Lisa, thank you for joining us. You recently wrote a definitive chapter for the Research Handbook on Populism about the “ideational approach” to populism studies. I want to start there. Can you give our audience a brief description of the ideational approach and its key claims? We know the ideational approach is highly prevalent in the literature, can you tell us why it’s been preferred over other approaches? Finally, I hoped that you might detail in brief some of the criticisms of this approach, as you do in the chapter.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss my work. The ideational approach to populism, which I detail in my chapter, focuses on the ideas underpinning populist actors and movements. Central to this approach is the conception of society as divided into two antagonistic and morally defined groups: the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.” Populists claim to represent the general will of the people, positing that politics should directly express this collective will.
One of the most widely recognized definitions within this approach is Cas Mudde’s conceptualization of populism as a “thin-centered ideology.” This definition emphasizes the moral opposition between the people and the elite while highlighting the flexibility of populism to attach itself to “thick” ideologies, such as nationalism or socialism. This adaptability allows the ideational approach to distinguish populism from non-populism, assess its various subtypes, and examine its manifestations across contexts, whether associated with political parties, movements, or leaders.
The prevalence of the ideational approach in the literature can be attributed to several strengths. Its minimal definition enables empirical comparative research, offering tools to analyze populism across time and space. Moreover, it considers both supply-side (political actors and parties) and demand-side (populist attitudes among the electorate) dynamics, making it a comprehensive framework for understanding the phenomenon. Unlike approaches focused solely on leadership, this perspective acknowledges that populist ideas can manifest without a singular charismatic figure.
However, like any framework, the ideational approach faces criticisms. Scholars, particularly from discursive traditions, challenge the conceptualization of “the people” and “the elite” as homogeneous and morally defined entities. Critics argue that this may oversimplify the diversity within populist constructs and ignore contexts where these categories are politically or socioeconomically rather than morally defined. Others question whether populism fits the notion of a “thin ideology” as defined by Michael Freeden, suggesting that the ideational approach may not fully capture the richness or variability of populist expressions globally.
Despite these critiques, the ideational approach remains a robust and widely applied framework, offering clarity and comparability in the study of populism. It provides a foundation for identifying and analyzing populist phenomena while allowing scholars to explore their contextual specificities and theoretical implications.
Great, I want to move on now to a series of articles you have written on what we might call “populism beyond Europe.” So much of the literature on the populist radical right (PRR) focuses on Europe, and even within Europe, the bulk of work has been done on only a few country cases. You problematize this in a co-authored article from 2023. What insights emerge from such a comparative study? Is “populist radical right” even a universal category? If so, what differences can we observe in how it is articulated in contexts beyond Europe?
The article I co-authored with Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser addresses the pressing need to broaden our analytical scope given the global rise of PRR forces. While much of the literature on the PRR has focused on Europe, this study highlights how examining non-European cases enriches our understanding of the PRR as a global phenomenon.
A key insight from this comparative analysis is that, while the PRR’s defining attributes—as defined by Cas Mudde in his seminal book Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe—nativism, populism, and authoritarianism—remain central, their articulation varies significantly across national and regional contexts. This raises the question: does the concept of the “populist radical right” travel well outside of Europe, or does it require significant contextual reinterpretation? The paper explores the diverse ways in which PRR ideology manifests beyond Europe, offering several illustrative examples. For instance, nativism, closely associated with anti-immigration sentiment in Europe, takes on unique forms in non-European contexts. In Brazil and Chile, as well as in Australia, nativism extends to critiques of indigenous populations, reflecting colonial histories and sociocultural dynamics specific to these regions. Similarly, in countries like India, Turkey, and the United States, religion and racialized nationalism are employed as central components of nativist discourse. These cases contrast with the European emphasis on cultural homogeneity and opposition to immigration, demonstrating how PRR movements adapt their core ideological elements to resonate with local sociopolitical conditions.
Nativism, closely associated with anti-immigration sentiment in Europe, takes on unique forms in non-European contexts.
In this sense, the article empirically questions whether “populist radical right” is a universal category. While its ideological core provides a useful framework, the context-dependent variation in its articulation suggests that the PRR is better understood as a flexible phenomenon. This flexibility underscores the importance of comparative analysis in refining theoretical frameworks and deepening our understanding of the PRR’s global manifestations.
In Latin America, nativism plays a notably less significant role than authoritarianism.
Building on this foundation, I am currently collaborating with colleagues to further refine this perspective. One of our key findings, derived from analyses using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data (as discussed in an article co-authored with André Borges and published in Political Studies), is that in Latin America nativism plays a notably less significant role than authoritarianism, which emerges as the central ideological pillar of the radical right.
Additionally, I am re-evaluating the concept of nativism itself, as it may be too specific to capture the broader forms of nationalism articulated by PRR leaders. Allow me to share a preliminary insight from our ongoing research: together with Daphne Halikiopoulou and Carlos Meléndez, I am examining the discourse of PRR leaders in both Latin America and Europe, where nationalism grounded in ethnic discrimination (nativism) appears to be less prominent. Instead, these leaders more frequently employ civic or cultural nationalism, emphasizing shared values, traditions, and cultural identity over ethnic exclusivity.
I want to spend another moment on this article. In it, you identify other ideological tenets that can be added into the PRR formula, one of those being neoliberalism. We have recently had a series of discussions about how neoliberalism influences, and is influenced by, the radical right. Could you comment on that? Is neoliberalism something that can only ever be auxiliary to PRR ideology or does it deserve more attention, both in Europe and beyond? In other words, why is the PRR’s political-economic ideology seen as flexible, while other things like nativism, authoritarianism, etc. are seen as integral elements of the PRR project?
This is an excellent question, addressing a crucial point regarding the ideological flexibility of the populist radical right. First, it is crucial to recognize that, as previously mentioned, while the PRR is defined by its core ideological pillars—nativism, authoritarianism, and populism—the articulation of these elements varies across local contexts. For instance, nativism in Europe is primarily framed around anti-immigration sentiment, while in places like Brazil and Chile, it often targets indigenous populations as the “other.” Similarly, authoritarianism may emphasize law-and-order policies in some regions while aligning with religious or moral conservatism in others.
Economic ideology, however, is not a core tenet of the PRR. Instead, it is a domain where significant variability exists. PRR forces, both within and outside Europe, adapt their economic positions based on the political and social conditions of each context. In Europe, during the 1980s and 1990s, many PRR parties adopted neoliberal positions, advocating for free-market policies. This aligns with what Herbert Kitschelt in 1995 described as the “winning formula” of the radical right, combining neoliberal economic policies with sociocultural authoritarianism to appeal to both economic elites and culturally conservative voters. Over time, however, the economic discourse of the PRR in Europe shifted toward “welfare chauvinism,” which supports a robust welfare state but limits its benefits to “natives,” excluding immigrants. This evolution highlights the adaptability of PRR economic stances to align with changing voter preferences.
Economic ideology is not a core tenet of the PRR. Instead, it is a domain where significant variability exists.
Outside Europe, the diversity in economic approaches is even more apparent. In countries such as Brazil, Chile, India, and Turkey, PRR forces often embrace neoliberalism, reflecting the influence of historical and political-economic trajectories. Conversely, in the United States, Donald Trump adopted protectionist policies and a producerist discourse, showing that PRR forces can also espouse anti-neoliberal positions when these resonate with their electoral base.
I want to move now into some of the work you have done on specific cases of non-European radical-right populism. You have authored or co-authored a few articles on Chile, so I thought we might anchor ourselves there. You note for instance that the populist radical right arrived “late” in Chile but has consolidated itself rather impressively. Were the conditions that gave rise to the PRR in Chile similar to those that prefigured the rise of the European populist right? Or were they different/distinctly “Latin American” or characteristic of the Global South? What does this tell us about the global utility of populist radical right as a concept?
The arrival of the populist radical right in Chile, exemplified by José Antonio Kast and the Partido Republicano, provides a fascinating case for examining how PRR movements can emerge in contexts beyond Europe. As you correctly stated, in Chile, as in the rest of Latin America, the PRR was a latecomer, at least compared to most Western European countries. As outlined in the article I co-authored with Camila Díaz and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, the conditions facilitating the rise of the PRR in Chile share certain parallels with the European experience but also display distinctly idiosyncratic characteristics.
Similar to the European PRR, the rise of the Chilean PRR is linked to growing discontent with traditional right-wing parties, leading to the formation of a movement positioned “to the right of the right.” This dynamic mirrors cases like VOX in Spain, which emerged as a spin-off from the traditional right-wing party (the Partido Popular). Similarly, the PRR leader and founder in Chile, José Antonio Kast, was a member of the UDI for 20 years (1996-2016) before leaving and then establishing the Partido Republicano.
In Chile, Kast’s rhetoric and the Partido Republicano’s agenda underscore law-and-order policies, opposition to multiculturalism, and the defense of traditional moral values, reflecting a deeply authoritarian worldview.
However, the Chilean context introduces unique elements. Unlike in Europe, where nativism often takes precedence as the most salient ideological tenet of the PRR, the Chilean PRR places a much stronger emphasis on authoritarianism. Kast’s rhetoric and the Partido Republicano’s agenda underscore law-and-order policies, opposition to multiculturalism, and the defense of traditional moral values, reflecting a deeply authoritarian worldview. Moreover, the notion of “nativism,” as understood in Europe, seems somewhat constrained when applied to the Chilean context. The PRR in Chile has addressed immigration, but its anti-pluralist and exclusionary discourse also targets indigenous populations, particularly the Mapuche community, as outgroups together with immigrants.
Distinct from the European experience, the Chilean PRR also incorporates neoliberalism into its ideological framework. This marks a departure from European PRR movements, which often embrace welfare chauvinism—a strategy that limits social protections to natives while criticizing immigrants. In Chile, by contrast, Kast and the Partido Republicano continue to champion a neoliberal economic model rooted in the legacy of the Pinochet dictatorship. This commitment to neoliberalism reflects the enduring influence of Chile’s historical political-economic structure rather than the populist economic protectionism often observed in Europe.
Another idiosyncratic characteristic of the PRR in Chile—and Latin America more broadly—is its pronounced anti-communism. In Chile, this feature is particularly salient, rooted in the country’s historical memory of opposition to the government of Salvador Allende. The 1973 military coup, led by Augusto Pinochet, and the ensuing dictatorship were strongly defined by their anti-communist orientation, suppressing leftist movements and institutionalizing neoliberal policies as a counterpoint to socialism. This anti-communist legacy continues to resonate deeply within the Partido Republicano’s discourse, where it is framed as a defense against a perceived resurgence of socialism and leftist ideologies. While European PRR movements may also display anti-leftist rhetoric, the intensity and historical grounding of anti-communism in Chile and in Latin America more in general make it a distinctive feature of the region’s PRR landscape.
Additionally, the populist element in the Chilean PRR, much like in other contexts, can be characterized as a “thin-centered” ideology. While conceptually populism is Empirically, this thin populist discourse often overlaps with civic nationalism, wherein “the people” are framed not in exclusionary ethnic terms but as “good Chileans” or chilenos de bien—individuals who uphold traditional values and contribute to the moral and cultural fabric of the nation.
In sum, while the core elements of PRR ideology—populism, authoritarianism, and nativism—remain useful for understanding its global manifestations, their articulation in Chile underscores the importance of contextual specificity. These differences, including the enduring significance of anti-communism in Latin America, enrich the concept of PRR and demonstrate its flexibility as an analytical framework, while also suggesting the need for greater theoretical refinement to capture the nuances of PRR movements outside Europe.
Staying here, earlier this year you wrote about not only the kinds of voters that support the Chilean populist right, but also the heterogenous coalition of those who have opposed it. Can you walk us through the findings from that study and what they tell us about the Chilean political scene, but also the dynamics of non-European populism more generally? Then, if we might bring it up to the contemporary moment, the progressivist coalition assembled by Gabriel Boric from 2019 onwards seems to be unraveling: two failed attempts at reforming the constitution and approval ratings lingering around 30% have put that coalition in a difficult place. With elections scheduled for 2025, will the Chilean populist radical right be able to exploit this situation in your view?
As you mentioned, in the article I co-authored with Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser and Rocío Salas-Lewin, on the Chilean populist radical right, we examined not only the profiles of those who support this political movement but also the heterogeneous coalition of its detractors.
Kast’s supporters tend to be male, right-wing, conservative, evangelical, and hold anti-immigration views. Their opponents are highly diverse, spanning progressive, liberal, and working-class groups who share a commitment to democratic values.
Our findings reveal that support for the PRR, led by José Antonio Kast and his Partido Republicano, is relatively homogeneous. These supporters tend to be male, right-wing, conservative, evangelical, and hold anti-immigration views. This mirrors PRR constituencies elsewhere, demonstrating that this political force operates within a shared global framework of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. On the other hand, opposition to the PRR in Chile is highly diverse, spanning progressive, liberal, and working-class groups who share a commitment to democratic values. Many detractors view the PRR as a threat to Chile’s evolving social contract, particularly its progressive stances on immigration, gender equality, and state intervention. This negative partisanship has contributed to the PRR’s difficulty in consolidating power, as evidenced by Kast’s loss in the 2021 runoff election.
Amid the current political landscape, the progressive coalition led by Gabriel Boric has struggled to implement substantive reforms, including two failed constitutional reform attempts—one ultimately shaped by a Republican Party-dominated council—and persistently stagnant approval ratings. These circumstances—at least in theory—offer the PRR an opportunity to expand its influence. However, for this to occur, the PRR must navigate significant barriers, including high public rejection rates and its ideological roots in Chile’s Pinochet-era neoliberal policies. While adopting a welfare chauvinist stance, as many European PRR parties have done, could broaden its appeal, this shift remains unlikely given the party’s staunch neoliberal identity.
Furthermore, unlike in other regions where traditional right-wing parties have experienced significant declines, in Chile, the traditional right remains a relatively strong electoral and organizational force. As of now, it is widely regarded as one of the probable victors in the 2025 presidential elections. This resilience of the traditional right poses an additional challenge for the PRR, as it must compete not only with the progressive coalition but also with a well-established conservative bloc.
In essence, the Chilean case highlights how global PRR frameworks adapt to local contexts, but also how these adaptations encounter unique societal and historical constraints that shape their electoral fortunes. The interplay between these forces will be decisive as Chile approaches its 2025 elections.
As the penultimate question, I would like to ask something broader: where do you see the non-European populist radical right going? We have seen the European and North American populist rights re-emerge and in some cases retake, or take for the first time, power. Is the non-European world on a similar trajectory? And can this all be chalked up to the so-called “anti-incumbency wave” or is something deeper going on? Talk to us about this.
The trajectory of the non-European populist radical right presents both parallels and divergences with their counterparts in Europe and North America. While anti-incumbency sentiment certainly plays a role—particularly in regions like Latin America, where the previous “wave” of left-wing leadership dominated for much of the 2000s—this alone does not explain the recent surge of PRR forces. In fact, there is a noticeable momentum driving these parties, which goes beyond merely being a reactionary force to incumbent governments. Their appeal taps into deeper discontent with political establishments, as well as structural and ideological opportunities within their specific contexts.
In Latin America, for instance, the PRR has benefitted from widespread dissatisfaction with economic instability, insecurity, and perceptions of corruption within leftist administrations. Figures like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Javier Milei in Argentina have successfully leveraged this discontent, presenting themselves as “outsider” candidates who can restore order and efficiency. These leaders frame themselves as champions of the “true people” while adopting anti-establishment, authoritarian, and often neoliberal rhetoric.
However, the success of PRR movements in non-European contexts is shaped by unique institutional and contextual factors. Presidential systems, which dominate much of Latin America and other parts of the Global South, offer PRR leaders a more straightforward route to the executive compared to parliamentary systems. These systems allow charismatic leaders to appeal directly to the electorate, bypassing party structures that are often weaker in these regions. However, the ability of PRR leaders to govern alone and without coalitions depends heavily on the degree of institutional checks and balances, opposition strength, and, critically, their capacity to mitigate the high levels of public rejection that frequently accompany their polarizing figures and agendas. In cases where negative public sentiment is pervasive, coalition-building may become essential, even for leaders with strong initial mandates.
It is also important to note the adaptability of PRR discourse and strategies across different regions. While authoritarianism appears as the most relevant feature of the PRR outside Europe, nativism—a concept central to European PRR rhetoric—is frequently redefined or softened to align with local sensibilities. As ongoing research with colleagues demonstrates, civic or cultural nationalism often replaces ethnically exclusionary nativism in regions like Latin America. This highlights the flexibility of the PRR’s ideological core as it navigates different cultural and political contexts.
In conclusion, while the non-European PRR shares global drivers, such as dissatisfaction with globalization, migration, and inequality, its growth cannot be reduced solely to anti-incumbency. These movements are part of a broader realignment of political forces that reflects both local grievances and the global spread of right-wing populist strategies. Their future trajectory will likely depend on their ability to sustain momentum, adapt to regional dynamics, and overcome public resistance to their polarizing nature, particularly when seeking to govern without coalitions.
Finally, I want to ask you the question we always conclude with, tied to the name of our program. Much of your work is centered around the populism concept, but what do you think of this notion of illiberalism? Do you think it has analytical value in describing the parties, movements, and phenomena you study? Or is it somehow lacking?
The concept of illiberalism provides a valuable lens through which to examine the erosion of democratic norms and the rise of political actors who undermine liberal principles while maintaining the façade of democracy. It captures a critical spectrum of behaviors—those that fall short of outright authoritarianism but nonetheless weaken democratic institutions. This is particularly relevant in the cases I study, where populist radical right actors often blur the lines between operating within democratic systems and subverting their liberal foundations.
Illiberalism is highly useful because it provides a framework for analyzing the incremental and often subtle processes of democratic erosion…However, its empirical validity requires careful calibration, as it may struggle to fully capture the diversity of anti-democratic behaviors across different contexts.
However, the concept of illiberalism is not without its challenges. One risk is that it might obscure cases of blatantly authoritarian behavior, particularly where the erosion of democracy is more overt and systematic. While the term helps us navigate the nuances of democratic backsliding, it also forces us to grapple with the complexity of categorizing regimes and actors that operate in this “gray zone.” This tension highlights an important distinction between the concept’s value as a theoretical resource and its empirical applicability. As a conceptual resource, illiberalism is highly useful because it provides a framework for analyzing the incremental and often subtle processes of democratic erosion. It allows scholars to describe phenomena that do not neatly fit into binary classifications of democracy versus authoritarianism. However, its empirical validity requires careful calibration, as it may struggle to fully capture the diversity of anti-democratic behaviors across different contexts. For instance, what may appear as “illiberalism” in one setting might more accurately be classified as authoritarianism in another, depending on the intensity and systematic nature of the democratic erosion.
In my opinion, then, the distinction between its theoretical potential and its practical validity becomes central to its effective use in analyzing the phenomena I study.
Lisa Zanotti is an Assistant Professor at Diego Portales University in Santiago, Chile, and a Senior Fellow at the Global Forum on Democracy and Development at the Democracy Institute, Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. She also serves as Co-Editor-in-Chief of the Political Research Exchange journal.
