. This success rested on unprecedented cooperation among democratic parties. This cooperation took the form of two pre-election coalitions. The first was called Together (Spolu) and combined the conservative Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the liberal-conservative TOP 09, and the Christian and Democratic Union – the Czechoslovak People`s Party (KDU-ČSL). The second was an alliance of the centrist Pirates party and the Mayors and Independents (STAN). These coalitions joined forces to overcome the majoritarian bias of the electoral system and to present a “democratic alternative” to populism.
Quite interestingly, the momentum came from below. The public backlash against Babiš’ concentration of political and economic power, coupled with his criminal prosecution for subsidy fraud, triggered the largest street demonstrations since 1989, organized by the civic movement Million Moments for Democracy. This mass mobilization pushed the democratic parties to overcome their differences and unite. The campaign’s communication strategy also broke with tradition: instead of competing on economic or welfare policies, the opposition reframed the contest as a battle for democracy itself. Populist actors were portrayed as threats to the country’s liberal orientation and European anchoring.
The result was a last-minute surge of pro-democracy voters, particularly in urban centers, which gave the anti-populist bloc a parliamentary majority. Yet even on election day, the victory carried warning signs—and required a fair bit of luck.
A Loss of Luck
The 2021 win was, in hindsight, fragile. The record turnout that year was driven largely by educated, urban voters motivated by fear that Czech democracy was at risk. At the same time, three smaller populist-leaning parties—the Social Democrats, Tricolour, and Oath—fell just short of the electoral threshold, together receiving about 12% of the vote. Had even one of them crossed the line, the anti-populist majority would have vanished. In other words, structural quirks and strategic missteps by the populist camp played a decisive role.
Moreover, while the discourse of anti-populism that characterized the 2021 victory was highly effective, it came at a cost. By centering the campaign on the populist versus anti-populist divide, the democratic parties downplayed their ideological identities. The message of defending democracy overshadowed substantive debates about policy. Campaigns focused on the fear of democratic backsliding rather than visions for day-to-day governance.
Without the unifying anti-populist frame, the coalition struggled to articulate what it stood for beyond “not being Babiš.”
Once in power, this strategy’s weaknesses became clear. The governing coalition stretched from the conservative, mildly Eurosceptic ODS to the liberal, pro-EU Pirates. The result was constant internal friction and policy paralysis. Disagreements over digitalization eventually drove the Pirates out of government, and public communication often lacked coherence. Despite a solid handling of both foreign-security and energy crises and inflation, without the unifying anti-populist frame, the coalition struggled to articulate what it stood for beyond “not being Babiš.”
By 2025, the lesson of the missteps mentioned above had been learned. The radical right and left adapted by forming “hidden coalitions”—joint electoral lists designed to avoid wasted votes. The SPD incorporated candidates from several small nationalist parties, while a new left-populist alliance, Stačilo!, united the Communists, Social Democrats, and other minor groups. Although Stačilo! narrowly missed the threshold, SPD benefited from the collaboration (although getting less seats compared to the 2021 election), and a new protest vehicle, AUTO, surged to nearly 7 percent. Led by social-media star Filip Turek, AUTO mixed anti-Green Deal rhetoric with cultural conservatism, appealing to disaffected right-wing voters. In short, the anti-populist bloc’s share of the vote remained virtually unchanged—but this time, the other side played its cards right.
This election, the anti-populist bloc’s share of the vote remained virtually unchanged—but unlike in 2021, the other side played its cards right.
The Awakening of the Sleeping Populist Majority
The victory of the populists in the 2025 election was not merely luck. It revealed the awakening of a “sleeping populist majority” that had existed beneath the surface of Czech politics. Over the past decades, a large portion of the electorate has grown alienated from mainstream parties and the politics-as-usual they embody. Many, particularly in economically poorer regions, feel forgotten by successive governments that have failed to address their everyday struggles. These “left behind” citizens, concentrated in the country’s peripheries, are the natural base of populist mobilization.
The 2025 election revealed the awakening of a “sleeping populist majority” that had existed beneath the surface of Czech politics.
Populist leaders like Babiš have proven remarkably adept at speaking to these voters—offering empathy, protection, and the promise that “someone will finally take care of things.” The data confirms the pattern: both populist gains and voter turnout were significantly higher in peripheral regions in 2025, and voters of populist parties stated that economy-related issues were the most important reasons for their vote.
Demography adds a second dimension. As Czech society ages, the growing weight of older voters increasingly benefits populist parties. In 2025, about 60 percent of those aged 65 and over voted for ANO. Pensioners, who tend to value security and social protection, have become the backbone of this quiet majority. Combined with long-term regional frustrations, these demographic shifts suggest that populism now rests on a solid—and perhaps expanding—social foundation.
What’s On the Horizon
Based on the government formation talks (this text was completed at the end of October), a coalition comprising ANO, AUTO, and SPD appears to be the most likely outcome of the election. Given ANO’s clear electoral victory and the limited governing experience of both AUTO and SPD, Babiš’s party will almost certainly take the lead in shaping the government’s agenda. One indication of this dynamic is ANO’s immediate rejection of one of SPD’s central campaign promises—a law enabling referenda on Czech membership in the EU and NATO.
Babiš’ party tends to follow public opinion rather than a consistent ideological line, seeking to appeal to as broad a range of voters as possible.
More generally, ANO tends to follow public opinion rather than a consistent ideological line, seeking to appeal to as broad a range of voters as possible. In practice, this results in a mix of economically and socially protectionist policies combined with culturally conservative, and at times even radical right-leaning, positions on issues such as immigration. Reduction of support for Ukraine may also be expected. At the national level, the coalition parties are likely to continue their Eurosceptic rhetoric—SPD being the most outspoken, with AUTO and ANO adopting somewhat more moderate tones. However, under the pressures of Europeanization, ANO in particular will probably be more pragmatic and behave constructively at the EU level. As expressed by the leading coalition negotiator of ANO after the first round of governing talks finished, the goal was to create a program that would reflect “the center-right orientation of the government, with a social safeguard provided by the ANO movement,” and that would be built on “conservative foundations.”
Domestically, however, we can anticipate mounting pressure on liberal democratic institutions. Although the governing coalition lacks the parliamentary majority required to amend the constitution or change electoral laws, it will likely have enough votes to curtail the role and funding of public service media, or to reduce funding for universities—particularly in fields such as the social sciences, which have been frequent targets of their criticism.
With the new government, we can anticipate mounting pressure on liberal democratic institutions.
Moreover, all three parties have employed hostile rhetoric toward NGOs, often labeling them “political NGOs.” This label is, of course, aimed primarily at liberal or left-leaning civil society organizations, which raises the likelihood of cuts to their public funding. While ANO and AUTO are not as radical as, for example, Smer in Slovakia or Fidesz in Hungary, the ANO–AUTO–SPD coalition is not good news for the quality of liberal democracy in Czechia.
Lessons Learned
The 2021 election was a rare case of successful anti-populist mobilization. But it was also a product of exceptional conditions and, frankly, good fortune. The broader structural landscape—demographic aging, regional inequality, and widespread disillusionment with traditional party politics—remains fertile ground for populism. Czechia is not alone in this regard. Across Europe, populist victories are increasingly becoming the political norm rather than the exception.
For anti-populist forces to remain relevant, they must move beyond moral superiority and technocratic detachment. They need to speak to the frustrations of those who feel left behind.
Still, populists are often good at winning elections and poor at governing. Crises, scandals, or mismanagement can quickly erode their credibility, opening windows of opportunity for the opposition—as seen in Poland or, to some extent, in Hungary’s recent shifts in opinion. Yet for anti-populist forces to remain relevant, they must move beyond moral superiority and technocratic detachment. They need to speak to the frustrations of those who feel left behind, offer credible social and economic policies, and rebuild trust through responsive and inclusive governance.
In Czechia, that means abandoning the neoliberal narratives that blame citizens for their own economic hardship and replacing it with a more socially sensitive vision of development. Only by addressing inequality and investing strategically in the country’s neglected peripheries can democratic forces hope to compete. Otherwise, the “sleeping populist majority” may stay wide awake—for many elections to come.
Vlastimil Havlík is a professor of political science at Masaryk University and at the National Institute for Research on Socioeconomic Impacts of Diseases and Systemic Risks (SYRI). He was a Fulbright-Masaryk research fellow at Northwestern University and is the editor-in-chief of the Czech Journal of Political Science. His main research interests include political parties, democracy, and populism.
Image made using “A BABIŠ PRAHA 2015,” by David Sedlecký licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International; “1719998912664 20240703 TUREK Filip CZ 006,” by European Union; “Petr Fiala, 2025.06.26 (04),” by European Union; “Tomio Okamura portrét (cropped),” by Tomio Okamura licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International. Any other images used are in the public domain.
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